6 Generalleutnant Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller, Gefechtsbericht über die Eroberung der Dodekanes-Insel Lero (Unternehmen “Taifun”) [Combat Report on the conquest of the Dodecanese island of Leros (Operation “Typhoon”)].
7 Report of Proceedings of H.M.M.L. 456 from 3rd to 26th November 1943. By 15 November, ML 456 had completed temporary repairs and joined MLs 299, 461 and HDML 1004 at Samos.
8 Ibid.
9 Combat report by Leutnant zur See von Zatorski, who added: ‘According to a Pionieroffizier who landed in his Pi-La-Boot near Alinda Bay, his group found a heavily damaged English gun boat lying in a bay. It was destroyed by the Pi-La Boote without any resistance. According to prisoners, the boat had been attacked at sea by a German small unit and was badly damaged. It could reach the bay only with maximum effort.’ The flotilla commander, Oberleutnant zur See Hansjürgen Weissenborn, commented: ‘The attack was carried out with courage and planning. The heavily damaged boat could have been destroyed completely with a second attack. However, as the main objective was the landing of troops on Leros, the commandant’s actions were correct. Request acknowledgement of the destruction of the English gun boat for R 195.’ The widow of former crewman, Leslie Cheetham, told the author that ML 358 sank at Lakki where at least three of the crew reached shore: one man was seriously wounded and subsequently died in captivity; the others, including her husband, survived as prisoners of war.
10 Müller, op.cit.
11 The consensus of the British on Leros is that the Italians contributed little or nothing during the battle. The Germans were equally harsh in their assessment of the fighting abilities of their erstwhile allies. Significantly, when British veterans organised a reunion in Leros in 1988, they invited their former opponents to attend but refused to allow any Italian participation.
12 Captain John Olivey, MC and Bar, Long Range Desert Group Story in the Dodecanese Islands: Fee, Fie, Foe, Fum. IWM: LRDG 11/3. With the exception of No. 1 gun, Olivey and the Italians appear to have devised their own numbering of individual guns. What Olivey called No. 2 gun, the Italians knew as No. 4; what Olivey called No. 3 gun, the Italians knew as No. 2; what Olivey called No. 4 gun, the Italians knew as No. 3.
13 Ibid.
14 Gustav Wehrs, unpublished manuscript. The pack mule referred to was one of several being transported on what was actually a Pi-La-Boot. All of the mules were killed during the approach.
15 Edward B.W. Johnson, M.C., Island Prize, Leros, 1943, p.47.
16 Account by Eric Ransley, 14 January 2001.
17 Wehrs, op. cit.
18 Account by Eric Ransley, November 2001.
19 Wehrs, op. cit.
20 Olivey, op. cit. ‘Major M’ is named as ‘Major Millar, OC, the King’s Own’ in Olivey’s official after-action report, dated 1 June 1944 (and see note 36).
21 Ibid.
22 Second Lieutenant R.F. White, Report on operations on Leros. IWM: LRDG 2/1.
23 Olivey, op cit.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 White, op. cit.
27 Walter Keller, memoirs.
28 Olivey, op. cit. The Fallschirmjäger deployment seems to have come as a complete surprise to the Leros defenders. Yet, British Intelligence had known for at least a week of the presence in Athens of German paratroopers. It was surmised: ‘Although Leros topographically difficult for mass landing parachute troops it is possible that limited number might be employed to neutralise key positions such as guns and beach defences …’ TNA: ADM 223/589. According to the War Diary of 1 King’s Own, companies were informed about the German paratroopers late on 10 November. The War Diary of the Buffs indicates that this information was received the following morning.
29 One Ju 52 crashed just inland on the northern shore of Alinda Bay, probably on 12 November. This appears to have been a 2./T.G.4 machine (6763/G6+CH) from which Unteroffizier Fritz Näpflein (wireless operator) was the sole survivor; those who died were Leutnant Helmut Günther (pilot), Feldwebel Johann Mahr (observer), and Luftwaffe war reporter, Leutnant Werner Bockelmann. Also lost over Leros on this date were an Arado 196 of Seeaufkl.Gr.126, whose crew was rescued unharmed, and two Ju 88C-6s of 11./Zerstörergeschwader 26 (11./Z.G.26). One of the Ju 88s (750453/3U+PV) was reported missing together with the crew: Leutnant Hans Sukowski (pilot), Unteroffizier Karl Ustarbowski (observer) and Obergefreiter Günther Holstein (wireless operator). Obergefreiter Winfried Kröll (observer) was killed, and Unteroffizier Gregor Merva (pilot) and Unteroffizier Joachim Lieb (wireless operator) were reported missing from their aircraft (750908/3U+JV). Leutnant Jürgen Wellmann (pilot) and Unteroffizier Richard Kühlmann (wireless operator) of 5./Schl.G.3 were killed when their Ju 87D-3 (110594) was shot down by AA fire south of Antimachia, Kos, and a Ju 87D-4 (110598/S7+CH) of I./Schl.G.3 was written off after an emergency landing at Paros; the crew survived.
30 Leonard Marsland Gander, Long Road to Leros, p.187.
31 Major J.M. McSwiney DSO MC, The Aegean Dodecanese Venture (unpublished manuscript), pp.139–40. IWM: 97/36/1.
32 Major a. D. Martin Kühne, Sprungeinsatz auf Leros [Parachute mission on Leros], Der Deutsche Fallschirmjäger, March–April 1984.
33 Sergeant Daniel P.O ’Connell was the cousin of Sergeant Daniel J. O’Connell. Both had joined the army together, and received consecutive service numbers. 6979444 Sergeant D.J. O’Connell of ‘C’ Company was mortally wounded at Appetici on 12 November. 6979443 Sergeant D.P. O’Connell of ‘D’ Company was killed four days later. This is not the only instance where members of the same family lost their lives. Private Stanley A. Cooper of the Buffs was lost with HMS Eclipse while en route to Leros. His older brother in the battalion, Corporal Arthur R. ‘Chirpy’ Cooper, was shot dead during a patrol on or about 13 November 1943.
34 Brigadier Robert Tilney, DSO, The Battle of Leros, 12 – 16 Nov 1943. TNA: WO 32/12271. In Appendix B of his statement, LRDG on operations in Leros 10–16 Nov 43 (IWM: LRDG 2/1), Second Lieutenant G.V. Pavlides recorded his impressions of the German Fallschirmjäger:
‘Officers and NCOs seem to expose themselves very much when directing an attack. Orders appear to come very clearly in loud voice and obtained instant obedience. In night attack when enemy was much closer than this this was even more clearly noticed.
The enemy appeared very reticent about opening fire while on night attack although suffering casualties. Only when own troops had thoroughly exposed their positions did he open intense and well directed fire. Platoon Cmdrs made liberal use of white flares to show positions to A/C. Some paratroops carried 6 white and 3 red flares.
Paratroops infantry tactics not so good.
When the first 500 [who dropped on 12 November] made for RACHI feature they bunched badly offering good targets but were in position with their ground signs within ½ hour.
All chutes prior to jump are folded by the owner himself assisted by one comrade. If the chute fails to open comrade is court-martialled.’
35 Gander, op. cit., p.188.
36 Olivey, op. cit. In describing this particular episode in his after-action report, Olivey identifies ‘Major M’ as ‘Major Martin’. Both Major Millar (see note 20) and Major Martin appear to be one and the same. The officer commanding ‘C’ Company of the King’s Own at Clidi was Major W.P.T. Tilly.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. The ‘fort’ was a two-storey pillbox on top of Point 320, with the lower level housing an underground control room.
39 Ibid.
40 Unofficial sitrep 1800 hrs B [extract]. IWM: LRDG 2/3.
41 In his after-action reports Tilney consistently refers to the Faughs at Appetici as a platoon. He also neglects to mention the withdrawal during the evening of 12 November.
42 Tilney, op. cit.
43 9 Platoon of the Faughs under Second Lieutenant R.J. Hillman was sent to help defend Pandeli castle. According to Jack Harte, at the time a corporal in 9 Platoon, the move occurred during the day.
44 Johnson, op. cit., p.51.
&nbs
p; 45 Clifford A.L. Clark, Leros – From Invasion to Surrender, published in The Echo, September 1997.
46 Clifford Clark kept note of events throughout the battle. He assured the author that he is ‘absolutely certain’ about the times recorded.
47 Diary of Ted Johnson.
48 New Zealander Flying Officer Athol G. Greentree (pilot) and Sergeant George H. Freeman of 47 Squadron were reported missing in a Beaufighter X (LX912).
Chapter 9: Day Two
1 As many as six officers and 114 ratings appear to have been recovered by HM ships Echo and Belvoir; at least two more survivors were picked up by the German minesweeper R 210.
2 Walter Keller interviewed by Sonja Stammwitz, 27 December 2001. Commenting further on the Italian officer, Keller added:
‘I would be very interested to find out what happend to the chap who we let go back then. Probably, he is no longer alive. He was a little older. It all happened so quickly. It was over within a few minutes as what we did was prohibited on our side. There were always military police among the Kampfgruppen. We said to him, ‘Come on, put on a Landser’s uniform and then push off.’ He said, ‘Molto grazie’, and disappeared. I assume that he made it back home across the sea, but of course, I can’t be sure. War has its own laws; you can’t apply normal logic to it. Sometimes, the laws were interpreted differently as well. We had tribunals everywhere and those judges – Oberstabsrichter – they passed verdicts arbitrarily and people got condemned to death although it was not necessary at all. Now, after the war, trying to bring them to justice, you have to draw a line and move on.’
3 Jürgen Bernhagen, unpublished manuscript.
4 Leonard Marsland Gander, Long Road to Leros, p.192.
5 Letter to the author from Andreas Hutter, dated 3 February 2001. Hutter’s Ju 52 has since been found on the seabed north of Leros.
6 In available Luftwaffe records the flight engineer is named as Unteroffizier Friedrich Meyerdirks. In a letter to the Hutter family, the officer commanding 6./T.G.4 refers to Meyendicks (see Appendix 5).
7 Gander, op. cit., p.192. It would appear from Luftwaffe records that no Arado floatplanes were lost on 13 November.
8 Edward B.W. Johnson, MC, Island Prize, Leros, 1943, p.55.
9 Related to the author by Walter Pancott, 2000–01.
10 Ibid.
11 II./Lw.-Jägerregiment 22: Gefechtsbericht über den Einsatz auf Leros [II./Lw.-Jägerregiment 22 combat report on the operation in Leros] dated 22 November 1943.
12 Geoffrey R. Hart, correspondence with the author, June–July 2001. At the time Quirico was probably held by German paratroopers.
13 Both sides were provided with 1:25,000 maps, which were derived from those, used by the Italians. German commanders were also provided with a 1:20,000 aerial photo-montage marked with targets and other key points. British maps were noticeably inferior to those of the enemy, and apparently were rarely issued at platoon level.
14 Brigadier R.A.G. Tilney, Report of Operations on Leros: 12–16 November, 1943. This was compiled while Tilney was a prisoner of war and was the basis of a report later presented to the War Office.
15 R.A. Ardill, account written for Ted Johnson in 1989. Austin Ardill’s recollections are controversial in that it is generally accepted that Lieutenant Colonel French planned and led the counter-attack on Appetici. In a conversation with the author on 25 June 2001, Ardill reaffirmed his story, stating that French told him: ‘You will lead the attack, but I’ll go with you.’ After discussing the matter at length with Ardill, it seems likely that he was entrusted with taking charge of the leading company, while French retained overall command.
16 Statement by 2/Lieut Pavilides, LRDG on operations in Leros 10–16 November 43. IWM: LRDG 2/1.
17 Another theory attributes the reports of a major German attack on Meraviglia to misinformation spread by enemy troops in British or Italian uniforms. Although it has never been proven that the Germans used such tactics on Leros it is interesting to note that on 30 October 1943, Admiral Ägäis received from a source named as Löhrl the following signal: ‘Have arrived in Syra with all vessels … Request permission to seize Italian uniforms for Brandenburg for purpose of disguise.’ Of further significance is a signal emanating from Meraviglia at 6.40 p.m. on 13 November: ‘Many Germans in Italian uniform. You can tell them by their alpine boots.’ Colonel B. Tarleton, The 2nd Battalion The Royal West Kent Regiment on the Island of Leros, November 1943 (IWM: LRDG 11/5), records that towards the end of the battle, ‘It is possible … that there were GERMAN snipers wearing ITALIAN uniforms, and several suspected cases were reported by N.C.Os. of the unit.’ Such allegations are uncorroborated by German veterans, including Hans Schädlich, who commanded Kampfgruppe Schädlich.
18 War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 51. IWM: EDS 144.
19 At 9.55 a.m. on 13 November 1943, Leutnant Emil Clade of 7./J.G.27 shot down a Beaufighter X (LZ127) of 47 Squadron north of Levitha: American Flying Officer Edgar L. Clary (pilot) and Flight Sergeant Walter E. Finbow were killed. At 10.42 a.m, Warrant Officers Frank M. Cox (pilot) and Norman S. Ferguson, two Australians in 603 Squadron, were reported missing when their Beaufighter X (LX977) ditched with engine trouble. In the afternoon, another 47 Squadron Beaufighter X (LX928) ditched after being hit by return fire while engaging bombers over or near Leros: Squadron Leader S.R. Muller-Rowland (pilot) and Pilot Officer J.D. Anderson were rescued by a Greek fishing boat and subsequently returned to their unit.
Chapter 10: Day Three
1 R.A. Ardill, account written for Ted Johnson in 1989. Ardill’s description of the death of Lieutenant Colonel French differs to that provided just after the battle by Captain Michael Rochford, one of only two officers of the Royal Irish Fusiliers to escape from Leros. On 21 December 1943, he wrote in a letter to the colonel’s widow: ‘On the second day of the battle, he [Lieutenant Colonel French] was leading a counter attack on an enemy occupied hill. The attack was carried out by 3 Coys of the King’s Own – the only other members of the regiment present were Lieut Ardhill [sic] & Fus Hardy (Col French’s runner) … I spoke to his runner in the morning – he told me that Col. French & the Kings Own had reached the top of the mountain, but had been held up by heavy machine gun fire from the front. Your husband armed with his pistol at once rushed forward to attack the machine gun nest. He was killed immediately by machine gun fire. After this the Germans drove us back & your husband’s body was left on the battlefield. I understand that he was afterwards buried in a little Greek churchyard.’
Tilney, relying on ‘the account of a subaltern of the R.I.F., who was with Col. French’ (evidently Ardill), wrote: ‘[French], leading the attack, got to within 15 yds of the summit, on which were the gun positions, undetected by the enemy. Unfortunately, due to some circumstance which is at present unknown, Col. French was not followed by his force and the attack was a complete failure. French was killed.’ Brigadier R.A.G. Tilney, Report of Operations on Leros: 12–16 November, 1943.
2 Letter to Mrs Diana French, widow of Lieutenant Colonel French, from Brigadier Robert Tilney.
3 Letter to Mrs Diana French from Captain H.W. Dougall. The regimental motto, ‘Faugh a Ballagh’ (‘Clear the Way!’) is an anglicised form of Gaelic from whence derives the nickname of the Royal Irish Fusiliers: the Faughs.
4 Captain John Olivey, MC and Bar, Long Range Desert Group Story in the Dodecanese Islands: Fee, Fie, Foe, Fum (IWM: LRDG 11/3). In his after-action report, Olivey names those involved in clearing the cave as Corporal Coventry, Gunner Rupping and Rifleman van Heerden. Up to seventeen Germans were captured.
5 Ibid.
6 According to Major V.G. Bourne’s wartime batman, former Private A. Goodman, seventy-three Germans were taken prisoner.
7 Major V.G. Bourne in an account sent to the author in November 2001. The PIAT (Projectile Infantry Anti-Tank) was a shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon.
8 Tilney, Report of Operations on Leros: 12–16 Novem
ber, 1943. The King’s Own officer mentioned by Tilney could not be identified. Headquarter Company took part in the morning attack at Rachi. The officer commanding was Major Cunningham, who was wounded early on in the advance. The second-in-command, Captain John H. Thorp, was killed, as were two platoon commanders: Lieutenant George E.R. Brewer and Lieutenant Fred B. Lawson. ‘B’ Company lost its OC, Major Gordon H. Duxbury, and Lieutenant Derek B. Steward, but it is unclear whether they were killed in the morning or during a follow-up attack in the afternoon. (Eight of thirteen King’s Own buried in field graves on and around Searchlight Hill were officers.)
9 Diary of Ted Johnson.
10 Correspondence with Vic Kenchington, 2001.
11 Clifford A.L. Clark, Leros – From Invasion to Surrender, published in The Echo, September 1997. Clark, normally punctilious in his observations, describes these events as having taken place soon after midday on 13 November 1943, on orders relayed via Lieutenant Colonel French. Reports fail to corroborate such an attack on this date. Significantly, in his Report on operations on Leros (IWM: LRDG 2/1), Second Lieutenant R.F. White noted at 10.25 a.m. on the 14th: ‘From H.Q. GERMANS retreating in disorder North from RADIC [sic: RACHI] RIDGE. We could observe our infantry doing a counter attack behind a smoke screen down the spur running North from WINDMILL 083405 [San Giovanni] no mention of this action in any SITREP.’ This clearly refers to the move by ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents prior to the link-up with ‘D’ Company of the Buffs.
12 Kenchington, op. cit.
13 Johnson, op. cit.
14 Clark, op. cit.
15 Kenchington, op. cit.
16 Brigadier Robert Tilney, DSO, The Battle of Leros, 12 – 16 Nov 1943. TNA: WO 32/12271.
17 Letter to the author from V.G. Bourne, 15 January 2002. Commenting further, Bourne wrote: ‘I confess I thought we had lost “C” company. The fire was very intense and much more frightening than anything else in the whole battle.’
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