by Mark Nesbitt
• Bringing a message. Some spirits are said to appear as harbingers, or forecasters of future events, whether for good or bad. Other ghosts may intend to send other messages. Perhaps what the dead have learned about war is the message they wish to pass on.
• Drawn to the grieving. Tourists flock to battlefields literally by the millions. Gettysburg, for example, sees annually 1.5 million people, who wander the site in awe of what the young soldiers did there. We Americans visit our Civil War battlefields and ponder the deeds done on them. In other words, we mourn this entire generation of young soldiers every time we visit. The mourning has gone on for a century and a half.
• Unconsecrated burial. Many soldiers killed on Civil War battlefields were buried at least twice. First they were interred where they fell on the field, with no family or clergy to consecrate the ground. In some of the earlier battles, like Shiloh, the dead were gathered together and buried in mass graves. In later battles, too, the dead spent some time in hasty, shallow graves where they fell, then were exhumed and reburied in the new national cemeteries established near the battlefields. Ceremonies like those surrounding Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address consecrated the grounds. Still, not all the dead from our Civil War rest peacefully. Only five of the dozen or so mass graves at Shiloh have been identified. Individual remains still are found periodically, like at Gettysburg as recently as 1997. If an unconsecrated burial is criteria for lost, wandering souls, again, our battlefields are filled with them.
The Evidence
EVP, or electronic voice phenomena, was discovered when magnetic tape was invented, although some sources say it had been recorded on older wire recording devices. Voices were recorded on the tape when no one was speaking, in total silence. In the summer of 1959, Frederick Jurgenson was audiotaping bird calls alone in a field when he discovered that he had picked up voices. Later, he recognized the voice of his deceased mother calling him by a pet name. Convinced he was capturing the voices of the dead, he continued to record and in 1964 wrote a book called The Voices from Space.Modern paranormal investigators rely on digital recorders set on “voice activation,” so they should not record anything if no one is talking. In the field, investigators ask a pertinent historic question, such as “What state are you from?” and then pause in silence. Suddenly, the player starts recording with no discernable sound present. When played back, the results are sometimes remarkably clear, like the answer I got in the cellar of the Cashtown Inn when we contacted Andrew, a Confederate soldier. Asking the question about his provenance, I got the answer, “Mis-sis-sip-pi,” in four distinct syllables.
Photographs and videos have been taken of strange mists, circular lights called “orbs,” and even full-body apparitions. These photos have been taken at night and during broad daylight. Near-infrared cameras seem to capture more spirit energy than regular film did. Most digital cameras can “see” farther into the extreme ends of the light spectrum than film cameras. Some paranormalists believe that ghosts are visible in the infrared or ultraviolet wavelengths, beyond what the mature human eye can perceive. One caveat: The human brain is structured to “connect the dots,” or fill in the blanks to form a full image inside the brain of what we see in pieces. This phenomenon is called apophenia, and it sometimes works against us when we try to analyze what we think are ghost photos with a matrix background. Apophenia occurs with sound as well, and in analyzing EVP.
Small children’s eyes and animals’ eyes often have perception in the higher and lower areas of the spectrum, which may account for domestic animals’ reactions to things unseen by their owners and why children sometimes have “imaginary” friends.
Video cameras now come with an infrared ability to tape in the dark, and have captured everything from orbs moving in apparently intelligent ways to mists floating by. Often, when set up on a tripod and left alone to tape in a known paranormally active site, the camera will go in and out of focus a number of times without anything visible appearing on the tape. Whatever caused the camera to change disrupted the infrared focus but it was invisible to the human eye.
Infrared game cams, or trail cams, have been used successfully in a number of night investigations to capture spirit entities when no one living is in the area. These are particularly helpful in “lockout” investigations, where an area can be evacuated completely, leaving only the ghosts around to have their picture taken.
And, of course, there are the witnesses to paranormal phenomena. While many may scoff that this is merely anecdotal evidence, what is all history before it is published?
At the least, a large collection of ghost stories from eyewitnesses provides a mass of information from which data can be extrapolated. For example, analyzing my stories from Gettysburg tells us that at least half of them occurred in the daytime, giving the lie to the age-old fable that ghosts only come out at night. It is through this analysis that we determined that only 10 percent of all ghost-related experiences are visual, while some 60 percent are auditory. The other 30 percent involve all the other human senses: taste, touch, and smell. More analysis may tell us if ghostly encounters occur more frequently during certain times of the year or month, or to men, women, or children. All the data gathered and analyzed will hopefully lead us to better understand just what it is that is happening, seemingly consistently, on our Civil War battlefields.
First and Second Manassas
Like a number of sites in nineteenth-century America with key crossroads, railroad junctions, and strategic terrain features, Manassas in Virginia was unfortunate enough to be the scene of more than one bloody conflict.
Located less than two days’ march from the Federal capital of Washington, D.C., the junction of the Manassas Gap and the Orange & Alexandria railroad provided a supply of rations and ammunition to the rebel army encamped in the area.
First Manassas, or First Bull Run
After the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861, the North was filled with cries to advance “on to Richmond.” While the Union blockade of Southern ports began to be established, President Lincoln directed Union general Irvin McDowell to come up with a plan to take the 35,000 troops around Washington and oust the nearly 21,000 Confederates ensconced around Manassas Junction under the command of the hero of Fort Sumter, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard. A relatively large Union force was to prevent some 11,000 Confederates under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston from leaving the Shenandoah Valley and reinforcing their comrades at Manassas.
McDowell began his march to defeat the smaller Confederate force and capture the railroad junction at Manassas on July 16, 1861. His plan was to have part of his force demonstrate towards a stone bridge and Blackburn’s Ford on Bull Run while sending a large flanking force to Sudley Ford to attack the Confederate left and rear.
By the time McDowell’s men reached the battlefield, however, the 11,000 Confederates under Johnston had slipped away from the Federals in the Shenandoah Valley and climbed aboard railroad cars that took them directly to their comrades at Manassas Junction. It was the first time in warfare the railroad had been used to transport troops to the battlefield. Now the two sides were of even strength.
In the early morning of July 21, the Federals began their demonstration at the stone bridge. Facing them was the Confederate brigade of Col. Nathan G. Evans. Though the Union troops approached the bridge, they made no effort to force a crossing.
About 9:00 A.M. Evans received an urgent message from Confederate signal officer E. P. Alexander, using the wig-wag method of flag communication: “Look to your left. You are turned.” Leaving part of his force at the bridge, Evans marched the rest to Matthews Hill to confront the two flanking enemy divisions.
Fortunately, Confederate general Barnard Bee, after hearing the firing earlier, began moving his and another brigade toward Henry Hill. As the Union flank attack began to threaten Evans’s hold on Matthews Hill, Bee marched the two brigades to support him. While fighting continued on Matthews Hill, another officer whose reputation would be made in the next two
years led his brigade across Bull Run and toward the rear of the Confederates on Matthews Hill. Col. William Tecumseh Sherman and his troops made the Confederate position on the hill untenable and the three rebel brigades began to withdraw.
The Federals paused in their assault. The break allowed a Virginia Military Institute professor-turned-colonel to find an excellent position behind the retreating Confederates and establish a new defensive line. General Bee saw the brigade and proclaimed, “There is Jackson standing like a stone wall,” exhorting them to “Rally behind the Virginians!” Never again would Thomas J. Jackson teach under the students’ nickname “Tom Fool,” but would fight under the nom de guerre of “Stonewall.”
At this early stage in the war, it was not the Blue versus the Gray. Uniforms from prewar militia units were used, or new, gaudy uniforms were supplied by home states. Some Northern units wore gray; some Confederate units wore blue; some units on both sides wore red.
The now-familiar St. Andrew’s cross Confederate battle flag was not yet in use, and the Confederate flag was similar to the United States flag; in fact, it was mistaken in the smoke and haze of the battle. Because of this, there were several instances of “friendly fire” casualties.
By mid-afternoon Confederates had solidified their line on Henry Hill. McDowell attempted another advance to Chinn Ridge, but it was anticipated by the arrival of two Confederate brigades. He then ordered a withdrawal back across Bull Run.
What started out as an orderly withdrawal soon became a rout. Rumors swirled that the Confederates had reserved the Black Horse Cavalry to swarm down on the retiring units to capture—or worse, slaughter—the men on foot. A wagon crossing the Cub Run Bridge overturned, clogging that route and producing panic. To make things worse, civilians and congressmen from Washington had ridden out to watch the “show” from the safe side of Bull Run. As they began to head back to the capital, the traffic jam increased.
Yet, some Federal units maintained enough composure to discourage a full Confederate pursuit. They had all been marching and fighting since before dawn and were played out. Despite rampant rumors, the Confederates, disorganized in victory, were in no shape to advance upon Washington.
When the final roll of casualties came in, they were higher than in any other battle fought by an American army. According to the National Park Service’s figures, Confederates suffered 1,750 casualties and the Union army, 2,950. Another casualty was elderly Judith Henry, who refused to leave her house on the hill that bore her family’s name. She was killed by an artillery shell that exploded in her bedroom.
The real casualty, however, was American innocence. Suddenly those citizen-soldiers who signed up for ninety days hoping to get in a battle before it was all over were being asked to reenlist for three years. Everyone began to finally realize how costly–in both treasure and blood–this war might be.
Second Manassas, or Second Bull Run
After the defeat at Manassas, Lincoln put George B. McClellan in command of the new Army of the Potomac. McClellan’s unsuccessful Peninsula Campaign in the spring of 1862, in which the Confederates drove the Union army from the doorstep of Richmond, led the Federal War Department to organize troops around Washington into an army and brought Gen. John Pope from the west to command it. Gen. Robert E. Lee, now in command of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, decided to use Stonewall Jackson’s troops to contest Pope’s movements. A battle was fought at Cedar Mountain on August 9. Although Jackson held the field at the end of the day, he did not administer a decisive blow to Pope.
On August 12, Lee received intelligence that McClellan was heading to the area by water from the Peninsula. The next day Lee sent Gen. James Longstreet to join with Jackson, and Lee followed on August 15. Lee’s plan was to attack Pope before he could be reinforced by McClellan. Fortunes of war would dictate otherwise.
Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, Lee’s renowned cavalry commander, was nearly captured by Yankee troopers at Verdiersville on the morning of August 18. Stuart had been expecting other Confederate forces that morning, and when he heard approaching hoofbeats, he sent out some of his staff to meet them. Then he heard shots. Federal forces had surprised Stuart and his staff, who barely made it out of the yard where they had been encamped. As it happened, the Federals captured some of Stuart’s personal items, including his cloak and his famous plumed hat. More importantly, they got his haversack with Lee’s orders in it. Now Pope knew some of Lee’s aggressive plans and acted to withdraw north of the Rappahannock River.
Pope covered well the several fords across the Rappahannock, and heavy rains swelled the river so that it was virtually impassable. Stuart approached Lee with a plan that could dislodge Pope from the Rappahannock line, but yielded something more valuable.
In a raid on Catlett’s Station, Stuart missed capturing Pope, but got his dress uniform (which went on display in Richmond) and Pope’s dispatch book with marching orders and troop strengths. Lee now had some valuable information.
Splitting his army in the presence of the enemy seemed to be one of Lee’s tactical trademarks. On August 25 he sent Jackson and his 27,000 men and 80 pieces of artillery on a 50-mile march around Pope’s right flank. In just two days of marching, Jackson struck behind Pope’s lines and seized his supply depot at Manassas Junction. The hungry Confederates ate everything they could, and then burned the rest of Pope’s supplies and went into position behind a crossroads near Manassas Junction called Groveton.
Pope realized that Confederates had turned his right flank and attacked his base of supplies in his rear. His response was to become aggressive and march on Jackson’s men at Manassas, hopefully being able to hold them up until McClellan arrived from disembarking his troops at Alexandria and before Lee and Longstreet could cross the mountains to the west. It was what Lee feared.
Pope decided to concentrate his army at Centreville. As part of it marched along the Warrenton Turnpike through Groveton late in the afternoon on August 28, 1862, Federal officers saw a lone Confederate horseman ride out and observe the column. At least one Federal commander wanted someone to take a shot at him, but was unsuccessful in his efforts. As quoted in David G. Martin’s book The Second Bull Run Campaign, the lone rider returned to the woods near the Brawner Farm and told his subordinate officers, “You may bring up your men, gentlemen.” The single horseman making a personal reconnaissance was Stonewall Jackson himself.
Jackson knew Longstreet was on the march and would rejoin him by the next day; he also knew there were only a couple of hours of daylight left in case the battle went poorly for him; and finally he knew he wanted to hold up Pope from uniting his forces. In Jackson’s mind, they were circumstances good enough to risk an attack.
What ensued was the large-scale equivalent of an old-fashioned duel. Two of the most vaunted units in either army were involved: Jackson’s own Stonewall Brigade and some tough Midwesterners who would soon earn the cognomen Iron Brigade. Civil War shoulder arms were quite accurate and deadly at 300 yards; the Northerners’ first volley was fired at 150 yards, yet the Confederates continued to advance to within 80 yards before they fired their first volley. For twenty minutes the first units in the battle volleyed toe-to-toe, suffering horrendous casualties.
As the sun slowly sank, more units were thrown into the fight by both sides and blasted away at each other from practically pointblank range: one Union colonel called the participants “crowds” of men firing at each other from 50 yards; the right flank of the Union line was fired upon from 30 yards away; and famed Confederate artillerist John Pelham drove his guns to within 100 yards of the left flank of the Federals and opened up. Neither side wanted to withdraw. Finally, darkness forced an end to the first day of one of the most intense battles—for its duration—in the war to that date.
Jackson pulled his men back to an abandoned railroad bed, which made for fine entrenchments and defensive breastworks. He placed his artillery on Stoney Ridge behind his 20,000 infantry and secured his flanks with Stuart’s ca
valrymen. Now, all he had to do was hold off twice as many Yankees until Longstreet and Lee arrived.
The Federal advance against Jackson began at 5:30 A.M.on August 29. Pushing their way through dense woods, they engaged the Confederates along the railroad bed. By mid-morning, more Federals began advancing westward, past Groveton to the battlefield of the day before. Suddenly they were confronted by a large number of the enemy right before them: Longstreet had arrived.
Longstreet’s line hooked up with Jackson’s right flank, completing an L-shaped line. Connecting to Jackson were Gen. John B. Hood’s division of infantry and the famous Washington Artillery from New Orleans. Lee wanted to attack Pope immediately; Longstreet wanted to reconnoiter. While Longstreet, Stuart, and finally Lee himself examined the Union dispositions, Jackson’s position was under attack.
Fortunately for the Confederates, Federal assaults between 1:30 P.M. and 4:00 P.M. were not coordinated. Even so, several Northern units broke through Jackson’s front line. Unsupported, they were driven back by second and third Confederate lines.
A headless solider has been seen in the vicinity of the unfinished railroad on the Manassas battlefield.
Pope sent confusing orders to one of his commanders, Fitz John Porter, who stood idle just a few miles away with his 10,000-man Fifth Corps. Even a discussion with Gen. Irvin McDowell did little to solve the confusion. When a second order arrived at 6:00 P.M., Porter believed it was too late in the day to make an attack and remained where he was. He would later be court-martialed for his role—or lack thereof—in the battle.
Pope, in the meantime, believing Porter to be moving into position to attack, ordered another assault at 5:00 P.M. It resulted in the Federals being driven back yet again.
