North Korea: An Analysis of the International Repercussions of Juche Ideology
Hubbard, Chester
Sierra College
Popularly known as “The Hermit Kingdom”, North Korea embraces a political ideology that is arguably the most unique and unyielding in the world. Under the leadership of their new Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un, as well as the continuing ideas of their Eternal Leader, Kim Il-Sung, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, also known as North Korea, strongly follows the national concept of Juche, which embodies policies of strict national independence mixed with Marxist-Leninist domestic policy (Lee, 2003, p. 105). From an international relations perspective, this concept of Juche strongly transcends into North Korean foreign policy. In North Korea’s relationship with the United States regarding aerospace and nuclear development, North Korean-Iranian relations, and the countries’ reception of foreign aid from the U.S., North Korea as a nation strongly displays its pride of strong cultural and national independence—perhaps even hatred—of Western nations, particularly with the United States.
To begin, it is well-known that North Korea-United States relations have been extremely tense. Since the ceasefire of the Korean War in 1953, the United States and North Korea technically are still at war to this day. With respect to North Korean nuclear and aerospace development, tensions between the two states have dramatically increased from 1994 to 2013. In October 2002, North Korea announced that it had a nuclear bomb, which violated an arms control pact with the United States in 1994 (Turner, 2014). Following that violation, President Bush declared North Korea as part of “The Axis of Evil”, along with Iran and Iraq. In 2005, Pyongyang agreed with the United States and China to stop its continuation of a nuclear program in exchange for increasing international trade and reduction of sanctions (Leibo, 2013, p. 143). In 2006, North Korea started to publicly test its long-range ballistic missiles (ibid.). Although the missile testing was largely unsuccessful, underground nuclear testing later that year succeeded, despite international attempts to stop North Korean nuclear proliferation (ibid.). Despite international efforts and lip service of limited nuclear development from Pyongyang, North Korea has continued to both publicly and clandestinely attempt to develop a larger nuclear weapons program, following its Juche ideology of complete independence from Euro-American influence (ibid.). From 2009 to 2013, Pyongyang has continued to test its nuclear weapons program through its development of a space program, despite strong condemnation from the United States (Wall, 2012). Although technically a “scientific” space program, which is largely accepted by the international community, it is well-known that the North Korean space program is simply a way to demonstrate and test nuclear launch and ICBM capabilities without as severe international condemnation (ibid.). From the perspective of the relatively new Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un, the sudden upsurge of North Korean nuclear development and testing is largely considered a means to display Un’s strength as a leader. After former Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Il suddenly died in December 2011, the young Kim Jong-Un succeeded his father’s role, and he was largely considered to be unprepared for the job. Following the discharge of former Vice Marshal Ri Yong-Ho in July 2012 and the appointment of the relatively weak Hyon Yong-Chol, as well as several assassinations within the North Korean power structure, it has been postulated that there may have been a large power struggle inside the North Korean government and military following the death of Kim Jong-Il (McCurry, 2012). Consequently, the actions of Kim Jong-Un could certainly be a means to display his strength in leadership as “The Great Successor”, as well as a means to demonstrate to high ranking military officials that he is, indeed, a strong leader with experience. On the contrary, the political brinksmanship carried out by Kim Jong-Un may have also been detrimental to his power and popular opinion from within his military, in the sense that it could make the military feel even more skeptical about his abilities to maintain security. However, with the election of President Obama, North Korea-United States relations have changed when compared to Bush policy. Some significant diplomatic event that occurred between the two nations after Obama’s election include the United States removing North Korea from its list of states that sponsor terrorism, the American navy rescuing a pirate-captured North Korean vessel near Africa, the performance of the New York Philharmonic in Pyongyang, and even the widespread media attention of basketball celebrity Dennis Rodman and Google executives visiting the country (Leibo, 2013, p. 144). While the latter of this list may seem rather superficial and solely for entertainment purposes, the fact that high-profile Americans were allowed to safely travel through the country with vast media coverage is an unprecedented political danger for North Korean polticians to allow, suggesting that more American cultural involvement and interest may be in the future as the domestic power struggles wane. Consequently, it is certainly possible that notable American cultural figures may serve to be the nexus for previously unknown American cultural ideas to transcend into the North Korean high government, perhaps even eventually loosening tensions between the two countries. From loosening diplomatic tensions, the opportunities for reasonable arms talks could potentially increase. However, with state-controlled media and the culturally popular hatred of the United States, the chances for changing the North Korean Juche views of the United States still remain slim. Furthermore, despite North Korea’s superficial progress and interactions with the United States, the nation has still continued to demonstrate and test its nuclear weapons capabilities, especially after the death of Kim Jong-Il and the succession of Kim Jong-Un. Following the February 2013 nuclear test, Pyongyang publicly established its goal of being able to have a warhead reach the United States mainland and Japan with ease (Bush III & Pollack, 2013). In response, the United States announced that it would install a more advanced missile defense system in Alaska with the purpose to deter any North Korean threat (Leibo, 2013, p. 144). With respect to nuclear and aerospace development, North Korea’s relationship with the United States will undoubtedly remain immensely complicated and convoluted, and will not likely change so long as Kim Jong-Un still holds a chokehold on popular opinion and his military.
Domestically, the government in Pyongyang has had difficulties in keeping its population from starving and suffering energy shortages. Since the 1990’s, it has received over $1.2 billion from the United States in foreign aid, with roughly 50% of that budget for food aid and 40% for energy aid (Manyin & Nikitin, 2013, p. 2). From the perspective of the United States, this aid is largely a tool to coerce North Korea to stop arms production (Lowe & Wohns, 2013). After the missile launch in 2012, that assistance to North Korea has been stopped (ibid.). Another reason to the United States’ halting of foreign assistance to North Korea is the congressional demand for increased “monitoring and access” (Manyin & Nikitin, 2013, p. 15). Ironically, despite its fame for Juche desires of self-reliance, North Korea has historically relied on foreign assistance from its beginning as a state initially supported by Russia and China. Today, to the United States’ benefits and goals, providing aid can wield further American power and influence. First, there is increased capability of economic market expansion and thus, better relations from increased trade with the United States. Second, this market expansion in theory would potentially reduce the perception of credibility and legitimacy of the North Korean government from its people, as well as to potentially soften the power of the near-dynastic Kim regime. By doing so, the United States is playing a largely utilitarian—not altruistic—role in its assistance to North Korea. Ho
wever, with lack of adequate monitoring, Lowe and Wohns (2013) note that many American aid “deliveries are simply diverted to the military and ruling elite” and that an increase of “strict monitoring is essential” (p. 1). Furthermore, Lowe and Wohns (2013) argue that the United Nations and the World Food Program have difficulties in providing effective monitoring from outside of the United States (p. 2). Another large issue with North Korea is the dichotomy between its need for assistance and its domestic goal of independence. As Leibo (2013) argued, “North Korea has long refused to play the ‘beggar’ it has actually become in recent years. Instead, it has continued to play the ‘nuclear card’” (p. 142). Essentially, it will continue to use nuclear threatening as a means to ensure reception of foreign assistance and domestic security, as well as popular support of its people from more Juche propaganda (ibid.). As a government, it is difficult to determine whether or not Pyongyang will become more open to foreign
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