“Kim Jong-il has curly hair. They call him ‘Curly’. They say he’s so brutal, when he sits on the ground somewhere and then gets up, grass won’t grow there anymore. Nights and days are reversed for Kim Jong-il. He sleeps days, works nights. He phones people at odd hours—that brings about complaints. I acknowledge that he’s an artistic genius, but he’s leading a sinful and dirty life. He likes women too much. Who doesn’t like women? But he’s notorious. Lots of ordinary people know about his flings with women. We heard about Kim Jong-il’s Happy Group, Kim Il-sung’s Satisfaction Group. There’s an institute of studies for Kim Il-sung’s longevity.”
Q. Did you hear about some of this after you came to the South?
A. “I’m telling you only what I knew when I was in North Korea.”
Q. Why blame only Kim Il-sung’s followers? He set out to have himself idolized.
A. “I know he’s the boss behind idolization but the followers should get together and have a coup d’etat.”
Q. It seems that North Koreans who are dissatisfied enough to do anything end up defecting instead of rebelling. What must happen before people will stay and struggle rather than defect?
A. “When I was in North Korea, after having all those complaints I wanted to form some kind of anti–Kim Il-sung movement. But I alone could do nothing, so I defected. But middle-level officials know about the outside world and they do nothing. There should be a lot of pressure from the outside world. Ordinary people need a lot of pressure from the outside.”
Q. What do you think of the idea for Radio Free Asia?
A. “It would be very effective. I’d be very glad. I’ve heard them talking about it at the [South Korean] Defense Ministry”
Q. What sort of programming should it offer?
A. “Instead of looking at the big picture, take a more micro approach. Start reporting on North Korea’s lifestyles, crime and so on. Then, later, tune it up a bit and talk about the state of economics and politics. You “would have to interpret this for people, in a way or they wouldn’t be able to understand. Make it simple.”
Q. Do people have radios to listen?
A. “Only about one in fifteen homes has the right equipment. It would be difficult.”
Q. What did you learn about the ability or willingness of soldiers to fight if Kim Jong-il should give the order?
A. “I sort ofdoubt they would really fight. In the brigade there’s a line commander plus a party commissar. The military person should have the power, but the party commissar is struggling for power. There’s a split. Some are for the commander, others for the commissar. If war should come, the initial problem would be whose command to follow.”
Q. Can you envision ordinary soldiers and officers throwing down their arms or shooting their commanders?
A. “Since there are two factions in each unit, I thought in case war should break out I would shoot the commander. I was thinking of that when I got promoted, and it gave me an incentive to treat my subordinates very warmly. I figured if war broke out and they had the same mentality as I had, maybe they would shoot me. I can’t really say how many, but there certainly are others who think the way I did.”
Q. Some young civilian defectors told me the people of North Korea think it would be better to did in war than die ofhunger, so they want war.
A. “That’s a widespread attitude. I myself thought war would have to break out. I was suffering too much from hunger. When I first entered the army, I was 100 percent certain North Korea would win a war. But after four or five years of studying the South Korean enemy, I realized North Korea doesn’t have the economy to support a war. So I thought a war would destroy both South Korea and North Korea. Officially the government warns that war between South and North would be the third world war. But in military training we are taught we have to fight the South and win.”
Q. Tell me about your senior officers.
A. “I think they have the same sort of complaints against the regime.
I talked with them and they would complain indirectly: ‘Look at the rations my family is getting. Can they live on that?’”
Q. Other defectors I’ve interviewed had moments of crisis when they were faced with jail or loss of their positions, so they felt they had little to lose in defecting. How about you?
A. “After ten years of military service they assign you to a district other than your home district. Since you’re still young, they make you go to the mines for a couple of years. I was scared of that. I didn’t know about it at the time I entered the military but after I got in it started to worry me. [Unless chosen for something more important] you have no way of avoiding mine duty although if you work diligently you may get to cut it short earlier than otherwise. From 1987, I started thinking of coming to South Korea through China, once I got mustered out. I was thinking of just a visit en route to my new posting. It wouldn’t have been too difficult because my home town is Harbin and all my relatives except my siblings are in China. So I could set out to visit relatives in China. A high officer in my brigade promised to send me to Kim Il-sung University. But in 1988 he sent another officer instead. I got angry. With the combination of anger over that incident and fear of life in the mines, I decided to defect.”
Q. One high-ranking civilian defector suggested a scenario in which mine workers aided by military-trained people rise up against the regime and overthrow it.
A. “I don’t really know for sure the mentality of the people at the mines, but it certainly sounds plausible. Among my fellow soldiers, others besides myself were worried and angry at the prospect of being sent to the mines.”
Q. Why did you swim the Imjin River when you had a relatively painless escape route through China?
A. “I used to discuss these things with Kim Nam-joon, my friend who ultimately defected with me. At first we did plan to go via China. But then we said, ‘We’re so near the border, why not take the risk now instead of waiting a couple of years to be mustered out?’”
Q. What did you expect after defection?
A. “I didn’t have specific expectations except that South Korea was a more affluent society. I just wanted to get away from the miserable life of North Korea.”
Q. Tell me exactly how you escaped.
A. “We got all our preparations ready. There are four lines of fences, electrified from 6 P.M. to 6 A.M. The first two are 220 volts; the third, 3,300 volts; and the fourth, 10,000 volts. We got some wire cutters for the first two and planned to crawl under the third and fourth. To do that we needed a mine detector. We had guns. The Imjin River was the place where I worked. After cutting the first two fences we came to the 3,300-volt third fence. We had an iron rod and a three-meter rubber hose. The plan was to swing this and throw it at the fence, putting the fuse out. It didn’t work, although there was an enormous electrical flash, like lightning. We defected on September 10. The previous day had been a holiday, so people on the night watch were sleeping on the early morning of the tenth to rest up from the festivities. We accidentally fired a gun once, but they were too sleepy to hear it.
“Since we couldn’t get past the third fence, we crawled back to the night-watch camp and found the soldiers on watch asleeep. Luckily we found a sewer. It was low tide, so there was no water in it. We went through that to the Imjin River. We had life jackets and swam the 4 kilometers across the river, taking three hours. We went to a South Korean Marines camp.”
Q. What are you doing now?
A. “I’m still dealing with the National Security Planning Agency. South Korean people can figure from seeing me whether I’m a North Korean spy or not. I’m attending Kyongwon University, studying administration. I’m also studying hanja. I’m not married yet, but-will marry soon.”
Choi Seung-chan, an army sergeant turned factory supply official, defected in July 1996. When I interviewed him in 1998 he was thirty-one years old. There was no smile on his immobile face. His eyes were wide, his hair combed forward. He had clothed his small frame in a beige
suit.
Q. Why did you defect?
A. “I had been in the military for ten years and afterward worked to supply a factory. I came via Kangwha Island, near Inchon. The main reason is, I was watching people starve. While people starve in North Korea, Kim Jong-il only prepares for war. He visits military camps, not the ordinary people. I thought, ‘This country is not for the people, only for the military’ I also heard that South Korea-was richer than North Korea.”
Q. Were you in trouble?
A. “The main trouble I had was starvation. I thought it was better to come to South Korea than to get shot while stealing.”
Q. People in charge of supply are usually better off than the others.
A. “The only advantage I had was more free time than ordinary people had. The problem with working in the supply department was a total lack of supplies for the factory. I had to sell my personal assets to supply the factory. It was a brick factory in Kaesong. That’s my home city.”
Q. Tell me about your family.
A. “I’m the third son of five siblings. Father was retired when I was born. He was a trucker, delivering supplies. He worked for a marble quarry.
Both my parents were Kaesong natives. My father was seventeen when the war broke out. He was a farmer. Seven family members all died from American bombing and my father was severely burned. The family was pro-North so they could remain in Kaesong after the war when others were moved out.”
Q. What was your military assignment?
A. “Sergeant in the Parachute Corps, stationed in Pyongyang.”
Q. Is it true that military units made up of people from one region are always stationed elsewhere so they won’t mind opening fire on the locals in case of demonstrations?
A. “I’m not sure. It’s true that they station people away from their homes, and units can be dispatched to other provinces but not where they’re from, but I don’t know if the reason has to do with demonstrations.”
Q. So in your unit, for example, you met no Pyongyang natives?
A. “Right, basically, although there were some sons of high officials who had been brought up in Pyongyang.”
Q. Why were paratroopers stationed in Pyongyang?
A. “Two missions: One is war reserve. The other is to fight South Korean paratroopers when they come to Pyongyang. I joned in 1983 at sixteen and had my whole tour in Pyongyang.”
Q. Was it a good assignment?
A. (He finally smiles a little.) “I was very proud to be in Pyongyang. I had some free time and was able to relax.”
Q. Rations?
A. “I started in the military in 1983. Rations came at first. But in the end it was terrible. There was no oily food more than once a week. We had meat only on special holidays. Rice couldn’t be cooked properly because of the fuel shortage, so we had to eat it partly cooked.”
Q. Quantity?
A. “We could have only one-third to two-thirds of the standard due to corruption. Higher-ranking soldiers took the food. So when the military came to a village, the local people were afraid because they knew lower-ranking soldiers were hungry and would steal their food.”
Q. You, too?
A. “I had to survive. There was no exception. Villagers understood our problem but asked us not to steal the farmers’ individual crops from their own plots but just take from the collectively grown food.”
Q. When did military theft of food start?
A. “Before I joined. When I was a private I was ordered to go out and get food. Although I told you the situation was good when I first enlisted, I was speaking in relative terms.”
Q. What was the proportion of stolen to rationed food by 1983?
A. “I was in a seven-man squad. When we went out to steal, we stole 20 kilograms. We did that two or three times a month. The total I stole ?was maybe one ton. Some bad guys would steal a ton at one time, sell it and keep the proceeds for their marriage.”
Q. You knew someone who did that?
A. “Yes. You cannot live in the military without stealing.”
Q. Did military men find any contradictions in the fact they were supposed to be defending the socialist revolution and at the same time had to steal from the civilian population?
A. “Officially the military banned stealing. Those who were caught were supposed to be punished with demotion. But you cannot live the official “way”
Q. Did the men talk about contradictions?
A. “I could only think about them. I couldn’t speak about them or I’d be reported.”
Q. How did that relate to morale, fighting spirit?
A. “There’s an indoctrination effect. The men thought their hardship was caused by South Korea and the United States. The worse their difficulties, the angrier they became at the U.S. and South Korea. More and more people wanted “war, to escape reality.”
Q. Yourself?
A. “Everyone including myself.”
Q. What can you tell me about the ability of the North Korean military?
A. “While I was in North Korea my colleagues and I thought South Korea ?wasn’t any match for North Korea. The South Korean army was so weak. Even in the Korean War our side had gone all the way to Pusan. Without American intervention we could have conquered the peninsula then. After I moved to South Korea and saw the technology and the status of the military I thought the South Koreans could fight with North Korea. I think North Korean army morale is still high. They’re in a life-or-death situation. If there were a war they would fight to the death. They’re so starved.”
Q. Who would win?
A. “You never know.”
Q. How did you avoid getting sent to the coal mines after the army?
A. “Normally infantrymen go to the mines. Paratroopers—they valued my military contributions and sent me home. At first I worked at the stone quarry where my father worked, in the grinding and cutting department. The work was not too heavy—-we used machinery. But the noise was a problem.”
Q. Did you leave because of the noise?
A. (Becomes relatively heated.) “The work itself was OK. But the rules were too tight. It was a military quarry. There was a meeting every week at which I was subjected to criticism. That was a total pain. So I wanted to move to a civilian job. I moved to a brick factory.”
Q. What can you tell me about the food situation over the years?
A. “From 1987 there were problems with the government-provided rice. They would skip one or two months’ rations. By 1993, it stopped for over six months. I spent seven months of 1996 in North Korea and received no rice ration. In between, in 1994 and ’95, they skipped seven or eight months a year.”
Q. What precisely was your job at the brick factory?
A. “Collecting coal from a state agency in Kaesong. To do that I had to bribe them. We needed the coal to fire the clay into bricks.”
Q. Was a lot of production stopped by that time?
A. “In Kaesong, 20 to 30 percent of factories were still working. In my factory, 20 to 30 percent of the departments were working.”
Q. Why didn’t you report the coal agency’s demands for bribes?
A. “There’s much more demand than supply. So everybody bribed the officials. You had to use special gifts, liquor or meat, to make them happy.”
Q. What did you have to sell to get those presents for them?
A. “I had some private assets: eight goats, one pig and two dogs for eating, plus my bicycle, which I sold. Every year I sold 50 percent of my remaining assets and from those sales used 40 percent as bribe money. I was getting low and I couldn’t see any hope for the future.”
Q. Why didn’t you use all your assets to live on and forget about the factory saving the bribery costs?
A. “The factory gave me free time, which I needed to raise the animals and build my assets. If I couldn’t get the coal I’d be dismissed from the factory and would have no place to go. Public Security would get me. Every day the police check the attendance and if someone�
�s not there they go to his home and catch him. If I had no job for six months the police would catch me and charge me with theft. The theory is: If you have no income for six months, how else, except by stealing, could you get by?”
Q. Were you raising your animals on brickyard property?
A. “No, on a mountain near my house. I moved my house so I could raise them. If you sell one goat you can get 20 kilos (44 pounds) of rice—just a month’s worth.”
Q. Your animals weren’t breeding fast enough to keep you ahead?
A. “It takes one year for goats.”
Q. Did you think of switching to rabbits?
A. “One out of every three households raises rabbits. The value is too low. They only weigh a kilo or so. It was a relatively good job I had in the brick factory. But I’d sold all my goats by the time I decided to come here. So I thought maybe that was my last chance: ‘Die here or be shot crossing the border.’”
Q. Did you have surviving family?
A. “Brothers and sisters but no wife or children. I came alone.”
Q. How did you cross?
A. “I used the tides. Because I’d been trained as a paratrooper I could have come by land, but I thought the sea route was easier. I first tried in June, one month before my successful attempt, but the water was too cold so I postponed it to July 8, 1996, the second anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s death. At midnight, like in Papillon, I got in at low tide. I swam three days and nights using a small bicycle tube for flotation. It would be only a one-day swim, but I had to hide during daylight beneath fences. I followed the coastline for three days, still in North Korea, before I crossed the border. That’s my military training: I was sure I could make it.”
Q. Tell me about your military life. Ten year hitch, no home leave, no girls?
A. “I had no choice. Just life or death. No visits. No dates. All I could do was follow orders.”
Q. Even in Pyongyang?
A. “It’s just a slight difference. In some ways soldiers in rural areas have a better situation—they can steal more rice. My base was on the outskirts of Pyongyang. We could go to the rice mill or the dog farm.”
Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty Page 78
