Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series)

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Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Page 10

by Plato


  351

  b

  True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust State will be most likely to do so.

  I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior State can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.

  If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

  c

  I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.

  That is out of civility to you, he replied.

  You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a State, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evildoers could act at all if they injured one another?

  No, indeed, he said, they could not.

  d

  But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

  Yes.

  And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?

  I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

  How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

  e

  Certainly.

  And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

  They will.

  And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?

  Let us assume that she retains her power.

  Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction? and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?

  352

  Yes, certainly.

  And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person—in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just?18 Is not that true, Thrasymachus?

  Yes.

  And, O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?

  Granted that they are.

  But, if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friends?

  b

  Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.

  Well, then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay, more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for, if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.

  c

  d

  Proceed.

  I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?19

  I should.

  e

  And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

  I do not understand, he said.

  Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

  Certainly not.

  Or hear, except with the ear?

  No.

  These, then, may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?

  They may.

  But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

  353

  Of course.

  And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?

  True.

  May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?

  We may.

  Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

  I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.

  b

  And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

  It has.

  And has not the eye an excellence?20

  Yes.

  And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

  True.

  And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

  That is so.

  Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

  c

  How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?

  You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only inquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

  Certainly, he replied.

  I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?

  True.

  And the same observation will apply to all other things?

  d

  I agree.

  Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? 21 For example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

  To no other.

  And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

  Assuredly, he said.

  And has not the soul an excellence also?

  Yes.

  And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

  e

  She cannot.

  Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?

  Yes, necessarily.

  And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

  That has been admitted.

  Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

  That is what your argument proves.

  And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

  Certainly.

  Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

  354

  So be it.

  But happiness, and not misery, is profitable?

  Of course.

  Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

  Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea. r

 
For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle toward me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours.22 As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that inquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

  b

  c

  BOOK 2

  WITH THESE WORDS I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always the most courageous of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus’s retirement. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?1

  357

  b

  I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.

  Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now: Are there not some good things which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?

  I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

  Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?

  c

  Certainly, I said.

  And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician’s art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

  There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?

  Because I want to know: In which of the three classes would you place justice?

  In the highest class, I replied—among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.

  358

  Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

  I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too slow-witted to be convinced by him.

  I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice has not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by anyone in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

  b

  c

  d

  Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

  I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

  e

  They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good.2 And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

  b

  Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Crœsus the Lydian. s According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the King of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he, stooping and looking in, saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the King; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the flange of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the flange outward and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result—when he turned the flange inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the Queen, and with her help conspired against the King and killed him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and sleep with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a go
d among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust.3 For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another‘s, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

  c

  d

  e

  360

  b

  c

  d

  Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Æschylust says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honor and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.

 

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