Call to Arms
Page 2
In April 1939, frustrated by his conviction that he was being ignored by both the Marine Corps and the United States government, Major Carlson once more resigned his commission. He then spent part of the next two years in China as a private citizen, and there and in the United States wrote two books: The Chinese Army, which dealt with the Chinese Communists; and Twin Stars of China, which generously treated Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
He also carried on an extensive private correspondence, much of it unanswered, with prominent Americans, including Douglas MacArthur, as first Army Chief of Staff and then Marshal of the Philippine Army.
In early 1941, he reapplied for a Marine Corps commission. He was offered, and accepted in April 1941, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve commission as major, was called to active duty, and shortly afterward was promoted to lieutenant colonel.
The lowly reserve captain who, in January 1942, dared to write to the Major General Commandant, wrote a document that was itself only two pages long, but it contained several appendices, including a newspaper editorial from the San Diego Union Leader of January 6, 1942, which approvingly described British Commando raids in Norway and Malaysia.
The Major General Commandant, after all, was a busy man. Perhaps he hadn’t heard what the English were up to with their Commandos.
Appendix A to the captain’s letter was four pages long. It was his proposed organization of “Mobile Columns (Commandos). (To be called ‘Rangers’ or some other appropriate name.)”
In the introduction to the proposed table of organization and equipment, the captain’s letter called for “a closer relationship between leaders and fighters than is customary in orthodox military organizations.”
He then went on to explain how this would be accomplished. First of all, the “mobile columns” would not be burdened with ordinary Marine Corps ranks. Each column, to be the size of a battalion, would be under the command of a “commander,” instead of, say, a major or lieutenant colonel.
Everybody else in the “mobile column” (except, for example, medical officers and radio operators, who would be known by their specialties) would either be a “leader” or a “fighter.” In other words, there would be no captains, lieutenants, sergeants, or corporals.
In the “Qualifications of Personnel” section, the captain wrote that all personnel should be prepared to “subordinate self to harmonious team-work” as well as to be capable of making thirty-to fifty-mile marches in twenty-four hours.
In the next paragraph, the captain touched on the subject of Rank Hath Its Privileges: “Leaders must be men of recognized ability who lead by virtue of merit and who share without reservation all material conditions to which the group may be subjected, arrogating to themselves no privileges or perquisites.”
And in the next, on discipline: “Discipline should be based on reason and designed to create and foster individual volition.”
The captain’s letter was submitted on January 13, 1942.
The very next day, Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General of the 2nd Joint Training Force, Camp Elliott, forwarded it by endorsement to the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps. The endorsement read, “The thought expressed in the basic letter is concurred in, insofar as the value of such an organization is concerned. It is believed, however, that the Marine Divisions should complete their organization and train units now authorized prior to the formation of any such new organizations.”
It is possible, of course, that General Vogel, having nothing better to do with his time, sat right down and read the letter and the appendices straight through, and came to the conclusion that the captain’s recommendations (even if they sounded like the organization and philosophy of the Chinese Communist Route Armies) were touched with genius and should be brought immediately to the attention of the Major General Commandant.
It is also possible that the signature on the letter had something to do with General Vogel’s astonishingly rapid action in sending the letter on to the Major General Commandant, and his equally astonishing silence on the subject of throwing out the existing rank structure, and the privileges that went with it.
The letter was signed by James Roosevelt; Captain Roosevelt’s father was President of the United States and Commander in Chief of its armed forces.
The very same day—January 14, 1942—Major General Commandant Holcomb, back in Washington, wrote two letters, classified CONFIDENTIAL, that were dispatched by officer couriers. The letters were essentially identical. One went to Major General H. M. Smith, USMC, commanding the Marine Barracks at Quantico, Virginia; and the other went to Major General Charles F. B. Price, USMC, in San Diego.
1. Suggestion has been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the “Commando Project.”
2. It will be recalled that Colonel Donovan served with distinction in the 27th Division during World War I. He has since then observed practically all wars that have taken place and in particular has specialized in Commando Operations (amphibious raids).
3. A frank expression of opinion is requested from you as to the advisability of accepting this suggestion. Replies will be Confidential and will be forwarded as promptly as possible to the Major General Commandant by air mail where appropriate.
General Holcomb did not indicate—then or ever—who had suggested that Wild Bill Donovan be commissioned a general of Marines. To this day, in fact, the identity of the “very high” authority who wanted Donovan commissioned as a Marine (and thus relieved of his COI responsibilities and authority) has never been revealed, but there are a number of credible possibilities.
The suggestion may have come from the President himself, and then been relayed through Frank Knox, Admiral King, or someone else. Roosevelt was known to be firmly behind the “American Commandos” idea, and he knew that the Marine Corps brass was at best lukewarm about the concept. That problem would be solved if Donovan were a Marine general with “commando” responsibility.
Another possibility was General George Catlett Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was known to be unhappy with the carte blanche Donovan had been given by Roosevelt, and saw in Donovan an unacceptable challenge to his own authority.
Donovan was a thorn, too, in the side of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI (even though he held his post in large part because Donovan had recommended him for it), who had already lost to Donovan’s COI authority to conduct intelligence operations overseas (except in South America). Hoover was known to be privately furious that he no longer had the President’s ear exclusively on intelligence and counterintelligence matters.
The British intelligence establishment was also not happy with Donovan, who had already made it clear that he intended to see that the United States had an intelligence capability of its own, a capability that would not be under British authority. Their objections to Donovan reached Roosevelt via Winston S. Churchill.
But Donovan was not without his promoters; he had a legion of politically powerful fans, most prominent among them his good friend Colonel Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy. It is equally credible to suggest that Knox, who had charged up Kettle Hill in Cuba as a sergeant with Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, and who viewed the Marine Corps with an Army sergeant’s somewhat critical eye, really believed he would be doing the Marine Corps a favor by sending them someone who had not only impeccable soldierly credentials, but the President’s unlisted phone number as well.
Nothing has ever come out, it seems useful to note, to hint that Colonel Donovan himself was behind the suggestion, or that the nation’s first super-spy ever heard about it until long after World War II was over.
On January 16, 1942, two days after it was dispatched (indicating that the officer courier bearing the letter was given an air priority to do so; he otherwise could not have arrived in California until January 17), Major General Price replied to the Major General Commandant’s letter.
In this letter, he
didn’t appear to be especially opposed to Donovan’s becoming a Marine general in charge of Marine Commandos. He wrote that Donovan was “well qualified by natural bent and experience and probably more so than any General officer of the regular Marine Corps at present available for such assignment.”
General Price then turned to the whole idea of commando forces and the Marine Corps:
If the personnel to conduct this new activity can be recruited almost entirely from new resources it would be the judgment of the undersigned that the entire spirit and plan of employment of the Commando groups is directly in line with the aggressive spirit of the Marine Corps, that it will add immeasurably to the fame and prestige of the Corps, and must inevitably attract to our ranks the most adventurous and able spirits of America’s manhood.
If, on the other hand, our very limited resources in trained officers must be further disbursed and if the best of the adventurous spirits and “go-getters” among our men must be diverted from the Fleet Marine Force in meeting the requirements of this additional activity (Commando Project), then the undersigned would recommend seriously against assuming this additional commitment.
That was the official reply. The same day, General Price wrote a “Dear Tom” letter to the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps. In it he wrote,
There is another thing in this connection which I could not put in my other letter and that is the grave danger that this sort of thing will develop into a tail which will wag the dog eventually. I know in what quarter the idea of foisting this scheme upon the Marines originated, and I opine that if it is developed along the lines of a hobby in the hands of personnel other than regular Marine officers it could very easily get far out of hand and out of control as well.
It appears pretty clear to me that you are in a position of having to comply and that nothing can be done about it so please accept my sympathy.
Major General H. M. Smith’s reply to the Major General Commandant’s letter, also dated January 16, 1942, was typically concise and to the point:
(a) All Amphibious Force Marines are considered as commandos and may be trained to high degree under their own officers in this form of training.
(b) The appointment of Colonel Donovan to brigadier general could be compared to that of Lord Mountbatten in Great Britain—both are “royal” and have easy access to the highest authority without reference to their own immediate superiors.
(c) The appointment would be considered by many senior officers of the Corps as political, unfair and a publicity stunt.
(d) An appointment as brigadier general, Marines, doubtless would indicate that he is to form commandos from Marine Amphibious Forces. The commandant would lose control of that number of Marines assigned as commandos. We have enough “by-products” now.
(e) No strictures are cast upon Colonel Donovan. He has a reputation for fearlessness but he has never been a Marine and his appointment would be accepted with resentment throughout the Corps. It would be stressed that the Marines had to go outside their own service for leaders.
(f) It is the unanimous opinion of the staff of this headquarters that commando raids by the British have been of little strategical value. We have not reached the stage where our men are so highly trained and restless for action that they must be employed in commando raids.
And then, as if he wasn’t sure that the Major General Commandant would take his point, General Smith added,
(g) I recommend against the appointment.
Meanwhile, another brushfire had broken out. The senior U.S. Navy officer in England, Admiral H. R. Stark, had recommended to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (Admiral King), that seven Marine officers and one hundred enlisted men be sent to England for training by and with British Commandos, and that when they were trained, they participate in a commando raid somewhere in Europe, under British command.
Admiral King killed most of this idea on January 16. He wrote the Chief of Naval Operations, with a carbon copy to the Major General Commandant, authorizing a “small group of selected officers and non-commissioned officers” to be sent to England for about one month, “such personnel to be used as instructors in the Fleet Marine Force on their return,” and disapproved Marine participation in British Commando operations.
Three days later, Holcomb wrote to Samuel W. Meek, an executive of Time-Life, and a personal friend. After discussing an article someone planned to write for Life about the Marine Corps, and expressing the hope that “Mr. Luce2 will be willing to suppress it,” he turned to the subject of Donovan:
The Donovan affair is still uppermost in my mind. I am terrified that I may be forced to take this man. I feel that it will be the worst slap in the face that the Marine Corps was ever given because it involves bringing into the Marine Corps as a leader in our own specialty that is, amphibious operations. Because commander [sic] work is simply one form of amphibious operation. It will be bitterly resented by our personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, and I am afraid that it may serve to materially reduce my usefulness in this office, if any, because I am expected, and properly so, to protect the Marine Corps from intrusions of this kind.
Five days after this, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (Admiral King), sent a priority, SECRET radio message to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz:
DEVELOP ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF MARINE AND NAVAL UNITS OF “COMMANDO” TYPE FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH EXPEDITIONS OF RAID CHARACTER FOR DEMOLITION AND OTHER DESTRUCTION OF SHORE INSTALLATIONS IN ENEMY HELD ISLANDS AND BASES X
Admiral Nimitz promptly ordered the Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force, San Diego, to form four company-sized commando units. He wrote that he had requested the transfer of destroyer-transports from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet, for use with the commando units. He also “authorized and directed” General Vogel to “request the services of any personnel who may be familiar with training, organization, and methods of foreign commando units.”
Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson was shortly thereafter named commanding officer of the 2nd Separate Battalion, Camp Elliott, San Diego, California (which was to be shortly renamed the 2nd Raider Battalion), and Captain James Roosevelt was named as his deputy.
And on February 16, 1942, Major General Holcomb finally heard from Colonel William J. Donovan. It had nothing to do with Commandos, Raiders, or his becoming a Marine general. Navy personnel officers, desperate for officers, were scraping the bottom of the barrel and had informed Donovan that they intended to reassign some of the Navy and Marine officers assigned to COI.
Donovan made a reasoned, concise plea not to have the officers he was about to lose replaced by “a random selection of reserve or retired officers who would I am sure fall far short of our needs.”
If Major General Holcomb replied to Donovan, that letter is still buried in a dusty file someplace. But for the rest of the war, the Marine Corps was far more cooperative than any other service when it came to furnishing personnel to Colonel (later Major General) Wild Bill Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services. They included such people as Captain John Hamilton, USMCR, better known as actor Sterling Hayden, and screenwriter Peter Viertel, Captain, USMCR….
But that’s still another story….
CALL TO ARMS
Preface
The first surrender of United States military forces in World War II—the first time, in fact, since the Civil War that American military forces went forward under a white flag to deliver American soil over to an enemy—took place on a tiny but militarily useful dot of volcanic rock in the Pacific Ocean, Wake Island, shortly after the Japanese struck the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
In 1939, with war on the horizon, the U.S. Navy began to pay particular attention to the tiny atoll in the middle of the Pacific. This almost infinitesimal U.S. possession was 450 miles from the Bikini atoll; 620 miles from the Marshalls, which the Japanese would certainly use for military purposes; 1,023 miles from Midway Island;
and 1,300 miles from Guam. The USS Nitro was ordered to Wake to make preliminary engineering studies with a view to turning the atoll into a base for land (which of course included carrier-based) aircraft and submarines, and to fortify the island against any Japanese assault.
In 1940, Congress appropriated the funds. On 19 August 1941, 6 officers and 173 enlisted men of the 1st Defense Battalion, USMC, were put ashore on Wake Island from the USS Regulus. The first of what would be about 1,200 construction workers landed a few days later, and in October, Major James P. S. Devereux, USMC, arrived from Hawaii to take command.
Devereux brought with him two five-inch Naval cannon (which had been removed from obsolescent and scrapped battleships); four three-inch antiaircraft cannon (only one of which had the required fire-control equipment); twenty-four .50-caliber machine guns; and a large number (probably about one hundred) of air-and water-cooled .30-caliber Browning machine guns. And, of course, a stock of ammunition for his ordnance.
Nine Marine officers and two hundred enlisted men from the Navy base at Pearl Harbor arrived on 2 November 1941, bringing the strength of the 1st Defense Battalion to approximately half of that provided for in the table of organization and equipment. On 28 November 1941, Commander Winfield Scott Cunningham, USN, was detached from the aircraft tender USS Wright (after the Wright Brothers) with nine Navy officers and fifty-eight sailors to Wake to take control of the air station already under construction.
As senior officer, Cunningham replaced Devereux as Commander of United States Forces, Wake Island.
A five-thousand-foot runway was completed, and U.S. Army B-17 aircraft began to use Wake Island as a refueling stop en route to Guam, although it was necessary to fill the aircraft tanks by hand-pumping avgas from fifty-five-gallon barrels.