At 0248 Manke ordered the launch of a single eel against the next freighter in line, range 1,600:
Launch order given. But the torpedo stuck in the tube. A Mechanikersmaat [Machinist’s Mate] prodded it out with a mine ejector and it hit the target after a run of 118 seconds. A large explosion resulted amidships on the target and the steamer broke apart and sank in a matter of seconds. From Gröner we judged the vessel to be of the Clan Macnab class, 6000 GRT.… Only a destroyer and another escort could now be seen. We pursued the convoy, whose position was obvious from the frequent shooting of flares, but then, because of the sea force and swell, we dived in order to reload in a stable environment.9
Manke hit his ships all right, but their tonnages and fates were not as described in the rather inflated account he leaves us, for neither sank “within one minute” (versank innerhalb einer Minute) or “in a matter of seconds” (versank in wenigen Sekunden). The first vessel hit was the freighter Bristol City, bound for New York with a 2,500-ton cargo of China clay (also called kaolin, used in the manufacture of china or porcelain) and general goods. Her GRT of 2,864 tons hardly measured up to Manke’s estimate of 8,000. And in her stricken condition she survived well beyond a minute.
At the time of U-358's first torpedo, Bristol City was in position 54°oo’N, 43°55'W (AJ 6517), heading column No. 1 on the extreme port bow of ONS.5, steering a course of 197° through a sea with heavily confused swell; a southwest wind was blowing Force 5; and the overcast night was very dark, though with good visibility. No one on board sighted the torpedo before it exploded in No. 4 hold on the freighter’s port side. Her Master, Captain A. L. Webb, who was on the bridge, stated later that: “The explosion was dull, much quieter than I would have expected. I saw a flash, and a huge column of water was thrown into the air, which cascaded down and flooded the decks.” One immediate result of the blast was the collapse of the main topmast and the blowing off of hatches and beams. So much debris fell on the deck that it was difficult for Webb to assess the exterior damage, although he specifically observed that the port lifeboat and after rafts were wrecked. More serious was the flooding below of No. 4 hold and the engine room. Webb rang for the engines to be stopped.
“A few minutes later,” he remembered, a second torpedo struck his ship, with no flash, in No. 1 hold. But he also miscalculated times. The interval between torpedoes II and III of Manke’s fan shot should have been no more than seconds. A Facherschuss, such as Manke employed, was a simultaneous spread of two or more torpedoes; it differed from a Mehrfach, which was a multiple, though not simultaneous, launch. In any event, the second eel compounded the damage to Bristol City, collapsing the fore topmast, destroying the windlass, blowing off one of the forward rafts and hatches from Nos. 1 and 2 holds, and flinging China clay into the air. Webb was unable to get rockets off, but M.V. Dolius in the adjoining column to starboard sent up two. Nor was Webb able to get an SSS off, since the wireless room had been wrecked. He did see to it that the Confidential Books, which included the Wireless Codes, were secured overboard in weighted boxes. Then, recognizing that there was no hope for Bristol City, he ordered Abandon Ship.
Twenty of his crew of forty-four, which included four Navy and two Army gunners who never saw their assailant, jumped from the main deck into the sea to join the starboard lifeboat. A jolly boat with five occupants capsized on reaching the water, casting the crewmen overside; three of them were lifted into the lifeboat, while two floated off and were not seen again, despite the fact that all the crew wore life jackets with red lights. Webb was the last to leave the ship, which was not broken in two, as Manke observed, but had settled by the head and was steaming under; the Master was waist-deep in water before he swam off into the swells, where the lifeboat found him. When the ship finally disappeared it was nine minutes (not one) after the first torpedo had struck. A little more than an hour later, the survivors, three of them injured, were rescued by the corvette Loosestrife. Fifteen of the crew were missing, presumed killed by the torpedoes, or drowned, or carried off in the swells.10
The second ship, which was hit by Manke’s single torpedo launch, was S.S. Wentworth, a 5,512-GRT freighter of the Dalgleish Steamshipping Company, bound for New York in ballast. She occupied the third position in column No. 3. Her Master, Captain R. G. Phillips, had learned of Bristol City s misfortune from the Second Officer, and had hurried from his cabin to the bridge. Shortly afterwards, his own vessel was struck by a torpedo on the port side amidships, in the stokehold where the ship’s furnaces opened. There was no flash or flame that anyone could see, nor was there much of a noise. Only a modest amount of water was thrown up. But the ship’s hull was punctured to form a hole about twelve feet in diameter, with about three feet of its jagged dimensions showing above the water line. The main deck cracked amidships, and both the funnel and wireless room collapsed.
Since the W/T aerial had been carried away, too, the Wireless Operator was not able to send the requisite distress signal. Nor could the rockets be fired, because their sockets had been blown apart. The Third Engineer stopped the engines and Phillips, facing what he thought was certain and imminent sinking, ordered Abandon Ship. By 0330 three of the four lifeboats were waterborne and clear of the ship. Phillips could not get the forward raft to release, but at 0350, when he heard the hull splitting, he abandoned and joined the port motorboat. It was then early morning daylight.
Some of Wentworth’s crew were picked up from the sea, but altogether five of the forty-seven-man crew were missing, one from drowning, the rest from the torpedo’s blast through the stokehold or engine room. Among the survivors were three Navy and three Army D.E.M.S. gunners, who had been no more able to get a shot off than had their counterparts on Bristol City. By 0550 the survivors were lifted on board Loosestrife, which Phillips in his report called the Bluestrife, and now, by any name, was swollen with bereft humanity. Obstinately, the broken Wentworth continued to float well beyond the few seconds that Manke had allotted her. When Loosestrifes Captain, Lt. H. A. Stonehouse, R.N.R., learned that Phillips had failed to toss overside the Confidential Books, he knew he had to sink the derelict. Accordingly, he steamed along her port side and fired a D/C close to the hull. Then, on the starboard side, he put two shells into No. 2 hold. At 0700, over four hours after Wentworth was hit, Stonehouse sent word to Phillips, who had gone below, that his ship had finally gone down.11
Before Loosestrife had steamed to the rescue of the Bristol City and Wentworth survivors on orders from Tay, she had on her own energetically raced after U-boat targets detected by radar and asdic. On one chase she dropped a ten-charge pattern at 0517 on a U-boat that dived after being sighted on the surface, range 1,200 yards; the impact of the charges damaged her asdic recorder. During a second pursuit of a target detected first by radar at 0524, then by eye, Loosestrife opened fire with one four-inch high-explosive round (H.E.) and with port and starboard 20mm Oerlikons, scoring what he thought were numerous hits with the 120 Oerlikon rounds fired. No effort was made by the U-boat to offer return fire, and after one minute it dived. At 0527 Stonehouse threw a nine-charge pattern about 100 yards ahead of the diving swirl, the last D/C of an intended ten-pattern getting jammed in the rails. Stonehouse was confident that his pattern was very well placed and a “likely kill.” The NHB/MOD reassessment has identified the target of Loosestrife’s first attack as U—264 (Looks), which was undamaged; and the target of the second attack as U-413 (Kptlt. Gustav Poel), which received superficial damage. Poel, in fact, says he was not hit by any of Loosestrife’s gunfire. As for the D/Cs: “Heavy tremors in the boat, damage is slight, everything can be repaired immediately except for the main transmitter. Everyone breathes a sigh of relief!”12
During the dark hours of 4/5 May, Convoy ONS.5 had passed through a Werner Henke Night, as five U-boats accounted for seven ships sunk, matching the number sunk by Henke alone on the night of 30 April/1 May. That the slaughter had not been worse, with (now) thirty-six boats assembled for attack instead of Henke�
��s single U-515, owed in great part to the spirited and intimidating defense mounted by the B7 defenders. Though Lt.-Cmdr. Sherwood would have no way of knowing it when he and Commodore Brook took stock in the morning—whereas in Berlin Donitz and Godt were fully aware of it from anxious W/T traffic—his band of escorts had so far damaged three boats so gravely that they made for home: U-332 (Junker), U-732 (Carlsen), and U-270 (Otto).13 These, it could be argued, were equivalents to kills so far as ONS.5 was concerned.
The escorts had severely handled two other boats, which suffered slight damage, U-314 (Auffermann) and U-413 (Poel), and they had driven off or forced to dive six more: U-264 (Looks), U-707 (Gretschel), U-168 (Pich), U-662 (Kptlt. Heinrich Müller), U-584 (Kptlt. Joachim Deecke), and U-260 (Oblt.z.S. Hubertus Purkhold).14 To have damaged a U-boat, even in cases where the boat was not forced to retire, was effectively to take that boat for a time out of the convoy battle, since the damaged boat had to tend more to her injuries than to her potential targets, which were passing away at seven or more knots. And to have driven off a boat, or to have forced one to dive, was also effectively to neutralize that boat’s usefulness temporarily in a night battle. It is instructive to note that none of the boats damaged, driven off, or forced to dive after 0105, when Looks got lucky, subsequently sank or damaged a ship of ONS.5. In a signal sent to the Fink boats during the forenoon of 5 May, Dönitz and Godt showed their impatience at the meager returns obtained thus far in exchange for damage. Urging the boats to use the long daylight hours for submerged attacks and for getting as far ahead of the convoy as possible before nightfall, the two German admirals urged their distant Commanders:
IMMEDIATELY AFTER NIGHTFALL THE DRUMBEAT [PAUKENSCIILAC] MUST BE TIMED TO BEGIN. HURRY—THERE ARE 40 OF YOU— OTHERWISE YOU WILL LOSE THIS CONVOY. THE BATTLE CAN’t LAST LONG SINCE THE SEA SPACE LEFT IS SHORT, SO USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO THE FULLEST WITH ALL YOUR MIGHT [MIT ALLER ENERGIE.] 15
By 0700 on the 5th, Sherwood had B7 in day stations. The convoy, now twenty-six ships in ten columns, was steering on course 202°, speed seven and a half. The weather was overcast with good visibility, the sea was moderate with swell, and the wind was westerly Force 4. In those conditions Offa attempted to oil from Argon and Tay from British Lady, with Oribi scheduled to follow Tay at the same nozzle. But at 0947, as Offa closed the U.S. tanker, the Argons captain signaled that he would not be prepared to discharge fuel for another hour; and when the destroyer returned alongside at 1100 the Argons hose parted after only one gallon had passed! Tay had better luck with British Lady, and Oribi was able to follow at 1420. Not until 1730 in the afternoon was Offa able to begin drawing 30 tons from the British tanker, slipping the tow at 1930.
These were not the ONS.5 screen’s only daylight activities. Numerous HF/DF contacts in all quadrants were acquired beginning at 0654, indicating that ONS.5 was still surrounded. We know from intercepts that the following U-boats were in contact with the convoy or its escorts during the forenoon hours: U-618, U-584, U-438, U-531 U-264, U-260, and U-378.16 One result was that Oribi became particularly busy, followed by Vidette. At 1010, Oribi, in station bearing 160° 5 miles from the port wing ship of the convoy, was instructed to investigate a first-class bearing of 155° to a distance of 12 miles. Forty-seven minutes later, Oribi sighted, first, diesel smoke haze, and then the conning tower of a U-boat. Increasing her speed to 30 knots, the destroyer sighted within the next 13 minutes two additional U-boats proceeding away in what seemed line abreast with the first boat. Apparently aware that they were being overhauled, all three boats dived.
Oribi gained a definite asdic contact at 800 yards and attacked with four charges of a ten-pattern, the remainder being checked when the recorder tracing showed that the U-boat was passing down the port side, hence the six D/Cs left would have fallen progressively astern of it. When contact and a good trace were regained at 1243, a ten-pattern was fired by recorder and stopwatch at 1247, two minutes after which “a slight explosion followed by a heavy underwater explosion was heard, producing a bubbly eruption of water.” The quarterdeck then reported what appeared to be a periscope proceeding away from the center of the D/C scum. A third attack with five charges was carried out at 1254, with negative results, after which Oribi, thinking it essential “to conserve supplies of depth charges for attacks in the vicinity of the convoy,” rejoined to fuel from British Lady and, at 1740, to resume station. In this event Oribi had been in contact with four U-boats, since identified as U-223 (Oblt.z.S. Karljüng Wächter), U-231 (Kptlt. Wolfgang Wenzel), U-621 (Oblt.z.S. Max Kruschka), and U-634 (Oblt.z.S. Eberhard Dahlhaus).
Vidette was stationed in position “B,” off the convoy’s starboard bow, when at 1542 she acquired an asdic contact at very close range, bearing 090°. Lt. Hart altered course to intercept the contact, which quickly was classified a submarine. Reaching the target’s position at 1544, he fired a five-pattern set to 100 feet. After opening range to about 900 yards, he swept back through the attack position, but received no further contact. Vidette conducted an Observant until 1633, when she was ordered to rejoin. Hart’s assessment of his action read: “Although there was no evidence of damage to the U-boat, in my opinion the counter attack delivered probably prevented an attack on the Convoy.” The NHB/MOD reassessment doubts that a U-boat was present.17
Meanwhile, despite these efforts, another convoy ship was torpedoed. The victim was M.V. Dolius, ship No. 21 on the port-hand easterly wing. Professor Jürgen Rohwer conjectures that the assailant was U-638, commanded by Kptlt. Oskar Staudinger. A native of Löbau who had earlier (1938–1941) served in the Luftwaffe, Staudinger was one week away from his twenty-sixth birthday. We know nothing of the details of this attack, since the boat’s KTB and Schussmeldung, if one existed, did not survive the battle. The “KTB” that one does find in the archives for his second Atlantic patrol out of La Pallice, 20 April to 5 May 1943, is a reconstruction done in Berlin on or about 7 May based on his F.T.s (wireless messages), both incoming and outgoing. There is no direct evidence in the F.T.s to show that U-638 sank a ship on 5 May, and the KTB-BdU does not acknowledge receipt of such a report.18
Whatever U-boat was responsible, the Dolius, a 5,507-GRT freighter of the Blue Funnel Line, was torpedoed on her starboard side at 1240. Since she was the lead ship in column No. 2 on the port-hand easterly wing, the torpedo would have had to come from very slightly ahead or from within the formation. The Master, Captain G. R. Cheetham, judged that the torpedo had been launched from close range between his vessel and the two ships, Ottinge and Baron Graham, to his starboard. With what Cheetham called a “dull” explosion with no flash, the warhead opened a 30-foot-long hole extending some 15 feet above the waterline. The concussion stopped the engines and the engine room promptly flooded, as did No. 4 hold. The Fourth Engineer and Junior Assistant Engineer were killed at their stations. The ship at first listed slightly, then came upright and began to settle by the stern. Cheetham ordered his crew to stand by the lifeboats. It was an unusually large crew: thirty-nine British and twenty-two Chinese, plus five Navy and four Army gunners.
Some of the Chinese, panicking, began lowering one of the three serviceable boats—No. 3 starboard had been destroyed—but stopped when Cheetham shouted at them. After making a thorough search for any injured, Cheetham disposed of the Confidential Books and gave the command Abandon Ship. Every man behaved with well-ordered discipline, including the Chinese, and the boats were successfully manned and lowered. As the Third Officer’s boat pulled away from the vessel, its occupants sighted a crewman still on board waving his arms for assistance. The boat returned to rescue him and another crewman was found lying unconscious below. Twenty-five minutes after the torpedo’s explosion, all the known survivors were clear of the wreck. Two engineers and one gunner were dead, one gunner died in the lifeboats, and two gunners were injured.19
Two minutes after Dolius was hit, Sherwood ordered “Artichoke.” Sunflower and Offa responded, the corvette turning from her port bow station and charg
ing down between columns 2 and 3 at emergency full speed. Slightly astern of the derelict, Sunflower picked up an asdic contact in the center of the convoy formation, range 1,200 yards. Lt.-Cmdr. Plomer closed the position and dropped a ten-pattern with 150-feet settings. The blasts did some damage to his own ship, but there was no sign that he had done any to a U-boat. Contact was lost, and when Tay joined she could not regain, either. From circumstantial evidence, however, the NHB/MOD reassessment has concluded that Sunflower s attack resulted in the sinking of Staudinger’s U-638, at 54°12'N, 44°o5'W—swift retribution, indeed, for the loss of Dolius, and proof again of the effectiveness of Artichoke. Sunflowers was the first kill made by the close escort. Offa, meanwhile, obtained a doubtful contact at 1301, threw a ten-charge pattern, and rejoined the convoy.20
Between 1320 and 1400 Sunflower swept a circle around the sinking Dolius, then, on orders from Tay, began rescuing survivors while Snowflake provided cover. Once on board, the Dolius officers, ratings, and apprentices did whatever they could to make themselves useful, serving on lookout watches, performing deck tasks of various kinds, and cleaning quarters. Plomer said later, “The ship was sorry to see them go in spite of the overcrowding involved.” As Sunflower set course to rejoin the convoy, the D.E.M.S. rating who died in a lifeboat was buried overside with a short service.21
Since 2244 on the 4th, the corvette H.M.S. Pink, rather neglected in this narrative of late, has been trundling along faithfully as lone escort to a separately routed convoy of four stragglers: the American West Madaket, the British Dunsley and Director, and the Norwegian Gudvor. At 1150, ”Pink’s Party,” as the tiny fleet came to be called, was in position 54°56'N, 43°44'W, some 80 miles astern of the main body, making about 8 knots on the course, 240°, assigned by CinCWA. Twenty-seven-year-old Lt. (now Sir) Robert Atkinson, commanding Pink, was zigzagging ahead, his four charges in line abreast about 3,000 yards astern. With only 30 percent of his fuel remaining, with no chance to overtake the main body and refuel, and with a separate route that increased the distance to be steamed, Atkinson was proceeding on only one boiler, the second being banked, and had shut down one dynamo and rationed water. If an attack situation developed, he knew that the higher speeds required by those maneuvers would make greater than usual demands on his fuel reserves. But he did not quail before that prospect: not having seen any action during the voyage to date, he badly wanted a go at the enemy.22
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