9. Ibid., S.R.N. 1833.
10. PRO, WO 208/4205, S.R. Draft No. 3335.
11. PRO, WO 208/4145, S.R.N. 1834.
12. Ibid., S.R.N. 1831.
13. Ibid., S.R.N. 1832.
14. Ibid., S.R.N. 1807.
15. Ibid., S.R.N. 1801.
16. Ibid., S.R.N. 1734.
17. Ibid., S.R.N. 1758.
18. Ibid., S.R.N. 1738.
19. Ibid., S.R.N. 1768.
20. Ibid., S.R.N. 1739.
21. Ibid., S.R.N. 1796.
22. Ibid., S.R.N. 1778.
23. Ibid., S.R.N. 1566.
24. Ibid., S.RN. 1868.
25. Ibid., S.R.N. 1864.
26. Ibid., S.R.N. 1861.
27. Ibid., S.R.N. 1860.
28. Ibid., S.R.N. 1862.
29. Ibid., S.R.N. 1854.
30. Ibid., S.R.N. 1848.
31. Ibid., S.R.N. 1531.
32. Ibid., S.R.N. 1823.
33. Ibid., S.R.N. 1835.
34. Ibid., S.R.N. 1847.
35. PRO, WO 208/4205, S.R. Draft No. 1905.
36. Ibid., S.R. Draft No. 5470.
37. Ibid., S.R. Draft No. 2220.
38. Ibid., S.R. Draft No. 3495.
39. Ibid., S.R. Draft No. 1977.
40. Ibid., S.R. Draft No. 2802.
41. PRO, WO 208/4145, S.R.N. 1777.
42. Ibid., S.R.N. 1857.
43. Ibid., S.R.N. 1728.
44. Ibid., S.R.N. 1896.
45. Ibid., S.R.N. 1799.
46. Ibid., S.RN. 1782.
47. Ibid., S.RN. 1888.
48. Ibid., S.R.N. 1878.
49. Ibid., S.R.N. 1850.
50. Ibid., S.R.N. 1805.
51. Ibid., S.RN. 1826.
52. Ibid., S.R.N. 1821.
53. Ibid., S.R.N. 1822.
54. Ibid., S.R.N. 1779.
55. Ibid., S.R.N. 1732.
56. Ibid., S.R.N. 1865.
57. Ibid., S.R.N. 1900.
58. PRO, ADM 223/120, N.I.D. UC No. 318, 2 April 1943, “Morale Among U-Boat Prisoners of War.” The writer is indebted to W. J. R. “Jock” Gardner at NHB/MOD for sending him a copy of this document.
59. PRO, WO 208/4x45, S.R.N. 1695.
60. Ibid., S.R.N. 1890.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., S.R.N. 1842.
63. Ibid., S.R.N. 1710.
64. Ibid., S.R.N. 1803.
65. Ibid., S.R.N. 1800.
66. Ibid., S.R.N. 1802.
67. Ibid., S.R.N. 3495.
68. Ibid., S.R.N. 1800.
69. Ibid., S.R.N. 1732.
CHAPTER 10
1. PRO, ADM 237/114, Convoy ONS.6; ADM 199/2020, An Analysis of the Operation of Support Groups in the North Atlantic (Period 5th May-12th June), 15 July 1943 [hereafter Support Groups]; AIR 41/48, Peyton Ward, “The R.A.F. in the Maritime War,” Vol. IV, p. 70.
2. NARA, KTB-BdU, 7 May 1943.
3. The X-B-Bericht Weekly Summary for 3–9 May 1943, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Bestand RM 7/755, X-B-Bericht No. 19/43, Woche vom 3.5–9.5 1943, f. 87V and f. 88r.
4. Ibid. The information produced by B-Dienst on HX.237 read: “Funkspruch vom 6.5 2330 Uhr [German time] meldete Unbek. aus See die Position des Konvois in 43 56 N 48 27 W.”
5. Ibid., f. 87V. The information on 7.5.43 read: “Am 7.5 1600 Uhr befand sich der Geleitzug mit 38 Schiffen in 42 08 N 45 42 W, Kurs etwa 128 Grad, Fahrt 9 sm.” See also NARA, KTB-BdU, 8 May 1943.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. PRO, DEFE-3, ff-448 and 449, 745.
9. Ibid., Reel 718, time of interception (TOI) 1730, 9 May 1943, decrypted 21 May 1943; NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 275.
10. David Hobbs, “Ship-borne Air Anti-Submarine Warfare,” in Howarth and Law, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 391–392.
11. Ibid., p. 391. Cf. William T. Y’Blood, Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), Appendix I, “Escort Carrier Technical Data,” pp. 279–281.
12. Hobbs, “Ship-borne Air,” Howarth and Law, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 389–390.
13. NARA, KTB-BdU, 10 May 1943.
14. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 278.
15. NARA, KTB-BdU, 11 May 1943; NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17844.
16. NARA, KTB-BdU, 12 May 1943.
17. Herbert A. Werner, Iron Coffins: A Personal Account of the German U-Boat Battles of World War II (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 160–161. Although Werner states in his introduction that he wrote this volume “with the aid of notes I took during the war,” he told this writer that he consulted no official records such as U-230's KTB, accounting for certain events recounted out of sequence and errors in the times given for certain events. Few memoirs of the U-boat war can match Werner’s, however, in expressing the grim realities that U-boat men faced in May. “At the end of May all the sea officers at Brest were appalled,” he told the writer. “The petty officers and ratings were not fully aware of the extent of the losses. At that level morale remained high. But officers were now criticizing the leadership of the Navy, though only to their close friends.” Interview with Werner, Ponte Vedra, Florida, 9 May 1995. A criticism of Werner’s book Iron Coffins by Jürgen Rohwer is given in Marine-Rundschau: Zeitschrift für Seewesen, 67. Jahrgang (Frankfurt a/M: Verlag E.S. Mittler Sc Sohn GmbH bin, 1970), pp. 186–191.
18. NHB/MOD, Assessments, ff. 279, 280, and notations by R. M. Coppock; Coppock to the author, “Loss of U 89 U 456 and U 753 in May 1943,” FDS 412, London, by hand, 29 May 1997. Naval Staff History, The Development of British Naval Aviation 1919–1945, Vol. II (London: Historical Section, Admiralty, 1956), pp. 119–120.
19. The writer is indebted to Dr. Frederick J. Milford, formerly Vice President for Special Projects at the Battelle Memorial Institute, for sharing with him the impressive body of data that he has collected on the acoustic homing torpedo as well as the careful, balanced analysis that he has made of its use; Milford to the author, Columbus, Ohio, 19 January and 6 May 1996.
20. M. D. Fagen, ed., A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System: National Service in War and Peace (1925–1975) (Murray Hill, NJ: Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1978), p. 191. See also Mark B. Gardner, “Mine Mk. 24: World War II Acoustic Torpedo,” Journal of the Audio Engineering Society, Vol. 22, No. 8 (October 1974), pp. 614–626; and Frederick J. Milford, “More on Fido,” Submarines Review (April 1996), pp. 119–120.
21. Frederick J. Milford to the author, 19 January 1996; Fagen, ed., Bell System, pp. 191,193.
22. Fagen, ed., Bell System, p. 195.
23. NARA, SRH-367, Operations Evaluation Group Study [hereafter OEG] No. 289, “Proctor, A Short History: The Rise and Fall of an Anti-Submarine Weapon,” 12 August 1946, p. 5.
24. Frederick J. Milford to the author, 19 January 1997.
25. Telephone interview with Air Commodore Jeaff Greswell, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC, R.A.F. (Ret.), Saunderton, Princess Risborough, Bucks., England, 28 October 1997. See also Price, Aircraft versus Submarine, pp. 133–134, where this story was told first.
26. PRO, AIR 41/48, Peyton Ward, “The R.A.F. in the Maritime War,” Vol. IV, p. 63.
27. Ibid. NHB/MOD, Coppock, “Loss of U 89, U 456 and U 753 in May 1943,” FES 412.
28. NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17948.
29. Ibid., SRGN 17965.
30. Ibid., SRGN 17963,18031.
31. Ibid., SRGN 17980.
32. Ibid., SRGN 17975.
33. NHB/MOD, Coppock, “Loss of U 89, U 456 U 753 in May 1943,” FDS 412. F/Lt. Wright made no mention of his use of the Mk. 24 in his after-action report; PRO, Air 27/911, RAF Form 541, No. 86 Squadron, 12 May 1943, p. 4. Earlier published reports that U-456 was finished off by Sunderland “G” of Canadian 423 Sqdn. and two surface escorts are in error, according to Coppock, who concludes that their attack was made instead against U—753 on 13 May, see below. On 14 May the bodies of two crewmen from U-456 were found in BD 6643 by U-448 (Oblt.z.S. Helmut Dauter). From the position given, Coppock concludes th
at they had been lost overboard.
34. NARA, KTB-BdU, 12, 13 May 1943. Some earlier published accounts indicate that Mk. 24s were used successfully against U-266 on 13 (or 14) May by B/86 and against U-657 on 14 May by a USN Catalina of No. 84 Sqdn. from Iceland. But these are in error, according to Coppock. The U- 266 was sunk by D/Cs dropped by Halifax “M” of 58 Sqdn. on 15 May, and U-657 was sunk by the frigate H.M.S. Swale on 17 May. Credit for a successful Mk. 24 sinking of U-954 on 19 May has been given in several sources to Liberator “T” of 120 Sqdn. from Reykjavik, Iceland, but this seems not to have been possible and Coppock gives the credit instead to the frigate H.M.S. Jed and the ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutter H.M.S. Sennen on that date. Following 12 May, the only other successful use of Mk. 24 during the month was by USN Catalina “F” of Patrol Squadron VP-84 against U-467 on 26 May.
35. NHB/MOD, Coppock, “Loss of U 89, U 456 and U 753 in May 1943, FDS 412; Assessments,” f. 283.
36. PRO, ADM 199/577, 578, Convoy HX.237. their summation Dönitz/Godt explained that the operation against HX.237 had to be given up because, “Right from the first day, carrier borne planes were sighted with the convoy, and later on the carrier itself was seen once. These planes and other land-based escorts made the operation very difficult, and on the last day [13th] it had to be given up because this air activity was too powerful.” NARA, KTB-BdU, 13 May 1943.
37. During the daytime hours BdU signaled the Elbe I and II boats: BY DARKNESS AS MANY BOATS AS POSSIBLE MUST BE AT IT. OPERATE AT MAXIMUM SPEED TO REACH CONVOY BEFORE THEN. THE FIRST NIGHT IS THE MOST FAVORABLE ONE. EVEN TOMORROW IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT. NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17836.
38. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 25, and notations by R. M. Coppock, who emphasizes that all the attacks, including the ramming, were delivered against the same boat; PRO, ADM 199/2020, p. 5. A report of U-223's damage was sent by Wächter to BdU at 1620 GMT. He included mention of the two crewmen lost overboard, the death of the Coxswain, and light wounds suffered by himself and both Watch Officers. NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17989. Förster (U-359) went to Wächters aid, handing over one of the crewmen who went overboard as well as bandages for the wounded. This boat stayed with Wächter until, emergency repairs completed in the evening of the 14th, the rammed boat was able to make a crash dive. Ibid., SRGN 17900,17992,18243. Förster also was forced to return to base by an oil track caused by D/C damage to his own boat. Ibid., SRGN 17905,17943.
39. NARA, RG 457, SRGN 17938. T.O.I. 1031,12 May 1943.
40. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 27, and notation by R. M. Coppock; PRO, ADM 199/2020, Support Groups, Convoy SC.129, pp. 4–5; PRO, ADM 199/577, 579, 580, 2020, Convoy SC.129.
41. NARA, KTB-BdU, 13, 14 May 1943.
42. Interview with Herbert A. Werner, Ponte Vedra, Florida, 9 May 1995. In the introduction to his book Iron Coffins, as well as in his interview with the writer, Werner acknowledged that his book was written for a political purpose: to protest that “our lives were squandered on inadequate equipment and by the unconscionable policies of U-Boat Headquarters”; p. xix.
43. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 287, and notation by R. M. Coppock. It was probably U-640 that was attacked at 2043 the evening before by another USN Catalina, I/184; f. 286. This U-boat reported at 0112 that it had been attacked by a Catalina. Some authorities have U-640 torpedoing the merchant ship Aymeric three days later and then being sunk herself by H.M.S. Swale; but BdU, Rohwer, and Coppock deduce that Aymeric was sunk by U-657. That U-640 was sunk on the 14th, three days before, by K/84 best fits all the available evidence according to Coppock, to the writer, “Loss of U 381, U 640, U 657 and U 258 in May 1943,” FDS 442, London, by hand, 29 May 1997. The loss of U-657 is attributed to Swale on 17 May, see below. There were three unsuccessful attacks employing the Mk. 24 Mine on 14 May: by Catalina K/84 at 0900; Catalina C/84 at 1337; and Liberator J/120 at 1737. Liberator 0/120 made an unsuccessful Mk. 24 attack at 2159 on the 19th.
44. PRO, ADM 199/2145, Interviews with Survivors, Captain S. Morris, Aymeric, 24th June, 1943, ff. 147–148.
45. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 32, and notation by R. M. Coppock; also Coppock, “Loss of U 381, U 640, U 657 and U 258 in May 1943,” FDS 442.
46. PRO, ADM 237/203, Report of Proceedings—S.C.130. Comments of Senior Officer, Close Escort.
47. Ibid., Report of Attack on U-Boat, H.M.S. Duncan, 19 May 1943, 0130.
48. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Bestand RM 7/755, X-B Bericht No. 21/43 Woche vom 17.5–23.5.1943, f. 159r. Cf. NARA, KTB-BdU, 17 May 1943.
49. PRO, ADM 223/15, Operational Intelligence Centre Special Intelligence Summary, 10.5.43–17.5.43, f. 198.
50. PRO, ADM 237/203, Remarks by Commodore (D), Western Approaches [Simpson], S.C.130., 12 June 1943.
51. NARA, KTB-BdU, 17 May 1943. The first U-boat to sight and report SC.130 was U-304 (Oblt.z.S. Heinz Koch) in Qu AK 4675 early on 19 May.
52. PRO, AIR 27/911, RAF Form 541, No. 120 Squadron, 19.5.43, Liberator III T/120. Gretton was annoyed that this aircraft did not keep in better communication with him, but the pilot’s after-action report states that he informed Gretton of each sighting.
53. NHB/MOD, Assessments, ff. 37,38, 38A, and notations by R. M. Coppock; Coppock to author, “Loss of U 954 and Others in May 1943,” London, by hand, 13 November 1996. Most authorities, going back to Peyton Ward, have written that U-954 was sunk by Liberator T/120's attack at 0534 on 19 May in position 55°09'N, 35°18W. But Coppock has shown that this could not have been the case since U-954 transmitted a (nondistress) signal at 0811 that day, over two and a half hours after T/120's attack. It should be noted that after EGI joined the convoy, Kitchener was detached to reinforce Convoy ON.184, as per orders from CinCWA; PRO, ADM 237/203, Convoy SC.130, Appendix D.
54. The loss of U–954 was mentioned matter-of-factly in NARA, KTB-BdU, 20 May 1943. Dönitz’s older son, Oblt.z.S. Klaus Dönitz, was killed a year later, on 14 May 1943, when an S-boat on which he was a passenger was sunk by a Free French destroyer.
55. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 308, and notation by R. M. Coppock.
56. R. M. Coppock, “Loss of U 381, U 640, U 657 and U 258 in May 1943,” FDS 442.
57. PRO, ADM 237/203, Reports of Attacks on U-Boats, Convoy SC.130.
58. R. M. Coppock, “Loss of U 381, U 640, U 657 and U 258 in May 1943,” FDS 442; NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 34, and notations by Coppock.
59. NHB/MOD, Assessments, ff. 39, 40, and notations by R. M. Coppock.
60. PRO, ADM 237/203, Convoy SC.130. No count is given in the record of Zamalek’s HF/DF contacts other than her first at 2219 on the 18th.
61. NARA, KTB-BdU, 19, 20 May 1943. A “Frog” search was astern of convoy to a distance of so many miles. An “Adder” search was ahead of convoy to a distance of 8–12 miles. A “Viper” search was a square flight around the convoy at visibility distance. When an aircraft searched down a DF bearing it was called a “Mamba.”
62. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 312, and notations by Coppock; PRO, AIR 27/911, RAF Form 541, Liberator I P/120, 20 May 1943.
63. PRO, AIR 27/911, RAF Form 541, Liberator I P/120, 20 May 1943; telephone conversation with R. M. Coppock, 11 November 1997. For a description of the Mark I 600-lb. A.S. bomb see CAB 86/4, Report on Progress of Development of Anti-U-Boat Weapons May 1943, f. 130.
64. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 312, and notations of R. M. Coppock. On the day before, Liberator T/120 dropped two “600 lb.D.C.'s” in its attack on U-731, as recorded by its pilot Flight Sergeant S. W. Stoves; PRO, AIR 27/911, R.A.F. Form 541, Liberator III T/120, 19 May 1943. For U-418 also see NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 309, and notation by R. M. Coppock; and Peyton Ward, “R.A.F. in the Maritime War,” Vol. Ill, p. 65. U-418 was destroyed by R.P. (Rocket Projectiles), described below.
65. PRO, ADM 199/2020, Analysis of U-Boat Operations in the Vicinity of Convoy S.C.130. 18th-21st May 1943, p. 3; PRO, ADM 237/203, S.C.130—Report of Proceedings, p. 3.
66. PRO, DEFE-3, reel 718, TOI 0337, 20 May 1943, decrypted 20 May 1943.
67. PRO, ADM 199/2020, Analysis of U-Boat Operations in the Vicinity of Convoy S.C. 130. 18th-21st May 1943, pp. 2–3.
68. PRO, ADM 237/203, Convoy SC.130.
69. Three Commanders from the Donau II line are reported to be still alive on the roster of the Verband Deutscher U-Boot-fahrer, but the writer and his research assistant in Germany have not been able to locate them.
70. “To enjoy fair winds, then foul.”
71. NHB/MOD, Assessments, f. 41, notation by R. M. Coppock. The British submarine sunk by U-123 (von Schroeter) on 18 April was P. 615, the former Uluc Ali Reis built for Turkey and taken over by the RN. Interview with Horst von Schroeter, Bonn, 26 December 1995.
72. A concise presentation of this point is given in Montgomery C. Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines, pp. 90–96. Despite the deployment of “Hunter-Killer Groups”—the pioneer such group centered around the escort carrier U.S.S. Bogue is discussed below—Colonel Meigs contends that King never did accept the idea of an offensive strategy; pp. 92–95. The author gives a short account of the Antisubmarine Warfare Operational Research Group (ASWORG), the USN’s counterpart to O.R.S. at RAF Coastal Command and CAOR at the Admiralty; pp. 58–62,195, 216–217.
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