It is certainly an odd experience, having the drop on your own security services by twelve months, but my life hasn't been what you would call normal for some years. Suffice to say, until you've been personally trolled by a hostile foreign state, you really haven't lived.
J.J.P.
20th May 2018
THE NOVEMBER STATEMENT: 21 NOVEMBER 2017 (UNCORRECTED)
Written evidence from James John Patrick (Known As J.J. Patrick)
Introduction:
Written evidence submitted to the UK Parliament by James John Patrick, known as J.J. Patrick.
This evidence is submitted freely in my capacity as a freelance journalist and private individual and contains 9658 words and spreads over 18 pages. Due to the complex nature of the submission, forgiveness is kindly requested for the length of the statement.
This statement has not previously been published elsewhere and as such is provided on the understanding that, if accepted and published by Parliament, it falls within the protections afforded by absolute privilege in this form.
The content is true to the best of my knowledge and honest belief and I am happy to appear before any hearings or committees.
Summary of Evidence:
1. Russia is deliberately interfering in Western democracy through the use of disinformation, cybercrime, psychological manipulation – through social media and disinformation (also known as fake news) - and the collaboration of well-placed of third parties. This hybrid conflict is live.
2. This global hybrid conflict has decisively impacted upon the democratic process in the United Kingdom and the United States with negative effect. The threat is continuing and extends to additional nations.
3. The current legal frameworks and responses of the UK and the US are inadequate and have contributed to the continuance of the live threat and success of Russian operations to date, but a number of solutions and tactical options are available.
4. Urgent action in response to the actions of Russia is being hampered by unnecessary, circular debate and fundamental misunderstandings of the core issues around the power of disinformation and psychological targeting of populations.
Personal Background:
1. Between 2004 and 2014 I served as a police officer with the Derbyshire Constabulary and Metropolitan Police Service in the United Kingdom. I retired in 2014 after giving evidence in a parliamentary inquiry.
2. In 2013 I acted as a whistleblower in the course of my duties, giving evidence to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee on the manipulation of crime figures by the police. The final report of the committee said of me “we are indebted to PC Patrick for his courage in speaking out, in fulfilment of his duty to the highest standards of public service, despite intense pressures to the contrary.”
3. I am now a freelance journalist and member of the National Union of Journalists and my primary publication platform is Byline, an independent news website based in the United Kingdom. This is a non-partisan publication which holds no editorial input or sway over my work. I am also signed up to the Impress regulations. My funding comes direct from the public and is unaffiliated to advertising of any kind.
4. I have also acted as a freelance specialist consultant in respect of crime data analysis with an NGO in Mexico.
Background: What Is A Hybrid Conflict And How Long Have We Known?
1. The term ‘hybrid warfare’ was first mentioned sometime during 2005, and the year after it was used to try and describe the tactics deployed by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Since then, the term “hybrid” went on to occupy most of the discussions around modern and future warfare, while also being broadly adopted by senior officials and military groups.287
2. The concept of a “hybrid threat” was first introduced in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s Strategic Concept of 2010288 and then incorporated in the NATO Capstone Concept289, defining hybrid threats as “those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.”
3. Their 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled Active Engagement, Modern Defence (AEMD) was, according to the organisation: “A very clear and resolute statement on NATO's values and strategic objectives for the next decade.” They set their stall out decisively, I suppose as an aid to the uninitiated, saying: “Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security are the Alliance's essential core tasks in today's transformed security environment, an environment the Alliance is equipping itself for both politically and militarily.”
4. According to the organisation itself, recapping essential history in the concept’s preamble: “The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.”
5. It is obvious why NATO is perceived as a threat to its enemies, and why – very squarely – Russia is placed in the category of a potential threat, with particular focus on its ballistic and nuclear weapons being placed on or located within reach of the European borders. NATO makes clear an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area, defining the union as a unique and essential partner. “The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence,” the AEMD states, adding: “We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges.”
6. The AEMD adds: “Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security,”
7. Though the idea of a hybrid threat has come a long way since the concept was first introduced, it was drafted to included cyber-threats, political disruption, state-engaged criminality, and extremism, in addition to traditional warfare threats. It articulated the “unique challenges posed by current and future hybrid threats” and explained why these developing challenges required an adaptation of strategy by NATO, so it could adjust both its structure and capabilities accordingly.
8. Capstone discussed both a general approach to dealing with the (then) new hybrid threats, as well as laying down a framework for the organisation to deliver an effective response should such threats manifest in reality. The draft was central in informing the development of the new AEMD Strategic Concept and, even in those early days, NATO was sure “analysis and maturation” would support Capstone’s implementation. The paper also suggested broader implications for NATO’s core military components.
9. Capstone’s Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established in early 2009, indicating how long the threat we face now had been on the horizon. The IPT subsequently developed a detailed campaign to “assess both hybrid threats and the broader challenges facing NATO within the emerging security environment,” according to Royal Marine Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hills, the IPT’s Lead Concept Developer. “Between 2009 –2010 a number of ACT led international workshops were held to both focus the key analysis and better inform the development of the concept. The workshops included a broad range of participants from NATO and non-NATO organisations,” he said.
10. Capstone, led by the IPT, asserted that hybrid threats involve any adversaries, including “states, rogue states, non-state actors or terrorist organisations,” who may employ a combination of actions in an increasingly unconstrained operating environment in order to achieve their aims. Almost ten years later, they have been proven right.
11. While not a new problem, at the time
NATO said “the interconnectedness of the globalised environment now makes hybrid threats a far more significant challenge for the Alliance and its interests, whether encountered within national territory, in operational theatres or across non-physical domains.” I found the description used chill-inducing: “Hybrid threats will apply pressure across the entire spectrum of conflict, with action that may originate between the boundaries artificially separating its constituents. They may consist of a combination of every aspect of warfare and compound the activities of multiple actors.”
12. On behalf of the IPT, Hills set out NATO’s role at an early stage, saying Capstone “also asserts that NATO’s role in managing the emerging security environment will invariably be a supporting one. The Alliance needs to develop its understanding of how it can cooperate with other organisations and stakeholders to both deter potential threats and mitigate their impact.”
13. With principal support from Joint Irregular Warfare Centre (JIWC), NATO set out to conduct its first Counter Hybrid Threats Experiment in Tallinn, Estonia. The primary purpose defined at the time was “to explore and discuss the key implications of the new draft concept and develop with other international stakeholders an understanding of potential approaches in addressing the likely challenge areas.” Academic centres, businesses and international bodies attended.
14. Explaining the experiment, Hills said “one of the key outcomes of the event will be clear recommendations to NATOs Political and Military leadership of what the organisation must do to support the international community in tackling the array of potential hybrid challenges. The results will feed directly into the further development and refinement of the CHT Concept Paper with the aim to potentially produce a more informed draft, by late 2011.”
15. The experiment, according to the official report, was conducted to examine the utility and feasibility of the Military Contribution to the Countering Hybrid Threats Concept. The Tallinn activity also centred on NATO’s potential support role in the wider context – what they called a “comprehensive approach” in addressing hybrid threats in a “steady state, security environment.”
16. The complex environment of hybrid threats was “examined through three different lenses.” The first dealt with cyber, technology and economic threats – followed by the second on stabilisation, conflict prevention and partnership. The final aspect of the experiment examined the “Global Commons and Resource security.” The global potential for resource-based conflict has been well established in the defence community for many years, but this is the first time it appeared to have been fully considered in the context of a multifaceted conflict.
17. During the Tallinn test, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, French Air Force General Stephane Abrial, stated: “Unforeseen NATO Operations in Libya remind us of a historical string of ‘strategic surprises’- central in assessing Hybrid Threats.” He went on to say that hybrid conflict situations are linked to “the versatility of threats and a lack of strategic predictability.”
18. Hybrid threats gained renewed traction in response to Russian actions in Ukraine and the Da’esh campaign in Iraq.
19. In 2014, Russian military forces made several aggressive incursions into Ukrainian territory. After subsequent protests and the fall of the then Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russian soldiers without insignias (often referred to as the Green Men) took control of strategic positions and infrastructure within the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Russia went on to annexe Crimea after a disputed referendum concluded the electorate wanted to join the Russian Federation. In August 2016 the SBU, the Security Service of Ukraine, published telephone intercepts – dated 2014 – showing details of Sergey Glazyev, a Russian presidential adviser, Konstantin Zatulin, a Russian politician, and others discussing the covert funding of pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine and arranging the occupation of administration buildings, along with other activities, which led to the eventual armed conflict290. Glazyev did not deny the authenticity of the intercepted records and Zatulin confirmed they were real but claimed they were “taken out of context.” The intercepts showed that, as early as February 2014, Glazyev was giving direct orders to pro-Russian parties in Ukraine, asking them to instigate civil unrest in the key locations of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Odessa.
20. Meanwhile, Barack Obama declared Da’esh a hybrid threat in 2014291, with world security services at the time reporting the sophisticated use of social media for worldwide propaganda in a campaign which attracted thousands of foreign fighters from Europe, the Maghreb and Asia. The combination of conventional and non-conventional warfare, with disinformation and terrorist operations, saw Da’esh placed in the centre ground of the hybrid conflict arena from that point on.
21. By February 2015, EU Defence Ministers meeting in Riga called for more unity and decisive action across the union. By May, the European External Action Service had created a circular entitled Countering Hybrid Threats292, which encouraged member states to recognise the risks and build individual responses.
22. The report was particularly bleak in its outlook, setting the full potential of hybrid threats against a more developed context than Capstone initially outlined. It stated: “Elements of hybridity can be traced in many other dimensions of the current security environment” with “various governments in the EU’s southern neighbourhood (i.e. the Gaddafi regime in Libya or the current government of Turkey)” having “used the complexity of migratory movements as a pretext to demand various concessions from the European Union.” It also concluded that ISIL/Da’esh simultaneously sought to instil fear in EU citizens and governments which, in turn, had the effect of “pushing them to take more hostile attitudes towards refugees, ultimately strengthening the image of the EU as an anti-Muslim society, to its discredit.” There is no doubt such a response, in fact, fed (and feeds) the continued propaganda necessary to drive the cycle, escalating the conflict steadily.
23. In addition to intentional actions, the EU report cited increasing concerns about the potential consequences of complex crises resulting directly from, or even combining the different elements, which would require an equally complicated response. The concerns they documented included ideas rarely thought of in connection with war or conflict, including observations that: “Abnormal weather conditions and climate-induced resource scarcity, for instance, increasingly influence relations between states, and might provoke confrontation over access to water or crops production.” At the time, researchers on the impact of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa had estimated, by 2050, summer temperatures across the region would reach around 46 degrees Celsius and hot days would occur five times more often than at the beginning of the 2000s. “Such extreme temperatures,” the report stated, “in combination with increasing air pollution by windblown desert dust, will render living conditions in parts of the region intolerable, leading to a ‘climate exodus’ and social unrest, that might be exploited to destabilise the region by state and non-state actors alike.”
24. Most references to hybrid war are commonly based around the idea of the existence of an “adversary who controls and employs a mix of tools to achieve their objectives,”293 and this brings with it a layering effect, a structure obfuscating the direct responses available in a traditionally declared military conflict. A hybrid conflict has been given the globally accepted definition of “a situation in which parties refrain from the overt use of armed forces against each other, relying instead on a combination of military intimidation falling short of an attack, exploitation of economic and political vulnerabilities, and the deployment of diplomatic or technological means to pursue their objectives.”
25. Despite the relatively early horizon identification, the world’s response has not been sufficiently effective – or unified – in updating the international framework to reflect this developing landscape.
26. As with all conflicts, attributing responsibility and intent is absolutely necessary, not only to ensure state and all
ied policy responses are proportionate, but they are legitimate and appropriately targeted. However, a cluster of problems is generated in hybrid conflict situations, arising from international law limitations, technological constraints, and the diffusion of actions to non-state actors working together to give an adversary in such a conflict substantial deniability. For instance, the involvement of a third party not immediately identifiable as being state-sponsored (such as Wikileaks) becomes incredibly difficult to set against the legal concept of beyond reasonable doubt when a response is being tabled. Nonetheless, the US have done this with North Korea after the Sony Pictures hack294.
27. Additionally, at a NATO Summit in 2014 the organisation set out that the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the event of a cyber-attack would apply295. The heads of state of NATO's member countries met in Wales at what the organisation called a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. They released a joint statement which said: “Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern neighbourhood, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. These can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe.”
28. Looking to the future of conflict, NATO correctly anticipated cyber threats and attacks would continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially damaging, and, in response to the developing challenges, the alliance endorsed an enhanced cyber defence policy. The commitment, they said, reaffirmed the “principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence,” making clear the fundamental cyber defence responsibility of NATO was to protect its own networks. The policy emphasised assistance would always be addressed in accordance with the spirit of solidarity and went to lengths to press the understanding it remained the individual responsibility of allies to develop “relevant capabilities for the protection of national networks.”
Alternative War: Unabridged Page 36
