The spirit and comradeship which became Tobruk’s great strength were forged in battle. But when the various units first sorted themselves out and were drafted to action stations on April 10th, no one could tell how they would stand the test. Everything was against them. The Australians – at any rate – were short of training, equipment and experience; most of them and many of the British troops had just come through a week of dispiriting, bewildering withdrawal. Almost overnight commanders of units and arms, who had never even met before, had to work out co-ordinated plans. There was no time for detailed preparation; much had to depend on what individuals could improvise. The defences were far from strong; the weapons far from adequate. Compared with the enemy, the garrison had but a handful of tanks and aircraft.
They had been carried back to Tobruk on the ebb-tide of defeat, which had swept unchecked from Narvik and Dunkirk; the enemy came against them on the flood-tide of victory, which had already engulfed half Europe. The new German Army with its Blitzkrieg technique and its mass of tanks and dive-bombers had, until this time, appeared invincible. Knowing all this, these men might well have quailed, but the very urgency of their common peril welded them together and fired them with a unity of purpose that only a grave crisis could have developed so swiftly. Yet more important for them than the danger to Suez or themselves was the fact that their reputation in the eyes of their fellows was at stake. They had come to fight; they now had a chance to fight – and fight they would.
_____________
1 The four infantry brigades eventually had three battalions each. The additional ‘battalion’ was the 18th Indian Cavalry Regiment. Later the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion was also used in the line, and, under Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold Brown, carried out its infantry role excellently.
2 For further details of the numbers and units in Tobruk see Appendix I.
CHAPTER 8
THE EASTER BATTLE
THIRTY-SIX hours after the last of the garrison withdrew inside the perimeter, the Germans began probing for weak spots preparatory to launching the concentrated attack that became known as the ‘Easter Battle’. Those thirty-six hours were invaluable. Throughout a hot, dusty day and night sappers laid a minefield around most of the perimeter, while infantry repaired barbed wire and shovelled sand out of the half-filled anti-tank ditch and concrete posts. Transport drivers toiled ceaselessly carrying ammunition, food and water to forward posts and artillery positions. Gunners dug-in their 25-pounders and camouflaged them as best they could. Signallers ran out several hundred miles of wire linking the scattered units. It was a period of hard work, hasty improvisation and urgent ‘scrounging’.
The infantry were perilously short of essential weapons, such as Bren guns and mortars. In time they made up for this by salvaging captured Italian weapons, but not many of these were ready for action when the first attacks came. Weak also in anti-tank artillery, the infantry recovered Italian field guns, which had been lying abandoned since the capture of Tobruk, and set them in position for anti-tank defence. Few of these had sights or instruments, but they were soon giving valuable support to the regular guns and became known as the ‘bush artillery’. The anti-tank defences were considerably strengthened by the last-minute arrival from Mechili on April 10th of the survivors from the 3rd Australian Anti-Tank Regiment and the 3rd R.H.A. They brought with them forty urgently needed guns but the garrison still had not enough to give adequate defence against Rommel’s great tank strength.
This was specially so in view of the inadequate minefields. Because of the scarcity of British mines, Italian ones had to be used, and there was no time to load them with booby-traps which could stop enemy sappers delousing them. This was done later, but in the first few days these mines were as easy for the Germans to delouse as they had been for the Australians. There was no reserve minefield, and work on the Blue Line had not begun when the first attacks were made. The signal position was still serious. With companies holding such vast fronts, telephone communication between forward posts and Company H.Q. was all-important, but the Italian phones, wire and switch-boards, which later gave Tobruk an excellent signals service, had not then been salvaged.
During April 9th and 10th, however, Rommel was no more ready for attack than Tobruk was for defence, and the garrison gained time to put at least the outer defences in order. It seems that Rommel had originally intended to go only as far as Bengazi and to consolidate there before launching his main attack on Cyrenaica; and that he pushed straight on across the desert merely because he found that the British armoured forces were so weak.
Consequently, by the time his vanguard got to Tobruk, he had over-reached himself and had to pause for a few days while the slower-moving elements caught up. Their advance, as we have seen, was delayed by a ‘dust blizzard’, under cover of which the last Australian units withdrew inside the perimeter on the night of April 9th–10th. About noon on the 10th the dust cleared and the 2/28th Battalion, then holding part of the western perimeter, saw enemy tanks and trucks coming down the road from Derna and across the desert to the south of it. Sappers promptly blew up the Derna road bridge just outside the perimeter and ‘bush artillery’ manned by infantry of the 2/28th struck the first blow for the garrison.
One of the gunners, Sergeant E. D. Rule, said later that when the battalion reached Tobruk it acquired eight Italian 75s and two 105s and dug them in about 500 yards behind the forward posts, near the Derna road, primarily for defence against tanks. A British artillery sergeant gave the carrier platoon a few gunnery lessons and by April 10th they were set for action.
‘On this morning,’ Rule said, ‘our Transport Officer was in command of the guns and, when the first enemy vehicles appeared, Battalion H.Q. said he could engage them. The guns had no sights but we got direction by squinting down the barrel, and range by trial and error. As it happened a British artillery colonel was there and he gave expert advice. Our gun drill wasn’t very good and our fire orders would have shocked the R.H.A., but we got the shells away. When the vehicles were about 500 yards out, the T.O. called, “All ready boys, let ’er go.” The first shell fell short. “Cock ’em up a bit, boys,” said the colonel. We did, and the second shot fell dead between the two leading vehicles. We kept on firing and they disappeared in a cloud of dust – and stayed out of range for the rest of the day.’
Soon afterwards, near the Derna road, another ‘bush artillery battery’ and some guns of the 51st Field Regiment had a more prolonged encounter, which ended in the destruction of two enemy armoured cars and seven vehicles. The Axis column withdrew, but not before its artillery had knocked out two guns and two Bren carriers.
Apart from spasmodic shelling and the occasional appearance of enemy vehicles in the distance, the garrison continued work on the defences undisturbed. But R.A.F. reconnaissance planes brought back unmistakable warning of the enemy’s intention. Early on the 10th pilots reported 700 enemy vehicles on the road between Gazala and Tobruk; by nightfall the leading vehicles were discovered only seven miles west of El Adem.
Before noon on the 11th – which was Good Friday – the Germans had by-passed Tobruk; four tanks and some lorried infantry had cut the Bardia road and a column of 300 vehicles was moving east between Tobruk and El Adem. Gott’s Support Group had to pull back towards the frontier. Tobruk was cut off.
On Good Friday afternoon the Axis forces staged a demonstration against Tobruk; it was half reconnaissance and half attack. They made their move against the southern sector of the defences, where Murray’s 20th Brigade was holding a 10½-mile front astride the El Adem road, with the 2/17th on the right, the 2/13th on the left and the 2/15th in reserve. The forward troops were still seriously short of weapons. The 2/17th, for instance, had only the normal establishment of one Bren gun per section and one anti-tank rifle per platoon. They had no anti-tank guns or 2-inch mortars forward and only one 3-inch mortar in the battalion. Captured weapons – so necessary to give them the fire-power to cover their 5-mile front – had not yet bee
n issued.
In the middle of the afternoon the O.C. of the 2/17th’s left company (Major J. W. Balfe) saw enemy infantry, estimated at about a battalion, advancing out of the desert haze some 1500 yards from the perimeter. He called for artillery fire and, as shells began falling round the infantry, they went to ground. Enemy tanks appeared; the infantry rallied and advanced with them straight for Balfe’s company’s front. Our artillery intensified its fire and the infantry went down again, but the tanks continued on.
Balfe later gave me this account of the engagement that followed:
About seventy tanks came right up to the anti-tank ditch and opened fire on our forward posts. They advanced in three waves of about twenty and one of ten. Some of them were big German Mark IVs, mounting a 75 mm gun. Others were Italian M13s and there were a lot of Italian light tanks too. The ditch here wasn’t any real obstacle to them, the minefield had only been hastily rearmed, and we hadn’t one anti-tank gun forward. We fired on them with anti-tank rifles, Brens and rifles and they didn’t attempt to come through, but blazed away at us and then sheered off east towards the 2/13th’s front.
Before this about a battalion of infantry had advanced in close formation on that front as well. As these came on, an officer of the 1st R.H.A., who was directing his guns from a perimeter post, waited until the enemy was less than a mile from the wire. Then he ordered ‘twenty-five rounds gun-fire’ from his four 25-pounders. This sharp greeting stopped the infantry, but about twenty tanks (no doubt one of the waves of tanks which Balfe saw) that had been moving up behind them advanced through the barrage as far as the anti-tank ditch. Then they moved eastwards along the perimeter shelling the forward posts. Near the El Adem road they ran into fire from the Italian 47 mm anti-tank guns, manned by the 2/13th’s mortar platoon. One M13 was knocked out and several others hit. The rest sheered off and swung south. One Italian light tank was even disabled by intense small arms fire, and its crew was captured near the junction of the road and the perimeter.
As the tanks withdrew eleven cruisers of the 1st R.T.R. engaged them from inside the wire. When the last wave of ten tanks appeared the cruisers tackled them too. In thirty minutes of long-range sparring they knocked out one M13 and the artillery destroyed a German Mark IV. Three other Italian ‘lights’ were disposed of during the general skirmish, bringing the Axis losses to seven. Two British Tanks were lost, and since the garrison had only twenty-three cruisers it could ill afford to lose them.
After the Axis tank demonstration the infantry began to move forward once more. According to Balfe:
About 700 of them advanced almost shoulder to shoulder. The R.H.A. let them have it again, but, even though some of the shells fell right among them, they still came on. In later months our patrols in no-man’s-land found scores of German graves, marked by crosses dated April 11th. When the infantry were about 500 yards out we opened up, but in the posts that could reach them we had only two Brens, two anti-tank rifles and a couple of dozen ordinary rifles. The Jerries went to ground at first, but gradually moved forward in bounds under cover of their machine-guns. It was nearly dusk by this time and they managed to reach the anti-tank ditch. From there they mortared nearby posts heavily. We hadn’t any mortars with which to reply and our artillery couldn’t shell the ditch without risk of hitting our own posts.
About ten o’clock we got three mortars and with these kept their machine-guns quiet, while two platoons of the reserve company counter-attacked. But before they reached the ditch, the Germans had withdrawn. We sent two fighting patrols to follow them, but both were driven back by heavy machine-gun fire, which continued sporadically throughout the night.
Meantime there was even more significant activity on the 2/13th Battalion’s front. In the moonlight several enemy tanks came up to the anti-tank ditch, evidently looking for a shallow crossing. They could not find one, and withdrew. In the ditch shortly afterwards a 2/13th patrol disturbed what was evidently a party of pioneers, sent to blow the wire and make a tank crossing. The Germans cleared out, abandoning tools, explosives, Bangalore torpedoes, and a pack radio transmitter. Had this enemy party established a bridgehead, German tanks would no doubt have attacked at dawn. Anticipating this from the events of Good Friday and from R.A.F. reconnaissance, Lavarack during the night deployed the reserve tanks and infantry to meet any attack on the El Adem sector. None came but the enemy gave the garrison time for a useful dress-rehearsal.
Next morning – Saturday, April 12th – Balfe’s company found that the Germans who had withdrawn from the ditch the night before were dug in about 400 yards out on a 1200-yard front. Sniping from there, the enemy hindered the installation of seven anti-tank guns, which reached the perimeter posts about 9 a.m.
These guns arrived just in time, for the advanced screen of Germans was clearly covering preparations for a major attack. Dust-clouds rose from a slight hollow where the enemy was assembling tanks, guns and lorried infantry about 3000 yards out. Three Blenheims bombed one concentration of tanks and transport and the R.H.A. shelled others very heavily and no attack developed that day. After the gunners had landed 500 shells in ninety minutes among the group of sixty vehicles, half a dozen ambulances appeared and picked up the casualties. During the afternoon, in response to an urgent request from Lavarack, half a dozen bombers attacked a concentration of about sixty tanks near the El Adem road.
Later twelve tanks approached the wire, but were driven off by the newly installed anti-tank guns. In the evening more vehicles were seen, some of them towing field pieces, and Balfe directed a moonlight shoot, in which the 1st R.H.A. fired more than 400 rounds. When the dust and smoke cleared there was not a vehicle to be seen. Apart from the occasional shelling and the machine-gun and mortar fire the rest of the night was quiet, though patrols sent out from the forward posts could not advance far into no-man’s-land.
During that day enemy planes had been more active in reconnaissance and bombing. Twice they attacked the guns of the 1st R.H.A. and fifteen stukas with strong escort went for the harbour. They were engaged by ack-ack batteries and by the half-dozen surviving Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron – the only fighters operating from inside the Fortress. Three enemy planes were shot down.
In addition to dropping bombs the enemy scattered pamphlets far and wide. These said:
The General Officer Commanding the German Forces in Libya hereby requests that the British troops occupying Tobruk surrender their arms. Single soldiers waving white handkerchiefs are not fired on. Strong German forces have already surrounded Tobruk and it is useless to try and escape. Remember Mekili. Our dive-bombers and Stukas are awaiting your ships which are lying in Tobruk.
The request went unheeded. ‘No doubt,’ said the Tobruk H.Q. operational summary, ‘owing to the prevailing dust and the necessity to ration water for essential purposes there were no white handkerchiefs available.’ Advising G.H.Q. Cairo of this in its daily situation report, ‘Cyrcom’ said: ‘Leaflets dropped calling on tps [sic] to surrender stop answer –’ The answer consisted of two ‘unprintable’ letters of the alphabet which, though hardly military symbols, expressed the garrison’s reply in the Diggers’ own language.
On Easter Sunday morning, April 13th, the enemy was still busier, though a duststorm cloaked his activities. ‘We saw staff cars and motor-cycles pulled up apparently near a battle H.Q. and we had a crack at them,’ said Balfe later. ‘At the extreme range of 2000 yards our anti-tank gunners hit two motor-cycles and a staff car. But the Germans continued to bring up vehicles and during the morning their artillery began shelling our forward posts. At noon a ‘recce’ plane circled around our company area at about 2000 feet. Late in the afternoon, after a brief bombardment, enemy tanks and infantry again advanced towards the perimeter, but were again stopped by our artillery. Everything indicated, however, that a major assault was coming and that it would be on my company’s front.’
By Easter Sunday afternoon the enemy had gathered a considerable force for this attack. Fortunately Go
tt’s Support Group had drawn off some Axis troops to the frontier and these had already occupied Bardia and were threatening Sollum. Even so, the R.A.F. in the previous two days had reported more than 200 tanks either near El Adem or on their way to Acroma. On the Sunday afternoon, in spite of bad visibility, pilots had spotted 300 vehicles, including a large number of tanks, astride the El Adem road, four or five miles south of the perimeter. Rommel then had outside Tobruk most of the 5th Light Motorized Division – with well over a hundred German tanks of the 5th Regiment; part of the 132nd Ariete Armoured Division with about the same number of Italian tanks; one motorized and one infantry division, both Italian. These last two straddled the Derna and Bardia roads, but the bulk of the other two had been assembled north of El Adem for attack on Tobruk.
The enemy had substantial superiority in tanks and aircraft, but the half-hearted, abortive moves he had made during the weekend had given the garrison experience, self-confidence – and warning. The troops had been able to take stock and they fully appreciated the significance of the message Wavell sent Morshead that Easter Sunday.
Enemy advance means your isolation by land for time being. Defence Egypt now depends largely on your holding enemy on your front . . . Am glad that I have at this crisis such stout-hearted and magnificent troops in Tobruk. I know I can count on you to hold Tobruk to end. My best wishes to you all.
The attack came that night. By eleven o’clock, after an hour’s heavy mortar and machine-gun fire on the forward posts of Balfe’s company, the enemy was seen moving through the wire east of Post 33. About thirty Germans established themselves just inside the wire, and brought up two light field guns, some mortars and eight machine-guns. Small arms fire could not shift them and it was strongly answered from both inside and outside the wire. The position was serious. If this party stayed there, it could cover a bridgehead and hold the gate open for the tanks.
Tobruk 1941 Page 13
