The shelling, which made the German tanks abandon their attack on R8, broke up other attempts by them to organize a major drive down the line of posts. North of R6 at 3.30 p.m., one Australian counted fifty-three German tanks, but an hour later they had withdrawn to escape the British bombardment. All day, supply and ammunition trucks as well as lorried infantry and guns, which they had brought to the bridgehead, were heavily shelled. German prisoners spoke feelingly of the disorganization and delay this caused. In the late afternoon, while the enemy hesitated, British tanks made another attempt to drive him back.
This British force consisted of three cruisers and five ‘I’ tanks. At 3.30 these had been ordered to move along the perimeter from the south-east and to re-establish control of each post in turn. Soon after 5 p.m. they reported that R6, R8 and R9 had been attacked but were still held by the 2/24th. From R6 they saw about fifteen German tanks near R4 and three more on the wire at R3. The British attacked and lost one cruiser in driving off these three, but while doing so, exposed themselves to a flank attack by the fifteen which advanced from R4. One Matilda was hit and although it was not knocked out all the crew except the driver were killed. The fire from the German tanks and the artillery supporting them was so heavy that the surviving British tanks were forced to withdraw, firing as they went. As they pulled back a new threat developed from fourteen fresh tanks that came up on their right flank. Describing this, Sergeant Stockley, who commanded one of the Matildas, said:
Jerry tanks seemed to attack us from all sides. One cruiser was disabled and the other, because of its light armour, had to withdraw leaving us four to fight it out. They had the advantage of being on lower ground, which made us skyline targets. We were all hit many times, but our heavier armour saved us and we kept the Jerry tanks off until it became hard to tell theirs from ours in the half light. Finally we ran short of ammo, and fuel so we had to break away, but we couldn’t keep up our rate of fire and they closed in. Two more of our tanks were knocked out. As we came back one ‘I’ tank tried to tow a crippled cruiser to safety, but it had to be left behind when a chance shell shot away the tow-rope.
This brought the total British casualties in the action to six. Two ‘I’ tanks had been destroyed and two temporarily disabled; two cruisers had also been burnt out. The Germans had had four tanks badly damaged. The British tanks, however, might have had greater success if they had not been used in ‘penny packets’.
It has been proved that it is better to risk all your tanks in one bold action than to fritter them away in several. Throughout May 1st Morshead always kept a third of his tanks in reserve, with the result that in each action the British tanks were more heavily outnumbered than they might have been. Morshead, however, was in a dilemma. Most of his tanks were old and in bad mechanical condition. He did not know which was the enemy’s main thrust nor how severe that might prove to be, for aerial reports were conflicting. Consequently during the morning he kept his tank forces divided and disposed to meet a thrust from the west and from the south as well. He was reluctant to counter-attack with them, because they were needed as a final reserve to deal with any deep penetration. He used them in the morning only in a defensive role, when the Germans threatened to outflank the minefield, and he could not then employ all his tanks since he had them dispersed in three groups.
These considerations explain the handling of the tanks in the morning, but they do not account for the failure to mass all the Matildas and cruisers for a major attack in the afternoon, once the tanks had been ordered to restore the position south of 209. At that stage the German tanks were still dispersed attacking the perimeter posts and recovering from their earlier mauling, but the Tobruk tank commander, Colonel H. L. Birks, sent in barely a third of the available tanks and used even those in two and threes. A bold strike at this time might have driven the enemy tanks back before his infantry had been able to consolidate its position on the southern flank of 209, and would have greatly assisted the Australian infantry when they counter-attacked at dusk. Morshead himself admits this to be fair criticism. It is, however, very easy to criticize after the event, when all the facts are known.
The British tanks used for this late afternoon attack took severe punishment, but did hold up the enemy’s advance until it was too late for him to push on. Even though the British were forced to withdraw, the enemy did not follow them. He was evidently dissuaded from doing so by the heavy bombardment, for which the British tanks called by radio as they broke off the engagement. Instead of pressing their advantage, the German tanks turned back to help their infantry, who were still held up at R6 and R7.
This time the Germans attacked R6 in force. All day they had been exerting strong pressure against it and for several hours two heavy tanks had stood off some seventy-five yards and tried to blast the garrison into submission. Under cover of this fire, enemy infantry had attempted to rush the post but had been repeatedly stopped. Several times the Australian machine-guns had been put out of action, but Corporal A. A. Francis, although wounded twice, and working only with a nail file, had got them going again. But, as dusk fell, a battalion of infantry attacked with the support of tanks and flame-throwers.4 By this time direct hits had knocked out both machine-guns in R6, and half the garrison of fourteen, including its commander (Captain A. C. Bird), had become casualties. Its strength was now so reduced that in the face of this fresh German attack it was forced to surrender at 7.30 p.m.
Simultaneously the Germans attacked R7, but it managed to hold out until the following morning. We know little of what happened in R3 and R5 because the survivors were all captured, but it is known that they were attacked from both inside and outside the wire and that flame-throwers were used against them. While these three posts were holding out they were dive-bombed and machine-gunned by German planes and must have received a severe hammering before they were captured. The strength of their resistance is indicated by the slow enemy progress during the day. Between dawn and dark he had advanced barely a mile from 209 and had taken only five posts.
At 7 p.m., soon after the tank battle ended, the commander of the 5th German Tank Regiment was ordered to prepare for a major drive south-east along the perimeter with his 2nd Battalion plus German and Italian infantry and part of the Ariete Armoured Division. If this force could widen the bridgehead beyond the southern end of the minefield, which had blocked the advance that day, the way would be clear for a deep thrust on the morrow. But at 8 p.m., as they were getting ready for this new attack, the Axis tanks were urgently recalled to 209 to meet a counter-attack that Australian infantry had launched half an hour earlier. Without their tanks the Axis infantry could make no further progress and as darkness fell they began to dig in around R7. That evening men of the 2/1st Pioneers were sent to reinforce the posts on this flank and to prepare a switch-line running eastwards to the minefield to stop the fresh thrust that the Germans were expected to make in the morning, if not earlier.
Meantime the enemy advance had been similarly checked on the northern flank of 209. We do not know what happened there in the morning of May 1st because no one escaped from the area he overran. By 7.30 a.m. he had gained possession of five strongpoints on Hill 209 and north of it, but it took him all the morning to advance a thousand yards and subdue the next three (S5, S6 and S7). During the afternoon Italian infantry, without tank support, could make little impression on the next three posts – S8, S9 and S10, held by part of the 2/24th’s right company. Back in Spowers’s H.Q., however, no one knew what had happened to these three posts, for all signal communications with them had broken down. In the late afternoon therefore Tovell ordered the battalion on Spowers’s right, the 2/23rd, to re-establish contact with, or, if necessary, control of, these three positions. Captain Ian Malloch’s company went out at dusk. Their advance was greeted by mortars and artillery. Bren carriers protecting their flank drew shells from Axis anti-tank guns. They found that S10 was still held by Lieutenant J. S. Rosel and half a dozen men, although it was under heav
y fire from positions beyond. These seven had beaten off several enemy attacks and had only a thousand rounds of ammunition left.
While one of Malloch’s platoons helped to silence nearby machine-guns, his other two pushed on to S8 and S9. At the former five unwounded survivors were still holding on, though they too were down to their last few hundred rounds. When Lieutenant J. N. Bowden’s platoon got near S9 they found the enemy had surrounded it, but after a short hand-to-hand struggle with Italians in the anti-tank ditch around the post they captured thirty-three of them and fought their way through to the relief of Lieutenant J. S. Christie and five men. Christie told them at dusk, under cover of heavy machine-gun fire from the escarpment near S7, Italian infantry had succeeded in getting up to the anti-tank ditch around S9, but had been pinned down there by small arms fire and grenades. Soon after dark, the position in this area was fully restored and the enemy attempt to widen the bridgehead on the northern flank had been stopped. Everything now depended on the counter-attack that the 2/48th Battalion had launched against 209 from the east.
By dark the Germans had been checked on the perimeter both north and south of 209. They had captured fifteen posts on a 3-mile front but had paid heavily for their gains. They had spared no effort and were baffled by the strength of the resistance and alarmed now at the prospect of counter-attack. Schorm’s diary shows this clearly:
It is now late afternoon. Dive-bombers and twin-engined fighters have been attacking the enemy constantly. In spite of this the British repeatedly counter-thrust with tanks. As soon as our planes have gone their artillery starts up furiously. It is beginning to grow dark. Which is friend, which is foe? Shots are being fired all over the place, often on our own troops and on tanks in front, which are on their way back. Suddenly a wireless message – ‘The British are attacking the gap with infantry.’
PHASE III. COUNTER-ATTACK AND STALEMATE
The infantry counter-attack was made by the 2/48th Battalion. Morshead had intended to launch this attack during the afternoon, but had been distracted by a threat from the south. Consequently it was 4.45 p.m. before the 2/48th’s C.O., Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. V. Windeyer, received his final orders to counter-attack westward that evening at 7.15, retake Hill 209, and drive the enemy outside the perimeter. Windeyer asked that the attack be delayed until the following dawn for these reasons: no tanks were available; there was no time for reconnaissance and little for preparation of an adequate artillery programme; and his battalion was widely dispersed on a 5-mile front in the Blue Line. Morshead replied that, in view of the dangerous situation developing on the perimeter south-east of 209, delay might be serious, and that, in spite of the difficulties, the attack must be made that evening. But he added that British tanks would protect Windeyer’s left flank by continuing to engage the German tanks.
With only two and a half hours in which to get his troops to their start-line, Windeyer had a difficult task, particularly as this was the first time his men had made a battalion attack, and this task was made the more difficult by enemy aircraft. Attracted by the dust of the transport bringing the 2/10th to take over the 2/48th’s section of the Blue Line, they swooped on it just as the battalions were changing over. This and a duststorm caused such delay that the 2/48th were twenty minutes late in reaching the start-line about half a mile west of Bianca. The enemy’s complete command of the air gave him ample warning and the Australians were heavily shelled as they debussed. This caused further casualties and delay, and by the time they moved off their artillery barrage had already lifted too far ahead to give them the support that had been planned.
To make matters worse, the troops had little information as to how far the enemy had penetrated and they could not now pick out his positions in the bad light and the dust raised by the wind and shelling. Carriers were sent forward to draw fire from enemy machine-guns in the hope of discovering where these were, but they were driven back by anti-tank fire.
The general line of the attack was down the Acroma road – a dirt track leading due west from Bianca and crossing the perimeter half a mile north of 209. ‘D’ Company was ordered to advance along the right of this road, while ‘A’, on the left, struck direct for 209 along a track that these South Australians had named ‘Pirie Street’. ‘B’ Company of the 2/24th was ordered to move from its reserve position westwards down the Acroma road in conjunction with the 2/48th’s advance.
In spite of the shelling, ‘D’ Company advanced more than a mile before it was checked just at dark by severe fire from anti-tank and machine-guns emplaced near S4 and S6. Forced to bear off to the right, it lost contact with the company on its left. The Australians tried to get forward in bounds, but the enemy fire became heavier and they were finally pinned down 250 yards short of the German positions. The company Sergeant-Major (E. A. Noble) told me later that as they advanced the Germans in front of them pulled back, but those on the flanks held their ground. ‘And so we were soon being shot up from our front and both flanks,’ he said. ‘We couldn’t use our Brens effectively to answer their machine-guns, because we didn’t know where they were. We fired on their flashes but they still kept going.’
Undeterred by this, the company commander (Captain H. A. Woods) crept forward with Noble and two runners in an attempt to locate the enemy posts. After going a hundred yards they could hear German voices, but in the darkness could not pick out the positions from which these came. One German called out, ‘Come here, Aussie. Surrender!’ The reply was typically Australian. One runner was hit and as Woods moved over to help him he too was badly wounded. The machine-gun fire increased and Woods decided they could not go on, even with the help of the reserve company that Windeyer had sent up to support him. At 9.30 the two companies began to withdraw, still suffering casualties from enemy fire which showed no signs of slackening.
In the meantime the 2/24th’s ‘B’ Company had lost a third of its men as it advanced along the Acroma road. It was finally forced back by three tanks and more than half a dozen machine-guns established astride the road. The left company of the 2/48th (commanded by Major J. Loughrey) had also been held up by German tanks in the strangest incident in the day’s fighting. An account of this was given to me by Lieutenant H. C. Morphett, who commanded the platoon on the extreme left.
As we moved down Pirie St. towards the minefield, we saw six tanks moving west, half a mile on our left. We had been told our tanks would be operating in that area so we continued on without taking much notice of them. But when they got within 150 yards of us one fired a burst from its machine- gun right along our line. No one was hit and we still thought they were ours and that they must be shooting at something beyond us. They followed us through the minefield and came up within twenty-five yards of our left section. Suddenly we realized they had Nazi flags on them, and when one tank fired again we lost no time in going to ground. But it didn’t continue firing and the tanks filed past us towards Hill 209. When they were 300 yards ahead, they turned round and let us have it. There was no cover at all and as our weapons made no impression on them, we lay there until dark. Then we tried to advance again, but the combined fire of tanks and machine-guns stopped us 500 yards short of 209, and we were ordered to withdraw.
If the story of this incident had not been told to me by three reliable eye-witnesses, I should have been reluctant to believe it. It is strange that the tanks did not strafe the platoon more severely at close quarters. Apparently they were hurrying back into position to meet expected intervention of British tanks.
Thus the 2/48th counter-attack petered out and before midnight the battalion was back at Bianca. It had not achieved its main objective – the recapture of 209 – primarily because the assisting fire was insufficient. It had no Vickers gun support and, having lost the advantage of the barrage, its own fire-power was not enough to carry it through. Nevertheless, it had stopped two dangerous German moves. As we saw earlier, the enemy’s plan to attack in force southwards along the perimeter at dusk had petered out when his tanks ha
d been rushed back to 209 to ward off the 2/48th’s attack.5 This gave Morshead time to establish fresh anti-tank guns and infantry on the southern flank of the enemy salient. Similarly he was able to consolidate the positions on the northern flank.
Most important of all, however, the 2/48th forced the enemy on to the defensive and stopped him sending sappers forward after dark to delouse the minefield that had checked his tanks during the first morning. Late in the afternoon half a dozen German tanks had found a way through the minefield, but they had been withdrawn when the counter-attack was launched. The 2/48th might have achieved even more if, instead of withdrawing to the Blue Line after the attack, it had been ordered to dig in on the east side of the tactical minefield. Its advance had driven the enemy back west of this field, and the ground it had recovered might well have been held. As it was, when dawn broke on May 2nd, there was nothing between the Germans and Bianca, except the minefield, for even the 2/24th’s reserve company had been withdrawn from its position near Forbes Mound – a small rise just north of the Acroma road and a mile west of Bianca – named after Captain W. Forbes of the 2/48th.
The way was open and the Germans were expected to attack again at first light on May 2nd. But by then a heavy duststorm blanketed Tobruk, making movement difficult and serious attack unlikely. Small parties of Germans felt their way forward in half-hearted probings, but the enemy made no concerted drive. The storm gave the garrison time to bring up fresh infantry, form a new switch-line to contain the enemy salient and move more field and anti-tank guns to cover it. All day British gunners poured shell after shell into enemy-held areas, while Australian infantry dug new positions and sappers laid new minefields. But even as they fired and worked, they did not know when the storm would raise its curtain and reveal the stage set for another German thrust.
Tobruk 1941 Page 19
