General Taylor was not alone in his reservations about Hood’s plans. Braxton Bragg also warned Davis that Hood’s weakness along with Sherman’s overwhelming force made remote any chances of success, for Federal forces outnumbered the Confederates by more than two to one. Their combined opposition did not change Davis’s mind, for neither did adopting a defensive stance guarantee victory.48
Command structure as well as strategy received Davis’s attention. In this area, political considerations took primacy. The removal of Joseph Johnston had caused unrest that only intensified after the fall of Atlanta. Although Davis had no intention of sacking Hood, he did want to placate his critics and at the same time help his effort to boost public morale. He contemplated creating a new theater command, similar to the old Department of the West. This new one would be termed the Military Division of the West, with boundaries reaching from Georgia to the Mississippi and including Hood’s and Richard Taylor’s forces. The commander would have to be an experienced full general. Because Lee was required in Virginia, and Bragg and Johnston were impossibilities, there was only one choice—Beauregard. Davis’s opinion of Beauregard had not improved, but if he wanted a grand command in the West in the autumn of 1864, he had no alternative. And he was prepared to make use of Beauregard’s public reputation and popularity.49
Even before leaving Richmond for Georgia, Davis had this new structure and Beauregard in mind. He asked Lee about Beauregard’s availability and willingness to accept a western post. Because neither Lee nor Beauregard was satisfied with the latter’s difficult position in Virginia as Lee’s deputy, both generals eagerly welcomed the president’s suggestions. At Palmetto, Davis broached the possibility to Hood, and in Montgomery to Taylor. Both agreed. On his return to the capital, Davis met with Beauregard in Augusta. They discussed both Hood’s strategy, which Davis had already approved, and Beauregard’s job. Beauregard backed Hood’s northern move and accepted his new assignment, commanding general of the Military Division of the West.50
Beauregard’s orders dated October 2 made clear his authority and the character of his duties. He was authorized to establish his headquarters wherever he thought best, within the limits of his command. “Your personal presence is expected wherever in your judgment the interests of your command render it expedient,” his instructions read. They also made clear that he was the commanding general. Davis certainly gave Beauregard authority to command, but Beauregard, like Joseph Johnston before him and like so many other Civil War generals, could not conceive of commanding without actually leading troops in the field. General responsibility over a geographical area or theater rather than a specific army made Beauregard uncomfortable. The instructions that “he would be without troops directly under him” and that “he was not superseding General Hood” left Beauregard unsure about his new post. But his desire to be on his own, and the president’s promise of support, persuaded him to accept the assignment.51
The device of the Military Division of the West and the selection of Beauregard as its commanding general constituted a masterstroke. It provided advice and restraint for a young field commander. It muted public criticism after Atlanta. It resurrected an old hero to repel the invader from the southern heartland.
After his western tour, the president headed back to Virginia, with stops in Augusta and in Columbia. In Augusta he met to discuss military matters with Beauregard, Cobb, and also Hardee, whom he had reassigned from the Army of Tennessee to command the South Atlantic coast. On October 3 he also made a major speech. In spite of inclement weather, he had a substantial audience. Davis rode in a carriage from the railroad station to the nearby speaker’s platform. When he stepped down from the carriage, women crowded around to get a glimpse of him, even to kiss his hand, according to a reporter. Davis then journeyed to Columbia, where he was the guest of his former aide General James Chesnut. At Chesnut’s home a group of small boys came to serenade him. On the fourth, the mayor welcomed him, and he spoke to a large assembly. Afterwards, in Mary Chesnut’s words, his hand was “nearly shaken off.” That evening the Chesnuts, with the governor of South Carolina in attendance, provided a sumptuous dinner that belied reality and harkened back to the halcyon days of 1861—boned turkey stuffed with truffles along with stuffed tomatoes and stuffed peppers on elegant old china. A sixty-year-old Madeira accompanied this feast. When Davis departed, a wealthy Columbian provided some dozen bottles of fine wine for the president to take on the train.52
Finally, on October 6, after more than two weeks on the road, he got back to Richmond. As on his two previous western trips, he had made critical decisions on military policy, and in public appearances, impromptu talks, and major speeches he had toiled strenuously to rally his fellow citizens.53
Just before leaving Richmond for this trip, President Davis wrote two letters that highlighted themes he stressed on his western journey. On September 19 he penned a circular to six governors, from Virginia westward to Alabama, in which he preached the gospel of unity. Several states had issued proclamations requiring all aliens either to enter the army or leave the state. Pointing to the essential labor provided by foreigners in Confederate factories and workshops, Davis urged the state leaders to rethink their policies in this instance. In his view, all Confederates must join together in making their utmost contribution to the war effort. At the same time, he assured the governors he wanted no clash between the central government and state governments and would raise no issue that could lead to conflict. Unity must be the watchword. On the day before his circular went out, he requested Senator Herschel Johnson of Georgia to combine with him in striving to produce “the support of a public opinion which will drive to the army all who belong to it, and all who ought to belong to it.…”54
On his trip to and from Hood’s army, in addition to a number of short talks, the president gave at least four major addresses, in which he tried to generate renewed enthusiasm for a cause that he insisted remained virtuous and was not lost. Carried in newspapers, his words reached far beyond his immediate audience. Before even reaching Hood’s headquarters, he addressed a Macon meeting that had been called to discuss aid for Atlanta refugees. He also spoke in Montgomery, and on his return in Augusta and Columbia.55
Acknowledging the continuing importance of local identity, Davis praised each state for its participation in the war. In Macon, he called himself a son of Georgia because of his father’s birth in the state and said he would never forget that Georgians had battled so valiantly. Before Alabama lawmakers, he applauded the exertions their state had made in behalf of the Confederacy. In Columbia, he expressed gratitude for all South Carolina’s sacrifices during the conflict. In all of these speeches he also defended his removal of General Johnston and his opposition to Governor Brown’s policies.
Davis concentrated on four major topics in these addresses. First, he regularly conceded Confederate setbacks, but always hastened to add that “our cause is not lost.” The president declared the Army of Tennessee could and would strike back at the enemy, just as Lee had done in Virginia. Sherman would never be able to maintain his communications, Davis predicted. Moreover, he prophesied that the invading Federal host would meet the same fate that befell the French in Russia a half century earlier. According to this script, Sherman, like Napoleon before him, would suffer harassment and eventually destruction. On his return in speeches at Augusta and Columbia, Davis said he came away from visiting with Hood and Taylor more confident than ever. He was convinced the revived, rejuvenated Army of Tennessee would soon drive the invaders from Georgia. Speaking directly to those who were giving up on the Confederacy, Davis maintained they were simply unaware of what had been done in the army and what would be done. He assured doubters that he did not doubt the future.
In order for the army to accomplish its task most expeditiously, Davis exhorted absent soldiers to return to the ranks. His second major theme was the large number of men away from the army. Admitting that as much as two-thirds of the army’s strength
was absent, and most of that number absent without leave, he urged all to return promptly. He refused to dwell on reasons for absence; instead, he called on all men to meet their patriotic duty. “The man who repents and goes back to his commander voluntarily, at once appeals strongly to Executive clemency.” In contrast, Davis asked where those who stayed away would shield themselves after the war, “when every man’s history will be told …?” He pressed all citizens to help push the absentees back to the colors.
His attempt to enlist everyone’s help in repopulating the army led Davis to his third basic theme, addressed chiefly to the group he believed most influential in this critical endeavor: women. Praising them for being “like the Spartan mothers of old,” he celebrated their “sacrifices which, if written, would be surpassed by nothing in history.” In the war, they had performed their great duty. “You have given up all. You have sent your husbands, your fathers, your sons to the army.…” Moreover, these wives, daughters, and mothers had “buoy[ed] up the hearts of the people.”
But now, Davis proclaimed, “you must do more.” He said Confederate women “must use your influence to send all to the front, and form a public opinion that shall make the skulker a marked man, and leave him no house wherein he can shelter.” Davis even incorporated romance. “And with all sincerity, I say to my young friends here, if you want the right man for a husband, take him whose armless sleeve and noble heart betoken the duties he has rendered to his country, rather than he who has never shared the toils, or borne the danger of the field.”
From the letters that crossed his desk, the president knew that many mothers and wives wanted their men back home to provide sustenance and protection. In numerous areas of the Confederacy, invasion and conquest by Union forces had broken down the normal social and economic order. The president also knew that pleas from women affected the troops—whether or not he or his commanders granted leaves or resignations. The desertion rate gave indisputable proof that their women’s entreaties moved soldiers to leave their units for home. In these speeches, he attempted to convince women that their ultimate safety depended upon the defeat of the enemy. Given this reality, he told them they must stand stalwart until their men could accomplish their crucial mission. He pleaded with them not to establish safe havens away from the battle lines.
Davis’s final point underscored precisely why the return of the absent soldiers was so critical. He asserted that only battlefield victory would guarantee Confederate success. Declaring the war not a revolution but a struggle of “a free and independent people” to protect their rights by creating “a better government when they saw fit,” he announced independence the only Confederate hope. He had striven for peace, he professed, but to no avail, for all his efforts had been rebuffed. He demanded the independence of the Confederate States, and Abraham Lincoln absolutely refused this condition for ending the war. Thus, military triumph was essential. To secure this imperative purpose, Davis defended his administration’s legislative program. “We are fighting for existence,” and that struggle, he averred, demanded war measures. Even though he could not predict “how many sacrifices it may take,” he again expressed no doubt about the final outcome. In his mind, all Confederates comprehended the enormity of the stakes. Moreover, “I believe that a just God looks upon our cause as holy, and that of our enemy as iniquitous.” Harking back to Old Testament prophets and centuries of Christian sermons, Davis declared that God “may chastise us for our offences, but in so doing He is preparing us, and in His good Providence will assist us, and never desert the right.”
Back in Richmond, the president received word that his arduous labors had been productive, at least in part. It was far too early to know whether men were returning to the army, but the public seemed to respond. Before going, Davis had been condemned publicly and privately for “indulg[ing]” his “pitiful personal feelings” in making policy. Accusations of “unworthy motives” prompting presidential actions spouted from his opponents. In contrast, both Georgia senators hailed Davis’s effort. “Your visit to Georgia has been decidedly beneficial,” wrote Senator Johnson, who said the presidential presence helped “heal the heart burnings.” Senator Hill concurred: “the spirit of the people has evidently improved.” Echoing this assessment, the editor of a Macon newspaper especially cheered Beauregard’s appointment because it would enable friends of the administration to refute charges “that you are implacable in your resentments and know not how to forgive.” Even those troubled by Davis’s stalwart oratorical defense of himself found continuing personal attacks even more disquieting. According to this view, public morale, the “last great element of defense,” depended at least partially upon faith in the president. Davis’s trip also sparked a meeting of several governors in Augusta. These chief executives came together and passed resolutions entreating all Confederates to reunite zealously behind the war effort.56
Despite such heartening statements and actions, Davis’s most inveterate foes held fast to their implacable opposition and different vision. Yet, as before, extremism and enduring divisiveness undercut their ability to make headway. The most potent unit, the Brown-Stephens combine, advocated a convention of states that would negotiate peace, perhaps with reunion, a tactic generally known as reconstruction. A handful of congressmen and Holden districts in North Carolina joined in. But all to no avail. A public letter from one congressman generated no enthusiasm. In North Carolina, fervor for peace went down with Holden. Governor Brown could not even persuade his own legislature to stand with him. For most Confederates, talk of giving up independence went too far. The Richmond Examiner, which regularly excoriated the president, spoke for them when it denounced Brown and his proposal for reconstruction. Even in the fall of 1864, the overwhelming majority of Confederates, including officeholders on both state and national levels, still stood stalwart for independence. No serious competitor had risen to challenge the president.57
Although Davis remained adamant against any kind of separate state action and utterly opposed any negotiating terms that did not make independence a sine qua non, he demonstrated a willingness to try different approaches to reach his goal. As the presidential election of 1864 approached in the United States, numerous Confederates hoped for a Democratic victory over Abraham Lincoln that would result in ending the war. Lincoln worried they were right. Confederates wanted to do all they could to help all opponents of Lincoln. Davis doubted that his government could have much impact except through steadfastness on the battlefield. He wrote Governor Vance that he foresaw no change in Federal policy “until the enemy is beaten out of his vain confidence in our subjugation.” Yet he had been told that significant numbers of antiwar and anti-Lincoln northerners, especially in the Middle West, were eager for peace, even if it meant Confederate independence.58
Word of this latent fifth column came to the president from several different sources. In the late spring of 1863 Clement L. Vallandigham, a major Democratic figure in Ohio, whom Lincoln had banished from the United States for antiwar activities, showed up in Richmond touting himself as a leader of forces who wanted Lincoln defeated and the war ended. He talked with civilian and military officials, though not directly with the president. Later that year, Confederate prisoners of war who escaped from confinement in Ohio claimed the Confederacy could make positive use of restive northerners. In March 1864 a Missouri Confederate traveled to Richmond and claimed to Davis that 490,000 men in states from New York to Iowa, but mostly in the Middle West, stood ready to aid the Confederacy and were prepared to challenge the Lincoln administration, by force if necessary.59
Davis was persuaded to help his alleged allies in the North. He hoped for “the adoption of some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile section.” In February 1864 the Congress appropriated $5 million to fund clandestine enterprises. It was decided to mount this campaign of subversion from Canada, where Confederate agents could more easily meet with antiwar activists and Confederate sympathizers. In April the pres
ident appointed Clement C. Clay, Jr., of Alabama and Jacob Thompson of Mississippi to oversee the operation. Davis had long known each man, and Clay had been a particular friend, though the friendship had recently been buffeted by political disagreement and misunderstanding. Equally important, because of previous public service in the 1850s—Clay in the United States Senate and Thompson in the House and in James Buchanan’s cabinet—both were well known among northern Democrats. Neither was eager for the assignment, but convictions about duty and the promise of presidential support gained acceptance from both. Given oral instructions by the president, they ran the blockade from Wilmington, reached Bermuda, and journeyed on to Canada. Thompson carried $1 million in specie with him.60
Clay and Thompson engaged in an amazing variety of ventures. A major goal was to funnel financial aid to Lincoln opponents who would take an active role in stirring up antiwar sentiment. There was talk of a massive uprising in the summer and of disrupting the Democratic convention to be held in Chicago. The Confederates plotted to liberate captured soldiers from prison camps on Lake Erie and near Chicago and to destroy military property. Men who schemed to burn New York City also received money.
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