Towards the end of February, Sir Neil Campbell went to the Italian mainland on business, coincidentally at the same time that British warships stationed at Elba were absent for a few days. Napoleon grabbed his chance. He packed 600 men of his little army on to the brig Inconstant – part of Elba’s tiny navy. The flag of Elba was hauled down and the tricolour of Revolutionary France raised in its stead.
On 26 March the Inconstant put to sea, heading north-west for France. The following day it was sighted by the Royal French ship Zéphir, flying the white flag sprinkled with gold fleur-de-lis of the royal dynasty. The captain of the Zéphir saw that the Inconstant was flying the now illegal tricolour and closed to hail and demand an explanation. Nobody on board the Inconstant replied and, concerned by the superior armament of the ship, the captain of the Zéphir hauled away.
On 1 March Napoleon and his tiny force landed at Golfe-Juan, then a tiny fishing village but now a holiday resort on the Cote d’Azur. He marched to the town of Antibes, where he was greeted by enthusiastic crowds. He made a speech, which he would repeat at every town he subsequently entered. Napoleon promised to restore the reforms of the Revolution, cut taxes and restore the vote to all adult men. He summoned former soldiers to join his army on a temporary basis to safeguard the new revolution. He also sent out agents to repeat his promises and post up copies of his speech in villages and towns.
It was quickly evident that not everyone was delighted to welcome Napoleon back to France. Several towns in western Provence gave Napoleon’s agents a cold reception and some began mustering local militia against him. Knowing that Provence had always been lukewarm about the Revolution, and fearing that a royal army would be marching against him, Napoleon made a decision influenced as much by political as by military considerations.
Instead of taking the main road north up the valley of the Rhône, Napoleon marched his army north through Grasse, Castellane and Gap towards Grenoble – a city long known for its revolutionary and Napoleonic fervour. The route not only took him away from the royalist areas of Provence, it also followed steep, narrow roads that could not be used by artillery. Napoleon had no artillery, but the royal army did. If he was going to meet an enemy army, Napoleon wanted to meet one that did not have large guns.
On 5 March Napoleon was passing La Mure, with Grenoble only a couple of hours’ march away, when he heard that the road ahead was blocked at a defile by the 5th Infantry Regiment. The opposing forces were about equal, though Napoleon had the advantage of having a hundred or so cavalry. The two small armies drew up to face each other. But Napoleon knew that if he were to succeed he would need to do so peacefully. A civil war could end only in his own defeat.
Taking his life in his hands, Napoleon ordered his men to ground arms. He then walked forwards alone and unarmed to face the levelled guns and bayonets of the 5th Regiment. Having got to within 20 metres of the men, Napoleon stopped. He unbuttoned his coat and threw it open to reveal the uniform of his own Imperial Guard.
He declared, ‘If any of you soldiers of France wish to kill your emperor, here I am.’ There followed a few seconds of tense silence, followed by a shout of ‘Vive l’Empereur’ from the ranks of the 5th. Discipline collapsed and the men of the 5th surged forwards to crowd around Napoleon.
The next day another infantry regiment came marching toward Napoleon’s army. This time there was no confrontation. Its commander, Charles de la Bédoyère, sent ahead a message saying that he and his men were loyal to Napoleon.
Face to face with Marshal Ney
Meanwhile a more dangerous force was approaching. When news of Napoleon’s arrival in France first reached Paris, the newspaper Le Moniteur announced the news with the headline ‘The Monster is Loose’, followed the next day by ‘The Corsican Ogre has landed at Cape Juan’.
King Louis and his government were unconcerned. They had more than 100,000 men under arms, loyalists were in positions of power and influence in the government and Napoleon had a tiny force without artillery. Louis turned to Ney and asked what should be done. ‘He should be brought to Paris in an iron cage,’ responded Ney, explaining that the last thing that France needed was a civil war. Louis, suffering badly from an attack of gout, appointed Ney to lead a large army south to stop Napoleon’s advance and arrest him for treason.
In Vienna the news of Napoleon’s landing in France caused rather more consternation. Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia all declared war on Napoleon – not on France – and each pledged to put 150,000 men into the field within three months. A command was sent out by the fastest horses available to put the orders into action.
Everyone in Vienna knew that there would be problems with getting things moving. Britain did not have an army of 150,000 men at all, so its promise would probably be made good by including the navy. The Russian army was dispersed across the vast Russian Empire and would take months to gather; much the same was true of most of the Austrian army. Only the Prussians stood much chance of getting an army to march against France in the near future, and the size of that force was in doubt.
Ney, meanwhile, had gathered his army and had got as far as Auxerre. By 14 March he was in a distraught frame of mind. He was aware that all along the route north the civilians had cheered Napoleon and local authorities had declared for the emperor. He knew also that several garrisons of troops had likewise declared for Napoleon. Ney had been one of Napoleon’s most talented commanders and closest associates, but he had taken service with King Louis and was uncertain how Napoleon might react to such disloyalty. He had been sincere in telling Louis that France could not afford a civil war and that arresting Napoleon was the best way to avoid this, but now he was not so sure. Joining Napoleon might be the surest way to avoid civil war.
Ney talked things over with his officers, then had a letter from Napoleon slipped into his hand. The letter repeated Napoleon’s plans as announced in his speeches, then reassured Ney as to his own personal position. ‘I will receive you as I did after the Battle of the Moskowa,’ it read. The reference was to a celebrated event during the campaign of 1812 when Napoleon had publicly dubbed Ney ‘the bravest of the brave’.
Next morning Ney announced to his army that the true ruler of a country was chosen by its people, not by inheritance. They men cheered and Ney led them to join Napoleon.
King Louis concluded that he had chosen unreliable commanders. First de la Bédoyère and now Ney had changed sides. He sent a larger army under the command of his brother the count of Artois and cousin the duke of Orléans to defeat Napoleon. On 19 March the men and most officers of this army mutinied and declared for Napoleon. Artois and Orléans fled back to Paris and next day King Louis clambered into a coach and raced for the Dutch border.
Napoleon is carried shoulder high into the Tuileries Palace in Paris. His return was widely welcomed by the mass of French citizens who expected him to restore the liberties and freedoms that they had gained in the Revolution.
Back in power – a new constitution
On 20 March Napoleon entered Paris. The next day Le Moniteur – the same newspaper that had called him a ‘monster’ and an ‘ogre’ a fortnight earlier – announced, ‘Yesterday evening His Majesty the Emperor made his public entry into our City.’
The Parisian press may have been won over, but Napoleon’s enemies were not. The first real trouble came in Provence. The duke of Angoulême – whose wife had so upset Ney’s wife – happened to be in Provence when Napoleon landed and marched north. He quickly mustered a force of men loyal to King Louis and seized a number of towns and key strategic positions – including the great naval base of Toulon. He took his main force as far up the Rhône Valley as the great fortress town of Valence and there awaited relief from the Austrian army mustering in northern Italy.
Those who met Napoleon in Paris could not help noticing that he had put on weight while living on Elba. A few remarked that he was no longer as restive as before, and wa
s prone to periods of sitting around talking or eating. What only a very few people knew was that Napoleon was now suffering from medical problems.
Neither of Napoleon’s conditions were especially serious, but both were painful and uncomfortable. The first was that he suffered from periodic bouts of urine retention. More serious for the campaign to come were his haemorrhoids. This condition can be uncomfortable at the best of times, but it made sitting a horse for more than an hour or so extremely painful. Napoleon had to travel in a coach instead of on horseback. This not only slowed down his movements but also restricted him to good-quality roads.
In the days before radio communications, a military commander needed to be able to travel around the battlefield to see things for himself. Napoleon was not able to do this and consequently was not always fully aware of what was going on.
Such problems were not, however, readily apparent in Paris in March 1815. And Napoleon had other problems.
The most immediately pressing issue was the need to justify his coup and ensure that the move had popular support among the French people. Napoleon therefore called in the constitutional expert Benjamin Constant to draft a new constitution for France. The franchise was expanded to more than 3 million men immediately, with provision for further expansion. The parliament was to be composed of one chamber of hereditary peers and a second of elected deputies.
The draft constitution – it never got as far as being implemented – guaranteed the freedom of the press and a host of what today would be termed human rights. It also gave to the emperor powers rather more limited than those either Louis XVIII or Napoleon himself had enjoyed before 1814. Napoleon told Constant, ‘I am growing old. The repose of a constitutional king may suit me. It will more surely suit my son.’
Dealing with the French royalists
Meanwhile, Napoleon was determined to establish control over all of France, and in particular of the naval base at Toulon. He sent an army south to tackle the duke of Angoulême. The force was led by Marshal Grouchy, a commander who would play a significant role in the Waterloo campaign.
On 9 April, Grouchy reached Valence and prepared to besiege the city and the duke of Angoulême. However, Angoulême knew that the Austrians had decided to march their main force north to invade France across the Rhine. He was therefore no longer expecting support from the Austrians and opened talks with Grouchy. The two men agreed that Angoulême’s men would lay down their arms, but would be free to return home without any reprisals for their action. Delighted to have gained a bloodless victory, Grouchy hurriedly took control of southern France and then returned to Paris. Angoulême, meanwhile, set sail for Britain.
While Grouchy was dealing with Angoulême, a new royalist uprising had begun in the Vendée, in the lower valley of the Loire river. The area had never been particularly keen on the Revolution and had rebelled twice before, in 1792 and 1799. Now the Vendée erupted in a pro-royalist rebellion yet again. The leader was Jean-Baptiste Constant, count of Suzannet, who had led the 1799 uprising. He was assisted by another local nobleman, Charles de Beaumont, count of Autichamp. He, too, had fought in the 1799 uprising and, like Suzannet, had subsequently surrendered to Napoleon and been living quietly in retirement. The two men had taken up local government positions on the restoration of Louis XVIII and now saw it as their duty to retain those positions for the king in the face of what they saw as an illegal military coup.
Suzannet and Autichamp captured the town of Cholet and nearby areas without a struggle, but found that very few men rallied to their colours. Only about 8,000 men could be found, and few of them had any real military experience. Unable to advance towards the major towns of the region, the royalists began preparing defensive positions to hold out against the expected Napoleonic offensive.
But the offensive was slow in coming. The royalists were not holding any strategically important areas, so Napoleon felt that he had more important matters to attend to. General Jean Lamarque was sent to the Vendée with 3,000 men. He had orders to recruit men locally to tackle the royalists and to keep them pinned back in their defensive positions, where they could do little harm to Napoleon.
It was not these internal enemies that formed the main threat to Napoleon – it was his foreign foes.
Grouchy
Emmanuel de Grouchy was born in 1766 into one of the premier noble families of France – indeed, his grandmother was rumoured to have been a mistress of King Louis XV. Despite this, young Grouchy was a fervent supporter of the Revolution and fought with success in several campaigns. Although his skill and courage as a cavalry commander were highly acclaimed, Napoleon preferred to use Grouchy in administrative and diplomatic tasks for most of the period 1803–12. In 1814 Grouchy was badly injured at the Battle of Craonne. This rather conveniently meant that he avoided making any pledges of loyalty to the restored King Louis, being able to claim he was too ill to journey to Paris. Grouchy’s wounds healed suddenly and conveniently in March 1815, allowing him to join Napoleon’s army. After the Waterloo campaign, Grouchy fled to the United States of America where he lived until pardoned in 1821. In 1830 he was restored to his military ranks and to his title of Marquis de Grouchy. He lived in retirement to his death in 1847.
Emmanuel de Grouchy, 1766 - 1847
Chapter 2
‘White knight to black bishop’
Sir Charles Oman, commenting on Napoleon’s ability to mask his intentions.
Almost as soon as news arrived in Vienna that Napoleon had landed in France, the war began. The alliance that was hurriedly put together appeared to be impressive indeed. Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal and a host of smaller German and Italian states all allied themselves against Napoleon. Together they could put nearly 1 million men into the field. The date for the joint invasion of France was set for 1 July 1815.
In fact the vast coalition was not as impressive as it appeared to be. The unity of purpose was largely illusory. Only days before, Austria and Russia had nearly gone to war with each other – while Prussia had lingering doubts about British policies and was openly hostile to Austrian claims to leadership of the German-speaking peoples.
Moreover the ability of the allies to put armies into the field was rather in doubt. Some powers were quite unable to do what they had promised. King Ferdinand VII of Spain, for instance, had promised at Vienna to send two armies to invade France. One would go over the eastern Pyrenees to seize Perpignan and Narbonne, the other over the western Pyrenees to take Bayonne and Bordeaux. However, the Spanish government was bankrupt and Spain itself had been badly damaged by eight years of French occupation and wars of liberation. Nobody seriously expected the Spanish army to invade France – at least not in 1815.
‘German Corps’
Rather more useful were expected to be the armies of an assortment of smaller states in northern Germany. The Electorate of Hessen, Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, Duchy of Saxe-Gotha, Duchy of Anhalt-Bernburg, Duchy of Anhalt-Dessau, Duchy of Anhalt-Köthen, Principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Principality of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Principality of Waldeck, Principality of Lippe and the Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe all promised to muster their armies at Koblenz by early June. It was expected that they would together total around 25,000 men.
Because none of these small states had a military commander of note, and in any case were jealous of each other’s status, they asked Prussia to provide a commander. General Friedrich von Nollendorf was given the task, but he had barely arrived when he fell dangerously ill and effective command fell to his second in command, the Hessian general, von Engelhardt.
Engelhardt soon experienced difficulties welding his confusing array of separate forces into a single army. The various armies did, at least, all speak the same language but their system of commands varied dramatically, as did the tactics in which the
y were trained. Even more diverse were the uniforms. The army of Anhalt-Bernburg wore green jackets and grey trousers. The men of Mecklenburg-Schwerin wore blue coats and white trousers, except the cavalry who were in green. The troops of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach wore white coats with grey trousers, while those of Anhalt-Bernburg were kitted out in a fetching shade of sky blue. Making the confusion worse, the rank badges varied enormously, making it difficult for a captain from Oldenburg to know if he were supposed to give orders to an officer from Waldeck or take orders from him.
The task of this ‘German Corps’ – as it was dubbed – was to guard the Rhine around Koblenz. When war began in early July it was expected to advance on the French fortress towns of Sedan, Bouillon, Montmédy, Laon and Rheims, to which it would lay siege. After capturing those strongpoints, the German Corps was to advance on Paris in co-operation with the Prussian army of Field Marshal Blücher that was forming to its north.
Russian contingents
Other armies were likely to take part, but were certainly going to be late. Tsar Alexander of Russia had promised 250,000 men, with 200,000 men marching immediately and the rest following on in the summer. In fact, it was difficult to know how large these two Russian armies really were. Corruption was widespread and endemic, being considered a normal part of military life. Officers routinely claimed their units were larger than they really were. This enabled them to draw pay and rations for men who did not exist and take it for themselves. It is thought that the First Russian Army may have had an actual strength of about 160,000 men, compared to an official strength of 200,000; but nobody is, or was, certain.
The Russians’ military effectiveness was further hampered by their appalling supply system. The supply wagons trundling along behind the troops were empty as often as they were full. More than once in the campaigns of 1812–14 Russian soldiers had been unable to attack due to a total lack of ammunition. Food was also frequently missing, forcing the men to steal and loot to stave off hunger. Whenever civilians learned a force of Russians was approaching they packed everything up and left. What could not be taken away was buried or hidden deep in the forests.
The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance Page 2
