‘Cockade be damned,’ shouted Blücher. ‘A dirty dog is a dirty dog.’ He threw Bourmont out of his headquarters and refused to see him again.
Despite his anger, Blücher had gained from Bourmont’s defection. He now knew beyond doubt that Napoleon and his main army were marching into the Netherlands. What he did not know was quite what Napoleon’s intentions were.
Hearing of the desertion, Napoleon made some changes to his plans, but the overall pattern could not be altered substantially as the men were already marching.
The fighting begins
The first shots were fired at 3.30 am when French advanced scouts made contact with outposts of Zieten’s corps. At about 4.30 am Zieten himself heard the rumble of distant cannon fire at his headquarters. The noise was coming from the south and, after spending some time trying to pinpoint the source of the noise more accurately, Zieten sent messengers to Blücher and Wellington announcing that his outposts were being attacked and that, should the attack turn out to be serious, he would fall back towards Fleurus.
Although Zieten could not be certain, the cannons were in fact French guns firing directly south of Charleroi. They marked the French assault on Zieten’s most southerly units as they marched directly north to seize Charleroi.
When Blücher received Zieten’s report at about 10.30 am he sent out messages ordering his corps commanders to hurry up and get to Sombreffe as fast as possible. One of those orders – to von Bülow, the commander of the Prussian IV Corps – was to cause massive confusion. An earlier order had told Bülow to march his corps to Hannut, a few miles to the north-east of Sombreffe. This was probably to prevent the Prussian army congesting the roads, but Bülow had managed to convince himself that the entire Prussian army was going to gather at Hannut.
Matters were not helped by the fact that Bülow outranked Blücher’s chief of staff, Gneisenau, and was notoriously prickly about status. Rather then write the sort of blunt order he would address to other officers, therefore, Gneisenau had couched his message to Bülow as a request. Bülow completely failed to gather from this message that there was any urgency at all. Not realizing that Napoleon was attacking, Bülow continued to Hannut and spent the night there.
Bülow sent a message to Blücher informing him of what he was doing. Blücher fired off an angry response telling Bülow to march to Gembloux to join up with the rest of the Prussian army. This confused Bülow even more. In the event he let his men sleep and did not move until the morning of the 16 June.
Zieten’s message to Wellington arrived at a little after 9 am. Wellington was frustrated by the rather vague nature of the message. Cannon were firing somewhere south of Zieten’s headquarters. That could mean anything. Still concerned about his communications to the Channel ports, and having received no message from the spy Grant, Wellington sent urgent messages to his own forward units asking for news of any enemy movements to their front. Crucially this message for the first time told his forward commanders to instantly tell him if a message arrived from somebody called Grant. Unfortunately when the message reached Dornberg, who had earlier received a report from Grant, it was merely logged by his staff.
A regiment of hussars of the King’s German Legion sent back a report of a party of French cavalry probing north near Mons towards the right flank of Wellington’s position. This caused Wellington real concern. Was Napoleon merely feinting toward Charleroi while the real attack would be toward the Channel ports? In fact the French cavalry were a strong force sent by Napoleon to find out if Wellington was still in position or if he had moved to join Blücher.
Zieten was, meanwhile, organizing a fighting retreat. As he had earlier decided, he fell back toward Fleurus. This town lay between Blücher’s headquarters at Namur and Wellington’s at Brussels. He could, therefore, continue to act as a link between the two main armies. At 11 am Zieten abandoned Charleroi and its important road junction. There then followed a pause while the French main body got over the river Sambre, resuming their advance at 3 pm.
It was at about this time that a wounded Prussian cavalryman arrived at Quatre Bras, a crossroads where the Namur-Nivelles road crosses that from Charleroi to Brussels. There he found the 2nd Nassau Regiment peacefully encamped and entirely unaware that any fighting was taking place at all. The Nassau Regiment was part of the Netherlands Army, which was under Wellington’s command. Major Philip von Normann of the Nassauers listened to what the Prussian had to say. He then sent a galloper off to Brussels to give Wellington the news, pushed scouts south toward Charleroi and drew his men up for battle. The man riding to Brussels passed several other units of the Netherlands army and told them his news.
News of the fighting had meanwhile arrived at the headquarters of the Dutch army. Their commander was Prince William of Orange, later to become King William II of the Netherlands. Prince William had served in the British army for two years from 1811 to 1813, mostly on active service in the Peninsular War under Wellington. His jovial nature and calm courage under fire won him many admirers in the British army. He was, however, still only 23 years old during the Waterloo Campaign and comparatively inexperienced.
Having interviewed the scouts who had seen the French around Charleroi, Prince William leapt on his horse and, with a small escort, spurred north to tell Wellington what was going on. Arriving in Brussels, William found Wellington at about 5 pm and blurted out his news. Wellington listened patiently, then asked some questions. Prince William’s news did not really add very much to what he already knew. The French were attacking near Charleroi but in numbers that might add up to only a single corps. The location of the bulk of Napoleon’s army was still unknown. The Prince of Orange rode back to his headquarters to discover more news.
Wellington’s orders
Nevertheless, Wellington decided it was time to take action. The messages were written by Wellington’s aide, Sir William de Lancey, and sent out by courier. The messages were clear, but cautious. All divisions were to gather together immediately and be ready to march at dawn next day.
At 6 pm scouting parties of French lancers appeared in front of Normann’s Nassauers south of Quatre Bras. Skirmishing followed, forcing Normann to fall back to the crossroads. A Netherlands battery of cannon arrived at this point and opened fire, driving the lancers away. The cannon fire was heard by Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, who at once marched his three regiments towards the sound of gunfire. He arrived at Quatre Bras at about 8 pm and took command of the situation. By nightfall he had with him a mixed force of Dutch and Brunswick troops that together made up about half a division in strength.
Among the men who received Wellington’s orders was Count Perponcher, who commanded the 2nd Netherlands Division – of which both Normann and Saxe Weimer were a part. His orders told him to collect his men at Nivelles and be ready to march at dawn next day. Only a short time earlier, however, Perponcher had received messages from Saxe Weimer outlining the situation at Quatre Bras. He recognized the strategic importance of the crossroads and concluded that it was his duty to try to hold it. He ignored the direct orders of Wellington, reasoning that Wellington must have issued his orders before he heard of events at Quatre Bras. Instead of gathering his division at Nivelles, he mustered it at Quatre Bras.
At the same time none of the Prussian corps were where Blücher wanted them to be. The II Corps was camping about about 10 km from Sombreffe, the III Corps about 25 km away and Bülow’s unfortunate IV Corps was 100 km away. Zieten’s I Corps was closest – at Fleurus; but his men were tired after a long day of a fighting retreat. In fact the only Prussians at Sombreffe were Blücher himself and his headquarters staff.
Dancing in Brussels
Wellington was at this point arriving in his finest evening clothes at a ball being given by the duchess of Richmond. The ball had been arranged some days in advance, and Wellington had made it clear that he wanted it to go ahead. The last thing he wanted was for panic to spread
among the civilians of Brussels. Fear would achieve nothing, and if the civilians fled they would block the roads that Wellington was going to need for his army. Whatever else happened, Wellington was determined to give the impression that everything was perfectly normal.
Soon after the ball began, the Prussian liaison officer, General Karl von Müffling, arrived with detailed news of events from Blücher. The message had been written at noon and gave detailed descriptions of what Blücher knew of the events so far. This was the first time that Wellington was made aware that the main French body was crossing the river Sambre at Charleroi. Wellington retired to a side room to read the despatches and discuss them with his senior officers.
A few minutes later orderlies began to rush off, carrying messages to various regiments in their camps scattered across the countryside around Brussels. Some units were to march at once towards Nivelles, others were to come to Brussels, others were to be ready to march at dawn but to await further orders before moving.
When Wellington himself emerged he was approached by the elderly earl of Malmesbury, who asked what was happening. ‘Napoleon is at Charleroi,’ Wellington replied. ‘He has humbugged me, by God. He has gained twenty-four hours’ march on me.’
Next to talk to Wellington was the duchess of Richmond, who asked if she should stop the ball. Wellington appeared shocked. ‘No’, he replied. ‘All officers obliged to ladies will finish their dances. There is no cause for alarm.’
There was, in fact, very good reason for alarm. Napoleon had gained the first victory of the campaign by getting between Wellington and Blücher. Napoleon was in a position to turn on Blücher and defeat him before Wellington could intervene. Wellington now accepted that Napoleon was invading the Netherlands with his main army, but he was still unconvinced that an assault up the main road to Brussels was really what Napoleon was up to. Wellington suspected that this was merely a feint. He still wanted to hear from Grant. A little after midnight Wellington went to bed.
Müffling wrote a report to Blücher stating that Wellington was concentrating his army at Nivelles and gave an estimate of what time particular units were be arriving there.
At 2 am Wellington was woken by a knock at his bedroom door. De Lancey put his head around the door and announced the arrival of the Brunswick cavalry commander Dornberg with news. Dornberg had finally read the message issued that morning instructing him to be alert for news from Grant. Dornberg at once realized that he had passed on Grant’s message the day before without saying who it was from. He had leapt into the saddle and ridden as fast as he could to Brussels to report and apologize to Wellington.
Wellington leapt from his bed and dashed to his office, still in his night shirt. He studied the map, then told de Lancey to order the entire army to march on Quatre Bras as quickly as possible. Senior officers were to be roused from their sleep and dragged to Wellington’s office. The need for speed was now paramount.
In the early hours of 16 June, Wellington rushed from his bed in Brussels to order the entire arm to march on Quatre Bras.
Marshal Ney – and French movements
As Wellington realized what a mess he was in, events from the French point of view things looked very good indeed. The march north was going well, and if it was falling slightly behind schedule that did not seem to be very serious. Napoleon’s cavalry had reported at lunchtime that Wellington had not yet moved his army. Indications were, however, that Blücher was concentrating his forces somewhere beyond Fleurus.
That suited Napoleon very well. If Blücher’s army was gathered together it could be destroyed before Wellington’s had gathered and could march to help. About lunchtime on 14 June, there was a new arrival at Napoleon’s mobile headquarters, at that point situated just outside Charleroi. This was Marshal Michel Ney. As he rode into the camp there were shouts and cheers from the soldiers as they recognized one of their favourite and most respected commanders.
It had been Ney who had advised King Louis to imprison Napoleon in an iron cage, and before that it had been Ney who had persuaded Napoleon to abdicate in 1814. His subsequent decision to join Napoleon as the emperor marched on Paris had done nothing to disarm Napoleon’s apparent distrust. The highly talented Marshal of France had been given no job to do. It was not until Napoleon had been leaving Paris that he had sent Ney a message telling him to hurry up and join his emperor if he wanted to be present at the first battles.
The message had given Ney no clue as to what – if anything – Napoleon would want Ney to do. Ney had thought to bring with him his favourite staff officer, Colonel Heymes, but had not had time to get his proper campaign steeds and arrived to see Napoleon mounted on a borrowed horse.
Napoleon greeted Ney with the words. ‘Bonjour, Marshal Ney. I want you to take command of my I and II Corps. Then you must go to Quatre Bras, drive away any enemy troops you find there and open up the main road to Brussels.’ Ney was amazed, but delighted. Pausing only to get hold of a proper cavalry horse and to collect an escort of light cavalry to act as bodyguard and messengers, Ney rode off.
As Ney left he had little idea where d’Erlon’s I Corps or Reille’s II Corps actually were. His first job was to find out, then lead them to Quatre Bras. He soon found d’Erlon at Jumet but found that much of his corps was spread out on the march. Ney issued orders to close up the troops into a more compact body and march to Quatre Bras. He sent out numerous messengers to try to find Reille. Napoleon had also given Ney the III Cavalry Corps, but they would not join him until late the following day.
Ney himself reached Quatre Bras at almost 10 pm. It was getting dark and he could not see the enemy position clearly. The French officers already there told him that the enemy was present with about one division of infantry plus a few guns and a small number of cavalry. Realizing that he could do nothing until daylight and reinforcements arrived, Ney went to Gosselies to sleep and await news of Reille.
Napoleon had, meanwhile, put Marshal Grouchy in command of the right wing of the French Army. That meant Grouchy had the III Corps (Vandamme), IV Corps (Gérard), I Cavalry Corps and II Cavalry Corps. Napoleon kept under his own command, as a central reserve, VI Corps (Lobau), IV Cavalry Corps and the Imperial Guard. His orders to Grouchy were to drive back the Prussians of Zieten’s Corps – and any others they meet – as far as Sombreffe.
Grouchy’s advance proved to be slower than Napoleon wanted due to the larger than expected size of the Prussian rearguard. By nightfall, Grouchy had got only as far as halfway between Fleurus and Ligny. Napoleon was not too upset, however, for all the reports indicated that a large part of the Prussian army was at Ligny, where it was isolated from Wellington and ripe for destruction.
At midnight Ney, Grouchy and Napoleon dined together in Charleroi. It turned out to be an unfortunate event for the French. Napoleon chose to criticize Ney for some of the minor movements he had made with his advanced units. Grouchy came away with the impression that Napoleon had been angry because Ney had not done exactly as ordered. He decided that he would do as ordered in future.
Napoleon told Ney and Grouchy that he would decide what to do next day as soon as the situation became clear. The two marshals left for their own headquarters and got some sleep. There would be a battle next day and they needed to be fresh.
Marshal Ney
Michel Ney was born the son of a retired soldier in Sarrelouis, then in France but now in Germany, in 1769. After leaving school, Ney became a civil servant but in 1787 ran off to join the army as an hussar. An ardent supporter of the ideals of the Revolution, Ney was commissioned to be an officer in 1792 and just four years later attained general rank. In 1804 he was one of the first officers to be created marshal of the empire by Napoleon and thereafter was one of Napoleon’s favourite commanders. He fought in Spain against Wellington, where he achieved some successes before being moved to join the invasion of Russia in 1812. It was during this campaign that he gained the nickname
of ‘Bravest of the Brave’. In 1814 he led the marshals who demanded Napoleon’s abdication and then transferred his loyalties to the restored King Louis XVIII of France.
Marshal Ney, 1769 - 1815
Chapter 4
‘The Prussians were very roughly handled’
Wellington in a letter to Lady Frances Webster, 16 June 1815
Although the main focus of attention was in the Netherlands, the war had actually already started hundreds of kilometres away to the south. Acting without orders and entirely contrary to the agreed plan of campaign, the Austrian commander in northern Italy, General Frimont, had decided to invade France.
Frimont’s move was unexpected, but it did make sense. He was concerned that Napoleon might decide to open the war with a lightning strike into Italy, and with good reason. Frimont’s army had just fought the campaign against Murat in Naples. The men were tired, stocks of ammunition were low and units were scattered on garrison duty.
Frimont knew that secret pro-revolutionary societies were active in the large cities of northern Italy – Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice and elsewhere. These societies had promised to rise in support of Murat when he arrived so long as he brought them weapons. Assuredly they would rise if Napoleon entered Italy. If the reformists of the big Italian cities rose with success it was likely that the revolutionaries of the larger German cities would do likewise. That would make the positions of the Austrian Schwarzenberg and the Russian Tolly difficult or even impossible if the armies of the smaller German states deserted the alliance.
The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance Page 5
