19. TET ’68: THE END OF WESTMORELAND AND THE TURNING POINT OF THE WAR
“We have reached an important point”: Don Oberdorfer, Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105.
“The majority of them clearly was killed”: “Interview with Ngo Minh Khoi,” July 26, 1981, for Vietnam: A Television History.
Some were almost successful: Oberdorfer, Tet, 145. This paragraph and the ones preceding and following it rely heavily on Oberdorfer’s account and on James Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (Columbia University Press, 2007).
The Communist tapes: “Dang Xuan Teo,” Vietnam: A Television History.
“This small squad of VC sappers”: Willbanks, Tet Offensive, 35.
executed a Viet Cong guerrilla: One author has contended that the dead guerrilla had operated under the nom de guerre Bay Lop and was the leader of one of the assassination squads and had been captured shortly after killing thirty members of families of police officers and pushing them into a ditch. See James Robbins, This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive (Encounter Books, 2010), 154–56. But Erik Villard, author of a forthcoming official U.S. Army history of the Tet Offensive, concluded after studying documents from both sides that the executed man was “definitely not” Bay Lop and instead was probably a member of the T4 section of Sub-Region 6 (Saigon Party Committee), the Viet Cong headquarters for political affairs in the city. The T4 section’s mission was to assassinate South Vietnamese and American officials. Villard, e-mail message to author, March 17, 2011.
“They killed many Americans”: Willbanks, Tet Offensive, 36.
on December 15, 1967: Oberdorfer, Tet, 137.
“‘Hey, something is going on here’”: Weyand, interview by Sorley, Weyand Papers, USAMHI, 123–34.
This move, commented Lt. Gen. Dave Richard Palmer: Palmer, Summons, 184.
Westmoreland would fudge the facts: See discussion in Sorley, Westmoreland, 180.
When it was over, between 45,000: The lower number is from Cao Van Vien, “Leadership,” in Vietnam War: An Assessment, 296. The higher one is from Oberdorfer, Tet, vii.
“We saw the Germans do this”: “Interview with William C. (William Childs) Westmoreland,” April 27, 1981, for Vietnam: A Television History.
“Our soldiers’ morale had been very high”: Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 (University Press of Kansas, 2002), 224.
When the people of South Vietnam did not rise up: Konrad Kellen, “Conversations with Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968/Early 1969: A Study of Motivation and Morale,” RAND Corporation, September 1970, 70–71.
“The president’s tax proposal”: William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, part 4: July 1965–January 1968 (Princeton University Press, 1995), 907.
“the American imperialist will” . . . “the American ruling clique”: Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 221, 223.
“Washington panicked”: Willenson, The Bad War, 95–96.
“they were all in a state of shock”: Willenson, The Bad War, 150.
“Nobody believed anything”: DePuy interview, LBJ Library, 46.
50 percent of Americans interviewed: Oberdorfer, Tet, 246.
“He told me some stories”: Kent Sieg, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963–1968, vol. 6, Vietnam, January–August 1968 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 226. Also accessed online as FRUS, Vietnam: Jan–August 1968, vol. 6, Document 80, “Notes of Meeting, Washington, February 20, 1968, 1:05–2:50 pm.” Hereafter: FRUS 1963–1968, vol. 6.
Brandon spoke with Johnson a few days later: Henry Brandon, Anatomy of Error: The Inside Story of the Asian War on the Potomac, 1954–1969 (Gambit, 1969), 130.
Johnson sent a telegram: FRUS 1963–1968, vol. 6, 45.
“in virtually ignoring pacification”: Sorley, Westmoreland, 107.
“Every night when I fell asleep”: Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson, 253.
“Even before assuming office”: Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Little, Brown, 1982), 83.
“In any area where the grass was green”: “Interview with Nguyen Cong Minh,” n.d., for Vietnam: A Television History.
Some had been buried alive: Nguyen Ngoc Bich, “The Battle of Hue 1968 as Seen from the Perspective of Its NVA Commander,” April 15, 2010, Viet Thuc, 5.
In the city, many more corpses: Oberdorfer, Tet, 201, 214–15, 232.
“You had this horrible smell”: “Interview with Myron Harrington,” December 8, 1981, for Vietnam: A Television History.
20. MY LAI: GENERAL KOSTER’S COVER-UP AND GENERAL PEERS’S INVESTIGATION
“The Americal Division strives”: “Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Major General S. W. Koster,” June 2, 1968, Defense Technical Information Center, 10.
“a collective nervous breakdown”: Ronald Spector, “The Vietnam War and the Army’s Self-Image,” in The Second Indochina War (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 170.
Charlie Company was not a unit driven around the bend: Peers Report, 4/8. See also commentary by a former Army platoon leader in Vietnam, Philip Beidler, “Calley’s Ghost,” in Late Thoughts on an Old War: The Legacy of Vietnam (University of Georgia Press, 2004), 157.
“They had received casualties”: “Lecture by Hugh Thompson,” in Moral Courage in Combat: The My Lai Story (U.S. Naval Academy, 2003), 15.
“The people we received at mid-level”: “Interview with BG Koster, Samuel W., Retired,” notes taken by George McGarrigle, August 26, 1982, in historians’ files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 2.
“It was the most unhappy group”: Seymour Hersh, Cover-up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4 (Random House, 1972), 29.
“He was a protégé”: “Oral History of General William A. Knowlton, USA Retired,” interview by Lt. Col. David Hazen, USA, 1982, Senior Officer Oral History Collection, USAMHI, 461. See also a similar account in “Interview #2 with General Bruce Palmer Jr.,” USAMHI, 214.
“Terribly difficult command and control problem” . . . “least qualified to be a division commander”: “Interview #2 with General Bruce Palmer Jr,” USAMHI, 239–40.
“When I was assigned to Charlie Company”: Appy, Patriots, 350.
Army investigators later would determine: Peers Report, 8/14.
He would later testify: William Eckhardt, “My Lai: An American Tragedy,” accessed from the Web site of the law faculty of the University of Missouri at Kansas City, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/ecktragedy.html, 8.
“When we left the briefing”: Peers Report, 5/14.
“Waste them”: William Calley, “Testimony at Court-Martial,” excerpted in James Olson and Randy Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Bedford, 1998), 112.
“I was ordered to go in there”: Excerpt from direct examination by George Latimer of Lt. William Calley, Calley court-martial transcript, accessed at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/myl_Calltest.html.
“There are many versions of what happened”: Anderson, ed., Facing My Lai, 21.
At around eight the following morning: Richard Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley (Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1971), 4, 57–59.
“As the 1st Platoon moved”: Peers Report, 6/7.
“Kill everybody”: Herbert Carter, “Testimony to U.S. Army CID,” excerpted in Olson and Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History, 79.
“I walked over to the ditch”: Dennis Conti, “Testimony to the Peers Commission,” excerpted in Olson and Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History, 78.
“at least one gang-rape”: Peers Report, 6/10.
“I killed about eight people”: Varnado Simpson, “Testimony to U.S. Army CID,” excerpted in Olson and Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History, 88–89.
Lt. Col. Frank Barker: Peers Report, 6/9.
“This was an operation”: Anderson, ed., Facing My Lai, 56.
“It was our guys doing all the killing”: Appy, Patriots, 347.
“I was brought up in the country”: Thompson, Naval Academy lecture, 26.
When the soldiers of Charlie Company finished: Peers Report, 6/17.
The nearby dead totaled: Trent Angers, The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story (Acadian House, 1999), 223.
some 120 were children: Appy, Patriots, 347.
Of about twenty females raped: “Summary of Rapes,” CID Deposition Files, excerpted in Olson and Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History, 99–102.
“There’s a ditch full of dead women and children”: Angers, The Forgotten Hero of My Lai, 132.
“a result of justifiable situations”: Quoted in Peers Report, 10/13.
That afternoon, Gen. Koster: Testimony of Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster before the Peers Commission, December 15–16, 1969, 35–36.
“as their goal the suppression”: “Summary Report,” Peers Report, 2/6 and 7.
“he felt the pilot had been confused”: Koster testimony, Peers Commission, 188.
“This operation was well planned”: Quoted in “Suppression and Withholding of Information,” Peers Report, 11/7.
Col. Henderson wrote a document: Oran Henderson, “Report of Investigation,” April 24, 1968, reproduced in Peers Report, 10/57, 58.
“Lieutenant Kally”: “Letter of Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour to Secretary of Defense, March 29, 1969,” Peers Report, 1/8.
“But if the Pinkville incident”: William Wilson, “I Had Prayed to God That This Thing Was Fiction,” American Heritage, February 1990, reproduced in Olson and Roberts, My Lai: A Brief History, 153ff.
“a repugnant picture was forming”: Wilson, “I Had Prayed to God,” 156.
“We just moved on in” . . . “I was just following orders?”: “Testimony of Paul D. Meadlo,” July 16, 1969, taken during the investigation by Col. William V. Wilson, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Army, 1010–13, accessed at Clemson.edu.
“Something in me died”: Wilson, “I Had Prayed to God,” 162.
“We investigated this thing fully”: “William C. Westmoreland,” vol. 2, interview by Lt. Col. Martin Ganderson, 1982, William Westmoreland Papers, box 70, USAMHI, 237.
“I have been getting pressure”: “William C. Westmoreland,” vol. 1, interview by Lt. Col. Martin Ganderson, 1982, William Westmoreland Papers, box 69, USAMHI, 76.
“There was no use”: Quoted by a Peers investigator, Koster testimony, Peers Commission, 186.
“We have not only searched”: Question during Koster testimony, Peers Commission, 225.
Peers had known Koster: W. R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (W. W. Norton, 1979), 113, 117.
“They made no statements” . . . “I can’t explain that”: Koster testimony, Peers Commission, 151.
“Efforts were made at every level”: Summary, Peers Report, 6/7, 9.
“I threw the files against the wall”: Anderson, ed., Facing My Lai, 42.
“This prosecutorial record was abysmal”: Eckhardt, “My Lai: An American Tragedy,” 7.
“Poor Sam Koster”: “Oral History of General William A. Knowlton, USA Retired,” interview by Lt. Col. David Hazen, 1982, Senior Officer Oral History Collection, USAMHI, 461, 465.
“My opinion was that”: “Interview with Gen. Jonathan Seaman,” 1.
“unfair and unjust”: David Stout, “Gen. S. W. Koster, 86, Who Was Demoted After My Lai, Dies,” New York Times, February 11, 2006.
“a travesty of justice”: Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 223.
In his official oral history: “Conversations Between Major General Kenneth J. Hodson and Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Boyer,” vol. 2, section 6, side 1, January 12, 1971, Kenneth J. Hodson Papers, box 1, USAMHI, 2, 11, 14, and 16.
When he appeared before a congressional committee: House Armed Services Investigatory Subcommittee, “Investigation of the My Lai Incident,” 91st Congress, April 17, 1970, 234–35, 246.
“death threats at three o’clock”: Thompson, Naval Academy lecture, 12.
“It appeared to the Inquiry”: Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 232.
“Thus,” Peers wrote: Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 254.
“so many people in command positions”: Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 209.
“Because men’s lives are at stake”: Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 247. My italics.
“The memo shook Westy”: Stuart Loory, Defeated: Inside America’s Military Machine (Random House, 1973), 28.
“moral and professional climate”: Study on Military Professionalism, U.S. Army War College, June 30, 1970, 53.
“He said that we should use it”: Ulmer, interview by Lynch, USAMHI, 114–15.
“The traditional standards of the American Army officer”: Study on Military Professionalism, iii.
“Duty, honor and country”: D. M. Malone, “The Trailwatcher,” Army, May 1981, 186, collected in D. M. Malone, The Trailwatcher: A Collection of Colonel Mike Malone’s Writings (U.S. Army, 1982).
“an ambitious, transitory commander”: Study on Military Professionalism, iv.
Close to half the officers surveyed: Study on Military Professionalism, B-31–B-34.
“Nobody out there believes the body count”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-10.
“so that if they did kill someone”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-14.
“that there will be no AWOLs”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-10.
“to accept mediocrity”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-1.
Senior officers, “including generals”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-2.
“The honest commander who reports”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-5.
“led by fear, would double-cross”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-2.
“Unless you are willing to compromise”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-19.
“it’s necessary today to lie”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-28.
“isolated, perhaps willingly”: Study on Military Professionalism, v.
“Senior officers appear to be deluding themselves”: Study on Military Professionalism, B-1-13.
Senior leaders were portrayed: Study on Military Professionalism, 19.
“ ‘bleed’ his troops dry”: Study on Military Professionalism, 17.
“cover your ass” . . . “endless CYA exercises create suspicion”: Study on Military Professionalism, 14–15.
“True loyalty among men”: Study on Military Professionalism, 23.
“the leaders of the future”: Study on Military Professionalism, 29.
“winners in the system”: Gole, “U.S. Army in the Aftermath of Conflict,” 9.
“he kept shaking his head”: Malone, “The Trailwatcher,” 186.
“I mean close”: Malone, “The Trailwatcher,” 187.
“We put a couple of hundred copies”: Ulmer, interview by Lynch, USAMHI, 115.
21. THE END OF A WAR, THE END OF AN ARMY
In 1965, Communist forces: Lewis Sorley, ed., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972 (Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 347.
“to minimize the role of local forces”: Peter Brush, “The Significance of Local Communist Forces in Post-Tet Vietnam,” Journal of Third World Studies 15, no. 2 (1998), 198, collected in Walter Hixson, ed., The United States and the Vietnam War: Significant Scholarly Articles (Garland, 2000).
“By winter of 1969”: Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell, o
ral history, LBJ Library, 4.
“The NVA were tenacious”: Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA, 221–22.
“was pleading with the units”: Maurer, Strange Ground, 509.
In mid-1965, the Army: Spector, “The Vietnam War and the Army’s Self-Image,” 175.
“concluded that it is not essential”: Lyndon B. Johnson, news conference, July 28, 1965, John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, “The American Presidency Project,” University of California, Santa Barbara, 2.
The Army was not designed to go to war: Weigley, History of the United States Army, 534.
The president’s refusal to activate: Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Harcourt, 1999), 294.
“I didn’t have the NCOs”: Gorman, Cardinal Point, 55.
By 1969, draftees made up 88 percent: Sorley, A Better War, 288.
“After only two months in Vietnam”: Spector, “The Vietnam War and the Army’s Self-Image,” 179–80.
“appalling” . . . “There would be a lieutenant”: Starry, interview by Spruill and Vernon, in Sorley, ed., Press On!, 1002.
“Individual personnel redeployments”: Donn Starry, “New Abrams Biography: ‘A Life So Full,’” Armor, September–October 1992, 51.
“The way Westy ran the organization”: Kerwin, interview by Doehle, 351–52.
“In the whole picture” . . . “how many losses he takes”: Sorley, A Better War, 59, 124.
“Hanoi had pushed most of the best”: “R. W. Komer,” Vietnam: A Television History.
“When Johnson rolled out”: Al Santoli, Everything We Had (Ballantine, 1981), 149.
By the end of 1971: Robert Komer, “Was There Another Way?,” in Thompson and Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam, 220.
“During late 1968 the enemy” . . . “new plots and schemes”: Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 237.
“The political and military struggle”: Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 238–39.
the Communists lost all but three: Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 250, 468.
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