The White House photographer who captured: Manchester, Death, p. 320.
After a seven-minute helicopter: Elements of this scene are captured in Johnson, The Vantage Point; Manchester, Death; Caro, Passage.
“I need you more”: Caro, Passage, p. 410.
He privately described Johnson as “mean”: Guthman and Shulman (eds.), Robert Kennedy, in His Own Words, pp. 417, 411.
On the afternoon of Thursday: Pearson diaries, November 1963, Pearson papers, LBJ Library. (Pearson misstated the date of the entry, identifying November 21 as Friday. It was actually a Thursday.)
In 1942, he bought: Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition, p. 533. See also Caro, Master of the Senate.
“He was my close”: Johnson remarks honoring Hoover, May 8, 1964, accessed from the American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26236. Also see “President Johnson’s Dogs,” essay on the Web site of the LBJ Library, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/faqs/dog/doghouse.asp.
Johnson’s motives were: Time, February 5, 1973.
“You’re more than the head”: Telephone conversation between Johnson and Hoover, November 29, 1963, in Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, p. 147.
Johnson asked President Kennedy’s: Caro, Passage, p. 374.
At about ten a.m., Johnson: Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, pp. 68–73.
Among the tens of millions: Ibid., pp. 87–89.
He told a friend: Telephone conversation between Johnson and columnist Joseph Alsop, November 25, 1963, in Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, p. 98.
With Oswald dead: Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 26.
CHAPTER 4
Two of her three husbands: The history of the Oswald family, including that of Marguerite Oswald, is offered in detail in the Warren Report, pp. 69–80.
At the age of three: Robert Oswald, Lee: A Portrait of Lee Harvey Oswald, pp. 32–33.
“It seemed to me”: Ibid., p. 33.
On the afternoon: Bob Schieffer, “A Ride for Mrs. Oswald,” Texas Monthly, January 2003.
“That’s how it would”: Oswald, Lee: A Portrait, p. 178.
“Nothing really to put my finger”: Testimony of Robert Edward Lee Oswald, February 20, 1964, Warren Appendix, Vol. 1, p. 346.
She remembered that on: Statement of Marina Oswald, February 19, 1964, in Dallas, Texas, FBI transcript, as reproduced in Aynesworth, JFK: Breaking the News, p. 146.
Mrs. Martin introduced: Lewis, The Scavengers and Critics of the Warren Report, p. 65.
“Mrs. Oswald called”: Lane interview; also, Lane as quoted in Lewis, Scavengers, p. 24.
CHAPTER 5
Clare Booth Luce: Martin, A Hero for Our Times, p. 159, as cited in Caro, Passage, p. 115.
The night of the assassination: Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 26–27.
On the afternoon of Friday: Warren, Memoirs, pp. 355–56.
Cox described Warren: Time, November 17, 1967.
“I told them I thought”: Warren, Memoirs, p. 356.
Former chief justice Harlan Fiske Stone: Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, p. 63.
“Early in my life”: Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 27.
At about three thirty that afternoon: Warren, Memoirs, p. 356.
The chief justice was about to be: For an explanation of the “Johnson Treatment,” see Tom Wicker, “Remembering the Johnson Treatment,” New York Times, May 9, 2002.
“I was ushered in”: Warren, Memoirs, p. 357.
The president said he needed: Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 27; Warren, Memoirs, p. 357.
According to Warren: Warren, Memoirs, p. 357.
He explained his reasoning: Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 27; Warren, Memoirs, p. 358.
Johnson told the chief justice: Warren, Memoirs, p. 358.
“If Khrushchev moved on us”: Telephone conversation between Johnson and Senator Thomas Kuchel, November 29, 1963, as cited in Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, p. 193. See also published interview of Johnson by Drew Pearson, Pearson papers, LBJ Library. In the undated Pearson interview, Johnson says he warned Warren about reports of a $6,500 payment to Oswald.
“You were a soldier”: Warren, Memoirs, p. 358.
“The President of the United States says”: Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 27.
The truth was that: Ibid.
In that first call: Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, pp. 153–59.
He would be delivering: Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, pp. 196–206.
“Dick?”: Ibid., pp. 196–206.
At the Supreme Court the next day: Warren, Memoirs, p. 356.
He later told his friend: Pearson diaries, November 1963, Pearson papers, LBJ Library.
CHAPTER 6
Warren’s children: Interviews with Robert Warren (January 28, 1971) and Earl Warren Jr. (July 8, 1970), conducted for the Regional Oral History Office of the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, found on the library’s Web site: http://archive.org/stream/warrengovfamilywa00earlrich/warrengovfamilywa00earlrich_djvu.txt.
Hoover had come to consider: Hoover memo to Tolson et al., June 22, 1964 (“Re: Justice Edward Tamm”), FBI.
When Governor Warren traveled: Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets, p. 410.
Warren later told Drew Pearson: “The ‘Chief,’” unpublished profile of Warren by Drew Pearson based on extensive interviews with Warren, found in Pearson papers, LBJ Library.
It would be: Telephone conversation between Johnson and Hoover on November 25, 1963, from Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, p. 95.
It was Warren’s selection of Olney: Memo from DeLoach to Mohr, February 7, 1964, “Subject: Assassination of the President—allegations that Oswald was an FBI Informant,” FBI. Although Hoover would deny that the FBI was responsible for undermining the choice of Olney, DeLoach’s memos and other paperwork show otherwise.
Warren scheduled the first meeting: Warren Commission Executive Session transcript, December 5, 1963, NARA.
The FBI argued: Memo from Belmont to Tolson, December 3, 1963, FBI.
On December 3: Associated Press, “FBI Report on Oswald Nearly Ready,” as published in the Star News of Pasadena, California, December 3, 1963 (accessed through newspaperarchive.com).
“It almost has to”: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 5, 1963, NARA.
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 6, 1963, p. 8.
The meeting that Thursday: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 5, 1963, p. 8.
“This is a very sad”: Ibid., p. 1.
He then set out: Ibid., pp. 1–3.
“I think our job here”: Ibid., pp. 1–2.
If the commission: Ibid., p. 2.
“If we have the subpoena power”: Ibid., p. 40.
If the commission: Ibid., pp. 40, 2.
Warren’s mailbag: Ibid., p. 2.
McCloy, a sixty-eight-year-old: Esquire, May 1962. Although the article was written tongue in cheek, there was little doubt that McCloy deserved the title.
McCloy did not: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 5, 1963, p. 37.
“There is potential”: Ibid.
Warren was wrong: Ibid.
The investigation had: Ibid.
Boggs and Ford: Ibid.
“If the rest of you”: Ibid., p. 39.
Next, Russell objected: Ibid., p. 53.
He reminded Warren: Ibid.
McCloy suggested: Ibid., p. 39.
The chief justice spent: Ibid., pp. 43–46, 55.
Olney, he said: Ibid., p. 45.
Olney might be: Ibid., pp. 46–47.
“I don’t want”: Ibid., p. 46.
“I have a feeling”: Ibid., p. 48.
“I think the chairman”: Ibid., p. 50.
The chief justice said: Ibid., pp. 55, 62.
He put the plea: Ibid., p. 62.
The meeting ended: Ibid.
, p. 68.
Ford, Dulles, and McCloy: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 6, 1963, p. 21.
“I would not want”: Ibid., pp. 4–6.
Overnight, McCloy: Ibid., p. 4.
The mention: Ibid., p. 6.
As solicitor general: Ibid., p. 6.
Most notably: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
“We saw”: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 6, 1963, p. 6.
Rankin, he said: Ibid., p. 10.
Russell recommended that: Ibid., p. 20.
Before the meeting ended: Ibid., p. 12.
“No, I have not”: Ibid.
“They have”: Ibid.
“Of course we do”: Ibid.
CHAPTER 7
Gerald Ford asked: Memo from DeLoach to Mohr, December 12, 1963, FBI. After public release of the DeLoach memo decades later, Ford did not dispute the contents of the memo, although he said he had no substantive contacts with the FBI over commission work after December 1963.
Fifty-year-old “Jerry”: Gerald R. Ford Biography, Ford Library, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/grf/fordbiop.asp.
He used one of his: Ford speech, July 8, 1949, Congressional Record, House of Representatives. A salary of $17,500 a year in 1949 would be equal to about $171,000 in 2013.
“Ford told me”: Memo from DeLoach to Mohr, December 12, 1963, FBI.
The FBI’s former number-three official: Sullivan, The Bureau, p. 53.
On Sunday, November 24: Jenkins memo for the files, November 24, 1963, four p.m., as cited in the Church Committee, Vol. 5, pp. 32–43.
On Tuesday, November 26: Hoover, as recorded in HSCA final report, p. 244.
Three days later, on November 29: Ibid.
That estimate proved: The full FBI report, “Investigation of Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,” December 9, 1963, is available online through the Mary Ferrell Foundation Web site, http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=10402&relPageId=4.
Warren and the other commissioners: Warren Commission Executive Session, December 16, 1963, NARA.
“He’s been with me”: Ibid., pp. 1–2.
“We’re in business”: Ibid., p. 2.
“The grammar is bad”: Ibid., p. 12.
“Gentlemen, to be very”: Ibid., p. 11.
“This bullet business”: Ibid., p. 12.
“There are all kinds”: Ibid.
Even Ford: Ibid., p. 33.
“It will take quite a while”: Ibid., pp. 19–20.
Warren was also now ready: Ibid., p. 22.
Someone on the staff: Ibid., p. 24.
“This is a serious concern”: Ibid., pp. 25–26.
Boggs suggested that: Ibid., p. 10.
McCloy had questions: Ibid., pp. 35, 55.
Warren hesitated: Ibid., p. 54.
“Your mind plays tricks”: Ibid., p. 55.
“You have to feed”: Ibid., p. 57.
“You understand that reports”: Ibid., p. 59.
The next day, Hoover called: Memo from Hoover to Tolson, December 22, 1963, FBI.
The day after the meeting: Memo from Tolson to Mohr, December 17, 1963, FBI.
CHAPTER 8
His teenage son: James Rankin interview.
“He never expressed”: Sara Rankin interview.
J. Lee Rankin: New York Times, June 30, 1996.
Rankin, a graduate: James and Sara Rankin interviews.
“If you made a typo”: Sara Rankin interview.
“The substantive decisions”: Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, HSCA, August 17, 1978 (hereafter Rankin Deposition), NARA.
Within hours of Warren’s: James and Sara Rankin interviews.
Willens arrived at the commission’s: Testimony of Howard P. Willens, HSCA, November 17, 1977, p. 312.
“No one could seriously”: Ibid., p. 327.
“I do concede”: Ibid., p. 322.
Rankin thought that Redlich: Redlich conceded his lack of background on criminal law and investigative work in HSCA testimony, November 8, 1978, p. 109.
His involvement in social justice: See eulogy for Redlich prepared by Dean Richard Reversz of New York University’s law school, June 13, 2011, as published by the law school online: https://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__news__media/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069050.pdf.
CHAPTER 9
The sealed envelope: Warren, Memoirs, p. 371.
An FBI inventory: “Autopsy of Body of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy,” FBI, November 26, 1963. Accessible through history-matters.com Web site: http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/arrb/master_med_set/md44/html/Image0.htm.
“I saw the pictures”: Warren, Memoirs, pp. 371–72.
Arlen Specter was a young man: Specter interviews. Also see Specter, Passion for Truth, p. 36. See also “Court Refuses Appeal of 6 Convicted for Union Fraud,” New York Times, November 10, 1964.
The recruiting call: Specter interviews; Specter, Passion, pp. 43–45.
“They were all very excited”: Specter interviews, Specter memoir transcripts. See also Specter, Passion, passim.
CHAPTER 10
In the first days of January 1964: Slawson interviews.
There was no second-guessing: Slawson interviews.
“At the beginning, I really thought”: Coleman interviews. See also Coleman, Counsel for the Situation, pp. 171–78.
“He dealt with his”: Guthman and Shulman, Robert Kennedy, p. 252.
He still resembled: Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, pp. 59–60.
Robert Kennedy recalled: Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, p. 446.
CHAPTER 11
In the first hours after the assassination: Particulars of the meeting are found throughout Whitten’s testimony to the Church Committee on May 7, 1976 (hereafter Whitten Senate Testimony) and his testimony to the HSCA, May 16, 1978 (hereafter Whitten House Testimony), NARA.
Whitten’s real name: Whitten Senate Testimony, passim.
When President Johnson created: Description of Whitten’s personality and background comes from Jefferson Morley, “The Good Spy,” Washington Monthly, December 2003, pp. 40–44; description of Whitten’s job and responsibilities at the CIA comes from Whitten Senate Testimony.
Like so many of his colleagues: That Whitten reviewed Oswald’s agency file comes from Whitten House Testimony and Whitten Senate Testimony, passim.
At the meeting on November 23: That Helms told the others that Whitten would have “broad powers” comes from Whitten House Testimony, passim.
“was to be in charge”: Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140417.
Whitten thought: Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–136/001918.
“I had investigated”: Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–112/001894.
Among the others in Helms’s office: Who was at the meeting comes from Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140429.
The two men had clashed: Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140459; Whitten House Testimony p. 1–71/001852.
“None of the senior officials”: Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–74/001855.
Whitten thought of Angleton as a sinister force: Angleton was paranoid. Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–167/001949.
Angleton had a: Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–167/001949.
The Yale-educated Angleton: Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, p. 10.
“Everything that Angleton did”: Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–71/001852.
“He had enormously influential”: Whitten House Testimony, p. 1–169/001951.
“One of the reasons”: Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140472.
“The FBI could be extremely clannish”: Ibid., p. 76000140473.
“Angleton’s influence also extended”: That Angleton was close to Allen Dulles can be found in Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140469; Whitten House Testimony p. 1–73/001854.
Whitten admitted he took some pleasure: Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140459.
“We were flooded”: Wh
itten House Testimony, p. 1–131/001913.
“We dropped almost everything else”: Ibid.
Much of it was: Ibid., p. 1–135/001917.
Whitten said he knew nothing: Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140473; Whitten House Testimony, pp. 1–30/001811 and 1–47/001828.
That was not surprising: Whitten House Testimony, pp. 1–15/001796 and 1–103-A/001885.
They were detected: Ibid., p. 1–50/001832.
Whitten shared Hoover’s admiration: Ibid., p. 1–18/001799.
According to Whitten: Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140458.
Whitten said that every: Whitten House Testimony, pp. 1–51/001833 and 1–56/001837.
Whitten recalled: Ibid., pp. 1–129/001911 through 1–131/0013.
“We were sure to give them”: Ibid., p. 1–163/001945.
“We wondered”: Ibid., p. 1–161/001943.
“There was no nefarious”: Ibid.
The station had secretly: Whitten House Testimony, pp. 1–61/001837 through 1–68/001849.
Scott was a force unto: See Morley, Our Man in Mexico, for the definitive biography of Scott.
Among his deputies: Interview of Anne Goodpasture, HSCA, November 20, 1978, JFK Records, RIF: 180–10110–10028, NARA (hereafter Goodpasture House interview).
She had also begun: Morley, Our Man, p. 84.
In later years, Goodpasture denied: Deposition of Anne Goodpasture, ARRB, p. 36, NARA (hereafter Goodpasture Deposition). See also Morley, Our Man, for the definitive biography of Goodpasture.
Goodpasture was sometimes confused for: Goodpasture House interview, p. 31.
She was not a street spy: Goodpasture Deposition, p. 14.
“He maintained his own”: See Morley, Our Man, passim. See Goodpasture Deposition, Goodpasture House interview, passim.
“Win never trusted”: Morley interview with Goodpasture, May 2–3, 2005, cited in Our Man, p. 257.
Over time: Memo from CIA officer Scott Breckinridge, “Memo for the Record: Conversation with Ann [sic] Goodpasture,” July 18, 1978, NARA (document: 1993.08.09.10:37:28:500060). Also see Goodpasture Deposition, pp. 27, 32. See also Morley, Our Man, passim.
CHAPTER 12
Whitten put together: Testimony of John Scelso (pseudonym for John Whitten), Whitten Senate Testimony, p. 76000140416, NARA, available from www.maryferrell.org (accessed May 13, 2013).
By this point: Testimony of John Scelso, Whitten House Testimony, pp. 1–114/001896 through 1–116/001898.
A Cruel and Shocking Act: The Secret History of the Kennedy Assassination Page 66
