by Don Berry
When they reached the encampment
there was 7 or 8 Inds. at camp when we got there, and I [Rogers] made signs to them that we were attacked by some of there band, shoot at, one of our horses wounded, and we had killed one; they packed up and put off very soon.
On June 8, they reached the sea at last. They found grazing for the horses near the coast, and the hunters brought in game. "The men," Rogers notes, 'appear better satisfied than they do when in a state of starvation."
On the 11th an incident occurred which threw its shadow into the future, though, naturally, little was thought of it at the time. When they were preparing to leave camp, the party discovered that their "fellin axe and drawing knife was missing, and the Inds. had left the camp."
Smith and five men went to the nearby lodges. They caught one of the Indians, tied him, and led him about two miles in this state, by way of persuasion. He finally revealed the ax, buried in the sand, and was released.
On the 20th they crossed Smith River; on the 23rd they were over the 42nd parallel and beyond the authority of the Mexicans. They were not aware of it; and Mexicans were, by this time, the least of their worries. It is remembered in Rogers journal as the day the ammunition mule was temporarily lost, and not found until near nightfall.
They continued working up the coast, staying near the ocean, losing horses in the brush and rocks, drowning them crossing streams. Indians became less and less friendly; horses appeared in camp with arrows in them; it was impossible to open any kind of communication because the Indians could not be induced to come close enough.
Most of the men had been enlisted a year before, on July 2; when their time expired Jedediah reengaged them at a dollar a day. The next day they picked up an addition to the small party, though he could hardly be called reinforcement. Marshall brought a ten-year-old Indian boy into camp, whom they promptly named Marion. He was a slave, captured from one of the Willamette valley tribes, and not particularly averse to joining this odd, roving tribe of white men. His previous owners had all run off and left him, anyway. Rogers gave him some beads and dried meat, and he was "well satisfyed."
Now they began to encounter Chinook speakers; the great lingua franca of the Northwest Coast, universally used as a trading jargon. It was not Old Chinook. the tribal dialect, but a composite language. Starting from Chinook and Nootkan, the Jargon picked up words here and there from Salishan and other language groups: and when the whites came it adopted French and English with equal ease. At its peak the Chinook Jargon was spoken by as many as 100,000 people of all colors and races, from California to Alaska and from the coast to the Rocky Mountains.
From two of these Chinook speakers Smith learned on July 5 that they were only 'ten days travell from Calapos on the wel Hammet, which is pleasings news to us."
Meaning the Kalapuyan tribes of the interior Willamette valley. And pleasing news it was, because it meant they were within easy reach of "civilization"; defined. as being the sphere of HBC. Once into the Willamette valley they could descend that river to Fort Vancouver with little expected difficulty. It began to look as though the end were in sight. In spite of the terrible difliculty traveling, the trapping had been good. Smith had nearly 800 beaver, 40 or 60 otters, and had managed to bring through 228 of his horses and mules (according to the later report of HBC’s factor at Fort Vancouver, John McLoughlin).
On Friday, July 11, they camped at the mouth of a large river, the Umpqua. They traded with the Indians they found there; fish and berries, though Rogers notes they were forced to pay "a pretty dear rate." The Indians themselves, however, appeared friendly, and several of them stayed overnight at the encampment.
The next day there was more trouble with petty thievery. One of their overnight guests stole an ax. Smith employed the same means of recovery as before; the man was caught and bound. According to Rogers, Smith "put a cord round his neck, and the rest of us stood with our guns ready as case they made any resistance, there was about 50 Inds. present but did not pretend to resist tying the other."
A little later, a minor chief mounted a horse and was parading around camp. Arthur Black forced him to dismount, and the stage was set for the Umpqua massacre.
II
On the night of July 13, l828—exactly one year out from the Bear Lake rendezvous—Smith and the company were camped near the confluence of the Umpqua and Smiths Rivers, not far from present Reedsport, Oregon. The Indians had told them they should ascend the Umpqua fifteen or twenty miles inland; from there they would have easy going to the Willamette, and by that River to Fort Vancouver. They were now to leave the coast, most probably to join the Coast fork of the Willamette. The country here—by Smith’s account to General Clark—was "very swampy in the lowlands and woody in the mountains." With John Turner and Richard Leland, an Englishman recruited in San José, Smith set off up the Umpqua in a canoe to examine the banks and see if they could find a passable road for the party. They were paddled by one of the Indians.
They went upriver only a short distance. Possibly they had found an easy route and were returning for the remainder of the party. As the canoe was nearing their encampment, another Indian of the band (who called themselves Kelawatsets) appeared on shore. He said something to Smith’s guide, who immediately grabbed the white man’s rifle and dove
overboard.
The Indians on shore at once opened fire on the unprotected canoe. Smith and his companions paddled to the opposite bank and took to the woods. According to John McLoughlin’s report to the Governor and Committee of HBC, "he ascended a Hill from whence he saw his Camp distinctly, but seeing none of his people & from none of them coming forward when he was fired on though within reach, he naturally concluded they were all cutt off."
Smith. Turner, and Leland then struck off for the coast, which they followed north to present Tillamook Bay. There Smith was able to get the Tillamooks to guide him across the coast range to the waters of the Willamette, which he followed down to Fort Vancouver. He arrived at the HBC post on August 10; the whole joumey north from the massacre site had taken almost four weeks. At Fort Vancouver Smith discovered that news of the defeat had preceded him. in the form of the sole survivor of the camp party, Arthur Black. Black had beaten Smith to Fort Vancouver by two days, and from him Jedediah was able to learn for the first time the
circumstances of the attack.
When Smith left camp on the morning of July 14 he had given Rogers instructions not to let many of the Kelawatsets into the encampment. This not through apprehension, since they had given him no reason for fear, but simply as a matter of mountain prudence. For one reason or another Rogers didn’t observe this precaution. (Possibly he was not able to prevent the Indians coming in, but it is much more likely that he was not concerned about the problem.) They had, after all, manifested a good deal of friendliness (and Rogers, it may be noted, had not been among the Mojaves when their friendliness turned to murder.) His journal entry of the night before—the last he ever made—was hopeful: "Those Inds. tell us after we get up the river 15 or 20 miles we will have good travelling to the Wel Hammett or Multinomah, where
the Callipoo Inds. live."
Perhaps this prospect, coming after the dreary months of vicious travel and hardship, was enough to deaden his sensitivity to danger. In any case, there were nearly a hundred of the Kelawatsets in camp. As Arthur Black told the story to John McLoughlin:
...a short time after Mr. Smiths departure, their being about a hundred Indians in the Camp & the Americans busy arranging their arms which got wet the day previous, the Indians suddenly rushed on them, two got hold of his [Black’s] Gun to take it from him, in contending with them he was wounded on the hands by their Knives & another came with an axe to strike him on the head, which he avoided by Springing on one side & received the blow on the back. He then let go his Gun & rushed to the woods, as he was coming away he saw two Indians on one Virgil [Virgin], another, Davis~[Daws] was in the water & Indians were pursuing him in a Canoe, a third w
as on the ground & a band of Indians were
butchering him with axes.
After escaping from the encampment, Black had wandered in the woods for four days, and finally made his way back to the beach. The first Indian he met tried to take his knife away from him, but Black was able to keep him off. Shortly after this he ran into a party of seven,.who "stripped him of all his clothing except his Trousers." These were soon joined by another party, and an argument developed; about himself, Black thought. He took advantage of the diversion to scamper into the woods and escape. He saw no more Indians until he reached the "Killimaux” villages, at present Til1amook Bay, then Murderer’s Harbor, about 150 miles up the coast. ("Tillamook" was variously spelled, but always with the "k" sound until 1852.) There he secured a guide—as did Smith a day or so later—who took him inland to the Willamette and thence down to Fort Vancouver. He arrived about 10 P.M. on the 8th of August.
At daybreak the next day McLoughlin dispatched runners to the Willamette valley chiefs, requesting them to send out parties in search of survivors and bring them to the fort, if found.
Nothing came of this, of course, because the day after runners had been sent Smith, Leland, and Turner arrived, "to our great joy," says McLoughlin.
Now, for the third time in two years, Smith was again at the tender mercies of a foreign power, and this time it was Britain, which had very good reason for wishing Jedediah Strong Smith had never seen the light of day.
III
The use or the terms "American" and "the Arnericans" in HBC documents gives a faulty air of anonymity to their relations; almost as though HBC considered "the Americans" a rather odd tribe, and thought of them not as individuals but as a whole. This was far from the case. HBC took a strong interest in individual personalities connected with the American fur trade. They—and by this I include the Governor and Committee in London—were conversant with the name and activities of every American trader of any importance. In this respect they were far more knowledgeable than their opposite numbers on the American side, who viewed HBC simply as a monstrous, menacing corporate entity.
HBC’s interest was due in part to the fact that it had a much less myopic view of the fur trade than did the American companies, and could afford the long view. From the solidity of its corporate structure HBC was, in effect, immortal. This is in sharp cpntrast to the outlook of the principals in this narrative. The American traders were individual mortal men, figuring what they could take out of the trade in the next six months, or year, or—at a maximum—five years. The British wanted a steady, stable return over a period of ten or twenty years, and they were profoundly concerned with the condition of the country in fifty years. They had, after all, been in business for 160 years by this time, and youthful impetuosity, if it ever existed, had long since faded sweetly away.
Despite the presence of highly colorful, powerful individuals in the ranks, the activities of HBC are comprehensible only when viewed as the actions of this immortal entity. Their standing policy of conservation, their reluctance to use liquor in the Indian trade, their discretion in clashes with American parties—all are directly attributable to this long view. And for the same reason the HBC factors tried to keep themselves informed about the principal American traders.
Thus, when Jedediah Smith appeared at Fort Vancouver, John McLoughlin was fully aware that "the American" was a chief partner of the major firm then operating in the Rocky Mountains; a firm which had given HBC some restless moments recently. (In the previously quoted letter, McLouglin identities Smith as "this is the same that came to the Flat Heads 1824/5 and also whom Capt. Simpson saw last Jany. at St. Francisco.")
McLoughlin was a fiery man, six feet four with a seven foot temper. When Ogden’s freemen deserted to Johnson Gardner in 1825, McLoughlin had responded angrily: "we are justified in resisting to the Utmost of our power" any assumption of authority on the part of the American companies. He even wanted to send a party into the Snake country the following year for the express purpose of throwing the gauntlet back in the face of Smith Jackson & Sublette: 'to defy them to put their threats in Execution?
Considering the situation as outlined above, it is reasonable to expect that Smith would be received rather coolly, if not treated to a display of outright hostility that would make
even Echeandia wince.
Such was not the case. That it was not is to the eternal credit of HBC and the two men through whom the company acted, John McLoughlin and George Simpson. Never did
HBC more thoroughly merit its sobriquet, "The Honourable Company."
***
When the survivors arrived at Fort Vancouver, McLoughlin was in the process of fitting out one of the "Southern Expeditions," under Alexander McLeod. The party was headed for an area not far from the site of the Umpqua massacre, and McLoughlin was only waiting the return of some men from Okanogan to dispatch McLeod.
Immediately on receiving news of the disaster, McLoughlin altered the purpose of the expedition to include recovery of Smith’s property and disciplining the Indians who had plundered it. Until McLeod's party could get off, a matter of several weeks, McLoughlin sent Michel Laframboise to see what he could find out. Laframboise was a French Canadian who had been in the Oregon country for nearly twenty years; ever since the Astoria enterprise. He traveled freely and alone where even heavily armed angels feared to tread. (According to one source, this was because he had a wife in almost every tribe he was likely to run across.)
It was September before McLeod’s party—with Smith accompanying him—could get off. They took the Willamette south, and on the second day met Laframboise returning.
The news was not particularly encouraging. The stolen property had been scattered around the country in various bands; it wasn’t likely that much could be recovered. As to further survivors—there was a rumor that four of the men were alive and in the custody of the "Cal1oose" Indians (probably either the Milluck Coos or the Manis Coos). But it was just a rumor. Laframboise had apparently talked to some of the Indians involved, and they had offered the ironic excuse that they had not taken Smith’s party to be the same people as
HSBC.
Laframboise continued down to Fort Vancouver, carrying letters from McLeod and Smith to McLoughlin. Part of Smith’s letter said:
. . . should you think it necessary for the benefit of your Company to punish these Indians you would confer a favour on your humble Servant to allow him and his Men to assist.
McLeod was probably requesting instructions, now that there seemed to be no likelihood of recovering any of the American property without enormous eifort.
Michel was back within a week, carrying replies to both men. Smith’s offer of assistance1 was appreciated, but McLoughlin wanted the American to understand his motives:
I beg to assure you that in this case I am actuated by no selfish motives of nterest—but solely by feel‘ ings of humanity . . . in our intercourse with such barbarians we ought always to keep in view the future consequences likely to result from our conduct as unless those Murderers of your people & Robbers of your property are made to return their plunder, as we unfortunately too well know they have no horror or compunction of Conscience at depriving their fellow Man of life—If strangers came in their way they would not hesitate to murder them for the sake of possessing themselves of their property; but as it would be worse than useless to attempt more than our forces would enable us to accomplish and as Mr. McLeod knows those Indians & knows best whether we can effect any good, he will decide on what is to be done.
To McLeod, the chief factor admitted that:
Mr. Smith's.affair has a more gloomy appearance than I expected & it seems to be in that state, either that we must make War on the Murderers of his people to make them restore his property or drop the business entirely.
It was a difficult decision to make. McLoughlin‘s letter to McLeod reviews the pros and cons of the situation. On the one hand lay the danger of leaving the Indians unpunished, and thu
s incurring the danger of possible repetitions in the future. Against this was the dubious authority of HBC to make war, and the even worse consequences if they should undertake any action against the Indians that they were not able to carry through. McLoughlin wanted no Aricara campaign on his hands in the Columbia Department. All this they had gone over before, during the three weeks before McLeod’s party was ready to move out:
it is unnecessary after the various conversations we have had for me to say any thing further on this subject—You know those Indians you know our means . .. & as you are on the spot—you therefore will decide on what is best to be done.
Considering the possible consequences of a decision either way, this put Alexander McLeod in an unenviable position. It is characteristic of McLoughlin’s compassion and understanding that he closed his letter thus: "whatever that decision may be at least as far as I am concerned every allowance will be made for the situation you are placed in."
McLeod’s decision was to play his part by ear. Accordingly he continued down the Willamette; hearing rumors all the way that the Umpquas planned to ambush him. The party crossed over the mountains in the vicinity of present Cottage Grove and began to descend the Umpqua to the sea. As they moved down this river, the Indians scattered before them, until those with the brigade were able to reassure them this was not, strictly speaking, a war party;
McLeod had a chief of the Umpqua tribe in for a conference on October ll; the chief showed up leading eight horses from the massacred party. McLeod reassured him that the whites had no present intention of making war, but merely intended to restore Smith’s.property and "Establish Peace and Quietness."
McLeod could get nothing from the chief respecting survivors, though he did learn that the tribes were quite astonished that an HZBC party should be upset about the massacre.
