Zombies, Vampires, and Philosophy

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Zombies, Vampires, and Philosophy Page 14

by Richard Greene; K. Silem Mohammad


  If we conclude that it is morally wrong for a society to make such a symbolic statement concerning its sense of the cheap value of human life, then why might we not say the same with respect to big screen depictions of the horrifying treatment of Hollywood zombies in films like Dawn of the Dead and Night of the Living Dead that are also produced for entertainment? In the recent Land of the Dead, the writers envisioned something very much like Hollywood zombie gladiatorial battles, using zombies for target practice, and pitting them against a living person in a cage for the crowd’s amusement and political edification.

  There are two important differences. First, patrons of the cinema, even children old enough to attend, know that they are watching actors in makeup with a dazzling array of special effects. The whole institution of filmmaking and of viewing projected images that are shown over and over again in many places, that can be owned in VHS or DVD format, is understood as a work of fiction. Zombie gladiator mutilations and slayings, by contrast, would be real, taking place in real time before the spectators’ eyes. Secondly, in the movies there is always an opportunity amidst all the carnage to incorporate morally and socially redeeming values as a part of the entertainment. In the zombie gladiatorial arena, there is at most only the possibility for a false display of such virtues as courage, cunning, clemency, among others, in the struggle to survive, and the nobility, strength and determination of what might look to an audience to be force of will.

  If these qualities happen to surface in a live gladiatorial performance, it can only be by sheer accident, as in real life, and not by artistic design. In the cinema, if moral values are to be communicated, they must be built into the choices that determine a film as a product of art. It is to the filmmaker’s moral credit when such redeeming features are made part of a Hollywood zombie production. If virtues appear to be exemplified in a real-life zombie gladiatorial contest, they are not due to the combat organizers, who cannot plan for or direct the spontaneous behavior of zombie combatants, nor to the zombies themselves, who are utterly devoid of all conscious mental states, and hence of all moral intent or responsibility for their “actions” on the battlefield, as the audience also well knows.

  Postmodern Postmortem

  What can philosophy learn from the zombie gladiators thought experiment? As we take stock of our findings, it seems inescapable that being a person presupposes consciousness, which in turn is presupposed by morality. It follows, then, as we have emphasized, that zombies, as automata falling outside of moral judgment, are altogether amoral.

  Zombies are never morally responsible for what they do or fail to do, never right or wrong in their behavior, never morally blameworthy or praiseworthy. These facts need not preclude the possibility that it may turn out to be causally effective in shaping their behavior to praise or blame, reward or punish zombies physically, even though they cannot be aware of what we are doing or saying, and even though they experience no pleasure or pain as a consequence of such actions. In this as in other respects, again, philosophical zombies are remarkably different from those wanton flesh-gnawing Hollywood zombies milling about the shopping mall after dark. What is not true, as demonstrated now by the zombie gladiators thought experiment, if we have correctly understood its implications, is that morally, therefore, we can do whatever we like to zombies.

  There are good solid reasons for thinking that we should not use zombies as gladiators. To do so with no higher purpose than entertainment makes a morally objectionable symbolic statement about our (dis-)regard for human life, conscious or Undead. What this proves in turn is that consciousness or personhood is not both necessary and sufficient in deciding all questions of moral responsibility. We can act wrongly, in a sense, toward ourselves, in the way we treat zombies, even though we cannot hurt or in other ways psychologically traumatize them. The blame, if any, and moral responsibility, will always be entirely on our side, shouldered exclusively by those of us who are conscious thinkers with an understanding of the difference between moral right and wrong. Zombies get a moral pass for whatever they do; we conscious beings, with a sense of moral right and wrong, do not.58

  10

  Should Vampires Be Held Accountable for Their Bloodthirsty Behavior?

  JOHN DRAEGER

  Vampires versus Zombies

  Flesh-eating zombies have been known to feast on innocent people in a violent frenzy. Vampires often keep their victims alive only to kill them another day. Any human being performing such actions would be considered morally despicable and rightly so. But while human perpetrators should pay for their violence, it’s unclear whether the Undead can be held to the same standard.

  The zombies in George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead, for example, lack the cognitive sophistication to be held accountable for their bloodthirsty behavior. Operating according to some set of (un)natural laws, they smash through doors and devour people in a kind of catatonic trance. They behave more like a plant drawn to sunlight than a rational creature aware of its surroundings. If a poisonous plant were to inadvertently take an innocent life, it wouldn’t be subject to moral condemnation. The nuisance might reasonably be destroyed, but a plant cannot be held accountable because it is unaware of the damage it inflicts. Similarly, Romero’s zombies should be stopped, but they shouldn’t be blamed.

  By contrast, Dracula meticulously plans his move to London. He secures the services of Jonathan Harker. He carefully considers which pieces of real estate to purchase. And he arranges passage aboard a cargo ship. Furthermore, he willingly makes short-term sacrifices for long-term gains. He isn’t some mindless zombie lacking self-control. If he were, then he would have gorged himself on Harker before they reached his castle. Because Dracula understands the nature of his actions, he seems accountable in a way that Romero’s zombies aren’t.

  Dracula: Amoral or Immoral?

  Not everyone should be blamed for their harmful actions. Some people, such as those with severe mental deficiencies, cannot comprehend the nature of their actions and thus lack the where-withal to be held accountable. Romero’s zombies fit this description. Other people, such as those with certain emotional deficiencies, lack an emotional connection with those around them. Psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley, for example, describes the puzzling behavior of a patient, named Milt, who seemed utterly indifferent to the needs of others.59

  By way of illustration, Cleckley tells us that Milt once went to the hospital to pick up his mother. While driving her home, the car broke down and he set off to find the parts to fix it. On the way, however, he became engaged in one distraction after another. He watched football and talked to a friend. Cleckley suggests that Milt was not absentminded. He knew that his mother had just been released from the hospital and he knew that she was waiting by the roadside, but he couldn’t see her condition as being “any big deal.” When he returned hours later, Milt was annoyed to find the car empty. He could not understand why his mother would be unwilling to wait. This lack of empathy helps explain why he was indifferent to his mother’s situation.60 In the literature on moral responsibility, Milt’s case is often taken to show that those incapable of a certain level of basic empathic concern should not be held responsible for their behavior and should be treated as amoral creatures.61

  Romero’s zombies lack both the cognitive and the emotional sophistication to be held responsible for their behavior and thus they are amoral. Dracula’s case, however, is less cut-and-dry. I’ve suggested that vampires have the cognitive sophistication necessary to be held responsible for their behavior, but it is unclear whether they are emotionally sophisticated enough to fully appreciate the gravity of their actions. It all depends upon how vampires are portrayed. If they can empathize with others, then they can know of the suffering they cause. And this would demonstrate that they are capable of moral reflection and thus accountable for serial murders. However, if they are like Cleckley’s Milt and are incapable of appreciating the pains of others, then they should be considered amoral. They can be locked up, b
ut they can’t be blamed. A vampire’s emotional capabilities are morally significant because they mark the difference between an amoral and an immoral creature.

  Bram Stoker’s Dracula, for example, seems devoid of moral emotion. True, he is enraged when his brides feed on Harker, but this is because their actions might undermine his long-term plans and not because he is particularly interested in the man’s well-being. Throughout the novel, he seems more interested in satisfying his own desires than worrying about the value of a human life. In a particularly callous moment, he tells Mina, “You may as well be quiet; it is not the first time, or the second, that your veins have appeased my thirst.”62 Shortly thereafter, he forces her to drink of his blood. The extreme narcissism exhibited by Stoker’s Dracula suggests that he may be incapable of appreciating the needs of others. Thus, he seems akin to the amoral Milt.

  Francis Ford Coppola’s film adaptation of Dracula is faithful to the novel in many respects, but Mina’s conversion is importantly different. Before turning her into a vampire, Coppola’s Dracula respectfully explains that everlasting love comes at the cost of her mortal life and hints that immortality cannot guarantee bliss. Unlike Stoker’s Dracula who seems willing to use Mina for his own purposes, Coppola’s Dracula asks Mina to give her informed consent to the life he has planned for them. As he slits his chest and Mina begins to drink, he cries out, “I cannot let this be. You’ll be as cursed as I am to walk in the shadow of death for all eternity. I love you too much to condemn you.” These words indicate that he is fully aware of the consequences of his actions. His love for Mina compels him to sympathize with her future misery and causes him to regret the pain he is about to inflict. These feelings are important because they demonstrate that he has a deep appreciation of the value of a human life. In the end, however, he relents and she drinks.

  It is somewhat of a mystery why anyone would hurt those they love, but this kind of behavior is all too common. Like many human beings, Coppola’s Dracula finds that he just can’t help himself. He knows Mina will be hurt, but he gives into temptation anyway. Unlike Stoker’s Dracula, Coppola’s Dracula is capable of “feeling Mina’s pain” and thus seems capable of appreciating the gravity of his actions. And, like most human beings, Coppola’s Dracula seems capable of self-control and thus can be faulted for his immorality.

  Noble Louis and Villainous Lestat

  Neil Jordan’s film version of Anne Rice’s novel Interview with the Vampire provides us with another example of a vampire tormented by his feelings for others and offers perhaps the clearest example of an Undead creature responsible for his behavior. Not wanting human blood on his fangs, Louis prefers to feed on poodles, chickens, and rats. He does give in to temptation when he tastes the blood of the young Claudia. However, he quickly runs away in self-disgust and spends the rest of her life caring for her as a member of the family.

  Despite being a vampire, Louis tries to live a moral life. Time and again, he exhibits a “lingering respect for life.” He is not only aware of the consequences of his actions, but he makes the self-conscious effort to treat others as he believes they ought to be treated. He refuses to turn Daniel Malloy into a vampire because he knows the misery it will bring. The fact that he self-consciously rejects Armand’s call to be “beautiful, powerful, and without regret” demonstrates that he is capable of both moral reflection and self-transformation. In short, Louis’s guilt as well as his decision to live with it suggests that he holds himself accountable for his bloodthirsty behavior and perhaps we should too.

  Romero’s zombies might enjoy the taste of human flesh, but they cannot enjoy watching terrified human beings beg for their lives because they cannot appreciate the nature of human terror. As we’ve seen, zombies are amoral and not evil. Lestat, by contrast, takes fiendish delight in the suffering of others. Like the cruel torturer, he knows of the pain he inflicts and enjoys it for this reason. He especially likes tasting the blood of aristocrats because he likes seeing the mighty fall. He understands their arrogance and so takes added pleasure in watching them wither in fear. Achieving this level of immorality took some work: Lestat had to find ways of silencing his inner conscience. As he tells Louis, “The trick is not to think about it.” He knows that if he were to think about it, he would feel guilty and that would spoil his fun.

  Lestat’s behavior resembles that of someone wanting to commit common acts of immorality (say, adultery). Deceiving oneself about the true nature of one’s bad behavior certainly makes it possible to continue down that road. And once someone has made a habit of behaving badly, it becomes easy. However, an action doesn’t become morally permissible because people trick themselves into believing that it is the right thing to do. Marital infidelity, for example, is wrong despite the fact that lots of people do it. Similarly, a life of murderous cruelty is still wrong even if some folks enjoy it and some subcultures find it acceptable.

  Warped sensibilities might explain why people (including vampires) behave as they do. The fact that someone was a victim of childhood sexual abuse may explain why they become child predators as adults. However, the fact that someone has warped desires doesn’t change the fact that we can (and should) hold them responsible. Similarly, the fact that vampires must drink blood to survive explains why they kill so frequently, but it doesn’t mean that their actions should be excused. The fact that Lestat must engage in self-deception shows that he knows (at some level) that his actions are wrong. The fact that he has an insatiable thirst for human blood makes overcoming temptation difficult, but it doesn’t mean that his actions are above moral scrutiny. Like the human sex offender, if Lestat is capable of appreciating the consequences of his actions, then he should. The fact that he doesn’t engage in moral reflection merely shows that he is morally lazy. And the fact that he enjoys being cruel shows that he understands what he is doing and he is all the more despicable because of it.

  In sum, Coppola’s Dracula as well as Jordan’s Louis and Lestat should be held accountable for their bloodthirsty behavior. Each acts with an awareness of the consequences of his actions. Each can distinguish right from wrong. Each is capable of sympathizing with the needs of others and acting on their behalf. And even if they sometimes fall victim to temptation (or have become hardened over time), each is capable of exercising self-control. In short, they should be held responsible for their crimes because they share all the characteristics of human perpetrators of violence. This suggests that vampires aren’t so different from us. Stoker’s Mina recognizes as much when she urges Harker to punish Dracula for his crimes, but not to lose sight of the fact that under the bloodthirsty exterior is a pitiable (almost human) creature.

  Some Implications: Equal Rights for Vampires

  There’s no question that wrongdoers ought to be punished. We want them off the streets and we want them to pay for their crimes. But most civilized societies recognize that even the moral scum of the earth deserve certain basic protections. Legal systems, for example, demand fair trials and moral systems prohibit torture. Once we recognize that someone is capable of moral reflection and self-transformation, we must also recognize that he deserves to be treated as such. If, as I have argued, vampires are capable of moral reflection, then they deserve to have their rights respected.

  Van Helsing, Morris, and Harker indulge in a form of vigilantism when they hunt down Dracula as if he were some animal. They don’t attempt to capture him in order to bring him to justice. They don’t provide him with adequate legal counsel capable of presenting his version of events. They don’t allow him to be judged by a jury of his peers. Instead, they presume he is guilty or, worse, assume that he is incapable of being held to account for his crimes. They are justifiably afraid of his violent actions, but fear can’t justify vigilantism.

  Most civilized societies recognize that everyone deserves their day in court. If vampires deserve equal rights, then they deserve this legal protection as well. Of course, justice isn’t always done. History is full of mobs taking the law
into their own hands. However, we should not confuse the treatment that some people actually receive with the treatment that they actually deserve. If vampires deserve equal rights, then they should not be victims of vigilante justice.

  Vampires may be difficult to capture and even more difficult to incarcerate. However, we should not suspend our system of justice simply because it is easier. After all, executing shoplifters would effectively prevent theft, but surely delinquent children deserve a chance to learn from their mistakes. Despite their ease and effectiveness, some punishments are unjust. Moreover, if Louis is any indication, then it seems reasonable to suppose that vampires can be rehabilitated. But even if they must be executed, we should at least feel bad about it. Any creature capable of moral reflection and self-transformation should be regarded as a thing of value. It is at least regrettable when this is not or cannot be done.

  Criminals aren’t typically allowed to participate in civil government because they are thought to forfeit such rights as soon as they commit a crime. But suppose Louis were to survive on a strict diet of chicken, lamb, and cow blood. If he were to behave like any other decent citizen, then why shouldn’t he be allowed to vote or run for public office? There are legitimate worries about the feasibility of this new form of government. Should legislative assemblies meet at night or during the day? What kind of meals should be served at state functions? Even so, practical concerns should not be confused with the question of whether vampires deserve the right of civic participation.

 

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