by Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War
The situation on the carriers Hornet, Enterprise, and Yorktown wasn't good. Most of the available fighters had been sent out with the strikes that morning, gambling that they would catch the Japanese flat-footed. Those carefully planned attacks had come apart when the torpedo planes, bombers, and fighters arrived at different times, and the Japanese were able to deal with them piecemeal as they arrived. Many hadn't even found the Japanese, and many had landed on Midway Island or ditched at sea. Only short unintelligible scraps of radio messages had gotten through to the Combat Information Centers, and most of these seemed to point to confusion and desperation, not success. A few planes made it back to the carriers, badly shot up, with only fumes remaining in their fuel tanks. By midmorning on June 4, 1942, the main striking power of the U.S. carriers was scattered far away or down in the ocean and with no help on the way.
Two Japanese aircraft had located the American fleets by now and were using the bits of available cloud cover to stay hidden while maintaining contact. They were sending navigation information to the oncoming Japanese strike force of bombers and fighters and would guide them to their targets with the minimum loss of time. Shortly after 1100 local time, U.S. air search radars detected the first wave of over 200 Japanese aircraft closing on the sparsely defended carriers. There were only a handful of F4F Wildcat fighters available to deal with the attacking planes, and the battle was quickly over. Within less than thirty minutes all three carriers were burning, and the attacking Japanese turned on the escorting cruisers and destroyers. When the attacks ended, Enterprise and Yorktown were afloat but abandoned except for damage control parties. Hornet had gone down quickly, and destroyers moved as fast as they could to recover survivors. Despite desperate efforts to restore power and get the carriers under way, time became an issue. No one doubted that new air attacks would be coming and that they would soon be in range of the guns of Japanese battleships as well. After every crewman who could be evacuated was removed, destroyers moved alongside and fired torpedoes into the hulls, and two more U.S. carriers joined their pilots and aircraft two miles under the deep Pacific. The surviving vessels, overloaded with the men they could find and rescue, moved as quickly as they could north and east to escape.
Not long afterward, the Japanese invasion force, covered by the heavy fire of the support force's battleships and cruisers, began landings on Midway. After a short and brutal battle, the island's defenders were overrun and the Rising Sun was raised once more over what had been American territory.2
Loss of the three carriers and of Midway itself struck Washington like a hammer. The news couldn't be kept from the American people; there were too many stories in the newspapers and on the radio about a major naval battle taking place. Once the news hit in full force, there were loud and emotional calls for accountability from the government. Emergency meetings were conducted between the president and his staff, General Marshall, the Department of War, the service secretaries, and ranking members of Congress. When the shock of the losses began to sink in, blame for the disaster was swiftly attributed to Adm. Chester Nimitz's foolhardy gamble with almost all of America's remaining sea power in the Pacific. Why was Yorktown risked, even though it had sustained serious damage just days before in the battle of the Coral Sea? With all the warnings Nimitz received, why had the air attacks on the Japanese carriers failed? When Admiral Halsey had been hospitalized, why did Nimitz pick Spruance, a cruiser admiral, of all people, with no experience in carrier operations, to lead these critical carrier strikes against the Japanese?
An investigation was initiated, but the new and difficult situation facing the United States and her allies had first to be understood and confronted. This was more than another major defeat in the Pacific—this was a crippling loss. What little initiative the U.S. and Allied forces could have had before Midway in the form of raids or campaigns seemed impossible now. Australia and all of the southwestern Pacific lay vulnerable against a virtually unscathed Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Wasp and Saratoga were the only remaining U.S. carriers in the Pacific, compared to ten fleet carriers and five light carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy. There hadn't been any battleships available in the Pacific Fleet since Pearl Harbor, which meant that the Japanese were essentially unopposed from the Indian Ocean to the California coast. Recriminations abounded but solutions seemed elusive.
Now, the Japanese felt safe from any further danger from Doolittle-style attacks and, most important, the United States would be forced to recognize Japan's supremacy and accept peace on their terms. This had been the foundation of Japan's war plans since the beginning. First cripple the U.S. fleet, then isolate and defeat America's garrisons, then lure the remainder into an all-out decisive battle at sea. Everything had fallen into place. All that remained was to ensure America's acceptance of the Japanese terms and Japan could concentrate on the development and solidification of her Empire.
When the celebrations in Tokyo were in full swing, only Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto stayed at his headquarters with his top staff. There was no time to be lost, even with the enemy apparently prostrate. He was working on his and the navy's proposals for the next phase of operations, to ensure that the initiative would stay with Japan. Armistice proposals were being drafted to be passed to the Allies through the good offices of Sweden and Switzerland and almost every member of the Japanese senior leadership believed or hoped that the U.S. government would see no choice but to agree to their terms. Yamamoto wasn't one of those leaders. His experience as a naval attache in Washington had taught him that while Americans were fractious and uncultured they could also be stubborn and determined. The courage of those American torpedo bombers, fruitlessly boring in against his carriers, had impressed his officers. All of the American pilots had remained committed to the attack, flying at a ridiculous 120 kph as his much faster Zero fighters shot each of them down in turn. They died like true warriors, his officers had said. That thought sobered him as he worked over the next phase of operations.
Strategically, the near-term courses of action were:
1. Seize New Guinea and Australia: Resume the campaign that was prematurely ended by the Battle of the Coral Sea and expand the Empire to the south. This was near and dear to senior Japanese leaders and particularly the army, since it would solidify Japanese control of the entire southwestern Pacific and the entrances to the Indian Ocean. Control of these seas guaranteed unobstructed access to fuel and raw materials and a firm road to the seizure of India. Japan, it was thought, would be unassailable. The problem with this course of action was that it would require all of his Combined Fleet's resources, and once Australia and the Straits of Malacca were secured large land sea, and air defensive forces would be pinned in place to keep that area secure. This was an all-or-nothing option, for at least the next nine months to a year.
2. Reinforce the forces at Midway and seize Oahu and the Hawaiian chain: A logical and easily achievable objective, since Oahu was the last remaining outpost of U.S. power in the Pacific. Its great natural anchorage at Pearl Harbor, its fleet and army air force bases, and its large fuel stores were a threat to Japanese forces operating at Midway and a potential springboard if the Americans still had the will to counterattack. Seizure of the Hawaiian chain and the reduction of American military forces and facilities on Oahu would guarantee the safety of the home islands and provide Japan with an insurmountable water barrier against any future offensive. Full supremacy at sea would facilitate the movement and support of the landing forces, and it was in hand now, but this situation would be fleeting. Any decision to commit forces for operations to seize the Hawaiian Islands would have to be done quickly. It went without saying that the foothold in the Aleutians on Attn and Kiska would have to be reinforced and enlarged, with any remaining American power within range eliminated.
3. Strike the U.S. mainland: Japan's enormous striking power could reach and severely damage the cities, factories, transportation, and fuel reserves on America's West Coast. Strong attacks would also convin
ce U.S. leaders that continued war against Japan was impossible. The Combined Fleet was the perfect weapon to strike a large part of the enemy's critical design and production capabilities. The major U.S. aircraft companies were well within carrier-based aircraft range, and some were even within range of his battleship's guns from fire support areas along the Pacific coast. Sudden and powerful strikes would emphasize Japan's new position in the Pacific, damage the American citizens' morale and their support of their government, and give a gift of revenge to the Emperor for the insult of Doolittle's raid against His Majesty. Given the impotence of land-based bomber attacks against his fleet during the Midway Battle Yamamoto was sure he could operate close to altitude attacks by torpedo-bombers, but the swift Zero fighters could make short work of these assaults, as they had before. Such combatant vessels as were available to the Americans would have no chance against him. Besides aircraft production assets, there were oil production and refining facilities, power stations, shipbuilding yards, and many other critical targets within the reach of his unbeaten fleet. The Americans had 2,200 kilometers of coast to defend, and no way of knowing where and when the Japanese could choose to attack.
4. Answer the forceful German requests to strike the Soviet Union: Some influential members of the Japanese government and the army urged immediate attack on the Soviet southeastern flank from Manchukuo, to support the Nazis in bringing about the collapse of the USSR. This course of action was attractive. It would solidify the Manchukuo frontier, with the possibility of securing all of the northern Pacific area, including the Sea of Okhotsk, the port of Vladivostok, and the riches of Siberia. It would almost certainly guarantee an Axis victory against the USSR, still reeling from the German blitzkrieg toward Moscow and the Caucasus. A second front by the Japanese would divert a large part of Stalin's forces and ease Germany's path in the West. This would be an expensive option in manpower and logistics and another all-or-nothing proposition. The Russians and the Japanese had been adversaries before, and the combination of rugged terrain and weather, long distances, and tough troops would mean that this course of action could not be undertaken lightly. As with option (1), it assumed that the United States would not become a threat in the near future and could be held in place with minimal effort.
5. A combination of some or all these courses of action: U.S. forces were incapable of offensive operations but were not yet negligible. The key remaining capability available to America was its submarine force, operating from Pearl Harbor and Australia. While its submarines were few in number and their torpedoes, poor, no Japanese skipper could ignore the threat they posed. American aircraft were a problem too, U.S. bombers had already conducted strikes against his forces consolidating on Midway. Radio interception units had also detected reinforcement of the aircraft on Oahu. His own staff's recommendation was for course of action (2), the isolation or seizure of Hawaii, in order to permanently seal the Pacific from the U.S. Navy and to continue the objectives of the Midway operation. However, his discussions with the Army General Staff showed that the army remained committed to course of action (1), offensive action against New Guinea and Australia.
Yamamoto, as usual, had different ideas. To maintain the momentum gained by the victory at Midway, he would recommend a multiple set of objectives in the short term, to obtain what they all wanted in the long term. He would isolate the American forces on Hawaii, and damage or destroy the ports, facilities, and production capabilities on the West Coast of the United States, using carrier air power and the guns of his battleships. The gains made so far put Japan in position to threaten the U.S. mainland, and Yamamoto knew that nothing less than the direct threat of attack could push the Americans into giving in to Japan's demands. Then they could turn their attention to the Southwest Pacific and complete control of their Empire.
He knew that the enormous tactical advantage Japan now enjoyed would still prove temporary if the unmatched resources of the United States were allowed to come into their own. He was also sure that new American carriers were being rushed into service, along with many more pilots trained to fly from them. He considered the possibility of locating the shipyards where the new carriers were being built and attacking them. That would give Japan some extra time with their well-won advantage in naval air forces. However, his naval intelligence service had located the carriers in yards on the East Coast of the United States, in New Jersey and Virginia, a long way out of reach. It would be helpful for Japan to coordinate attacks with its German allies, but other than recommendations that could be accepted or rejected, the Germans had not as yet shown any inclination for more aggressive support of Japanese forces. The key to preventing rapid reinforcement and parity in the Pacific, then, lay in interdicting the Panama Canal and cordoning the gap between South America and Antarctica with submarines. He also had to consider the possibility of operations by the two remaining U.S. carriers. That thought made him smile. If he could find them quickly, the Japanese victory would be absolute. What chance would two carriers have against all of his?
Once Yamamoto made up his mind to concentrate his naval forces against the U.S. mainland, he brought in his most trusted planners, under Captain Genda,3 to put the operation together. In his view, Japan had won six months to a full year of freedom of movement to utilize against the United States before the latter either capitulated or was sufficiently restored to strength to become a threat again. There was the usual resistance by the army and the General Staff to his plans, but his prestige and force of personality made sure that they would be accepted. The Emperor had issued an Imperial Rescript for his victory over the American Pacific Fleet at Midway, and he had little trouble convincing his opponents to allow him to go ahead. His plans promised to close the lid on a formerly formidable enemy and would allow the army to begin pursuing its own agenda very soon. Most of all, his plan appealed to the view now held by most Japanese: Why push for an armistice when complete victory was within reach? After all, the Japanese forces were undefeated! He had work to do.
MacArthur Reacts
The Secretary of War opened the Emergency War Plans Conference at the Pentagon immediately after conferring with the president and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The latter had been brought home from Australia to accept command of the Pacific Theater, with overall command of all army, army air forces, and naval forces. Despite many voices against this decision, the president was sure that MacArthur was the right man to take charge of this situation and get the nation back on the road to victory. MacArthur made it very clear that he would accept only if he had all available forces under his command and if the additional materiel and supplies that he deemed necessary were provided. Panic was just below the surface as the Emergency War Plans Conference opened, as one briefing officer after another laid out the losses, the forces available to the enemy, and the vulnerability of U.S. positions on the Pacific coast and Hawaii.
After the briefings were completed, MacArthur was introduced as the commander in chief, Pacific, and the members of the conference listened in silence as he laid out his plans to assemble, train, and set America's combat power in motion against the Japanese. The original belief that the war could be conducted by holding the Japanese at bay while concentrating on the Germans alongside America's European allies was dead. The defeats that started at Pearl Harbor and were followed by the surrender of 20,000 troops in the Philippines had now been capped by the loss of nearly 10,000 airmen, soldiers, sailors, and Marines dead or missing near Midway. Hawaii was universally believed to be untenable. No air force could maintain the lines of communication and support for U.S. forces there, and no sea force could be assembled anytime soon to defend it against attack and invasion. Japanese air attacks from Midway and from carrier raids were common occurrences now, and the morale of its civilians was visibly and understandably poor. Anyone who could get transportation away from Hawaii packed their possessions and left. It was apparent to everyone that it was only a question of time before the Hawaiian Islands fell. The Pacific Fleet he
adquarters and other command centers on Oahu were evacuated back to San Francisco, where MacArthur was building his command center at the Treasure Island naval facility.
To U.S. leadership, the threat to the West Coast was obvious. For the first time, American cities lay open to the kind of devastation that Europe and West Asia had already seen. The first priority was to reinforce air power for the full length of the Pacific coast, stretching from San Diego to Seattle, to provide reconnaissance as well as fighter and bomber forces. Critical industries and facilities would have to be moved hidden, or protected from attack, and much of the noncritical civilian population would have to be relocated farther from the coast.
Politically, the situation was in turmoil. The Republican leadership in Congress was incensed that the Roosevelt government had been so inept, so unprepared. Some even called for Roosevelt's resignation or impeachment and for a new national leadership. This movement surged and then ebbed as the Democratic members of Congress rallied to the president. Once the situation stabilized the timing was right to issue the Secretary of War's recommendations for the redirection of the war effort:
