by Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War
Map 8. Japanese Naval Attacks, 8-10, 1942
All along the West Coast, around Oahu, and along the Central American coasts, patrol aircraft, radars and radio intercept stations, and submarines searched for signs of the approaching Japanese. They didn't have long to wait. At 0330 Pacific Time, October 8, 1942, a PBY from the North Island Naval Air Station flying to the west of San Diego spotted a large formation of enemy ships, reported their location, and then was quickly shot down. Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet had arrived (see Map 8).
Air raid sirens all over San Diego and Los Angeles wailed and hundreds of thousands of residents went to shelters or took to the roads out of the cities. Just as the sun came up over the hills, swarms of Japanese carrier fighters began strafing airfields in and around San Diego and searching for any aircraft that might be up and waiting. There were. Swarms of P-40s and P-38s from Brown Field and Lindbergh Field and F4F Wildcats from North Island Naval Air Station poured down on the Zeros from high above. Soon there were swirling trails of aircraft mixed in with one another, some racing after one another down to the red tile roofs of the homes in the San Diego hills. Close behind the fighters, nearly 200 Kate level bombers and Val dive-bombers poured in over the coast from six carriers to attack targets in the naval base, the airfields, and the Consolidated Vultee aircraft factory. More American fighters dove in behind the bombers, and smoke trails intersected the blue skies of California. Antiaircraft fire was sporadic and inaccurate at first, but as the gunners became accustomed to the mayhem and their own weapons, more aircraft began falling. Bombs were landing all over the city. Some hit their target but many didn't. Badly aimed or jettisoned bombs, downed aircraft, and falling antiaircraft shells sparked fires and spread a pall of smoke over the city and out over the harbor to the sea. San Diego was burning and the battle had just begun.7
MacArthur's command center went to full alert as soon as the first contact report came in. Direct telephone lines to the San Diego and Los Angeles area command centers relayed radar data and orders to launch strikes against the Japanese. Bombers from dispersed strips throughout southern California gained altitude and took headings based on radar bearings from the attacking Japanese aircraft, which helped them locate the Japanese fleet. The training and tactics that had been rethought and amended following the debacle at Midway began to tell: While high-level B-l7s began runs from several directions, the wildly twisting Japanese ships had dozens of separate bombers to watch and avoid all at once. A lookout aboard the carrier Shokaku spotted twin-engined bombers approaching from wavetop height from the east. Scores of B-26 Marauders carrying torpedoes and B-25 Mitchells carrying bombs raced in to strike the flanks of the wildly maneuvering ships. The Zeros, which had been climbing to meet the B-l7s, were forced to break off and dive to try to catch the medium bombers speeding toward their ships. Navy F4F fighters joined the fray from Long Beach Naval Air Station and headed to intercept the Zeros. The first bombs to strike were aimed at Yamato, and there seemed to be little damage, but smoke from her afterquarters indicated that aviation gasoline for the spotter planes had been hit. The cruisers Mogami and Mikuma were hit, then hit again, with Mikuma stopping dead in the water.
Nagumo, watching from the flag bridge, saw a bomber heading directly for Hiryu. He held his breath as the medium bomber, hotly chased by Zero fighters into their own antiaircraft fire, dropped a torpedo at point-blank range. The Marauder burst into flames and rolled right wing first, into the sea. Then its torpedo hit Hiryu, dead center.
The antiaircraft fire, which had been ferocious, littered the water with wrecked planes, but once the attacking aircraft scored hits, the antiaircraft fire lessened as damage control parties had to fight the resultant fires. More aircraft arrived on the horizon from two directions: navy TBF Avenger torpedo bombers from Long Beach, Seal Beach, and Los Alamitos Naval Air Station. MacArthur's air forces commander at Treasure Island General “Hap” Arnold directed more and more aircraft into the battle from outlying areas. Other aircraft and crews were being vectored to Los Angeles, and from there control was passed to the Aviation Control Center at Los Alamitos NAS, south of Los Angeles, where army and navy staff officers monitored scout reports and battle progress while controlling and positioning new units for their attacks. When an element of aircraft returned from strikes, they were directed to dispersed airfields, to be refueled and rearmed. In the short months that MacArthur had to prepare, his air officers devised a web of air control centers to mass and coordinate air combat.8
Yamamoto went from surprised to stunned: How could the Americans be so effective? The assumptions based on their performance at Midway were clearly wrong. They had learned to conduct coordinated attacks, and one of his carriers and several of his bombardment units were taking the worst of it. He wanted to get in close enough to begin the shore bombardment program with his battleships, but the air attacks were already achieving results, only thirty minutes into the battle and 200 nautical miles from his planned gunfire support areas offshore. He had hoped for more surprise, but the Americans had demonstrated a remarkable ability to predict his moves. He knew it was only a matter of time before more of his carriers were hit, and decided to order his task force south and west, to get more sea room out of reach of the air attacks. He would evaluate the next step from there, based on his aircraft crews' reports on the effectiveness of their own attacks and some post-attack reconnaissance photos. The battle was developing badly so far. He knew he could not afford to give the Americans a victory. The president was awakened at 0710, Washington, D.C. time, when the PBY's contact report was relayed to the Department of War Operations Center. The confrontation he'd been dreading had arrived just as predicted, and now it was up to Mac-Arthur's boys to stop the Japanese. The reports of training and preparations for defense had been encouraging, but he knew all too well what effect another major defeat would have on the country and on his political leadership. Recent communication with his allies had been very rough: Churchill was adamant that the British needed help immediately, declaring the situation in Europe grave. Nighttime bombing was proving ineffective, with rapidly increasing losses as the Germans improved their night-fighter defenses. North Africa was a steady drain as the Germans stubbornly held out against Montgomery, and nightly German terror raids against Britain's cities increased as reprisals for attacks against Germany. The situation at sea was the worst. The U-boat “wolfpacks,” sometimes as large as twenty boats, destroyed vital shipping in staggering quantities. Russia had gone beyond desperate. The Nazis were close to Moscow, and Stalingrad had fallen after a desperate and heroic defense. With only minor raids from the west and no chance of a second front opening, Hitler was confident, and applied ever larger proportions of the forces and assets available to him to increase his offensive against the Soviets. Stalin was hinting darkly at potential options to reach a separate arrangement with the Germans if the Allies didn't help him soon.
FDR stayed close to the phone and sent messengers to the Pentagon to get the most current reports of the battle taking place over California.
Five time zones away, Oahu sustained heavy air attacks by land-based bombers from Midway and, for the first time since Pearl Harbor, carrier aircraft. This time, though, the defenses had been warned and were prepared. As in California, U.S. Army and Navy fighters were up and on station slashing through the fighter cover to get at the Japanese bombers. New radars had been pushed through to Oahu during the months since Midway, and submarine and seaplane patrols had stretched Hawaii's “eyes” farther out to sea. When masses of aircraft were seen on radar this time, the Americans were ready. Antiaircraft fire was more effective too. For some reason, the gunners were finding the range more quickly, and in some cases Japanese aircraft were exploding from single large-caliber hits almost as soon as they were within range. Despite the careful preparations, the high morale and fighting spirit of the Japanese aircraft crews, and the preparatory raids that had been taking place for months, their casualties were much higher than expe
cted. And the Americans were surprisingly better. Nevertheless, fires were raging all over Oahu and virtually nowhere was left unscathed.
Before the sun rose in the south-central Pacific that morning, the Panama Canal strike force had arrived at its launch point and was warming its aircraft engines while Zuiho turned into the wind. The aircraft had been staged and armed with heavy bombs and torpedoes for the attack. Then a surprised lookout on Zuiho called out a warning of torpedo tracks in the water. The fast carrier turned radically to starboard to clear the torpedoes' paths, but it was too late. Two explosions rocked Zuiho and fire spread. Escorts began frantic depth charge attacks on the submarine responsible, but that only provided an opening for two more subs closing on their port quarter, which fired more torpedoes at the stricken carrier. At least two of these connected with Zuiho, increasing its list to over thirty degrees and effectively sealing its fate. One more torpedo from the same spread kept going and connected with Mutsuki. The massive explosion where the special attack destroyer had been only an instant before formed a giant mushroom cloud, rising quickly into the sky.9
By midday the reports reaching Washington, DC. were grim, with news of substantial damage and casualties, but a first inkling that the tide was turning in America's favor was beginning to emerge. MacArthur was masterful at his headquarters, directing the counterattacks against the three Japanese forces without letup. Where one series of blows ended, another began, until the Japanese suddenly withdrew farther out to sea and out of reach of U.S. aircraft. The California attacks had badly damaged San Diego's port and Santa Monica's pier and warehouses. Fires darkened the sky with thick smoke, and military and civilian casualties were severe. Ambulance sirens could be heard all over the city, mixed with the sounds of explosions. However, none of the damage had put San Diego or Los Angeles out of action for long; wreckage could be cleared, fires could be put out, and many of the casualties would heal. The Japanese had never gotten close enough to use naval gunfire, while on the ground and in the sea over 200 of their aircraft were reported downed, with several more observed to be trailing smoke as they flew back to their carriers.
The attacks on Oahu were even worse, but had a similar outcome: most, if not all, of the damaged facilities could be restored soon or replaced with others. Aircraft losses for the Japanese had been particularly severe, much worse than their most sanguine predictions, and the Japanese did not know why.
It was also a busy morning for the Panama Canal defense forces. U.S. submarines had attacked a Japanese force, and long-range bombers were now out searching for them, to continue the attack. Other than that, the morning had been a beautiful one, as antiaircraft crews, PT boat crews, and fighter pilots awaited the Japanese.
Yamamoto stayed at his command center on Yamato as reports were brought to him. Casualties had been high and Hiryu was lost. Struck by torpedoes and bombs and swept by fire, it could not be salvaged, and torpedoes from his own destroyers finished off the doomed carrier after the last of its crew was evacuated. Three destroyers were also lost, and most of his ships had some damage to report. Mikuma was reportedly taken under tow and would be able to rejoin the task force. Damage aboard Yamato had been light after the debris was cleared, but the attack had been distracting and the battle had not gone well. The loss of so many aircraft and their experienced crews was the worst blow. Carriers without aircraft were just soft-skinned targets, and task forces without sufficient air cover were as good as lost. His intelligence reports gave strong hints that the carriers Saratoga and Wasp could be nearby soon. Earlier that morning that would have been excellent news, but now, with over half of his aircraft gone, he knew the Americans would have the advantage. Coded reports of the Oahu and Panama attacks were distressing, with heavier than predicted losses to his aircraft and less damage than had been hoped for on Oahu. The Panama strike force was withdrawing after losing Zuiho and the special attack ship Mutsuki to submarines. With a few lucky shots, the enemy had destroyed the heart of the Panama strike force and there was little left for them to do.
He considered attacking again, perhaps to the north, but knew that what he'd been trying to achieve with this offensive was lost. Nagumo, true to form, had opened up the distance between his carriers and the battle area until they were not only safe from land-based attack but also ineffective to cover his naval gunfire attacks. The American fighting spirit was increasing, not decreasing, and any hope of a dictated peace had disappeared. He resolved to accept the blame for this failure and to apologize to the Emperor himself. This war was going to be a long one after all.
Meanwhile, contact with Colonel Ichiki was lost after the appointed time to attack the U.S. forces on Guadalcanal. When he had last reported, he was planning to attack the American forces at Alligator Creek just before dawri. Now there was only silence, which was troubling.
Epilogue
In late December 1942 the carriers Essex and Independence were completed. They would go through an accelerated fitting out and shakedown schedule as their new aircraft crews went through intense training. Within only six weeks, both carriers were ready for combat and traversing the Panama Canal for the Pacific. The Japanese had positioned subs to catch them as they emerged from the canal, but aggressive patrolling preserved the new carriers intact to join the Pacific Fleet. Within a very short time more of these new fleet carriers moved to that theater, and the balance of forces began to swing in America's favor. Guadalcanal had been held and then secured, and enemy forces throughout the Solomons and New Britain were under increasing American attack.
Finally, FDR directed that more of America's strength be directed at the Germans. Despite the reverses of the last seven months, the Germans could be beaten, and the United States had promises to keep. American convoy escorts now took charge of the eastbound shipping and aggressively took on the “wolf-packs.” Patrol bombers stretched their reach from the U.S. coast, the Caribbean, Iceland and Newfoundland as well as from new escort (jeep) carriers. U-boat losses began to climb. Amphibious landings in North Africa began in February, and the Germans, paralyzed by the stunning cold of the Eastern Front, had to turn their attention to a new presence in the southern Mediterranean. In carefully secured settings, teams of U.S. officers briefed their allies on the tactics, techniques, and technologies used in the battles of California and Hawaii and, for the first time, revealed the existence and effectiveness of the VT proximity fuse.
Jack Northrup and his and Glenn Martin's engineers worked feverishly on their XB-35. In view of his top-secret directions from Washington, DC, every effort had to be made to ready the new B-35 for use not later than late 1944 or early 1945. His was the only long-range bomber design that could be ready by then, and every possible resource was being devoted to help him.
His design team had been augmented by more engineers sent by the government, and together they decided to scrap the complex counter-rotating propellers in favor of more conventional paddle-bladed props, and some of the ambitious and complex remote-control defense gun positions were replaced by conventional manned turrets. The XB-35, a giant flying wing originally designed to have a wingspan of over 172 feet, was taking shape fast. Something to do with his bomber was also going on at Los Alamos, Northrup thought, but he couldn't find out what. He had been asked to increase the design payload from 16,000 pounds to over 26,000, and the design range from 8,150 nautical miles to 10,500. They had extended the wing-span to 207 feet and added two more engines, but he was puzzled about the size of the payload. He knew that some of the design payload would be the additional fuel needed to fly nonstop to Japan or Germany from the continental United States, but the rest of the increase was for a weapon or weapons. What kind of bomb weighed that much?
The Reality
In the final analysis, an American loss at Midway would have been a severe blow to U.S. forces and to the morale of the country. However, the basic and fundamental strength of the United States would not have been affected. Design and production on the West Coast would have been d
isrupted for a while, but there were more than enough other facilities to quickly take up the slack. The people of the United States could have sustained attacks and even an invasion, and would never have agreed to an armistice with the Japanese. Of all of the mistaken analyses the Japanese leadership made regarding American reaction to the loss of Midway and other defeats, that was their worst.
There would have been some very serious effects in Europe and the Soviet Union, but nothing final. Britain would have stood and fought, and held out to continue the struggle. The Soviet Union would probably have held Moscow and retaken Stalingrad, even with added forces and resources on the German side. The Soviets would have triumphed anyway, but it would have taken a bit longer, and many more Russians would have died.
Had Yamamoto decided to go along with the army's plan to seize New Guinea and Australia, the same result would have come about; America would have prepared for its defense, accelerated carrier production and aircraft crew training, and built up its combat power for a counteroffensive. Arguably, if the Japanese had not concentrated on U.S. targets, some of the ferocious desire for revenge would have been tempered, but not by much.
In the end, all that would have been lost was the additional blood and treasure of a six- to eight-month period. The Axis forces simply did not have the manpower and resources to hold the span of territory they had captured. They needed more luck, and a political system that accepted the cultures and peoples they conquered. Instead, the Japanese and the Germans persecuted, terrorized, and inflamed their conquered peoples, causing them to resist in any way possible. Further, the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy didn't have the logistic capability of sustaining a long-term transoceanic war. War needs fuel and ammunition in great quantities, and fuel and ammunition are heavy and bulky and require a lot of shipping. Japan never had the logistic depth to support an all-out war in America's backyard.
