Tactical operations largely concerned the area just beyond the embattled pivot of the German line but, as has often been the case in recent weeks, the line between strategic and tactical bombing was not precise and the general objective remained the same: to make the entire area north and east of Allied bridgehead useless to the Germans while destroying as many as possible of them at the same time.
Hundreds of Neapolitans used caves like this one which once housed supplies of the Italian Navy, as shelter to escape German demolition bombings in 1943.
The day’s warfare was largely one of the armies regrouping and shifting in position for the struggle both know is due soon to break out in renewed savagery. Meanwhile the Allied force in Italy kept growing stronger, with Taranto, Bari and Brindisi available for shipping as well as Salerno, itself.
The line now runs from the heights of the Sorrentine Peninsula to Salerno then irregularly inland to San Cipriano, Montecorvino Rovella, and Acerno. There it cuts inland to Contursi, which is eleven miles southeast of Acerno, and twenty miles from the shore of the Gulf of Salerno.
The front then dips down through Contursi and Caggiano to Avigliano above Potenza, which is the most important point held by the Eighth Army in south-central Italy.
The spot farthest south is now Montalbano, nearly sixty miles southeast of Avigliano and barely ten milos beyond the coast of the Gulf of Taranto.
Finally, the line parallels the western shore of that gulf through Ginosa and Gioia del Colle and then swerves up to Bari, the Adriatic terminus.
Although the Allied forces were following up the yielding left flank of the Germans, only occasional sharp clashes with rear guards were reported. Allied planes had even less resistance as they carried out the day’s varied program with scarcely any aircraft opposition.
One of the heaviest blows was that struck by Wellingtons last night at Formia. The coastal rail route linking Naples to Leghorn was again battered and one Wellington, taking a leaf from the fighter-bombers’ book, dove beneath the haze to shoot up a line of transports huddled at the roadside.
The day’s targets also included enemy positions near Avellino Nocera, Pagani and Montella, where A-36 Invaders did their stuff at the expense of slow-moving trucks.
The Allied planes encountered some flak but suffered no losses.
SEPTEMBER 26, 1943
Editorial
THE YEAR OF THE TOMATO
It won’t go down in the history books under that name, but 1943 might well be called The Year of the Tomato. Is there any gardener within sight or hearing who hasn’t all but buried himself under tomatoes? Of course not. They have even been harvesting tomatoes from window boxes. And right now suburbanites in frost-haunted regions are rapidly burying themselves under green tomatoes while they frantically scald, crush and strain the last high tide of ripe ones and fill the ketchup and chili sauce kettles. Our own carefully unconfirmed statistics show that two of every three jars sold for home canning this year are now full of tomatoes and looking around for a place to park themselves. Maybe even more.
Nobody would say anything but the kindest words for the tomato. It is a friendly, healthful vegetable, or fruit—and let’s not quibble about classifications. It oozes vitamins, and even more delectable things. It has flavor and substance and color. If it doesn’t help you to see at night, it ought to, for it outsells carrots on most tables. And it certainly helps you to see on the morning after.
In any normal season there are just about enough tomatoes to go around, generously. Somebody sees to such things. But this season everybody with a spade blister on his hand set out tomato plants, and the season, in these parts anyway, was just right for tomato culture. We’ve been stuffed to the ears with them for two months, and now we’ve stuffed every jar in sight with them. We’re about ready to call it quits. Until along about Thanksgiving. By that time we’ll be back to our normal vitamin deficiency and ready to say, from the heart, “And we are thankful, too, for all those jars of wonderful tomatoes—if they haven’t spoiled.”
SEPTEMBER 26, 1943
M’ARTHUR’S ISSUE ONE OF STRATEGY
General’s Statement Indicates That He Wants to Fight His Way Back to Philippines
AGAINST ‘ISLAND HOPPING’
By FRANK L. KLUCKHOHN
By Wireless to The New York Times.
ALLIED HEADQUARTERS IN NEW GUINEA, Sept. 25—The statement issued this week at his battle headquarters in New Guinea by Gen. Douglas MacArthur raised the issue of general Pacific strategy. The ranking United States four-star general put himself on record as opposed to any Allied strategy calculated to take years to beat Japan and costing heavily in men and materiel meanwhile. He made it clear that he was confident that the job could be done quicker and with relatively light cost if the proper strategy were adopted and followed.
Although no official statement has yet been made either by Washington or London, it appears likely that Lord Louis Mountbatten is not to be over MacArthur, but the general left little doubt that he thinks that Mountbatten is to get the men and implements of war and he is not to get them.
NEW PLANS SEEN
If this is true, it would seem to mean that MacArthur cannot return to the Philippines, as he has not the strength to do it now. It means instead that the strategy is to include a drive via Burma, Malaya and Indo-China as well as China itself.
This must be a bitter blow to MacArthur, but he insists he is not so much interested in what happens to him personally as in the way the Pacific war is to be conducted.
The statement was carefully phrased, MacArthur basing it upon “press reports” from England and the United States, but there is every reason to believe that he was not seeking a clarification of his position, the entire implication of the statement being that he was aware he had been sidetracked to a “secondary position.”
MacArthur went about as far as a ranking officer in active service could in bringing the strategy issue into the open. Whatever the merits of the statement, it seems to give away no information that was not already in general possession after the Quebec conference.
MacArthur’s idea always has been that if a firm position could be established in the Philippines it would flank and cut off Japanese sea routes to the Netherlands Indies as well as eastward to the Carolines and Marshalls. With Australia’s food and limited industrial production aiding the support of such a position, there then would be a sound base for operations against Japan proper.
The general emphasized in the statement that his proposed strategy calls for flanking operations involving air and sea power plus the unusual military tactics he employed successfully in the Lae operations, not “island hopping” which requires taking numerous islands. In fact, strategy of a different sort would require such hopping.
THE RECORD CITED
MacArthur’s supporters assert in defense of his plan that the general has not yet failed to carry out any assignment. They say he immediately realized that the battle for Australia must be fought in New Guinea and the Solomons and that he was successful in changing the trend from defense to offense with an amazingly small force while employing the flanking tactics he advocates. They note that the flanking attack on Lae forced the fall of Salamaua farther east, and this week the general can point to a new success at Finschhafen sixty miles farther up the New Guinea coast.
They note also that if MacArthur’s strategy is followed the Japanese would have to support their defense by sea, making impossible the employment of more than limited forces, whereas any land bloc strategy permits the Japanese to bring their full strength to bear.
The General was careful not to criticize any specific strategy, yet what was in his mind appears fairly apparent. It may be seen as something like this:
The Nipponese have numerous divisions in Burma with a land route for sending more. The terrain is most difficult. Even if the Burma Road is reopened the amount of supplies which can be sent to China probably would be insufficient for large-scale operations agains
t the large Japanese Army.
The Japanese also have interior lines of communication in Malaya and Indo-China.
Admiral King addressing the American Legion convention this week, asserted that recent United States naval attacks on Marcus and the Gilbert Islands were only the shape of things to come. In case of any attack based on Pearl Harbor it is obvious that the flanking Marshall, Gilberts, Carolines and other islands would have to be cleared first. Moreover, Hawaii itself is not self-supporting, and the real base of operations may be the west coast of the United States.
There are also political considerations in respect to battered China, still the principal land front against Japan, which those making policy decisions can not ignore. China’s air bases are the closest available to Japan.
What General MacArthur has done is to make his own views clear to the American public and raise questions on a matter of intense public interest and concern. It was implied in the statement that MacArthur wanted a minimum loss of men and material, and that he believed he could do the job his way without an overwhelming mass of war implements, although he needs considerably more than he has now.
AUSTRALIAN VIEWS
In any full and accurate report of the matter it is necessary to note that many Australians and some long-time observers here believe that, because of the tremendous popular acclaim he obtained in the glorious epic of Bataan, General MacArthur has been penalized for domestic political reasons by having the sinews of war withheld or meted out in such a manner as to make possible only limited operations. They express the opinion that this is one of the reasons he is allegedly being bypassed by the authorities now.
A year ago, General MacArthur, commenting on press reports, said that all he wanted was to retire at the end of the war. In this week’s statement, devoted exclusively to military affairs, he emphasized that he had no “military ambitions.”
SEPTEMBER 26, 1943
Hate Marches With the Red Army
By Ilya Ehrenburg
Soviet Author and Correspondent (By Wireless)
MOSCOW—In September, 1941, I happened to be in the forest near Bryansk. That was a bitter time. The tragedy of Kiev had begun. Every day the Berlin radio announced the fall of new cities and the communiqués were accompanied by the rolling of drums, Tyrolean yodels and roars of “Heil!” Peasant women gazed after the retreating Red Army with hard eyes. Terrifying rumors were rampant. Sweaty Germans in their undershirts and with their caps perched jauntily to one side cold-blood-edly shot refugees. Carts creaked—how I remember that mournful creak. The Germans wrote, “Russia is a colossus with feet of clay.”
That is worth recalling now, when Russia is striding westward. Her feet proved sturdier than many thought. And her heart proved sturdy too. It is vain for Hitler to try to reassure the Germans by saying. “We’re shortening our line of our own accord.” One has only to take a look at the scorched, shell-riven fields to realize what stubborn resistance the Germans are putting up. Elastic defense? They’ll have to take care the elastic does not break.
The Red Army is catching the Germans unprepared. Here, for example, is an announcement of Lieutenant Colonel Lenz, former German commander of Stalino, to the Russian inhabitants of that city:
For some time rumors have been circulating in the city, alarming the inhabitants, to the effect that the position of the German troops at the front is hopeless and that the arrival of the Bolsheviks is only a matter of a few days. Increased movement of vehicles in the streets are taken to mean that the German troops are retreating. The enemy has thrown his last forces into the field. Anyone who gives credence to such rumors is helping spread panic. Everyone must calmly and conscientiously continue at his work.
The Germans had no time to display this announcement; the posters were found lying in a print shop.
In an attempt to explain the reverses in Russia, Berlin is letting it be known via Stockholm and Berne that German divisions are being shifted from Russia westward. But at the same time reinforcement battalions are speeding from Germany to Russia. I have spoken to many prisoners of war who came to Russia last month. What do these reinforcement battalions consist of? Men mustered under the total mobilization scheme [munitions workers, men with physical defects] from Alsace-Lorraine and Slovenia, and also wounded men discharged from hospitals. Poor fighting material.
One German prisoner—an officer—said to me, “I prefer a platoon of seasoned soldiers to a company of such fellows.” But seasoned soldiers are not to be had—they are all under ground. For two months sanguinary battles have been raging. Many German regiments in this period have been replenished twice, even thrice, yet they count only fifteen to twenty men to a company. In many tank divisions there are only thirty to forty tanks left instead of 200. The Greater Germany Division which has not suffered as badly as most has sixty tanks. German bombers often fly without fighter protection. All this testifies that the German war machine is badly debilitated.
Formerly the Germans used to drag away their disabled tanks and get them repaired quickly. Now they often leave them where they are. This is more a matter of heart than of machinery: “The German isn’t what he used to be,” is the way our soldiers put it.
Corporal Fechner of the German Tenth Motorized Division, recently taken prisoner, complained: “The German soldier is used to fighting when results are to be felt at once. But there is no end to war here. And so our fellows are giving way. Do you want facts? Well, look at the number of prisoners here. They all surrendered like me, but they might not have surrendered. They might have fought back. In these two years of Russian war the Germans have changed. We have not got our old fighting spirit. Every man is thinking of his own skin.”
THAT is the way many Germans think now. The Red Army’s summer offensive not only smashed the German’s fortifications; it smashed the German’s self-confidence. The Conquistadores don’t feel so sure of themselves.
I don’t mean by this that all Germans have in their hearts capitulated. The Germans are not Italians. They are not the supers, but the authors and directors of war. Italian fascism was a sort of eczema—a skin outbreak. German fascism is a cancerous tumor. Among prisoners you still find many who believe in Der Fuehrer’s star.
There is Lieut. Hans Lucke, for instance. He says, “It’s true the old fellows at home are grouching. It’s true Italy has let us down. It’s true the Red Army is now very strong. But I am convinced we will win. If we manage to finish off Russia, we’ll go for England. Some, however, think we’ll build an ‘eastern wall’ and then turn against the Englishmen. As regards our post-war aims, most likely we’ll settle German colonists in conquered regions who at the same time will be soldiers, as Austria-Hungary did when she defeated Turkey at the beginning of the eighteenth century.”
Another prisoner, Lieut. Johann Bechtel, put it more simply: “We believe we’ll win because we’ve got to win. I am talking of the officers and noncommissioned officers. We all understand that victory will mean for us a fine life and a chance to get rich quick.”
Prisoners have become more numerous. German Army discipline is not yet undermined, but the Germans surrender more freely. That is a sign the end is near. Having fought in Russia for two years, the German suddenly feels he is a civilian at heart. He yearns for the quiet life. He is profoundly disillusioned. He keeps repeating “We failed.” Deal him one more blow and he will cry “Pass, I throw in.”
On the other hand, the Russians after two years of war have become a warlike people. Their new spirit finds its expression in many ways. In language, in discipline, in the cult of decorations, shoulder straps and insignia, and in the urge every officer feels to improve his military education.
Our people have changed profoundly in these two years; they have fallen in love with much which they formerly condemned, and learned to dislike much they formerly liked. A war like this plows up men’s souls. The Red Army is more of an army today than it was in 1941.
The artist learns a new process of creation. No mil
itary academy can replace actual fighting experience. Soviet officers have progressed. There was too much routine in our army at first. Many were under the spell of the civil war. They had to learn the strategy of a new epoch. In 1939 the Germans were military innovators. They have now become academics—such is the nature of the German character. In a military sense we were backward. Now we have outstripped the Germans. We have a more lively intelligence, more elasticity. I do not mean by this that the Red Army has become a professional army. It is a people fighting.
Exhausted German troops surrendering outside of Moscow in 1943.
What force has converted the Siberian farmer into a fierce fighter? What force enables our infantrymen to march forty kilometers a day and smile contemptuously when German bombers hover over their heads? There is something in this war which distinguishes it from all other wars: its motive power isn’t intelligence or even ardent love of country but the outraged conscience of the people.
As it advances the Red Army sees all the horrors of “the desert zone.” Who would believe that this was once the city of Karachev? Makeyevka, Stalino are in flames. In Taganrog the Red Army saw the horror of the Petrushina Ravine, where lie buried 38,000 inhabitants shot by the Germans. Thirty five thousand inhabitants were carried, off to Germany. And the city had a total population of 200,000. Between Orel and the River Desna stretches a desert waste. Before me lies an order of the German Command for the depopulation of the entire district. It reads:
“Every inhabitant together with his family, cattle and movables shall leave in a westerly direction. Anybody attempting to move eastward will be shot.”
The New York Times Book of World War II, 1939-1945 Page 102
