Overall, the Empire began to segment as revenue flows and communication links between North and South were periodically interrupted en route due to predations by bandits, warlords and even intermediate imperial officials. Most mansabdars in north India faced regional uprisings without the prospect of military reinforcement or financial support from ‘Alamgir in the Deccan. Further, distant mansabdars did not bond to the emperor through recurrent direct personal exchanges of nazr and khilat as they had earlier. Conversely, most governors remained unchecked by effective supervision from the imperial center, and were able to retain provincial revenues for themselves. By the time of ‘Alamgir’s death, no north Indian province was sending substantial revenues to him—except for prosperous Bengal where an especially effective Diwan (later Subadar), Murshid Quli Khan, managed an expanding agricultural base, developing artisanal production and increasing exports.
In the Deccan, many mansabdars who originated in north India—including Rajputs and many long-settled Muslims—had been serving far from home through decades of frustrating harassment by local insurgents, especially Marathas. One official lamented the frustrating and interminable Deccan campaigns: ‘Ever since His Majesty had … adopted all these wars and hardships of travel, … the inmates of his camp, sick of long separation, summoned their families … and … a new generation was thus born (in the camp).’33 Imperial commanders often saw little prospect of defeating these insurgents or particular benefit to the Empire or themselves from doing so. Instead, many imperial generals preserved their own financial and manpower resources by negotiating private settlements with those enemies, despite ‘Alamgir’s repeated, explicit orders forbidding this. On their part, many new Deccani mansabdars, whose submission had been thus purchased, had little loyalty to the Empire. They often saw better prospects in repudiating imperial service in order to carve out kingdoms for themselves or to join leaders from their own community who were doing so. These included various Marathas and other regionally rooted warlords.
In both north India and the Deccan, many tributary rulers, landholders and other subjects—including peasants, artisans, merchants and bankers—faced revenue demands from the Empire but increasingly doubted the value of paying. Imperial officials had diminished capacity to provide justice, law and order and also to compel tax payments. In contrast, local rajas and zamindars often had bonds with the local population and retained more revenues, which they used to bolster their own power. Particularly in the Deccan, much of the economy had been devastated by decades of warfare and disrupted commerce. Expanding areas were subject to annual levies by Maratha-led war bands: chauth (payment of a ‘quarter’ of the assessed revenue) plus other tribute in exchange for relief from even more costly depredations. Imperial officials often acquiesced in these exactions, often unable to resist them.
While European assertions in India would not appear prominently until long after ‘Alamgir’s death, their effects were already significant. Parts of the Indian economy were engaging more extensively in exporting cloth, saltpeter, spices and other goods aboard European ships. The more expansive English, Dutch and French East India Companies were replacing the Portuguese as controllers of the Indian Ocean trade and passage to Mecca. These joint-stock corporations also established trading enclaves along India’s west and east coasts and inland, seeking profits and negotiating with local officials and with ‘Alamgir himself for tax concessions. When negotiations broke down, violence sometimes ensued, for example in skirmishes between imperial officials and the English at Hugli (1686–90), Bombay (1688–9), Surat (1695–9) and Madras (1702).
Further, various independent European sea-captains also preyed upon merchant shipping as pirates and privateers, which imperial officials could not prevent. ‘Alamgir scolded his son, ‘Azam, Gujarat’s current governor:
… ships cannot sail without the permit of the Firangis [Europeans]. The Muslim community has become so impuissant that even the imperial vessels are unable to cruise. For the last twenty years, the ships of the Surat merchants and those destined for the Holy Land are being plundered on the high seas. Steps taken by [mansabdars] to combat the problem have proved fruitless. Negligence, indolence, and indifference towards this matter are contrary to the Islamic sense of honour …. Concession and favour to the Firangis have been shown beyond measure. Moderation will not work. Severity and harshness are required.34
‘Alamgir himself futilely tried to force English and Dutch ambassadors to make their Companies protect Indian shipping, or even cease seizing it.35 But the lack of a Mughal imperial seagoing navy and also pragmatic and self-serving collaboration in port cities between imperial officials and Europeans meant continued insecurity for Indian ships, their cargoes and pilgrim passengers.
‘Alamgir also feared for his dynasty, not perceiving much capacity in any of his potential heirs. Each son aspired to succeed him but each lost his confidence and suffered accordingly. ‘Alamgir tried to keep them and his already maturing grandsons dependent on his cash grants and loaned military and administrative manpower; he had them assigned less productive or inadequate jagirs. To economize, several princes reduced their military contingents, which weakened them in fulfilling their assigned duties, even as the inevitable succession war approached. Hence, by ‘Alamgir’s death, none of his sons was particularly strong, especially relative to powerful imperial commanders and governors. Two sons, Sultan and Akbar, had already died, the former in imperial prison, the other exiled in Iran.
Of the three remaining sons, Mu‘azzam was already aged sixty-three at ‘Alamgir’s death. Mu‘azzam and his family had for seven years been imprisoned by ‘Alamgir for treachery. Even after Mu‘azzam’s release, he remained in disfavor, posted from 1700 onward far from court, as governor of Kabul and Lahore. However, he gathered supporters among mansabdars there for the coming succession war.
Prince ‘Azam, aged 54, had also occasionally incurred ‘Alamgir’s displeasure, notably in 1692 for reportedly taking a large bribe from a besieged local chief in exchange for lifting the siege. Despite ‘Azam’s objections, he had been posted by ‘Alamgir away from court, as governor of Malwa, then Gujarat (1701–5). After finally gaining permission to return to dying ‘Alamgir, he was again expelled. But ‘Azam delayed his departure, intending to seize the imperial treasury and establishment immediately on ‘Alamgir’s death, as the first step toward securing the entire Empire.
‘Alamgir’s youngest son, Kam Bakhsh, was the child of Udaipuri Mahal, the low-born concubine who attended ‘Alamgir in his old age. ‘Alamgir always kept Kam Bakhsh nearby, only once entrusting him with a military command. That ended badly, however, when, in 1693, veteran imperial commanders arrested him for conspiring with Rajaram, the Maratha ruler. In ‘Alamgir’s last years, he appointed Kam Bakhsh nominal governor of Golkonda, hoping to protect him from his higher-born half-brothers. ‘Alamgir wrote him regretfully ‘… I pity you for your want of intelligence and ability; but now of what use?’36 ‘Alamgir, thus finding no son worthy, began to favor his nine grandsons, the eldest already age 46 when ‘Alamgir finally died.
By 1705, illnesses and the intensifying infirmities of old age forced Aurangzeb to withdraw from his hitherto continuous campaigns and rest in Ahmadnagar. As with each Mughal predecessor, ‘Alamgir struggled to balance leaving a strong Empire intact against preserving all his sons’ lives. His purportedly last written will partitioned his Empire after his death.37 He had long allotted Golkonda and Bijapur to Kam Bakhsh, and he directed his other two surviving sons to respect that. But he unrealistically willed the division of the rest of the Empire between ‘Azam and Mu‘azzam, one receiving the title Padshah and the contiguous provinces of Agra, Ajmer, Aurangabad, Berar, Bidar, Gujarat, Khandesh and Malwa while the other should hold Delhi and the widely separated provinces of Allahabad, Awadh, Bengal, Bihar, Kabul, Kashmir, Multan, Orissa, Punjab and Thatta. But ‘Alamgir’s dying testament, evoking the earlier Central Asian tradition of appanages, could not control events: the Empire so
on fragmented under a long series of weak emperors.
Part IV
The Fragmentation and Memory of the Mughal Empire, 1707–the Present
10
THE THINNING OF THE EMPIRE, 1707–1857
The skies have fallen down upon us,
I can no longer rest or sleep.
Only my final departure is now certain,
Whether it comes in the morning, or night.
Bahadur Shah II (r. 1837–57), penname ‘Zafar’1
Over the Empire’s last 150 years (1707–1857), a series of weak emperors reigned but rarely ruled. While no emperor held much control over events, many strove to recover power and participate in the surrounding political and cultural worlds. Further, the image of Mughal sovereignty proved so enduring that warlords, regional rulers and many others (Indian and European) still recognized the dynasty, albeit nominally. The final imperial cataclysm of 1857–8 showed the Empire’s continued significance but also ended it.
LATE SUCCESSION IN ESTABLISHED AND NEW PATTERNS, 1707–13
Retrospectively, some historians define the Mughal Empire as ending in 1707 with ‘Alamgir’s death.2 Yet, the ensuing succession struggle appeared superficially similar to previous ones. Each surviving son—Mu‘azzam, ‘Azam and Kam Bakhsh—rallied his supporters, declared himself emperor and sought to defeat and execute his brothers. For the first time, however, no imperial prince controlled much military force of his own, largely due to ‘Alamgir’s policies of awarding them inflated mansabs but insufficient jagirs. Instead, the most powerful mansabdars, while accepting the legitimacy of the imperial house and avoiding acts of direct disobedience, protected their own interests by not fighting for any of these self-proclaimed emperors. Additionally, the claimants were aging and many of their sons were already active politically and militarily, which rightly portended extended struggles, not a secure, long-lasting reign.
Prince Mu‘azzam, c. 1675 (detail). Courtesy Los Angeles County Museum of Art (M.74.123.5). www.LACMA.org
‘Alamgir’s contending sons each launched into action on learning of their father’s long-expected death in Ahmadnagar. The youngest and weakest claimant, Kam Bakhsh, tried to fortify himself in Golkonda, which ‘Alamgir had assigned to him. More aggressively, the middle brother, ‘Azam, who had strategically camped near Ahmadnagar, forcibly secured ‘Alamgir’s corpse, household, immediate wealth, courtiers and Deccan army, and then marched north to try to seize Shahjahanabad and Agra, which still contained the bulk of the dynasty’s coins, jewels and other treasures. The eldest brother, Mu‘azzam, recruited mansabdars in the north-west where he was governor, and then rushed across the Punjab, reaching Shahjahanabad and Agra first, taking the regnal title Emperor Bahadur Shah (r. 1707–12). He reportedly offered ‘Azam the Deccan, Gujarat and Ajmer as appanages if he would submit. Instead, just months after ‘Alamgir’s death, these two brothers battled near Agra, resulting in the deaths of ‘Azam, two of his sons and many supporters. Then, early in 1709, Bahadur Shah attacked and killed Kam Bakhsh in the Deccan.
At Bahadur Shah’s accession, he was already elderly. Seeking support from prominent mansabdars who commanded imperial armies and governed its provinces, he lavishly awarded promotions, titles and offices. But many mansabdars anticipated the impending next succession war and conserved their resources. Several entrenched themselves in the provinces they administered, including Nizam-al-Mulk in the Deccan and Murshid Quli Khan in Bengal.3 Increasingly, local rulers and communities ceased regarding the Emperor as the source of stable and just rule.
Bahadur Shah needed money. To raise immediate cash, he practiced revenue farming far more extensively than his predecessors. He distributed much of the remaining lands he controlled as jagirs to reward mansabdars who held real power. He himself remained almost constantly campaigning to subdue stubborn resistance even within the Empire’s core provinces, particularly against Rajputs in Rajasthan and Sikhs in the Punjab. Bahadur Shah thus spent his four-year reign struggling to restore bonds among the Emperor, his mansabdars, and his subjects—the beginning of a long ‘crisis of empire.’4
Bahadur Shah’s anticipated death in 1712 loosed a destructive, multi-round war among his male descendants, each desperately seeking support from mansabdars and others with military, financial and other resources. His four sons each proclaimed himself Emperor. At first, three sons warily conspired to divide the Empire among themselves, as soon as they defeated and killed the fourth, Azim-ush-Shan—the leading contender, since he had accumulated substantial treasure during a decade as governor of Bengal. But when these three brothers killed Azim-ush-Shan, they turned on each other. After a three-way melee, the eldest, Jahandar Shah (r. 1713), seized the throne and executed his remaining brothers, many of their sons and their major commanders. Rather than consolidate his reign, however, Jahandar celebrated his accession, prominently featuring his concubine-consort, Lal Kunwar. Many khanazad resented the Emperor’s feckless behavior and promotion to high office of Lal Kunwar’s family of court entertainers.
Within months, the late Azim-ush-Shan’s 29-year-old second son, Farrukh-siyar (r. 1713–19), marched up the Ganges from Bengal, rallying diverse discontented commanders against his newly enthroned uncle. Farrukh-siyar defeated the ill-prepared, dispirited and weakly led imperial army near Agra. He seized the throne, executed fleeing Jahandar and many of his supporters, and blinded three imperial princes who were possible rivals. However, Farrukh-siyar, like all his successors until the end of the dynasty, struggled futilely to hold together the fragmenting Empire.
FROM SALATIN TO EMPERORS UNDER REGENCIES, 1713–59
While nominal authority remained with the incumbent Emperor, effective military and political power had shifted into the contending hands of powerful courtiers, imperial commanders and governors and rising regionally based communities mobilized by charismatic leaders. Nonetheless, such was the ideological force of Mughal sovereignty that the Emperor’s decrees, appointments and awards of elevated titles could often have effect, even when obviously dictated by the current regent. Further, the residual prestige of the Mughal house meant that no regent ascended the throne himself nor ended the dynasty, even if he terminated individual emperors.5
Farrukh-siyar had improbably attained the throne largely due to the martial skills of Sayyid Hasan Ali Khan and his brother, Sayyid Husain Ali Khan, current governors of Allahabad and Bihar respectively. They led the Sayyid clan long settled in Barha (today in western Uttar Pradesh) which for generations had provided famously brave contingents to imperial armies. Even as Emperor, Farrukh-siyar lacked revenues to fund his own forces, so he could not confront the Sayyid brothers. Further, they threatened to enthrone another imperial family member whenever Farrukh-siyar proved too demanding. Hence, throughout his six-year reign, Farrukh-siyar schemed to offset the Sayyid brothers by favoring other mansabdars. Most notably Farrukh-siyar turned to the head of the Turani khanazad family, best known by his hereditary title Nizam-al-Mulk, with his own power-base in the Deccan, where he was periodically governor.
On Farrukh-siyar’s accession, he also sought support from Rajput and other Hindu mansabdars and regional rulers (including by abolishing jizya). Nonetheless, Raja Ajit Singh Rathor soon rebelled, expelling imperial officials from Marwar and Ajmer, aided by the Rajput rulers of Mewar and Amber.6 After Sayyid Husain Ali Khan compelled Ajit Singh’s submission and restored imperial authority in Rajasthan, Farrukh-siyar took Ajit Singh’s daughter, Bai Indra Kunwar, as a bride in 1715.7 Unlike Emperor Akbar, who bound leading Rajput houses to his dynasty through mutually respectful marriages, Farrukh-siyar converted her to Islam. Further, under pressure from strongly orthodox Muslim courtiers, Farrukh-siyar re-imposed jizya in 1717. When Bai Indar Kunwar was later widowed, she repudiated Islam, undertook a purification ceremony and returned to Hinduism and her family—all unprecedented for an empress and revealing rising Rajput resistance to Mughal culture.
In several core provinces, Farrukh-siyar and the Sayyid re
gents battled Jat communities climbing to local dominance. Concentrated imperial armies under strong commanders could still subdue such peasant uprisings, but these communities no longer routinely accepted Mughal authority. In the strategic Punjab, many Jats were Sikhs, an ever more militant movement. For years, imperial forces campaigned hard to defeat the current Sikh leader, Banda Bahadur, eventually capturing and executing him and many of his followers in 1716. Sikh insurrections recurred, however.
In the upper Gangetic region around Mathura, most Jats were Hindu. They had also periodically repulsed the Empire. Eventually, mansabdars compelled the current Jat leader, Raja Churaman, to submit. But this pacification also proved temporary; by the mid-eighteenth century, rising Jat leaders had made Bharatpur their major power base.
In the Deccan, various leaders of a similar community of independent farmers, the Marathas, had long been alternately fighting and allying with the Empire. During the eighteenth century, various powerful Maratha commanders repeatedly led armies northward into Gujarat, Malwa, Rajasthan and the Punjab—occasionally seizing Shahjahanabad. They also marched eastward into the Deccan provinces governed by Nizam-al-Mulk’s dynasty and beyond, into Orissa, southern Bihar and southwestern Bengal. In each region, Maratha chiefs negotiated or simply collected chauth, sardeshmukhi (‘headman’s fees’) and other exactions.8 Maratha forces also conquered south to Tanjavur and Mysore. But, periodic internecine conflicts among the Maratha ruling dynasty, their Peshwas (‘chief ministers’), other courtiers and semi-independent generals, as well as occasional battlefield defeats, led to temporary withdrawals. This pattern of Maratha conquest and occasional retreat persisted throughout the reigns of Farrukh-siyar and his weak successors until the early nineteenth century.
A Short History of the Mughal Empire (I.B.Tauris Short Histories) Page 23
