Mr Haughey defended the Irish Government’s and security forces’ record. But I was not convinced. I said that I wondered whether Mr Haughey realized that the biggest concentration of terrorists anywhere in the world save Lebanon was to be found in Ireland. The border was virtually open so far as terrorists were concerned. I accepted that the Republic’s resources were limited, but I was not satisfied that they were using them to best effect. I said that the results of the Anglo-Irish Agreement so far had been disappointing. Nor was I any less disappointed by the attitude of the SDLP. As for the suggestion that all would be peace and light if there were a united Ireland, as Mr Haughey’s recent message had suggested, the reality was that there would be the worst civil war ever. In any case, most nationalists in the North would prefer to continue to live there because they were much better provided for than in the Republic. Indeed, there continued to be a substantial flow of Irish immigrants to the UK, who were a significant burden on the welfare system.
Surprisingly, perhaps, though we were both pretty outspoken, neither of us, I believe, left our meeting with any ill will or rancour. Mr Haughey knew where I stood. He had, as it turned out, taken seriously at least some of what I had said about the shortcomings of Irish security co-operation. I, for my part, felt that I understood him better than I had before…and better perhaps than I ever did Garret FitzGerald.
There was a surge in IRA violence from early August. It began with an IRA bomb at an Army Communications Centre in Mill Hill in North London. One soldier was killed. This was the first mainland bomb since 1984. I was at Alice Springs on a visit to Australia when I learnt the news. Irish Republican sympathizers…on the streets and in the media…did their best to disrupt my tour. There were some particularly awkward moments in Melbourne where crowds of both opponents and well-wishers were funnelled into an overcrowded shopping precinct by Australian police, inexperienced in dealing with such situations. But I took every opportunity to express my contempt for the IRA. In a television interview I said that ‘they should be wiped off the civilized world.’
The bombing campaign continued. I was on holiday in Cornwall when I was woken very early on Saturday 20 August to be told of an attack at Ballygawley in County Tyrone on a bus carrying British soldiers travelling from Belfast back from a fortnight’s leave. Seven were dead and twenty-eight injured. I immediately decided to return to London and helicoptered into the Wellington Barracks at 9.20 a.m. Archie Hamilton (my former PPS, who was now Armed Forces minister) came straight in to No. 10 to brief me. He told me that the bus had not been on its designated route at the time of the explosion but on a parallel road some three miles away. A very large bomb, wire-controlled, had been laid in wait for the bus and then detonated. I questioned whether this could be a safe way of moving our troops around the province. But I accepted that perhaps there was no such thing as a ‘safe way’.
Ken Maginnis MP, whose constituency was yet again the scene of this tragedy, came in to see me over lunch, accompanied by a local farmer who had been first on the scene and a surgeon at the local hospital who had operated on some of the wounded. Then that evening I held a long meeting with Tom King, Archie and the security forces chiefs for the province.
Although the bus had been travelling on a forbidden route this did not seem to be material to what had happened. The IRA had from 1986 acquired access to Semtex explosive material, produced in Czechoslovakia and probably supplied through Libya. This substance was extremely powerful, light and relatively safe to use and as a result had given the terrorists a new technical advantage. The device could, therefore, have been planted very quickly and so the attack could have occurred on either route. It was also clear that the IRA had been planning their campaign for some time. The RUC reported that the terrorists were well prepared and had been successful in bringing large quantities of arms and explosives from the South. We then went on to discuss the co-ordination of intelligence, security co-operation with the Republic, the need to control the availability of fertilizers (which could be used as a basis for making bombs), the position on sentencing and remission and other matters. I called for more papers on all these subjects and for a vigorous follow-through on all the issues of security which I had raised after the murder of our soldiers in West Belfast earlier in the year.
Later that month I held several meetings to go through in detail what further action we should take. On the evening of Tuesday 6 September I chaired a meeting of the ministers and officials concerned. I noted that the expected IRA offensive had materialized. We had a number of possible proposals for action. But we would not be announcing a package of measures. Some would become public knowledge as they were implemented or introduced in Parliament. But in other areas I wanted to keep the terrorists guessing. Consequently it would not be possible to brief the Irish Government on our intentions, although we would inform them of individual measures shortly before their introduction.
Then we went through the possibilities one by one. Some measures…like the proscription of Sinn Fein or the removal of British citizenship from undesirables with British/Irish dual citizenship,[59] or the introduction of minimum sentences for terrorist offences…looked less promising the more they were discussed. But others…cutting back on the 50 per cent remission for all prisoners in Northern Ireland, ensuring that those convicted of certain terrorist offences would serve consecutively with a new sentence the unexpired portion of an earlier remitted sentence, measures to deal with terrorist finance, improvement of intelligence co-ordination…all these required further work.
I continued to go through the possibilities with ministers at a second meeting on the afternoon of Thursday 29 September. At this meeting I particularly concentrated on the army’s role. It was important to reduce the number of unnecessary commitments of army manpower in Northern Ireland in order to allow them to concentrate their efforts where they were most required.
One measure which we announced publicly in October was the prohibition of broadcast statements by Sinn Fein and other Northern Irish supporters of terrorism. This immediately provoked cries of censorship: but I have no doubt that not only was it justified but that it has worked, and there is some reason to believe that the terrorists think so too. Measures to cut Northern Ireland remission and to change the ‘right to silence’ in Northern Irish courts were also introduced, as was action against terrorist finance.
More and more in the struggle to bring peace and order to Northern Ireland, we were being forced back on our own resources. Because of the professionalism and experience of our security forces, those resources were adequate to contain, but not as yet to defeat the IRA. Terrible tragedies continued to occur. Yet the terrorists did not manage to make even parts of the province ungovernable, nor were they successful in undermining the self-confidence of Ulster’s majority community or the will of the Government to maintain the Union.
The fact remained that the contribution which the Anglo-Irish Agreement was making to all this was very limited. The Unionists continued to oppose it…though with less bitterness as it became clear that their worst fears had proved unfounded. It never seemed worth pulling out of the agreement altogether because this would have created problems not only with the Republic but, more importantly, with broader international opinion as well.
Still, I was disappointed by the results. The Patrick Ryan case demonstrated just how little we could seriously hope for from the Irish. Ryan, a nonpractising Catholic priest, was well known in security service circles as a terrorist; for some time he had played a significant role in the Provisional IRA’s links with Libya. The charges against Ryan were of the utmost seriousness, including conspiracy to murder and explosives offences. In June 1988 we had asked the Belgians to place him under surveillance. They, in turn, pressed us strongly to apply for extradition. So the application was made in close cooperation with the Belgian authorities. The Belgian court which considered the extradition request gave an advisory opinion, which we knew to have been favourable…something which th
e Belgian Government never denied…to the Minister of Justice. The latter then took the decision to the Belgian Cabinet. The Cabinet decided to ignore the court’s opinion and to fly Ryan to Ireland, only telling us afterwards. Presumably this political decision was prompted by fear of terrorist retaliation if the Belgians co-operated with us.
We now sought the extradition of Ryan from the Republic; but this was refused, initially on what seemed a technicality, though the Irish Attorney-General later suggested that Ryan would not receive a fair trial before a British jury. I wrote a vigorous protest to Mr Haughey. I had already taken up the matter personally with him and with the Belgian Prime Minister, M. Martens, at the European Council in Rhodes on Friday 2 and Saturday 3 December 1988. I told both of them how appalled I was. I was particularly angry with M. Martens. I reminded him how his Government’s attitude contrasted with all the co-operation we had given Belgium over those British people charged in relation to the Heysel Football Stadium riot.[60] I was unconvinced and unmoved by M. Martens’s explanations. His Government had clearly taken its decision in contradiction to and in defiance of legal advice. As I warned him I would, I then told the press of my views in very similar terms. But as a Belgian government under the same M. Martens later showed at the time of the Gulf War, it would take more than this to provide them with a spine. And Patrick Ryan is still at large.
I had moved Peter Brooke to become Northern Ireland Secretary in the reshuffle of July 1989. Peter’s family connections with the province and his deep interest in Ulster affairs made him seem an ideal choice. His unflappable good humour also meant that no one would be better suited for trying to bring the parties of Northern Ireland together for talks. Soon after his appointment I authorized him to do so: these talks were still continuing at the time I left office.
Meanwhile, the struggle to maintain security continued. So did the IRA’s murderous campaign. On Friday 22 September ten bandsmen were killed in a blast at the Royal Marines School of Music at Deal. The following summer the IRA’s mainland campaign resumed. June 1990 saw bombs explode outside Alistair McAlpine’s former home and then at the Conservative Party’s Carlton Club. But it was the following month that I experienced again something of that deep personal grief I had felt when Airey was killed and when I learned, early on that Friday morning at Brighton in 1984, of the losses in the Grand Hotel bomb attack.
Ian Gow was singled out to be murdered by the IRA because they knew that he was their unflinching enemy. Even though he held no government office, Ian was a danger to them because of his total commitment to the Union. No amount of terror can succeed in its aim if even a few outspoken men and women of integrity and courage dare to call terrorism murder and any compromise with it treachery. Nor, tragically, was Ian someone who took his own security precautions seriously. And so the IRA’s bomb killed him that Monday morning, 30 July, as he started up his car in the drive of his house. I could not help thinking, when I heard what had happened, that my daughter Carol had travelled with Ian in his car the previous weekend to take the Gows’ dog out for a walk: it might have been her too. I went down to Eastbourne to see Jane Gow in the early afternoon and we spoke for an hour or so. That evening I went to a service in the Anglo-Catholic church where Ian and Jane always worshipped and I was moved to see it full of people who had come in from work at the end of the day to mourn Ian’s loss. Whenever Jane came to Chequers to see me she used to play the piano there…she is a fine pianist. She once remarked to me, speaking of the loss of Ian, ‘people say it gets better, but it doesn’t.’ That must always be true of someone you love, whatever the manner of their death. But for some reason the loss of a friend or family member by violence leaves an even deeper scar.
The IRA will not give up their campaign unless they are convinced that there is no possibility of forcing the majority of the people of Northern Ireland against their will into the Republic. That is why our policy must never give the impression that we are trying to lead the Unionists into a united Ireland either against their will or without their knowledge. Moreover, it is not enough to decry individual acts of terrorism but then refuse to endorse the measures required to defeat it. That applies to American Irish who supply Noraid with money to kill British citizens; to Irish politicians who withhold co-operation in clamping down on border security; and to the Labour Party that for years has withheld its support from the Prevention of Terrorism Act which has saved countless lives.
Ian Gow and I had our disagreements, above all about the Anglo-Irish Agreement: but for the right of those whose loyalties are to the United Kingdom to remain its citizens and enjoy its protection I believe, as did Ian, that no price is too high to pay.
In dealing with Northern Ireland, successive governments have studiously refrained from security policies that might alienate the Irish Government and Irish nationalist opinion in Ulster, in the hope of winning their support against the IRA. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was squarely in this tradition. But I discovered the results of this approach to be disappointing. Our concessions alienated the Unionists without gaining the level of security co-operation we had a right to expect. In the light of this experience it is surely time to consider an alternative approach.
CHAPTER XV
Keeps Raining all the Time
The mid-term political difficulties of 1985–1986
A POLITICAL MALAISE
Whatever long-term political gains might accrue from the successful outcome of the miners’ strike, from the spring of 1985 onwards we faced accumulating political difficulties. Matters of no great importance in themselves, and often of limited interest to the general public, were invested within the hyperactive and incestuous world of Westminster with huge significance. The phenomenon is by no means uniquely British: my American friends tell me frequently of the gulf which separates the priorities of the ‘beltway’ from those outside it. So any democratic politician must be able to distinguish between the two — and recognize the pre-eminence of the second.
That spring the Labour Party started to move ahead of us in the opinion polls. In the local elections in May we lost control of a number of shire counties, mainly to the benefit of the SDP/Liberal Alliance. Francis Pym took the opportunity to launch a new grouping of Conservative MPs critical of my policies. The group was officially known as ‘Centre Forward’. Its failure to come up with any coherent alternative, however, caused it to be dubbed in a Times editorial as ‘Centre Backward’. A number of Francis’s supporters hurried to disclaim any connection with the group and after the initial flurry of publicity it sank into oblivion. But that did not alter the fact that, as the columns of the press showed daily, there were rumblings of dissent within the Parliamentary Party. I could not ignore them.
Opinions frayed further in July — always a bad-tempered time in British politics as MPs become restless to return to their constituencies, or in some cases to their villas in Chianti-shire. On Thursday 4 July we had a spectacularly bad by-election result at Brecon and Radnor, which was won by the Alliance on a swing of almost 16 per cent from the Conservatives: our candidate came in third. It was described — not quite accurately — as the worst Tory defeat since 1962. By-election results always have to be taken seriously, even though they are a poor indication of what would happen at a general election when people know they are voting for a government rather than registering a protest. But the press was full of unattributable criticism of the Government and of me personally which, having about it an unmistakeable whiff of panic, confirmed that the Parliamentary Party had a bad case of the wobbles.
Then a fortnight later the publication of our acceptance of the Top Salary Review Board (TSRB) recommendations provided the occasion for a large back-bench revolt in the House of Commons. What caused the outrage was the large increases for top civil servants. There was no doubt in my mind that we could not retain the right people in vitally important posts in government administration unless their salaries bore at least some comparison with their counterparts in the private secto
r. The cost of doing this to the public purse was, of course, only a tiny fraction of even a modest increase to large groups of public sector workers. I came to the conclusion that it was best to put the anomaly right at one go. When the Labour Party erupted I reminded them that Jim Callaghan had done the same thing in 1978. That said, we did not handle the issue well. Fear of leaks meant that those entrusted with explaining the rationale of our policy simply did not know about it in time. Even Bernard Ingham had been kept in the dark which, when he raised the matter with me afterwards, I conceded was absurd. In future we handled the TSRB announcements much more carefully. But for this occasion the damage had been done.
Generally, a political malaise spreads because underlying economic conditions are bad or worsening. But this was not the case on this occasion. True, inflation had moved upwards from the low point it had reached after the election and unemployment, always a lagging indicator, remained stubbornly high; but the economy was growing quite fast. It became clear to me that the root of our problems was presentation and therefore personnel. Of course, there is a tendency for all governments — particularly Conservative governments — to blame presentation and not policy for their woes: but in 1985 it really was the case that some ministers were not in the right jobs and could not explain our policies to the people. So there was only one way of changing the image of the Government and that was by changing its members. A reshuffle was required.
The Downing Street Years, 1979-1990 Page 54
