Hannibal’s Last Battle

by Brian Todd Carey; Joshua B. Allfree; John Cairns

  The Battle of Ticinus, 218 BCE, Phase I. Carthaginian and Roman forces deploy into fighting order as they close with each other near the Ticinus River. Hannibal’s Spanish heavy cavalry is flanked by his Numidian light horse. Opposing them are Scipio’s Gallic cavalry screened by javelin-wielding velites and backed by a reserve of Roman horsemen.

  The Battle of Ticinus, 218 BCE, Phase II. As the forces near each other, Scipio orders his velites forward, javelins at the ready.

  The Battle of Ticinus, 218 BCE, Phase III. Before the Roman skirmishers can throw their javelins at the approaching Carthaginian host, the heavy cavalry on both sides charge (1). The velites retreat through gaps in the Gallic formations (2) as the horsemen rapidly close with each other.

  The Battle of Ticinus, 218 BCE, Phase IV. As the cavalry battle swirls in the centre (1), Hannibal sends his Numidian light cavalry arcing around the flanks (2), cutting down the velites in their path as they sweep into the Roman rear (3).

  The Battle of Ticinus, 218 BCE, Phase V. The Numidian cavalry wheels and charges (1), smashing into the rear of the Roman cavalry reserve (2). During the ensuing action, Scipio is badly wounded (3). The attack on their rear and wounding of their general and consul prove too much and the Romans are routed from the battlefield.

  That night, Gauls in the service of Rome murdered and beheaded a number of sleeping legionaries and then deserted to Hannibal. The Carthaginian commander welcomed the 2,000 Celtic infantry and 200 cavalry that came over, promising rich rewards and sending them back to their tribes to raise support for the Punic cause.144 Soon, Hannibal’s ranks began to swell as more local Gauls joined his army. Recognizing his strategic position was becoming more untenable each day, Scipio ordered his army to withdraw across the Trebia under cover of darkness. Moving troops when your enemy is in close proximity is one of the most difficult military actions, and Scipio no doubt understood the risks of such an operation. When Hannibal learned his enemy was attempting to withdraw, he ordered first his Numidian cavalry, then the rest of his army, against the Romans. The Numidian horse paused to sack and burn the abandoned camp, allowing Scipio to bring most of his army across the river, though he did lose some of his stragglers to the Carthaginians.

  Scipio set up camp again near the modern village of Rivergaro in a much more defensible position and awaited reinforcements. He did not have to wait long. Sempronius Longus arrived from the Adriatic port of Ariminum at the head of a consular army made up of another two legions. Confident in his ability to defeat the invading host, he took sole command of the combined consular army due to Scipio’s injury.145 Hannibal watched patiently as the new army formed. The presence of two Roman consuls and four legions presented Hannibal with an ideal opportunity to beat a substantial Roman army in a set-piece battle and put his master plan in motion. But as he prepared to offer battle on his terms, a Carthaginian raid against a nearby Gallic ally of Rome nearly precipitated a full-blown engagement.

  Hannibal had sent a force of 2,000 infantry and 1,000 Gallic and Numidian cavalry to forage and plunder the camp of a duplicitous Celtic chieftain. Already spoiling for a fight, Sempronius came to the barbarians’ aid with a strong cavalry force and 1,000 light infantry velites.146 Laden with loot, the Carthaginian raiders were chased back into their own camp. The Punic picket repulsed the Romans, but instead of feeding more troops into a fight not of his own choosing, Hannibal held his men back. The Romans refused to press their attack against the fortified Carthaginian camp, and the Italians returned to their own camp in high spirits and claiming victory. Polybius showered praise on Hannibal’s generalship:

  In this situation [Hannibal] acted as a good general should: he checked the troops that were in retreat and compelled them to halt and face about as they approached their own camp. He would not allow them to pursue and engage the enemy, however, he sent out his officers and buglers to recall them.147

  Sensing that his adversary Sempronius was eager for a fight, Hannibal began to prepare the battlefield to his advantage. He recognized that the Romans would only offer battle in open terrain, so he decided to fight in an open treeless area near his camp that was bisected by the River Trebia and its high, overgrown banks. There, he would place his youngest brother Mago with an equal force of 1,000 infantry and cavalry, setting up an ambush to be sprung at a precise time.

  The Battle of the Trebia began at dawn on a frost-encrusted morning in late December 218, when Hannibal sent his Numidian light cavalry across the Trebia to attack the Roman camp. The action was designed to precipitate a general engagement and Sempronius did not let Hannibal down. The Roman consul ordered out his cavalry to meet the Numidians, followed closely by his skirmishers and legionaries. Polybius tells us that the Roman soldiers and their mounts left their camp without eating breakfast.148 Matters worsened quickly for the Italian soldiers and their allies as they marched into a snowstorm and crossed the Trebia in high flood, wading through water chest deep. When the Romans finally forded the river and formed up for battle across from the Punic army, they were a wet and freezing lot. Time and cold temperatures now favoured Hannibal and his army.

  Hannibal’s troops had eaten, groomed their horses and donned their armour around campfires. As the Roman army approached, Hannibal ordered 8,000 pikemen and slingers forward to screen his army as they deployed to the open field prepared earlier, about 1,400 yards in front of his camp.149 The Carthaginian general’s army had swollen since crossing the Alps to 20,000 infantry (Spaniards, Celts and Africans) and 10,000 cavalry equally divided on both wings, including the Numidian light horse which had returned. He formed his infantry in one line with his most unreliable troops, the Celts, in the centre. Finally, he placed his elephants in front of his infantry to deter Roman cavalry charges.

  The Roman army formed up in standard fashion with 16,000 heavy infantry legionaries and 20,000 allied infantry in the centre and 2,000 Roman cavalry on both wings. Sempronius drew up his infantry in three lines with the legions in the middle and their allied foot on each side. About 4,000 velites and allied skirmishers screened the Roman army.150

  The main battle opened with a general exchange of missile weapons by skirmishers on both sides. Polybius maintains that the Romans came off worse in this phase of the battle because they were suffering from the cold and had used up many of their javelins when pursuing the Numidian light horse.151 With no advantage gained, Sempronius recalled his light troops. It was at this moment of transition that Hannibal ordered his own numerically superior cavalry to attack the Roman cavalry on each wing, sweeping the Italian horse from the field and stripping the legionaries of their protection. Both infantry lines in the centre advanced and engaged in a vicious melee. Hannibal now launched his reformed Numidian light cavalry and his light troops against the exposed Roman flanks. The allied infantry, already pinned against the legionaries in the centre by the advancing Punic elephants and infantry, broke and ran. Sensing the moment was finally right, Mago led his 2,000 troops from their hiding place and fell on the rear of the legionaries. The veteran triarii in the third line turned around to face this unexpected threat, but to no avail. Their allied infantry were now being pushed backwards toward the banks of the Trebia. Only the legionaries in the centre had any success, cutting through their Celtic adversaries. But this success was not enough to save the day. With his army disintegrating all around him, Sempronius and about 10,000 of his troops (mostly legionaries) fought their way out of harm’s way and, abandoning their camp, back directly to Placentia in a cold, driving sleet.152

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase I. The battle opens at dawn as Hannibal, hoping to goad Sempronius into action, despatches his Numidian light cavalry across the Trebia to strike the Roman camps.

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase II. Sempronius takes the bait, ordering his cavalry out against the Numidians, who turn back towards the Trebia. The Roman consul orders his legions and allied infantry out as well, and they form facing the icy river (1). In their haste, the men and horse
s deploy before breakfast can be served. The Numidian riders re-cross the Trebia (2) to join the deploying Carthaginian force (3). The Carthaginian forces have breakfasted and their horse have been fed and groomed.

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase III. As Sempronius’s forces slowly advance towards the river (1), the Carthaginians deploy behind a screen of pikemen and slingers (2). Hannibal places his elephants forward to deter cavalry charges against his infantrymen (3). His less-reliable Celtic infantry is in the centre where they can best be controlled, and the cavalry is formed into two equal forces on each wing. Hannibal’s youngest brother, Mago, is sent to the right to prepare an ambush (4).

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase IV. Wading chest-deep waters of the Trebia in a snow storm, Sempronius’s army throws out a screen of javelin-wielding velites to enage their opposite numbers in missile combat (1) as the Romans realign their formations (2).

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase V. Sempronius recalls his skirmishers (1) who have expended most of their javelins and are suffering from the cold. The disorder created by the velites return through the lines presents Hannibal with a golden opportunity and he orders his cavalry to charge the numerically inferior Roman horse (2).

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase VI. The Roman cavalry is routed from the field by the Carthaginian horse (1), exposing the flanks of Sempronius’s main body. The infantry of both sides advance towards each other, intent on battle (2). Meanwhile, Mago bides his time, undetected on the Roman’s left flank (3).

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase VII. As the infantry clash in a violent melee (1), Hannibal orders his reformed light cavalry and skirmishers to attack the Roman flanks (2). Already pressed from the front by Carthaginian infantry and elephants, the flank attack proves too much, and Sempronius’s allied infantry routs (3). Mago seizes the moment and launches his force against the rear of the Roman legionaries in the centre (4).

  The Battle of Trebia, 218 BCE, Phase VIII. Even though the veteran triarii manage to face about to meet Mago’s attack (1), their disciplined stand is not enough to save the day. The fleeing allied infantry are pushed into and across the Trebia (2), and the solitary Roman success against the Celtic infantry (3) merely delays the inevitable. Sempronius and around 10,000 legionaries manage to fight their way out, abandoning the camps and retreating to Placentia.

  Roman casualties at Trebia were extraordinary, with perhaps as many 20,000 Roman legionaries and their allies killed.153 But despite the loss of so many allied troops, the Roman legionaries fared well against their opponents, a fact not lost on Roman commanders. Legionaries would figure prominently two years later in the Roman planning at the battle of Cannae. Punic losses were light and confined mostly to the Celts in the centre of the fray. But Polybius tells us that the cold and violence also took the lives of all but one of the elephants, robbing Hannibal of a tried and true weapon in the Carthaginian art of war.154 Sempronius would winter in Placentia and then move back to Ariminum in the early spring of 217. Now master of northern Italy, Hannibal Barca released his non-Roman captives and sent them home in an attempt to undermine the Roman Confederation. He then wintered in the Po Valley and prepared for his march south into central Italy and the heart of Roman territory.

  Ambush at Lake Trasimene and Rome’s ‘Fabian’ Strategy (217 BCE)

  In March 217 the Roman Senate picked two new consuls, Gaius Flaminius and Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, to lead the effort against the Punic invaders. The new consuls marched north in early spring, Flaminius to Arretium and Servilius to Ariminum, in an attempt to cut Hannibal off from the most obvious routes south into central Italy.155 What route Hannibal took is not precisely known for certain, though he probably crossed the Apennines from east to west through the Colline Pass before navigating the dangerous Arno swamps.156 Here, most of the pack animals faltered and died while many of the horses became lame due to the prolonged march through the mud. Both Livy and Polybius comment that Hannibal developed opthalmia while crossing these wetlands, leading to the loss of sight in one eye.157

  Leading his beleaguered army out of the swamp riding the lone surviving elephant, Hannibal found Flaminius encamped in Etruria (modern Tuscany) in front of the city of Arretium. Hannibal boldly marched past the Roman army of 30,000 Roman soldiers and allies and pushed south toward Rome itself, burning Roman settlements as he marched, baiting the consul into pursuit.158 Flaminius quickly broke camp and haphazardly began to track down the Punic army, despite the warnings from his officers concerning the importance of an orderly march to defend against Hannibal’s superiority in cavalry. Flaminius wanted to defeat the Punic invaders before they reached the gates of Rome, and was willing to brave combat without the aid of Servilius’ consular army at Ariminum.

  Hannibal continued to march south toward the capital keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on his left and Lake Trasimene on his right. The ancient road itself ran along the northern shore of Lake Trasimene between the hills and the water, an ideal place to ambush the trailing Roman army. On June 20, Hannibal entered the valley and peeled off some elements of his army to hide in the hills and defiles, then established a camp on one of the hills above the lake.159 Shadowing the Punic army, Flaminius stopped and rested his troops a few miles to the west on a defensible plain.

  That night Hannibal set the rest of his ambush, quietly deploying the rest of his troops along the ridge and in the defiles next to the road, their progress aided by a bright moon. The following morning, according to Polybius, ‘a thick mist still hung over the lakeside’.160 Impatient to overtake his enemy, Flaminius broke camp early and marched along the shore of the lake, entering both the valley and the fog of war. As soon as the greater part of the Roman army was in the defile, Hannibal sprung the trap.161 Polybius recounts:

  The sudden appearance of the enemy took Flaminius completely by surprise. The mist blotted out all visibility, and with the attack being launched from higher ground and from so many points at once, the [Roman] centurions and military tribunes were not only not able to issue any of the necessary orders but even to grasp what was happening. They found themselves attacked from the front, the flanks and the rear. In consequence most of the troops were cut down while still in marching order and without the least chance of defending themselves, delivered up to slaughter … by a complete lack of judgment on the part of their commander.162

  The Roman column was attacked along its entire length by Hannibal’s cavalry, who rode down many of the legionaries and their allies were they stood. The rest were pushed back into the lake where many were either killed or lost their footing in the mud and drowned under the weight of their armour. The only Roman troops to escape the ambush were the 6,000 members of the vanguard who hacked their way through Punic light troops blocking their path, seizing a nearby hill. Flaminius himself was killed by the leader of the Insubrian cavalry after the latter cut his way through the consul’s veteran triarii bodyguard and ran him through with his spear.163 Livy tells us that it took Hannibal’s men three hours to destroy the Roman army.164 By the time the noon sun had burned off the morning mist, 15,000 Roman soldiers lay dead and another 10,000 captured.165

  As before, Hannibal released the allied troops, instructing them that his quarrel was with Rome, not her subjects. The following day, even the 6,000 Romans in the vanguard surrendered. Punic losses were 1,500 men, most of these Celts.166 Adding insult to injury, a Roman cavalry force of 4,000 men sent by Servilius to assist Flaminius was intercepted and defeated by one of Hannibal’s most trusted cavalry officers, Maharbal, killing half the Roman force and capturing the other half.167

  The Battle of Trasimene, 217 BCE, Phase I. As Hannibal marches his army along the northern shore of Lake Trasimene (1) he directs some of his forces into ambush positions overlooking the road (2). The remainder of the Carthaginians make camp in the hills overlooking the lake (3). Hannibal knows he is being followed by a Roman army under Flaminius, and intends to turn the tables on his pursuers.

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sp; The Battle of Trasimene, 217 BCE, Phase II. As night falls, the Romans make camp on a plain along the shore (1). Aided by a bright moon, Hannibal deploys his remaining soldiers in concealed positions along the road (2).

  The Battle of Trasimene, 217 BCE, Phase III. Flaminius, impatient to catch Hannibal and his army before they can reach Rome, rushes his troops onto the road the next morning, heedless of the early morning fog (1). Shrounded by the mist and concealed in the hills and defiles overlooking the lake, Hannibal’s army awaits their commander’s signal to attack (2).

  The Battle of Trasimene, 217 BCE, Phase IV. Hannibal springs his ambush, trapping the Romans between his charging forces and the lake. Flaminius and his soldiers are taken completely by surprise as the Punic forces burst out of the fog from the high ground on their left.

  The Battle of Trasimene, 217 BCE, Phase V. Most of the Roman army is ridden down by Hannibal’s cavalry or drowned in the lake (1) and Flaminius himself is killed by the leader of Hannibal’s Insubrian cavalry (2). The Roman vanguard manages to cut its way through the light troops blocking its path (3) and takes up a position on a nearby hill (4), but the stand proves hopeless and they surrender the following day.