If anyone imagines that you have been brought here just to attack one town, he has made a better reckoning of your labour than your profit. It is indeed true that you are about the assault the walls of one town, but in that one town, you will have taken the whole of Spain.209
The following morning, Scipio ordered the first probe against one section of the defences. In preparation for this assault, the Carthaginian commander – another man named Mago – had buttressed his defences with an additional 2,000 citizen-soldiers, placing most of them on the landward walls in preparation of the attack.210 The Romans pushed forward against the walls with scaling ladders, but the height of the wall and the weight of so many Romans on the ladders caused the attack to falter. At this moment Mago ordered the gates opened and the defenders sallied forth to attack the retreating Romans. Seeing this, the Roman general ordered a counterattack with his reserves that very nearly took the gate before the defenders rallied. Polybius explains that Scipio, watching the attacks from beneath the shields of three bodyguards, eventually called the attack off at mid-day.211
Now with a better idea of the city’s defences, Scipio ordered a second, more comprehensive assault in the late afternoon against the entire length of the landward walls. He then ordered Gaius Laelius to command his marines in the harbour to assault the city from the sea, ensuring that every man of the garrison was engaged. Finally, Scipio stationed a contingent of 500 men with ladders at the edge of an unmanned side wall protected by a lagoon fed by tidal waters. At the climax of the assault, the tide began to ebb, exposing the foundations of the wall next to the lagoon. Here, the 500 soldiers waded through the shallow waters and set their ladders, scaling the undefended wall. These legionaries quickly cleared the walls and opened the gates, allowing their comrades access to the interior of the city. Polybius tells us that Scipio:
The Siege of New Carthage, 209 BCE, Phase I. Scipio’s army, consisting of 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, arrives outside of New Carthage. While his troops construct lines of contravallation (1) to defend against any possible Punic relief force, his thirty quinqueremes under Gaius Laelius blockade the outer harbour (2). Inside the city, Mago presses 2,000 citizens into service to augment his 1,000-man garrison (3).
The Siege of New Carthage, 209 BCE, Phase II. Attempting to bring the siege to a quick end, Scipio orders an assault (1), but New Carthage’s high wall and the weight of too many attackers on the scaling ladders render this first attempt fruitless.
The Siege of New Carthage, 209 BCE, Phase III. Attempting to take advantage of the confusion outside the walls, Mago orders a force to sally from the main gate (1) to attack the Romans. Scipio recognizes the opportunity the open gates represent and quickly orders his reserves to counterattack (2), but the Carthaginians are able to rally and repulse the attack. Scipio calls off the attacks by midday.
The Siege of New Carthage, 209 BCE, Phase IV. Scipio masses his troops for another assault (1), detaching a force to manoeuvre around the lagoon and approach from what he hopes will be an unwatched sector of the walls (2). To further stretch the defenders, Gaius Laelius is ordered to land a force of marines to assault the walls from the harbour-side (3).
The Siege of New Carthage, 209 BCE, Phase V. The Punic defences thin (1) as Mago attempts to face the renewed assaults against the landward and harbour-side walls (2). Meanwhile, a 500-man Roman force wades through the shallow lagoon towards the city (3). The ebb tide allows the Romans to get close enough to the city’s foundations to successfully scale the walls unopposed (4).
The Siege of New Carthage, 209 BCE, Phase VI. The Romans inside the city quickly clear the walls of defenders (1) and open the gates (2), allowing the rest of Scipio’s army inside. The Romans kill every Carthaginian they encounter as they pour into the city (3). Mago and a portion of the garrison retreat to New Carthage’s citadel (4), but surrender after a brief fight.
let loose the majority of [the Romans] against the inhabitants, according to the Roman custom; their orders were to exterminate every form of life they encountered, sparing none, but not to start pillaging until the word was given to do so. This practice is adopted to inspire terror, and so when cities are taken by the Romans you may often see not only the corpses of human beings but dogs cut in half and the dismembered limbs of other animals, and on this occasion the carnage was especially frightful because of the large size of the population.212
Scipio himself led 1,000 men against the city’s citadel where Mago was holding out with members of his garrison. After first putting up a fight, Mago eventually surrendered and handed over the citadel. Scipio then ordered an end to the slaughter and a beginning to the pillaging. As darkness fell, he ordered his soldiers to bring the city’s spoils to the marketplace. There, next to the piles of plunder, the Romans slept their first night in New Carthage. The following morning, all of the wealth of the city was divided equally among the legions.
Polybius tells us that the Romans were very systematic about how plunder was taken and distributed. Sometimes a portion of the soldiers from a maniple or sometimes the maniple itself was picked to collect the spoils. The Romans never used more than half the army to collect the plunder, keeping the rest in their ranks for security reasons. All of those soldiers who were detailed to collect the plunder brought it back to their legions where tribunes evaluated its wealth and distributed it equally among the legionaries. Everyone in the legion was due a cut, including the protecting force, camp guards, those tending the sick, and those away on special duties.213
Scipio reached out to those Carthaginian citizens not killed in the storming of New Carthage. He offered to employ two thousand Punic artisans if they agreed to work for the Romans (New Carthage was famous for the quality of its armouries). Polybius says that the Romans adopted the Spanish short sword (gladius hispaniensis) and throwing pilum at this time, but it is more likely the Romans began using these weapons earlier in the century during their contacts with Spanish mercenaries in the First Punic War.214 He also hired local sailors to row the captured ships in the harbour and freed the Spanish hostages kept in the prison there by the previous regime. After ordering Gaius Laelius back to Rome by sea with a report and spoils for the Senate, Scipio reconstructed the city’s defences and, leaving a substantial garrison, returned north to Tarraco to drill his army and solidify his alliances for the remainder of 209.
The loss of New Carthage was a substantial strategic blow to Carthaginian interests in Spain. Without the support of a large navy, any Punic attempt to retake the city would have been fruitless. Well aware of their situation, the Barca brothers spent the winter of 209–208 shoring up their own Spanish alliances. Hasdrubal Barca also recruited and trained new troops which he intended to march to Italy by land to reinforce his older brother Hannibal, still reeling from the Roman capture of Capua and Tarentum.
The Roman Conquest of Spain (208–207 BCE)
When the campaigning season began in spring 208, Scipio moved quickly south from Tarraco at the head of an army of between 35,000–40,000 men and 10,000–15,000 Spanish auxiliaries to engage Hasdrubal, fearing that any delay would allow the three Punic armies the opportunity to converge. To further his chance of success, Scipio ordered Gaius Laelius’ navy beached at Tarraco and he and his sailors added to his army’s numbers, outfitted with captured or newly-made weapons and armour courtesy of the armourers at New Carthage.215
Scipio surprised Hasdrubal’s 25,000–30,000 troops in the vicinity of Baecula, about twenty-five miles north of Jaen. Hasdrubal was also anxious to fight a decisive battle, having lost many key allies to the Romans over the winter. In fact, Polybius tells us that all of the tribes north of the Ebro had defected to Scipio’s camp.216 After learning of Scipio’s approach, Hasdrubal ordered his light cavalry to delay the advancing Romans as he took a strong defensive position on a flat-topped hill, protected by a river in the rear and surrounded on the sides and front by steep banks. The front of the hill was also terraced and ringed with a parapet-like rim –
an ideal location to make a stand against a numerically superior opponent.217 Hasdrubal placed his African skirmishers and some Numidian cavalry on the terrace and the remainder of his army on the top of the plateau.218
Scipio probably camped somewhere east of Hasdrubal and waited two days before he approached the well-defended hill.219 As he waited, the Roman general sent detachments to protect his position against the relief armies of Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Gisgo.220 Scipio began the assault by sending some of his light infantry velites and a group of handpicked legionaries to engage the covering force stationed on the lower terrace.221 The Roman army pressed hard against these forces, causing Hasdrubal to deploy his main army on the edge of the higher plateau to support his beleaguered troops. This may have been what Scipio had planned all along. Committing the rest of his light troops to the frontal attack, Scipio ordered his second in command Gaius Laelius around the left side of the hill with half the Roman heavy infantry legionaries while he went around the right with the other half. With the Roman pincers closing in on his position, Hasdrubal immediately ordered a hasty withdrawal, sacrificing his light troops to the melee and taking his elephants and treasury with him. Hadsrubal retreated up the Tagus valley, but left perhaps one half to two-thirds of his army to death or capture.222
The Battle of Baecula, 208 BCE, Phase I. Hasdrubal arranges his main body on a flat-topped hill (1) with a skirmishing force of light infantry and Numidian cavalry deployed on a terrace below (2). Scipio’s army approaches from their camp to the east where they have spent two days preparing for battle (3).
The Battle of Baecula, 208 BCE, Phase II. Scipio opens the action, throwing a force of velites reinforced by legionaries against the Punic forces arrayed on the lower terrace (1). Hasdrubal responds to the threat, deploying his main body to the edge of the higher plateau (2).
The Battle of Baecula, 208 BCE, Phase III. Scipio commits his remaining velites to the attack (1) against the Carthaginian skirmishers and Numidian light horse. He then orders half of his legionaries under Gaius Laelius to swing around the left flank (2) while he does the same on the right (3).
The Battle of Baecula, 208 BCE, Phase IV. Suddenly beset from both flanks by the Roman heavy infantry (1), Hasdrubal orders a quick withdrawal (2), abandoning his light troops. He loses perhaps as much as two-thirds of his army in this defeat.
Hasdrubal marched north and met up with his brother Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo. There, he decided to march on to Italy with his army reinforced with Spanish recruits. He then ordered Mago to hand over his troops to Gisgo and go to the Balearic Islands to hire more troops, while Gisgo returned to friendlier territory around Gades. Interestingly, Hasdrubal Barca also ordered the brilliant young Numidian commander, Masinissa, to take his light cavalry and harass the Romans and their allies wherever he may find them.223
Having put things in order, Hasdrubal then slipped through one of the western passes of the Pyrenees into Gaul, evading Scipio’s pickets along the eastern routes. Hasdrubal spent the remainder of 208 recruiting troops in Gaul in preparation for the invasion of Italy. Carthage sent a general named Hanno from North Africa to replace Hasdrubal and take command of Punic forces in Spain.
The Battle of Baecula was Scipio the Younger’s first field command. His use of light infantry to hold the centre while his heavier troops manoeuvred and attacked the flanks would become a signature tactic, for he would use it again at the battles of Ilipa in 206 and the Great Plains in 203. Though his tactical judgment is lauded, for over two thousand years historians have wondered why Scipio did not pursue Hasdrubal after his victory at Baecula. Perhaps he recognized the danger of chasing Hasdrubal when there were two other Punic armies in the area, or perhaps he recognized the value of consolidating his political gains with other Spanish tribes after yet another battlefield victory over the Carthaginians. Whatever his reasoning, he probably did not have the military capability to stop Hasdrubal from crossing the Pyrenees if the Carthaginian general was bent on doing so, and with Hasdrubal now out of his theatre of operations, Scipio would have one less dangerous commander to deal with in his conquest of Spain.224
Scipio returned to his barracks at Tarraco after the battle and spent the remainder of 208 there. Polybius maintains that the year 207 witnessed a lull in operations in the Spanish theatre, though Livy records some very significant events.225 According to Livy, the new Carthaginian general Hanno joined with Mago to recruit new Celtiberian tribes to the Punic cause, forcing Scipio to send a substantial Roman army of 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, under the command of Marcus Junius Silanus, to disrupt this activity. Silanus succeeded in destroying the Carthaginian army, even capturing Hanno, though Mago escaped with the cavalry and about 2,000 infantry. Scipio himself left Tarraco and pursued Hasdrubal Gisgo deep into the south of Spain near the city of Gades. Here, Gisgo dispersed his troops in the mountain towns, forcing Scipio to either take each town or withdraw. Scipio decided against such an arduous activity, and returned north, leaving his brother Lucius to secure a token victory by capturing the city of Orongis. Gisgo had successfully bought more time to recruit additional troops. But if the year 207 did not bring a decisive confrontation between Hasdrubal Gisgo and Scipio, it did see the death of Hasdrubal Barca and the destruction of the Carthaginian relief army by Roman forces at the Battle of the Metaurus River.
Hasdrubal Defeated: The Battle of the Metaurus River (207 BCE)
After wintering in Gaul in 208–207 Hasdrubal Barca crossed the Alps in the spring of 207 with an army some 20,000 strong using the same route that his older brother had used eleven years earlier, arriving in the Po Valley in May. Hannibal’s strategic position in Italy had deteriorated in the years since his spectacular victory at Cannae in 216. For the most part, the Roman confederation had remained loyal to Rome, and what army Hannibal did possess was often tied up garrisoning those cities in southern Italy which had defected to the Punic cause. The Carthaginian general found himself with an army too small to both prosecute an offensive and guard his newly-acquired territory from Roman counterattack.226 Hannibal sorely needed reinforcements to change this situation, and his brother Hasdrubal was determined to deliver them.
To stop the merging of the two Carthaginian armies, the Roman Senate ordered the two newly elected consuls to oppose the Barca brothers. Gaius Claudius Nero was sent to watch Hannibal in the south at Canusium in Apulia, while the other, Marcus Livius Salinator, was sent north to deal with Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal moved to the east coast of Italy and then made his way south towards the Roman province of Umbria. In an attempt to contact his brother, Hasdrubal unwisely sent four Gallic and two Numidian horsemen with a letter stating his intention to link up with his brother in Umbria. After riding nearly the entire length of the peninsula, these couriers were captured by a Roman foraging party near Tarentum, revealing the plan. Nero sent a letter to the Senate in Rome asking for a change in strategy, arguing that this would be an ideal time for the two Roman armies to join forces and crush the new invading army. The Senate agreed, though if Hannibal learned that the Roman presence in southern Italy was weakened, he would be free to terrorize the region.
Leaving a covering force to watch the unsuspecting Hannibal at Canusium, Nero hand selected a lean contingent of 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry and forced-marched this army north a distance of nearly 250 miles. He sent messengers ahead on the line of march to collect provisions from towns and farms in order to have them ready on the road for his troops’ use, facilitating this amazing military feat.227 Nero’s strategy to defeat Hasdrubal Barca was very risky, and he expressed these dangers to his men. According to Livy, the Roman consul said:
No commander has ever adopted a plan apparently more reckless, but actually more sure of success, than this of mine. I am leading you to certain victory. My colleague Livius did not leave for his field of action until forces sufficient to satisfy him had been granted him by the Senate, forces greater and better equipped than he would have needed against Hannibal himself. Our ta
sk now is to add a weight to the scale, never mind how small, to tip it in our favour. I shall see to it that the enemy gets no news of our approach; but once he knows, when the time of action has come, that another consul and another army have arrived, that knowledge will make our victory sure. Even a whispered word may settle a war – it doesn’t take much to push a man towards hope or fear. It is we who shall reap the harvest of glory if this enterprise succeeds – for everyone forgets the water in the bucket and imagines it is the last drop that makes it overflow. You can see for yourselves how we are being acclaimed from the crowds of admiring faces along the road as we march by.228
Seven days later Nero linked up with Marcus Livius Salinator, already encamped near Hasdrubal, and joined his army under cover of darkness. Salinator even went so far as to quarter the newly-arriving troops with his own so as not to enlarge the size of the camp and tip off the Carthaginians, camped only five hundred yards away.229 The following day a war council, or consilium, was held and it was agreed that the Romans would strike immediately. Livy tells us that orders were immediately given and the newly-combined armies formed a line.230
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