Hasdrubal’s army was already deployed for battle. But as he reviewed his troops protected by a small cavalry detachment, he noticed some unfamiliar legionary shields among the enemy and some unusually stringy horses among what seemed to be a larger contingent of Roman cavalry. Concerned, he sounded the retreat and sent Punic scouts to reconnoitre the Roman camp. They brought back news that the trumpet had been sounded twice in Salinator’s camp, indicating the presence of not one but two consuls. This confused Hasdrubal for he could not understand how another army could have entered the camp without his knowledge, and further inspection did not reveal extended ramparts or a larger Roman camp. This news worried him – either his brother’s army had been destroyed or his letter had been intercepted. Either way, Hasdrubal was in a precarious position. He ordered his troops to extinguish their camphres and pack in silence at first watch. Hasdrubal’s plan was to escape north under the cover of darkness, but in the confusion his guides lost their way and the retreating column floundered. Hasdrubal ordered the disorganized army to march along the bank of the Metaurus until first light, but the twists and turns of the river further compounded the confusion. Daylight revealed a river too wide to easily ford and the Roman cavalry overtaking their position.231
Nero and his cavalry were the first to appear, followed by one of Salinator’s supporting commanders, the praetor Porcius Licinus and his light troops. Both Roman contingents proceeded to harass the jumbled Punic column, blocking Hasdrubal’s attempt to organize his army and seize some high ground. When Salinator arrived with his legionaries already dressed for war, the Roman forces deployed for battle, with Salinator commanding the left, Nero the right and Licinus the centre.232 Modern estimates put the Roman strength at between 37,000 and 47,000 troops, including Nero’s 7,000 Roman reinforcements.233
Realizing he must fight, Hasdrubal placed his ten elephants forward to screen his own 20,000–30,000 troops as they formed.234 He placed his Gauls on the left while he personally commanded the Spaniards on the right, his most trusted and veteran troops. Hasdrubal placed his Ligurian allies in the centre, fierce warriors from northwestern Italy who held no love for the Romans. The Punic array was deeper than it was wide, protected on the right by the river Metaurus and on the left by a deep ravine. Both Livy and Polybius make no mention of cavalry and their whereabouts are unknown.
The Battle of the Metaurus River opened on 22 June 207 with Hasdrubal attacking with the elephants, followed by his right wing and centre. The hardest fighting took place here between Salinator’s Roman legionaries and Hasdrubal’s Spaniards and Ligurians. At first the war elephants pressed the forward ranks of the Roman hastati back, but as the battle grew more ferocious six of the pachyderms began to stampede back through their own ranks, forcing their mahouts to put the wild beasts down by driving a spike into their necks. The other four elephants were later captured, their mahouts abandoning their mounts to the Romans.235 Meanwhile, Nero found he could not get at the Gauls across the ravine. Undeterred, the consul took 2,000 legionaries and marched them across the Roman rear to fall on the Spanish flank. This motion decided the battle. Many of Hasdrubal’s Spaniards and Ligurians were now encircled and slaughtered. Many of the Gauls, never the most reliable allies, deserted their position. Salinator restrained his men from killing the fleeing warriors so that they would return home with news of the Punic defeat. He did not show the same mercy to the drunk Gauls found sleeping in the Punic camp and ‘slaughtered them like so many sacrificial victims’.236
Livy says 57,000 Carthaginians were killed, including Hasdrubal, making Metaurus the greatest single day of losses for the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War and a suitable revenge for Cannae.237 Polybius is much more conservative in his casualties, putting Punic losses at 10,000 killed and 2,000 captured.238 Hasdrubal died in the last moments of the battle, ending any hope of a relief army reaching Hannibal Barca.
Wanting to maintain the initiative, Nero gathered his men and returned south in another forced march to rejoin the remainder of his army at Casunium. He hoped to slip back into his camp without Hannibal ever knowing he was gone or that his brother’s army had been located and defeated. He succeeded. Livy relates to us that Hannibal only learned of his brother’s death when Hasdrubal’s head was catapulted into one of his outposts. Later, two Carthaginian prisoners were released to recount the disaster.239 When news of the victory reached Rome, the Senate declared three days of public thanksgiving honouring the achievement of the consuls Nero and Salinator and gave them a joint triumph at the end of the year.240
The Battle of Metaurus River, 207 BCE, Phase I. After reconnaissance reveals Salinator’s army has been reinforced by a 7,000-man force under Nero, Hasdrubal elects to withdraw north along the Metaurus River under cover of night. The retreat is disorderly as darkness and the winding course of the river work against the Carthaginians. Dawn reveals an unfordable river and a fast-approaching Roman cavalry force on their heels.
The Battle of Metaurus River, 207 BCE, Phase II. Nero’s Roman cavalry (1) keeps pressure on the jumbled Carthaginian columns (2), preventing Hasdrubal from occupying a hilltop from which to make a stand (3). Nero’s force is closely followed by light troops under Porcius Licinus (4), creating even more pressure on the Punic army.
The Battle of Metaurus River, 207 BCE, Phase III. Hasdrubal’s army deploys in a deep formation, protected by a deep ditch on their left, and the river on their right. He takes personal command of his most reliable Spanish troops on the right, a Ligurian contingent in the centre, and the unreliable Gaul’s on his left, screening his army with ten elephants. Facing them, the Roman left is commanded by Salinator, the centre by Licinus, and the right by Nero.
The Battle of Metaurus River, 207 BCE, Phase IV. Hasdrubal opens the battle with an assault by his elephants (1) that press the Roman hastati backwards. As the elephants move out, he orders his Spanish and Ligurian troops to advance as well (2). The fighting is ferocious as the Spaniards and Liguarians make contact with Salinator’s legionaries on the Roman left (3).
The Battle of Metaurus River, 207 BCE, Phase V. As the action grows more ferocious, six of the elephants stampede back through the Ligurian and Spanish infantry (1). The beasts are killed by their mahouts, but Hasdrubal’s attack is dealt a heavy blow. The four surviving pachyderms are captured by the Romans (2). On the Roman right, Nero looks for an opportunity to attack but finds the ditch prevents him from striking the Gauls on their flank (3). He elects to march his legionaries across the Roman rear to the left (4).
The Battle of Metaurus River, 207 BCE, Phase VI. Nero’s turning movement proves decisive as he attacks the Spanish and Liguarian flank (1). Hasdrubal and many of his most reliable troops are slaughtered as they find themselves encircled by the Roman legionaries. The Gauls witness the disaster and desert their positions (2) bringing the action to an end.
The entire Roman campaign surrounding the victory at the Metaurus River demonstrated a higher efficiency and greater flexibility of the Roman military machine compared to earlier in the Second Punic War. Nero had responded quickly to news of Hasdrubal’s presence in Umbria, marching 250 miles in seven days to buttress Salinator’s army and provide the Romans with an element of surprise and added mass to win the day, while his tactical acumen to march from one wing to the other in the battle to outflank his enemy illustrated a degree of tactical flexibility unimaginable in the legions at the start of the war.241
Scipio’s Masterpiece: Ilipa (206 BCE)
The Romans recorded some significant victories outside of Italy and Spain in 208 and 207. In 208 the Roman Senate sent proconsul Marcus Valerius Laevinus, now in charge of the Roman navy in Sicily, and a flotilla of one hundred quinquiremes to raid the coast of North Africa around the cities of Utica and Carthage. Laevinus encountered a Carthaginian fleet off Clupea, capturing eighteen of its ships.242 A year later he returned and defeated another Punic fleet, sinking four ships and capturing another seventeen.243 And although the Roman fleet was reduc
ed in Sicily in 206, it is likely the Carthaginian government saw this naval activity off their coast as a prelude to invasion, giving Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago Barca more reason to bring Scipio to battle. Except for the destruction of the Carthaginian army commanded by the newcomer Hanno, Roman activities in Spain witnessed a respite in 207, allowing Scipio to consolidate his gains.244
In Spain, news of the victory at the Metaurus elevated Roman spirits, while dashing those of the Carthaginians. Gisgo and Mago spent the winter of 207–206 recruiting new troops and strengthening their army for one last offensive. Amassing an enormous host consisting of perhaps 70,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and thirty-two elephants at Gades, Gisgo and Mago marched this army east in the spring of 207 to challenge Scipio for mastery of Spain.245 The Carthaginians stopped near the city of Ilipa near modern Seville, camping on high ground and sending a powerful message to Scipio that they were ready and willing to fight.246
Scipio concentrated his forces near Baecula, well aware of his enemy’s intentions. His army had been weakened by the need to garrison newly-acquired Spanish territories. He was able to muster 45,000 infantry and some 3,000 cavalry, although just over half of these were a core veteran contingent of two Roman legions and other Italian auxiliaries. The remainder were allied troops, many of which were recently-raised Spanish tribesmen whose allegiance was always suspect. No doubt Scipio realized he was fighting near where his father and uncle were killed only five years earlier and knew the tendencies of his new allies. Despite these reservations and a numerically-inferior army, Scipio marched to confront Gisgo and Mago in a decisive engagement for the future of Spain.
When the Carthaginian army was located, Scipio commanded his army to make camp on a line of low hills facing the enemy. Knowing the predilections of his enemy, Scipio concealed a unit of Roman cavalry behind a nearby hill and waited for a possible Punic cavalry raid on his main column marching to the camp. He was not disappointed. As the Punic horseman, led by Mago and the Numidian prince Masinissa, swept down on the marching Roman legionaries and their allies, the Roman cavalry charged unexpectedly across their flank, destroying the momentum of the attack. With the arrival of Roman reinforcements, the Carthaginian raid was pushed back until the retreat turned into a panicked flight.247 Elated by their victory, the Romans fortified their camp and rested for the upcoming battle.
Over the next few days, the two armies deployed for battle though neither host advanced far enough to precipitate a fight. Each day Hasdrubal Gisgo probed the Roman lines with his cavalry and light forces, then deployed for battle around midday, playing his best infantry, the Libyans in the centre, the Spanish on their flanks and the cavalry and elephants on the wings. Scipio would then order his own army from their camp to form up for battle, placing the legionaries in the centre, allied Spanish troops on the flanks, and cavalry on the wings. Livy tells us that neither side ‘made any forward movement, no missile was thrown, no sound was uttered’.248 As the daylight faded, Hasdrubal would order his own troops back into the camp first, with Scipio following suit.
Having witnessed this martial dance over a few days, Scipio decided to use his enemy’s routine to his advantage. The next night he ordered his infantry to have their meal and be dressed for battle before dawn. As first light broke, Scipio ordered his cavalry and velites against the Punic outposts, then marched his main army out of the camp, altering their deployment in order to wrong-foot his opponent. He placed his Spanish troops in the centre and one legion and auxiliaries on each of their flanks, in effect reversing the deployment of the last few days. With his outposts caving in, Gisgo ordered his troops to march out and deploy, but in the confusion he did not realize his enemy had altered his battle order until it was too late. For hours the two lines stared at one another, their light troops making probing attacks. Finally, Scipio recalled his velites to the wings and ordered an attack around midday.
Scipio commanded the right and the left was led by his second in command Marcus Junius Silanus and Lucius Marcius, the man who had rallied the Roman forces in Spain when his father and uncle had been killed in 211. We are not sure who commanded the Spanish allies in the centre, though these troops were ordered to advance slowly, creating a concave formation as the line marched forward. Contrary to standard Roman doctrine, Scipio next ordered the legionaries and their auxiliaries on the wings to switch from line of march to column, with both legions marching away from the centre and then turning ninety degrees toward the enemy. Now marching in column, the two legions and their auxiliaries advanced quickly against the less-reliable Spanish infantry on the Punic flanks, wheeling again from column to line as they engaged the enemy. The Roman legionaries and their Italian allies struck hard against these raw recruits who were already worn down due to lack of food and water in the midday heat. Livy recounts
Tired and discouraged as a result of all this, the Carthaginians began their retreat; but it was still an orderly retreat with the appearance, at any rate, of a planned withdrawal by an unbroken line. But this was not to last, for when the victorious Romans saw their advantage they redoubled their weight of their attacks from every side. The Carthaginians could no longer hold them; Hasdrubal [Gisgo] did all he could to keep them in hand and stop the rot, crying out again and again that if only they withdrew slowly and in order they could find safety amongst the hills in their rear. But panic proved stronger than discipline and, as their comrades in the van began to fall, the whole line suddenly faced about and took to flight.249
The Carthaginians fled to the base of the hill beneath their own camp and began to rally, only to be put to rout once more when the Romans arrived again in force. The fighting only ended when a timely deluge of rain allowed the Punic forces to escape into the night.250 By morning Gisgo’s Spanish allies had evaporated, forcing the remainder of the Punic army to fight from its hilltop camp. Seeing that all was lost, Gisgo managed to make it to the coast and take ship to North Africa, while Mago Barca fled to Gades. Later he would be called home to Carthage. His departure marked the end of several hundred years of Carthaginian rule in Spain.
Scipio’s victory at Ilipa was a masterpiece of strategic planning and tactical execution. Scipio successfully manipulated to his own advantage the rituals of a formal battle, with its characteristic days of delay, skirmishes and displays of confidence, and then dictated how and when the battle would be fought. He surprised his opponent and pressed his advantage by wrong-footing his opponent, gaining a substantial tactical advantage.251 His audacious plan to march perhaps 25,000 Roman legionaries and auxiliaries from line to column, and then again to line, illustrated the superior drill and discipline these Roman soldiers possessed compared to their comrades who fought a decade earlier at Cannae.252
After the Punic army disintegrated, Scipio divided his own forces and mounted punitive expeditions against those Spanish chieftains who refused to submit. Complicating his attempt to consolidate his gains, Scipio fell seriously ill and a rumour of his death spread quickly throughout the tribes. Indibilis, a chieftain of the Ilergetes tribe in northeastern Spain, seized this opportunity to organize some tribes and rebel against the Romans. Scipio recovered and the rebellion was crushed, but the Roman general also faced a mutiny from 8,000 of his Roman soldiers in the city of Sucro. Many of these legionaries had not been paid in ten years and their demands to be released from service and return home fell on deaf ears. The mutiny was suppressed, ringleaders killed, and wayward soldiers forced to retake their oaths.253
The Battle of Ilipa, 206 BCE, Phase I. The Roman and Carthaginian armies face each other over a period of several days, deploying for battle each day, but never advancing far enough to precipitate an engagement (1). Gisgo positions his high-quality Libyan infantry in the centre, his Spaniards on each flank, and his cavalry and elephants on each wing. Scipio matches his foe’s deployment with his legionaries in the centre, Spanish infantry on the flanks, and his cavalry on each wing.
The Battle of Ilipa, 206 BCE, Phase II. Scipio decides t
o alter the daily routine of deployment, probing, and returning to camp. He readies his army before dawn and orders his cavalry and velites to attack Gisgo’s outposts (1) while his main force deploys from camp (2). This time, Scipio places his legionaries on the flanks, with his Spanish troops in the centre, hoping to deceive his opponent. As his outposts break under Roman pressure (3), Gisgo orders his army to deploy from their camp (4).
The Battle of Ilipa, 206 BCE, Phase III. Both sides’ skirmishers probe back and forth (1), searching for an opening, as the main forces stand fast. Gisgo doesn’t recognize the change in the Roman disposition. At midday, Scipio recalls his velites (2), orders his Spaniards forward slowly in a concave formation (3), and deploys his legionaries in an unorthodox manner, marching to the flanks in column (4).
The Battle of Ilipa, 206 BCE, Phase IV. As the Roman’s Spanish infantry continues their advance (1), Scipio’s legionaries turn towards the Punic line, maintaining their column formations and speeding towards the unreliable Spaniards on Gisgo’s flanks (2).
The Battle of Ilipa, 206 BCE, Phase V. As the legionaries close with the Spanish recruits, they change formation from column into line (1). Already suffering from the midday heat, lack of water, and short rations, the raw Carthaginian troops begin to give way (2). Orderly withdrawal gives way to headlong flight (3) as the Roman infantry increases the pressure on the flanks. Many of the Carthaginians retreat to the base of the hill below their camp (4) where they begin to rally.
Hannibal’s Last Battle Page 12
