The Battle of the Great Plains began when Scipio ordered his cavalry under the command of Laelius and Masinissa to charge their counterparts, sweeping the enemy cavalry from the battlefield. The disappearance of their horseman must have had a debilitating effect on the Punic infantry, because a general rout of Carthaginian and Numidian foot soldiers ensued shortly afterwards, leaving the Celtiberians to fend for themselves. These mercenaries fought bravely, but were eventually engaged by the Roman infantry. Polybius remarks that when the cavalry ‘wings gave way, the whole of their contingent was quickly encircled by the principes and triarii and cut down where they stood, except for a few survivors’.288 Although neither Polybius nor Livy mention it explicitly, it is most likely the hastati engaged the Celtiberians first, then were assisted by the principes in the second line and the triarii in the third line, who deployed from line to column and struck the barbarian force in both flanks.289 We do not know whether one entire line went to left and the other to the right, or whether both lines split and half the principes and triarii attacked each flank.290
The Battle of the Great Plains, 203 BCE, Phase I. After four days of desultory skirmishing, the Punic and Roman armies deploy from their camps (1). Gisgo commands the Carthaginians on the right of the Punic line, Syphax the Numidians on the left, and a Celtiberian mercenary force holds the centre. Scipio commands the Roman legionaries in a conventional three-rank deployment, while Masinissa commands the allied Numidian light horse on the left and Gaius Laelius the Italo-Roman horse on the right. The action opens as Scipio orders a cavalry charge against the opposing horse (2).
The Battle of the Great Plains, 203 BCE, Phase II. The Punic cavalry is quickly routed by Laelius and Masinissa (1). Watching their mounted companions bolt for the rear proves more than the Numidian and Carthaginian foot can handle and they begin to rout as well (2), leaving the Celtiberian infantry to face the oncoming legionaries alone.
The Battle of the Great Plains, 203 BCE, Phase III. As the Roman infantry closes with the Celtiberians, the mercenaries bravely hold their ground (1), allowing their comrades to make good their escape. The Roman hastati very likely pinned the Punic infantry, while the principes and triarii deployed from line (2) to column (3) to fall on the enemy flanks, though whether it was a single or double envelopment is not known. Regardless, the outcome is the same, as the Celtiberians are quickly destroyed.
We do know that the spirited defence offered up by the Celtiberians assisted the fleeing Punic and Numidian contingents, delaying a Roman pursuit. Syphax withdrew to the safety of his own territory, while Gisgo limped back to Carthage. Scipio called his consilium together to discuss the next course of action, deciding to send Laelius and a contingent of Roman infantry and Masinissa and his Numidians to harass Syphax’s retreat, while the remainder of the Roman army stayed in the vicinity of the Great Plains to gather supplies, make alliances and plunder. Polybius makes the point that much of Punic-held Africa was ready for a change of government, having suffered hardship and high taxation for a long time due to the war.291 Many townships offered their allegiance to Rome, while others were assaulted and taken.
Laden with booty, Scipio decided to threaten Carthage itself, marching his army to the ancient city of Tunis, which was easy to invest since its garrison abandoned the city. Located only fifteen miles away from the capital, Scipio was able to see Carthage’s walls and its magnificent harbours from his headquarters in Tunis. This action was no doubt designed to intimidate the Punic population and put pressure on the suffetes and Council of Elders to sue for peace. Some of the Carthaginian elite wanted to capitulate, while others wanted to recall Hannibal from Italy to assist with the defence of the homeland. The latter proposal was agreed on and a party of Punic politicians was sent to southern Italy to deliver this order to Hannibal.292 For the short term, the Carthaginian legislature remained resolute, ordering the city to prepare for a siege and outfitting and manning a fleet to threaten the Roman supply line from Sicily and Italy. In fact, this maritime strategy was adopted immediately when Carthage ordered its fleet against the Roman siege at Utica.
Scipio witnessed the Punic fleet as it left the harbour at Carthage, recognizing immediately the vulnerability of his own fleet supporting the siege at Utica. Abandoning his new position at Tunis, Scipio marched in haste back to Utica, arriving at Castra Cornelia one day before the Carthaginian fleet. Scipio found his warships carrying siege equipment or supplies and his transports bow-up on the shore and not prepared for naval action. He immediately ordered his ships lashed together, surrounding his line of warships with transports three or four deep. He then stationed 1,000 hand-picked men to act as marines armed with copious amounts of missiles to protect the floating battlefield from attack.293 When the Punic fleet arrived, they waited a while to see if the Romans would come out and fight. After a while, the Roman strategy became apparent and the Punic ships rowed in to engage the tethered fleet. Livy writes:
What followed had no resemblance to a sea fight; it looked, if anything, more like ships attacking walls. The Roman transports were higher out of the water than their opponents, and the Carthaginians on their warships, forced as they were to lean back in order to discharge their missiles at the mark above their heads, failed more often than not to score a hit, whereas the striking power of their enemies’ [the Romans’] missiles was, from the fact of their positions, much greater and effective.294
The Carthaginians made little headway against the lashed ships, probably because the Roman transports’ superstructures were much higher than the Punic warships, providing the Roman defenders with an advantage. Nevertheless, the Carthaginians did manage to cut away some sixty transports and tow them back to Carthage in triumph.295 There, the population’s celebration was cut short with news of the defeat and capture of King Syphax.
After a fifteen-day ride, Gaius Laelius and Masinissa reached Numidia. In an interesting turn of events Masinissa was proclaimed king by his father’s tribe, the Maesulii, who then proceeded to eject Syphax’s officers and garrisons. Syphax soon surrounded himself with his own loyal subjects, the Masaesulii, returning to his kingdom to raise a new army of raw recruits. Recognizing the importance of striking Syphax before he had time to train his army, Laelius and King Masinissa marched into Masaesulii territory and confronted Syphax. Livy mentions that the Masaesulii’s superior numbers in cavalry first had a good showing against the Roman and allied cavalry, but after Roman light infantry entered the fray, the balance began to shift in favour of the Romans. Laelius then ordered his legionaries forward, but the sight of the approaching Roman heavy infantry caused panic within the ranks of the Masaesulii. In a last ditch effort to rally his faltering men, Syphax rode his horse up to the Roman lines, where it was shot out from under him.296
Masinissa followed up the victory by taking Syphax back to the captured king’s own capital of Cirta, followed by Laelius and the Roman army. At the sight of their king in chains the city elders surrendered the city without bloodshed. When Masinissa reached the royal palace, Livy tells us that he was so mesmerized by the youth and beauty of Syphax’s Punic wife, Sophonisba, that he vowed to marry her. Laelius, displeased with the idea of having to give up such a high profile political prisoner, convinced Masinissa to allow Scipio to make the decision. When the Roman expedition returned to Utica just after the successful defence of the tethered fleet, Scipio denied the new king’s request, and Masinissa is said to have sent a slave to Sophonisba with poison, which she took.297 Although Scipio denied the marriage, he did parade Masinissa in front of his Roman troops and address him as King, bestowing both titles and gifts on his young royal ally.298 Both of these stories have been doubted by some historians, though neither is beyond the realm of possibility.
Armistice and Hannibal Recalled
After defending his fleet at Utica, Scipio returned to Tunis, where he was greeted by a peace delegation from Carthage.299 The capture of Syphax changed the complexion of the war for many of the Carthaginian elite, wh
o now believed that, without Numidian support, continuing the war with Rome was futile. Thirty senior legislators met with the Roman proconsul, blaming Hannibal Barca and his supporters for the origins of the war.300 Scipio listened to the delegation and offered his terms. According to Livy, Carthage was to pay a large indemnity (either 5,000 talents or 5,000 pounds of silver), and:
Return all prisoners, deserters and runaway slaves
Withdraw all armies from Italy and Cisalpine Gaul
Stop interference in Spain
Evacuate all islands in the western Mediterranean
Surrender all but twenty warships
Supply the Roman army with 500,000 measures of wheat to feed troops and 300,000 measures of barley to feed the animals 301
To Livy’s account, the historian Appian of Alexandria added clauses forbidding the Punic state from recruiting mercenaries, a primary source of military manpower, and demanding the recognition of Masinissa as king of all Numidia.302
Scipio gave the Punic delegation three days to consider his demands. The Carthaginians eventually agreed to the proconsul’s terms, an armistice was concluded and Punic envoys sent to Rome where the treaty was ratified by the Roman Senate.303 Livy maintains that the Carthaginians were simply biding their time until Hannibal could return and redress the military situation.304 Since 205, Hannibal had been operating in Bruttium, though not unmolested. In 204 he defeated the consul Publius Sempronius Tuditanus near the city of Croton, though he experienced a setback when Sempronius was joined by the proconsul Publius Licinius Crassus.305 Hannibal continued to lose ground in southern Italy to the Romans in 203, so when he was summoned to return to Africa, the order may, from a purely military point of view, have been welcome.306 Hannibal’s brother Mago landed in Italy near Genua (modern Genoa) in 205 and began immediately recruiting troops in Etruria. Two years later, in 203, he advanced out of the region, but like his older brother, Mago’s activities were challenged by the Romans. The proconsul Marcus Cornelius Cethegus and the praetor Publius Quinctilius Varus defeated Mago in territory controlled by the Insubres, wounding the Punic general in the fray.307 When the Punic soldiers saw their commander carried off the battlefield, discipline disintegrated and retreat turned into rout. Mago was able to return to the west coast of Italy, where he met with Carthaginian envoys summoning him home. Livy believes Mago died of his wounds on the return voyage to Africa, and most of his ships and troops safely returned home.308
Hannibal probably left Italy in the autumn of 203, landing at Leptis Minor, between Hadrumentum and Thapsus.309 He would later make his winter camp outside of Hadrumentum. The sources do not mention how many troops he arrived with, though we do know he abandoned some of his soldiers in Italy, a rabble he described as a ‘useless crowd’, which he distributed among the garrisons of his allied cities.310 Appian tells of the slaughter of 4,000 horses and a substantial number of pack animals on his departure, no doubt because of limited space on the return voyage.311
The armistice continued throughout the winter months, but events in the early spring of 202 would destroy the peace. Scipio’s African army was still dependent on supplies sent from Roman territory, especially Sicily and Sardinia. When a large convoy of some 200 transports escorted by thirty warships was struck by extremely high winds, the oared vessels were able to make landfall, but the sailed merchantmen were blown way off course and scattered along the North African coast. Many of these vessels blew into the wide bay overlooking Carthage itself. Bending to the will of public demonstrations, the Carthaginian legislature dispatched Hasdrubal Barca and fifty warships to round up the now-abandoned merchant ships, whose grain cargos were added to Carthage’s own dwindling supply.312
Provoked by the action, Scipio dispatched three ambassadors from Castra Cornelia on board a quinquereme to Carthage to demand the return of the vessels and the cargo, complaining to both the Council of Elders and the Popular Assembly that the seizure of the ships had violated the terms of the armistice. But the mood had changed in Carthage with the return of Hannibal Barca and his veteran soldiers. The Carthaginians now believed they had the upper hand and wanted to resume hostilities. The Roman delegation was attacked by the exuberant mobs of Carthage, only saved from death by the city’s magistrates. In fact, the Roman quinquereme was given a Punic escort back to the Roman fleet, though even this gesture did not keep the Roman warship safe. Passing Utica, three Carthaginian triremes put out to intercept it. Only by skillful piloting and superior height was the Roman warship able to defend itself from both ramming and boarding, although Livy and Polybius reported many casualties.313
The armistice was now over and Scipio resumed hostilities immediately. He revisited cities which he had offered terms to and enslaved their populations in an attempt to provoke Carthage into a set-piece battle. Although the Roman general’s imperium had been extended by the Senate until he finished the war, he no doubt understood that the strategic position was rapidly changing with the return of Hannibal to African soil. To complicate matters for Scipio, the political situation in Rome was also in flux. One of the consuls for 203, Gnaeus Servilius Caepio, had traveled to Sicily late in the year in the hopes of taking a rival army to Africa. Though the dictator appointed to hold elections for 202 called Servilius Caepio back, both of the consuls elected in March of 202 hoped to be given Africa as their province. Fortunately for Scipio, his popularity in Rome with both the Senate and the Assembly continued, and his imperium was extended again. However, the Senate did send a fleet of fifty quinqueremes under the command of one of the newly-elected consuls, Tiberius Claudius Nero, to support Scipio’s land campaign. Livy makes it clear that Nero held the rank of imperator on par with Scipio.314 When the campaigning season began in 202, Scipio understood that a decisive battlefield victory over Hannibal Barca was required to end the war quickly and cement his political and military reputation.
Pyrrhus of Epirus whose intervention failed to halt Roman expansion in Italy and Sicily prior to the First Punic War.
(National Museum of Roman Civilization, Rome)
Obverse of a Numidian coin bearing the likeness of King Syphax, who sided with Carthage late in the conflict. (British Museum)
A marble bust found at Capua thought to be that of Hannibal Barca, considered a strategic and tactical genius. (National Museum, Naples.)
Black marble bust of Scipio Africanus, the victor of Zama. (National Museum, Naples)
Hannibal Crossing the Rhône, by Henri Paul Lamotte (1846-1922). When Hannibal marched on Italy in 218 BCE, transporting thirty-seven war elephants across large rivers and high mountains proved to be difficult, but Punic engineers successfully negotiated these barriers.
Inset: Reverse of a Carthaginian silver double shekel depicting a war elephant. Larger Indian elephants were used in Hellenistic warfare, but Carthage preferred the smaller African forest elephants (shown here) because they were easier to acquire and train.
(British Museum)
A fourth century BCE example of an Iberian falcata. (National Archaeological Museum of Spain, Madrid)
A Roman gladius. Spanish warriors fought with either a cut-and-slash falcata, or a short double-edged thrusting sword, from which the Roman gladius hispaniensis was patterned.
Roman ‘Montefortino’ type helmet. Celtic in origin, the Romans added cheek guards for greater protection. (Archaeological Museum of Bologna)
Sculpture of a Numidian horseman. (The Louvre, Paris) The Numidians, a fierce semi-nomadic people from the remoter parts of what is now Tunisia, supplied Carthaginian armies with their finest light cavalry.
Found in a tomb at Ksour-es-Sad in Tunisia, this ornate bronze triple-disc cuirass is of southern Italian origin and may have been taken back to Africa by one of Hannibal’s soldiers. (The Bardo Museum, Tunis)
Carthaginian armour and shield as depicted on a Roman triumphal frieze in Tunisia. Triumphal arches were built to celebrate Roman victories, depicting the captured arms and armour of vanquished foes.
Obv
erse of a gold stater with an image of Titus Quinctius Flaminius, who defeated Philip V of Macedon at Cynoscephelae in 197 BC.
(British Museum)
Coin of Philip V of Macedon. Philip entered into an alliance with Carthage against Rome in 215 BCE, initiating the First Macedonian War. Unable to make headway against Italy, he turned his attention towards Greece. He was finally defeated in the Second Macedonian War in 192 BCE.
King Antiochus III of Syria, attempted to fill the vacuum created by the defeat of Philip V, but his actions drew him into conflict with Rome and he was defeated at Magnesia in 190 BCE.
(British Museum)
A modern view of the harbour of Carthage. The ancient city of Carthage’s most impressive and imposing features were its city walls and its complex of harbour and docks, whose outline can still be seen here. The city was built on a naturally defensible position and then heavily fortified, protected by two restricted land approaches. A twenty-two mile city wall enclosed the great harbour as well as the citadel that was constructed on the Byrsa hill overlooking the harbour.
Artist’s conception of the ship storage shed and admiral’s headquarters that lay in the centre of the military harbour at Carthage, reported to have a capacity for 220 vessels.
(University of Texas at Austin)
Hannibal’s Last Battle Page 14
