Hannibal’s Last Battle
Page 22
114.
Livy, XXXIV.60.
115.
Healy, Cannae 216 BC, p. 12.
116.
N. B. Rankov, ‘The Second Punic War at Sea’ in T. J. Cornell, N. B. Rankov and P. Sabin, eds, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), p. 53. Also see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War: A Military History of the Second Punic War (Norman, 1998), p. 31, for a detailed discussion on Roman sea power at the beginning of the Second Punic War.
117.
Thomas A. Dorey and Donald R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage (London, 1971), pp. 29–30.
118.
Livy, XXI.23; Polybius, III.35.
119.
Polybius, III.35.
120.
Polybius believed the Spanish troops were dismissed as a conciliatory measure (III.35), while Livy maintains that 3,000 deserted and Hannibal released another 7,000 to shed unreliable troops and cover up the desertions (XXI.23).
121.
Polybius, III.38.
122.
Healy, Cannae 216 BC, p. 13.
123.
Polybius, III.41. See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 34–40, for a spirited discussion of how and where Hannibal crossed the Rhone. Also see Healy, Cannae 216 BC, p. 13.
124.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 34.
125.
Ibid, p. 36.
126.
Polybius, III.44.
127.
Livy’s translation taken from Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 37.
128.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pp. 161–162.
129.
Polybius, III.45.
130.
Livy, XXI.34.
131.
Polybius, III.53.
132.
Livy, XXI.34.
133.
Ibid.
134.
Polybius, III.54.
135.
Ibid.
136.
Polybius states that it took Hannibal fifteen days to cross the Alps (III.56). There is a great deal of speculation concerning whether a fifteen-day march across the Alps is possible. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, chapter 2, reconstructs the march in great detail and comes up with a twenty-four day crossing, nine for the ascent and fifteen for the descent.
137.
Polybius, III.56.
138.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 48.
139.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 168.
140.
Ibid.
141.
Livy, XXI.51.
142.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 168.
143.
For an outstanding reconstruction of the Battle of the Ticinus, see Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pp. 169–173.
144.
Polybius, III.66.
145.
Under normal circumstances, a consul would have at his disposal two legions made up of 16,000–20,000 infantry and from 1,500 to 2,500 cavalry. About half of the infantry and one-quarter of the cavalry were made up of Roman citizens, with the rest drawn from Roman allies or auxiliaries. After their election the consuls appointed twenty-four military tribunes, ten of which were senior tribunes with at least ten years of service, while the remainder required only five years of service. But during the manpower shortages of the Second Punic War, tribunes often were placed with less experience. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, p. 129.
146.
Polybius, III.69.
147.
Ibid.
148.
Ibid., III.72.
149.
Ibid.
150.
Ibid.
151.
Ibid., III.73.
152.
Livy, XXI.56.
153.
Healy, Cannae 216 BC, p. 51.
154.
Polybius, III.74.
155.
Polybius, III.77.
156.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 60–61. Also see Daly, Cannae: The Experience of Battle, p. 15 and Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, p. 172.
157.
Polybius, III.79 and Livy, XXII.2.
158.
Healy, Cannae 216 BC, p. 57.
159.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 63. Lazenby believes that Hannibal peeled off some elements of his army as they marched in the valley along the coast of Lake Trasimene before setting up the remainder of the ambush that evening.
160.
Polybius, III.84.
161.
See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 62–66, for a detailed reconstruction of the Battle of Lake Trasimene.
162.
Polybius, III.84.
163.
Ibid.
164.
Livy, XXII.6.
165.
Polybius, III.84.
166.
Ibid., III.85.
167.
Ibid., III.86.
168.
Ibid.
169.
Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, pp. 65–68. Jones describes the anatomy of the original Fabian strategy and the difficulty faced by the Carthaginian army while operating in Italy.
170.
Ibid., p. 67.
171.
Ibid.
172.
Polybius, III.114. There are many fine monographs which concentrate on the battle of Cannae available in print. Please see Healy, Cannae 216 BC: Hannibal Smashes Rome’s Army (London, 1994), Gregory Daly, Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War (London, 2002), and Adrian Goldsworthy, Cannae (London, 2001).
173.
Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Doubleday, 2001), p. 107. Hanson notes that the depth of the Roman infantry formation was the deepest since the Theban victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BCE.
174.
Ibid., p. 108.
175.
Polybius, III.115.
176.
Polybius, III.117.
177.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 85.
178.
Connolly, ‘The Roman Army in the Age of Polybius’, in John Hackett, ed, Warfare in the Ancient World (New York: Facts On File, 1989), p. 163. The ‘tumbling effect’ was coined by the military historian John Keegan.
179.
Polybius, III.117. Livy XXII.52.
180.
Livy, XXIII.12.
181.
Livy, XXII.51.
182.
Ibid.
183.
For a detailed explanation of the problems facing Hannibal had he besieged and invested Rome, please see B. S. Strauss and J. Ober, The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and their Lessons for Modern Strategists (New York, 1992), pp. 54–155.
184.
Healy, Cannae 216 BC p. 86.
185.
J. F. Shean, ‘Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 BC, Historia, 45.2, pp. 175–185. Also see Jones, Art of War in the Western World, p. 68. Also see Duncan B. Campbell’s excellent treatment of siege warfare during the Punic wars in his Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World (Oxford, 2006).
186.
Hanson, Carnage and Culture, p. 110.
187.
Livy, XXII. 58–59.
188.
Livy, XXII. 58.
189.
J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Volume I, From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto (New York, 1954), pp. 128–129.
190.
Livy, XXIII.13. Livy states that when Mago returned to Carthage in 216 to report on his brother’s progress, the Carthaginian government unanimously agreed to send Hannibal 4,000 Numidian cavalry and forty elephants from North Africa and 20,000 infantry from Spain to help with his Italian campaign. But most of these troops were never sent.
191.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 44.
192.
Livy, XXVII.9.
Chapter 3: The Early Campaigns of Scipio
193.
Livy, XXI.46.
194.
Livy, XXII.54.
195.
Livy, XXII.53.
196.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 224.
197.
Ibid., p. 225.
198.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 95.
199.
P. Brunt, Italian Manpower, (Oxford, 1971), pp. 416–422. Also see Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pp. 226–227.
200.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 9–10, 234.
201.
Livy, XXII.22.
202.
There is great debate concerning whether the deaths of Gnaeus and Publius happened in 212 or 211. Livy states 212 but most modern historians believe it took place in 211.
203.
Livy, XXV.32.
204.
Livy, XXVI.18.
205.
Ibid.
206.
Livy, XXVI.19.
207.
Bradford, Hannibal, pp. 158–159.
208.
Polybius, X.9.
209.
Livy, XXVI.43.
210.
Polybius, X.12.
211.
Polybius, X.13.
212.
Polybius, X.15.
213.
Polybius, X.16.
214.
G. Veith and J. Kromayer, Heerwesen und Kriegfuhrung der Griechen und Romer (Munich 1928), p. 325.
215.
Livy, XXVII.17.
216.
Polybius, X, pp. 34–35.
217.
Livy, XXVII.18
218.
Ibid.
219.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 141.
220.
Polybius, X.38.
221.
Polybius, X.39
222.
Ibid.
223.
Livy, XXVII.20.
224.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 143.
225.
Livy, XXVIII, p. 1–4.
226.
Nigel Bagnall, The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean, pp. 233–234.
227.
Livy, XXVII.43.
228.
Livy, XXVII.45
229.
Livy, XXVII.46.
230.
Ibid.
231.
Livy, XXVII.47.
232.
Livy, XXVII.48.
233.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 190.
234.
Polybius, XI. I. Appian maintains that there were fifteen elephants fighting for Hasdrubal at Metaurus (Hannibalic War, 52).
235.
Livy, XXVII.49.
236.
Polybius, XI.2.
237.
Livy, XXVII.49. This number seems preposterous, especially since it exceeds the total number of Carthaginian forces at the Battle of Metaurus River.
238.
Polybius, XI.3.
239.
Livy, XXVII.51.
240.
Livy, XXVII.51 and XXVIII.9.
241.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pp. 242–243.
242.
Livy, XXVII.29.
243.
Livy, XXVIII.28.4.
244.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 144–145.
245.
Polybius maintains that the Carthaginians had 70,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry at Ilipa (XI.20), while Livy believes 50,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry were present (XXVIII.12).
246.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 279.
247.
Polybius, XI.21 and Livy, XXVIII.13.
248.
Livy, XXVIII.14.
249.
Livy, XXVIII, 15.
250.
Ibid.
251.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 283.
252.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 50.
253.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 284.
254.
Livy, XXVIII.17.
255.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pp. 286–287,
256.
Ibid., p. 286.
257.
Livy, XXVIII.45.
258.
Ibid.
259.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 195.
260.
Livy, XXVIII.46.
261.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 287.
262.
Ibid. Also see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 203, for a discussion of what Scipio’s troop strength was for the African landings.
263.
Livy, XXIX.3.
264.
Goldsworthy, The Punic War, p. 288.
265.
Ibid.
266.
For a detailed account of the Locrian affair and its repercussions in Rome see Livy, chapter XXIX.
267.
Livy, XXIX.22.
Chapter 4: The African Landings and the Battle of Zama
268.
Livy, XXIX.25.
269.
See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, for a discussion on the Roman warship strength and theories on why the fleet was so small (pp. 203–204).
270.
Livy, XXIX.25.
271.
Livy, XXIX.28.
272.
Livy XXIX.29
273.
Livy XXIX.34. The site of the battle has been identified as being south of the saddle joining the hills southwest of Utica, now called Djebel Menzel Roul, to the Djebel Doumis.
274.
Caesar, Civil Wars, II.24.
275.
Polybius, XIV.1 and Livy, XXIX.35.
276.
Livy, XXX.1.
277.
Polybius, XIV.2.
278.
Ibid.
279.
Polybius, XIV.4.
280.
Polybius, XIV.6. The casualty numbers given by Livy (XXX.6) are farcical (40,000 dead and 5,000 taken prisoner), as are those given by Appian (Libyca, 23), who states 30,000 were killed and 2,400 taken prisoner.
281.
Polybius, XIV.5.
282.
Polybius, XIV.6.
283.
Polybius, XIV.2.
284.
Polybius, XIV.7.
285.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 209.
286.
See Polybius, XIV.8 and Livy, XXX.5 for accounts of the Battle of the Great Plains.
287.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 210.
288.
Polybius, XIV.8.
289.
See Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 210, for a detailed and entertaining discussion of the possible tactical arrays used by the Punic and Roman forces at the Battle of the Great Plains.
290.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, pp. 295–296.
291.
Polybius, XIV.9.
292.
Polybius, XIV.9 and Livy, XXX.9.
293.
Polybius, XIV.11 and Livy, XXX.10.
294.
Livy, XXX.10.
295.
Polybius, XIV.11 and Livy, XXX.10. Also see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 209–211.
296.
Livy, XXX.11.
297.
Livy, XXX.15.
298.
Livy, XXX.17.
299.
Polybius, XV.1.
300.
Livy, XXX.16.
301.
Ibid.
302.
Appian, Lib
yca, 32.
303.
Here, Livy and Polybius differ in their interpretation of events. Polybius states that the treaty was ratified by the Roman Senate, while Livy maintains that the treaty disintegrated when the Carthaginian delegation attempted to alter the agreement. The Punic ambassadors were expelled and Scipio given the authority to negotiate new terms or renew hostilities. Please see Livy XXX.17 and Polybius, XV.1 for differing interpretations of what happened to the Punic delegation to the Roman Senate.
304.
Livy, XXX.16.
305.
Livy, XXIX.36–38.
306.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 215. Professor Lazenby makes the point that Hannibal’s strategic position was eroding in southern Italy.
307.
Livy, XXX.18.
308.
Livy, XXX.19.
309.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 215.
310.
Livy, XXX.20.
311.
Appian, Hannibalic War, pp. 58–59.
312.
Livy, XXX.24.
313.
Livy, XXX.25 and Polybius, XV.1.
314.
Livy, XXX.27.
315.
Polybius, XV.3. Hannibal had abandoned most of his best horses when he left Italy.
316.
Polybius, XV.5.
317.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 218.
318.
Ibid., pp. 218–219.
319.
Livy, XXX.29.
320.
Livy, XXX.29. Polybius, XV.5.
321.
Livy, XXX.29.
322.
Ibid.
323.
Livy, XXX.30.
324.
Polybius, W.6.
325.
Polybius, XV.8.
326.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 218–219. See Lazenby for a very detailed discussion of the possible locations of the Battle of Zama.
327.
Ibid.
328.
Polybius, W.V.11
329.
Ibid., XV.3.
330.
Appian, Libyca, 40.
331.
Ibid., 41.
332.
Please see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, pp. 218–219, for a very thoughtful discussion on the troop strength controversy for the Battle of Zama.
333.
Polybius, XV.9.
334.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, p. 302. Also see Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 222.
335.
Polybius, XV.11 and Appian, Libyca, p. 40.
336.
Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, p. 222.
337.
Livy., XXX.23.
338.
Polybius, W.V.110
339.
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, 303.
340.
Ibid.
341.
Ibid.
342.
Polybius, XV.10.
343.
Polybius, XV.11.
344.
Ibid.
345.
Polybius XV.12. It makes the most tactical sense to send the first and second lines immediately after the elephant charge to take advantage of the chaos the pachyderms created.