As news flooded in of battered French forces reeling back toward Paris, the Swiss expected invasion. Intelligence reported a buildup of Wehrmacht forces along the border from lörrach to Lake Constance. Rumors were flying, and Switzerland braced for the expected onslaught. No one knew what the French could or would do. To the Federal Council, the French ambassador reiterated his country’s policy of neutrality toward Switzerland. Meanwhile, the British legation in Bern loaded up four panel trucks with archives and the luggage of its personnel to evacuate. Family members of the French mission departed. Both the French and British consulate generals in Zurich burned files and left the city, seeking safety in western Switzerland.5
In Basel, directly on the German border, there was chaos. Most foreigners fled the city, including the English consul. The Bank for international Settlements closed down when its foreign customers withdrew their deposits. Rumors of German troop movements swirled around the city. Looking up, one could see and hear the war as German air sorties against French targets rolled into Swiss airspace. Swiss air force fighters were constantly in the sky with the tricky task of defending Swiss borders against all comers. But the Germans, far more numerous and aggressive, were the first priority.
In the course of these initial French-German hostilities, Swiss aircraft, mostly Me-109 fighters purchased from Germany, shot down 11 Luftwaffe aircraft. Describing one such incident, the OKW reported that on the evening of May 16 Radio Lausanne broadcast that Swiss fighter patrols and antiaircraft guns had attacked a German Heinkel iii bomber. The bomber caught fire and made an emergency landing in Switzerland. Two wounded crew members were arrested and two others fled. The same OKW report also noted:
Rumors are circulating in Switzerland about an alleged German intent to attack Switzerland. Supposedly Radio London is the source of these rumors. The Zurich correspondent of Petit Dauphinois alleges that 25 German divisions are concentrated at the Swiss border.6
OKW’s intelligence agency, the Abwehr, remained surprisingly candid on conditions in occupied countries throughout the war. To the German occupiers, peoples’ attitudes—including their will to either resist or collaborate—were simply military facts. For instance, a report of May 17 had this to say about occupied, previously neutral, Denmark: “Those who are 100 percent Danish make no secret of the fact that they hate Germans. They resent the German attitude and, in a concealed or sometimes open manner, threaten to take revenge later. Their hatred is fueled because of our German demand that even children salute Hitler.” The Abwehr was no less blunt about Switzerland:
The entire population is against us; there is no doubt about that. Condemnation has become even stronger since the recent events in the north. The Swiss press has a hard time maintaining even a front of objective neutrality. Anyone who reads between the lines sees immediately that the hearts of the Swiss are on the other side.
Abwehr agents further reported: “Reich Germans [in Switzerland] are worried about the continuing [Swiss press] propaganda against Germany and the ugly mood of the people. Jews in particular are instigating inflammatory reports.”7
How deeply German intelligence moles penetrated into high-level Swiss military and government circles remains unknown. But routine German wartime intelligence was methodical and comprehensive. On a day-to-day level, the OKW continuously summarized and passed on public records, including both Swiss and foreign newspaper reports. No item of news was too small if it pointed to something larger. An example was a Swiss telegraph agency report that the Zurich Cantonal Police had arrested several persons and charged them with spreading false rumors. German intelligence reported British newspaper accounts that the British and French foreign offices in Bern had destroyed documents that could be helpful to Germany and had moved their staffs to Geneva. The Swiss News Service provided the Germans with a handy and detailed account about the Swiss downing of the German bomber, mentioned above, in the vicinity of Dübendorf:
During the air fight, the force of the projectiles of the fast-firing, wing-mounted canons on the Swiss fighter planes and of the antiaircraft guns ripped apart the fuselage and the engines and tore off part of the rudder of the German bomber. Two of the crew members were seriously injured and left the plane by parachute. Since the bomber was disabled, the two crew members still in the plane also wanted to parachute out, but one of the parachutes got entangled inside the plane. Both crew members therefore stayed in the nacelle and landed the bomber in hilly terrain, where it immediately burst into flames.8
The Swiss, for their part, were also watching, particularly what was happening in the small states to the north, which had been bowled over by the German assault. The Netherlands capitulated just five days after the blitzkrieg was launched. German intelligence reported that the efforts of Dutch National Socialists seemed to have paid off in reducing Dutch resistance. The Dutch were bitter and disappointed, but on the whole the population of this neutral country behaved very quietly toward the occupying German troops. Most Dutchmen felt betrayed both by England and by the Dutch government. The flight of the Royal House—especially of prince Bernhard, an officer—was regarded as scandalous. What would happen if Switzerland were tested in that fire? What could be done to prevent such an ignominious rout and surrender?
German intelligence gave this account of attitudes and activities in Switzerland:
We have reports that the Swiss government has ordered the arming of the civilian population and the drafting of those not fit for military service into an auxiliary. In Basel, barricades and bunkers have been set up everywhere. Requests for leave are being denied. There is fear that Germans will loot Swiss banks, and it is reported that banks have taken measures to move and safeguard assets.9
The Swiss had organized and armed their local defense forces, the Ortswehr,10 and removed gold reserves from the cities to hidden locations. Fears of systematic looting were justified as Germany in fact soon began seizing gold and other assets from the central banks of the countries it had conquered.
War seemed imminent and German military intelligence was everywhere in Switzerland. Thousands of German nationals—“Reich Ger mans”—remained in the country as long-term residents, in commercial ventures, or at Swiss sanitaria and spas. Many were ready and willing to aid the Reich. On June 1, Iwan von Ilsemann, the German military attaché in Bern, reported that intelligence activities had been greatly expanded, with two intelligence officers being added in Geneva. However, he added that gathering information from both Switzerland and France was becoming more difficult and less productive because both nations had enhanced their countermeasures. He recommended additional agents for the consulates in Zurich and Basel.11
OKH responded that further increases in the intelligence service in Switzerland were unnecessary for the moment since it appeared that Ger man military operations in France were coming to a successful conclusion. “We are curious to see whether the French will fight to the last man.”12 How ever, the opening of a second front against France through Switzerland, or a French counterblow via Switzerland, no longer seemed likely.
German intelligence did continue to report accounts in the French press that Germany was concentrating troops on the Swiss border. The Swiss were still on high alert, as trip-wire incursions continued. The Swiss command reported: “On Saturday afternoon foreign airplanes entered Swiss territory in the Jura area. A Swiss air patrol immediately pursued and engaged them, shooting down a bomber in the vicinity of Tessenberg (Canton Bern). The bomber was German.”13 The fact that the bomber was German appears almost as an afterthought.
This setback for the all-powerful Luftwaffe enraged Hitler. He looked down on the Swiss and ordered immediate retaliation, curiously in the form of a clandestine raid rather than a full-fledged military assault. A June 3 directive stated: “At the request of Field Marshal Göring, Abwehr ii (Military intelligence) has been ordered to attack Swiss fighter airplanes on Swiss airfields…. L.2 is in charge of executing this order.”14 The raid failed. Swiss authorities
managed to apprehend the German saboteurs, who were laden with explosives and carried plans to demolish Swiss fighter bases.15
The chaotic retreat of the French army gave the Germans one extraordinary intelligence coup offering an extensive overview of Swiss defensive preparations. The Germans regarded the Swiss Army as outmoded and locked into a World War I mindset, though OKW closely followed its efforts to devise new combat tactics.16 Then Wehrmacht units racing through France came upon a trainload of secret documents inadvertently abandoned by the French on a siding at la Charité near Dijon. Those documents, quickly processed by the Germans, were a Realpolitik bombshell. They detailed Swiss-French agreements for joint military resistance—in blatant violation of Swiss neutrality! Moreover, Swiss defensive plans were laid out in detail for the German high command. The Swiss, at least at first, were not aware of the break in their security.
Hitler once more flew into a rage. Now he had proof and, potentially, a powerful propaganda justification for attacking a clearly duplicitous neutral. The Swiss-French plans for joint resistance were transmitted to Berlin on June 10 by the intelligence office of the 1st Mountain Division. The transmission included:
1) 2 code charts. One of them (top secret!) shows that preparations are under way for armed actions on Swiss territory, plan H, Helvetia.
2) 1 code book (secret) for lower charges. The note attached to it shows which code is valid “immediately.”17
Soon, the contents of the seized documents were summarized in a memorandum entitled “Conclusions drawn from correspondence of French command authorities concerning relations between Switzerland and France, from October 1939 to February 1940.”18 The memorandum, which would be archived with Wehrmacht plans to invade Switzerland, stated as follows:
1.) It will take the 5 large [Swiss] units in the sector between Lake Constance and Basel about 1 to 2 days to fully occupy their defense positions. The deployment of large units on the west and south front (1st, 2nd and 9th infantry Divisions) will take about 5 days.
This means that the Swiss will deploy their major units to defense positions close to the (German) border. The Germans could plan a stunning assault, which could bypass these units or destroy them before they were fully in place. The memorandum continued:
2.) The connection to the French defense position runs on Swiss territory from Hegenheim (5 kilometers west of Basel) via Allschwil to Oberwill. This line will be lightly defended by frontier guard units.
3.) The city of Basel is to be defended by its own troops.
4.) The French recommend that the Swiss strengthen the defensive line from Lützel to les Rangiers and on to St. Ursanne, as a continuation of the French positions of the Glasenberg and the Jura, with the front facing east, and to defend this position with local units of the 3rd Front Guard Brigade.
This meant that Switzerland had done little or nothing before the end of 1939 to strengthen its border to France, concentrating its efforts primarily along its border with Germany.
5.) Urgent strengthening of defense position between Gempen and Zurich.
6.) Defense against tanks and dive-bombers is very weak. Switzerland requested assistance from the French army.
7.) Switzerland requested artillery support with 3 artillery regiments for its main position between Constance and Basel.
8.) Reference was made to deficiencies in Swiss anti-aircraft defenses in crucial zones.
9.) At the time of mobilization or assault, the Swiss air force was assessed to be capable only of “protecting assembling troops and maybe a few observation tasks.”
10.) A defense in depth—at least the preparation for destruction [of bridges and roads]—is in place, for example in the Aare section, for the most part behind frontline positions.
These concerns showed that the Swiss were still planning to put up their primary stand at the border.
11.) The French requested urgent strengthening of strongpoints between the Ergolz Tal and Basel to prevent a separation of Swiss and French troops in case of a German attack.19
While the Germans were digesting this new information, Wehrmacht units, particularly Guderian’s panzers, were pushing demoralized French and polish units toward the Swiss border.20 On June 18 a report to the German General Staff of a meeting in Versailles noted: “12th Army [German] at Swiss border. It is necessary for this army to assemble [to prepare for a move against Switzerland] soon.”21
To put this report in context, Swiss intelligence obtained information that on June 24, the day France capitulated, Hitler discussed Switzerland with Göring, Keitel, Ribbentrop, Hess and Goebbels. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop favored an immediate occupation of Switzerland, while General Keitel was of the opinion that German goals could be reached through the mere threat of a massive buildup, “without risking the sacrifice of some hundred thousand German soldiers.”22
An attack plan was clearly on the table. It would be led by General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, whom Hitler would shortly promote to Field Marshal. General Leeb personally reconnoitered the terrain and gave the command for the “Sonderaufgabe Schweiz” (Special Task Switzerland) to Army Group C, which would take up assault positions along the entire western border of Switzerland. Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, allotted the 1st, 2nd, and 12th armies to Army Group C for the attack. Various deployments proceeded near the border in the following two weeks, including the return of two mountain divisions from northern France.23
Because of the unsettled situation in France, neither final deployments nor a final date were fixed. On June 28, Leeb noted in his diary that “the 12th Army now includes additional mobile units and two mountain divisions. Should all my resources be aimed at Switzerland?” in the ensuing days, he continued to prepare the attack. At the July 11 general staff meeting, Leeb expressed concern that some of the preparations might be visible to Swiss customs officials, and worried that the destroyed railroad bridges on the Swiss border had not been restored. In a revealing passage, he added that these two points must be rectified “if the special task for Army Group C, in whatever time frame, is still being considered.” The “special task” was, of course, the invasion of Switzerland.24
On June 25, the effective date of the armistice with France, a detailed invasion plan was submitted by Captain Otto Wilhelm von Menges of the German General Staff to the Army High Command, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH). It was entitled “Vortragsnotiz über Angriff gegen die Schweiz” (presentation Notes for Attack Against Switzerland).25 it laid out a surprise attack on Switzerland by Wehrmacht troops from both Germany and France supported by Italian troops from the south. A coordinated knockout punch would be delivered to fragment the Swiss army and preclude it from falling back and regrouping for further resistance in mountainous terrain. The plan also outlined a speedy occupation of the economic resources of the country, and the arms industry around Solothurn, and included assaults to prevent the destruction of railroads, roads, and bridges by Swiss defenders. Menges’ plan detailed the German units to be involved and specified their objectives. The plan took note of the weakness of the Swiss forces near the French border (there were German troops near Geneva and Lyon) and that any Swiss attempts to reinforce them would only weaken Swiss positions along the German border.
The plan was thorough. It included a document entitled the “Reorganization of the Swiss Army,” which described the positions and strengths of the Swiss divisions.26 “Fortifications at the Swiss Border and in the Interior,” a study with map references of fortified positions, was also prepared.27 it was divided into sections on the north and northeast border with Germany, from Basel to Sargans; the northwest border with France, from Geneva to Basel; and the southern border, from Lake Geneva all the way back to Sargans. Also available was a study on the construction of the Swiss fortifications.28 Nothing was left to chance.
The machinery to isolate Switzerland and prepare for the offensive swung into place. On July 3, 1940, the 12th Army was ordered to move troo
ps to seal the Swiss border from the Geneva-Bellegarde road to Delle. The 18th and 25th Corps would support Guderian’s motorized units on that front. “The task of the border protection is to stop all border traffic to and from Switzerland.”29 On July 5, after the demarcation line was fixed, the 1st Mountain Division was transferred to the heights of the Swiss Jura to enforce the closing of the French border.30 The Swiss protested against German border violations.31 The OKH General Staff considered the border to be sealed.32
The Germans were now in a position to close the ring. Captain von Menges was informed on July 13 about the revelations of the la Charité documents establishing that Switzerland had been coordinating its defense with the French. That communication further noted: “There will be a meeting at the quarters of the Führer where the issue in question will be discussed.”33
As the pursuing Germans moved to close the French-Swiss border, the Swiss were giving sanctuary to large numbers of French and polish soldiers fleeing the Wehrmacht panzers. These military refugees were detained, disarmed and interned. The Germans, although they sought to seal the border, in fact welcomed what they realized was a distraction of Swiss troops. OKH intelligence noted on July 20 that the entire Swiss 3rd Division and part of the 7th Division were involved in securing French soldiers.34
The final collapse of French resistance—the endless lines of broken and bleeding soldiers—was an enormous blow to Swiss morale. The situation seemed hopeless. Militarily, the Swiss flank was now openly hostile, occupied by aggressive, battle-hardened and triumphant Germans. If ever there were a time for loss of heart, it was during July of 1940 when the Nazis seemed undisputed masters of the whole of Europe. England might not be able to hold, and the Americans showed no desire to enter the war.
Swiss and the Nazis Page 14
