In Switzerland, the surprisingly fast collapse of the Serbian and the Greek/English resistance has had a very sobering effect. The conviction is gaining ground among the Swiss that they must find some kind of agreement with Germany. However, as before, they do not want to give up their independence and neutrality. But they are afraid that the [German] request will be made at some point, perhaps soon, and that Switzerland will have to take a decision. Accordingly, the country is under constant pressure. Rumors are circulating that a new general mobilization will be necessary soon.4
This was only one of repeated episodes throughout the war in which countries were attacked without warning and subsequently had to endure occupation. Switzerland’s location on the very border of Germany left the country exposed to the Führer’s whims. Hitler was not pleased to have an independent nation—a fully armed and often intractable nation—directly on his southern flank.
With fascist Italy to the south and Austria to the east, Switzerland was still managing to smuggle war matériel to the Allies through Vichy France. The German Armistice Delegation for Economy pressured France to choke off this transit of goods to and from Switzerland. The delegation’s reports stated:
We have repeatedly brought up the demand expressed in the German memorandum of March 15, 1941. The French government has declared itself willing to do all it can to prevent the illegal transit of war matériel and other goods indispensable for the war from Switzerland to enemy countries and agrees in particular to increase the surveillance at the border. However, the French government declines to limit the transit from third countries to Switzerland because it is of the opinion that such a demand has no legal basis.5
The French delegation pointed to existing agreements with Switzerland stipulating freedom of transit, and expressed concern that the German demands would make French goods and services less competitive compared to those of countries that could freely conduct transit trade with Switzerland. They were referring to the age-old competition between Marseille and Genoa. Meanwhile the Allies had initiated a counter-blockade, cutting off transit of anything useful that might reach Germany if allowed into Switzerland.
The Swiss economy was being hammered by both the Axis and the Allies. Tough German-Swiss economic negotiations were instituted on May 23–24, 1941, to the intense interest of OKW since the discussions concerned the military implications of Swiss smuggling. The Swiss extended credits to Germany in exchange for relief from the Allied counter-blockade by expansion of the free list the Germans would allow to pass. So that critical cross-border traffic could be monitored, the Swiss-French border was closed to persons and goods with the exception of the rail and roadway Geneva-Pougny-Bellegarde. German customs officers in both Geneva and Basel would control goods to be exported and imported through France. This was actually a small concession by the Germans. “A single checkpoint in Basel that the Germans requested would cost Switzerland dearly. England would have considered it an obvious submission to German control. The Germans therefore had to agree that goods would in part be inspected in Geneva.”6 The Swiss would thereby avoid a tightening of the Allied blockade.
It was a complicated dance of demand, concession and counter-concession. Both sides needed what Switzerland produced. If one side—Axis or Allied—seemed to be gaining an advantage, the other would threaten to tighten the screws on Switzerland economically.
The crux of all these negotiated trade-offs lay in the effectiveness of enforcement. The Swiss continually found new ways to evade restrictions. The OKW representative demanded that so-called trade samples in letters be prohibited. Until then hundreds of mailings containing precision-engineered components weighing less than two kilograms had gone out daily, unchecked and unhindered via Portugal to England and overseas. Although controlling all mail—as opposed to export shipments—was a huge undertaking and in violation of international mail agreements, the OKW repeatedly sought to intervene, since Swiss mailed exports were significantly aiding the Allies and undermining German defenses.
The Armament Group of the German Armistice Commission reported from Wiesbaden to the OKW General Staff about the substance of these meetings as follows:
In the meeting of the Delegation for Economy of the German Armistice Commission (Subcommittee for Currency, Banks and Traffic of Goods) in Paris on May 24, 1941, Dr. Schöne, Senior Executive officer, informed the French that the Germans wished to close all border crossings to Switzerland with the exception of the Geneva-Bellegarde line, which is to be reopened. All other border crossings are to be closed in both directions except for local frontier traffic. Given the urgency of this matter, he asked that his request be answered as soon as possible. He said that the request was directed solely against Switzerland because according to reports in his possession large quantities of war matériel were being exported from Switzerland by way of unoccupied France.
Dr. Schöne said his intent was to redirect all traffic between Switzerland and France within the occupied territory to the Geneva-Bellegarde line. German flying columns would provide assurance that French customs control was diligent even in unoccupied territory. However, he added that concern about illegal arms traffic was no reason to stop the traffic of persons in both directions….
Should difficulties arise in the movement of goods, cross-border traffic could be allowed over side railroad lines and by truck over major roadways into Switzerland from France, but in no case in the other direction. Germany was particularly intent on stopping the export of fuse parts because these were small and could be transported in large quantities.7
Schöne was aware that Swiss smugglers were mailing these miniature precision fuse parts via roundabout routes to the British for making bombs to be dropped over Axis territories. They were so tiny that they could be mailed in ordinary envelopes or hidden in packages with other innocuous items. The Wehrmacht intended to stop this traffic. Meanwhile, general negotiations over an economic treaty continued. The OKW noted the German position:
In this area, any concession toward freer export by the Swiss to countries hostile to Germany constitutes a German sacrifice, since there are no severe bottlenecks in the British and American armaments production. However, we avoided concessions which could increase enemy armaments output and ruled out any and all concessions on heavy machinery and equipment, as well as other critical articles such as current rectifiers and generators from the comprehensive customs discussions.8
Swiss smuggling of war matériel through Vichy France was the subject of a conference in Wiesbaden, on July 11:
It has been reported that the watchmaker “le Coultre” in Geneva, which is owned by Jäger, is producing parts for time fuses for England. These parts are being shipped via Marseille and Lisbon in meat, chocolate or cheese containers or packages. The request was made to inform the French customs specifically about the shipments made by this company.9
German intelligence was hot on the trail of John Lomax of the British embassy, who coordinated a robust smuggling operation from Switzer land, but they may not have known about his relations withemil Bührle, a German World War I artillery officer who immigrated to Switzerland before World War II and founded a weapons factory. The Oerlikon-Bührle firm supplied the Allies with antiaircraft guns until the fall of France in 1940, then smuggled the blueprints to England and the United States, which produced hundreds of thousands of guns for use against the Axis.10
Now surrounded by the Axis, the Swiss government made agreements with Germany requiring Swiss firms, including the weapons industry, to export products to Germany. Paradoxically, Switzerland could thereby obtain raw materials from Germany to produce weapons to use against a potential German attack. The Allies blacklisted such Swiss firms, refusing to trade with them. British operative Lomax, however, needed samples of weapons components. He wrote: “The best source was a Swiss factory: but they were working for the Germans and on the blacklist. With the owner, an ex-German artillery officer, I had already had a stormy interview in which he had protested
that his factory had been ordered by the Swiss government to accept a German order; they—not he—should be black listed.” on one visit, the owner, who was obviously Bührle, responded to Lomax’s request for the weapon component:
“And if I give it will you take me off your blacklist?”
“No, colonel.”
“And are these the ethics of the British government?”
“No, colonel, they are the ethics of war.”
But I went out with the sample in my pocket.11
Throughout this difficult period, Germany still had a few friends in Switzerland. Some just urged realism in the face of the Nazi threat. Others remained attuned to German culture or admired German military successes. Swiss Colonel Gustav Däniker, the officer who was so impressed by the initially successful strategy and tactics of the Wehrmacht, continued to be sympathetic toward Germany. Däniker and his immediate circle were mistrusted by Swiss hardliners. He would eventually be demoted, but it is possible that officers like him were feeding information to the Germans. Officers with German connections may also have given the Swiss military useful intelligence. Just as the Germans were making lists of potential enemies, the Swiss were watching individuals they deemed un trustworthy.
German Military Attaché Iwan von Ilsemann reported from Bern on May 27, 1941, to OKH that he had met with Däniker after the latter’s return from a visit to Germany. Däniker told the German attaché that he would report to the Federal Council his impression that “material is currently being gathered in Germany for a white paper against Switzerland,” i.e., an official report indicting the Swiss which could serve propaganda purposes justifying aggression. Däniker believed that “the decisive question—whether and to what extent Switzerland will cooperate with Germany in a new Europe—will come to a head as soon as Germany resolves its issues with the countries to its east. He was of the opinion that Germany intends to find a satisfactory solution with Switzerland without using force.” Däniker was invited to return to Berlin to attend the course for foreigners at the Scientific Institute for Foreign policy, but was “afraid that he will be prevented from going if Germany at the same time invites members of organizations prohibited in Switzerland [Nazi party groups].”12
Däniker’s reference to Germany confronting Switzerland after resolution of issues in the East was noteworthy, in that Hitler would launch his attack on the Soviet union less than a month later, on June 22, 1941. Indeed, two days before the attack, OKH headquarters sent von Ilsemann its “Instructions for Military Intelligence organization in Switzerland.” The organization’s head, while directly subordinate to the Foreign office/Intelligence, was to work closely with the Military Attaché on all issues affecting Switzerland. Those duties included execution of reconnaissance requests concerning Switzerland made by the Attaché, submission of copies regarding all military reports concerning Switzer land, and close consultation with the Attaché.13
The Germans expected that the Eastern question would be resolved quickly. Thus, a new German attack plan against Switzerland was submitted on July 14, 1941, by a Major Wiest to Colonel Adolf Heusinger, Chief of the Operations Division of the German Army General Staff. Heusinger was a key planner of operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union, by now rolling over whole Russian armies. Wiest entitled the plan “Unternehmen W” (operation Wartegau). A Gau was a Nazi administrative unit, and “Warte” means to wait. Wartegau was thus a play on words, referring to a “province-in-waiting.” Wiest’s cover letter stated:
Should it become necessary to invade the Swiss Confederation, I take the liberty of sending you a contribution to the preparation of such an invasion under the key word “Unternehmen W” (operation Wartegau).
The plan contains a short discussion of operations to be recommended and a section about how and where the Rhine could best be crossed. A third section proposes an entirely new procedure to break up the Confederation from the inside and possibly to paralyze it militarily within a few hours. Sections 2 and 3 can be executed simultaneously.
My draft does not explain all of the details, but gives an overview of the best approach to achieve the goal with the least resources and losses. Given my knowledge of these details, I would consider it appropriate to be temporarily assigned to the operations Division with orders to work on the operation and to the Army headquarters charged with its execution.14
In operation Wartegau, 15 Wiest recommended an overwhelmingly rapid conquest of the populated middle section of Switzerland from Lake Geneva to the Rhine and Lake Constance, and the prevention of any retreat to the Réduit in the Alps. “The regions of the Alps and the Jura will then fall on their own because it is impossible for the Swiss army to conduct large operations there.” Interestingly, he makes the assumption that “the French will occupy the French parts of western Switzerland.” ominously, just weeks earlier Hitler had met with French Admiral Jean Darlan and invited Vichy France to occupy the French-speaking part of Switzerland.16
The Wartegau plan designated invasion routes to Swiss cities, with particular attention to areas where weapons industries were located. The “occupation of the power plants located between our thrusts will immobilize Swiss troops and make it impossible for them to maneuver (more than 50% of all Swiss trains operate withelectricity!).” Assault boats would transport troops across the Rhine in twilight or fog, and armored or camouflaged troop trains would storm into Switzerland using the railways. Wiest suggested the following innovative tactic:
Since [seizing] the Rhine crossings will not be easy to execute and Switzerland has massed troops along the Rhine, the idea suggests itself to assault Switzerland from the inside. However, our experience in Crete has shown that paratroops have great difficulties in mountainous terrain. Air landing troops can be dropped in large numbers only if paratroops secure airports and other landing areas. But then the element of surprise is lost and even if the airfields themselves are secure, the enemy can prevent the landing of troops by targeting runways with long-range artillery. Given this situation, an air landing operation remains problematic.
In the following I am proposing a completely new surprise attack against the enemy:
Our sea transport planes will be gathered on Lake Constance—if necessary also on the Lakes of upper Bavaria—and loaded with troops, in particular light motorized troops. Those planes can then land—all at the same time—on the numerous Lakes which form an almost connected string of waterways bordering the middle section of Switzerland. Such a water landing will be a complete surprise to the enemy. The Swiss will have no means to counter it and, once landed, our troops can seize the operational objectives listed in Section I almost immediately. These troops will then proceed to erect barriers and our most mobile units will begin operations in the reverse order from that described in Section I. These operations will be considerably easier to conduct since Swiss border defenses will be attacked from the rear. Their front-facing border fortifications will be worthless.
Luftwaffe planes would conduct this surprise attack in pre-dawn hours, approaching all Lakes simultaneously. Landings near cities such as Zurich, Thun, and Luzern would prevent the enemy from using artillery for defense. The plan concluded: “Given the prevailing weather in the foothills of the Alps, the fall (first half of October) should be particularly appropriate for this operation.” Within the German strategic context, this July plan was intended for execution in October, by which time Russia would have been knocked out of the war and troops could be spared to eradicate the irritating Swiss democracy once and for all.
German planning security was not total, and thanks to reports provided by Swiss intelligence, Commander-in-Chief Guisan devised plans to resist such a German Lake invasion.17
On July 21, Colonel Heusinger of the German General Staff commented on Wiest’s plan as follows: “The case discussed by you is not critical at this point, although I have ordered an evaluation of your suggestions.”18 For the moment at least, Heusinger had other fish to fry. The Wehrmacht’s advance
s in Russia were staggering and had become a logistical nightmare. In the short run, Switzerland had little to contribute and no Lebensraum. he was willing to let the country continue as a Wartegau (waiting to be a Nazi Gau) a little longer.
In the first half of August a German informant on a business trip to Switzerland noted that “the military is everywhere.” passengers on trains were mostly soldiers. The Limmat and Jura defensive lines were being extended. There was intensive work on the defensive fortifications leading toward the Réduit national—the National Redoubt—particularly the construction of bunkers and field fortifications. Inside the Réduit, massive decentralized reserve depots of ammunition, fuel, and food had been assembled. The general population remained vigorously opposed to a Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) to the point that “people in German-speaking Switzerland abstain from speaking high German in interactions with Reich Germans and speak only Swiss German.”19 This was not only an anti-German “attitude” on the part of the Swiss, it was a way of allowing them to speak more openly without divulging information useful to the enemy, since the Swiss German dialects cannot, for the most part, be understood by Germans.
Meanwhile, Gestapo chief and SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler was making detailed plans for a future occupation. He even named specific Nazis he intended to assign to govern the country. SS Gruppen führer (Major General) Gottlob Berger was directly under Himmler in the SS hierarchy and reported to him.20 Himmler named Berger to head the Schweizer Referat (Swiss project).21
Himmler trusted Berger, who was a very active Nazi and a stalwart of the SS. He had been involved in recruiting volunteers of Aryan blood throughout Europe for the Waffen SS, Himmler’s troops, for the campaign against the Soviet union.22 The SS Viking Division, for example, was composed primarily of Scandinavian volunteers. The huge breadth and depth of the Russian front had meanwhile diverted attention and resources away from any plan to attack Switzerland. It had begun to put a heavy strain on German resources and increased the need to find additional manpower and supplies. Perhaps Switzerland could make—or be forced to make—a contribution.
Swiss and the Nazis Page 30
