The Vatican’s fear of the communist menace grew after Mussolini’s fall and, a few weeks later, in the wake of Italy’s surrender. On September 23 Weizsäcker informed Berlin that “by chance” he had had a look at three Vatican documents all dated July 25 (the day of Mussolini’s fall). The third—and the most important—of these documents was, so Weizsäcker reported, “an exposition by Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione to the Italian Government of the dangers threatening the world. Maglione says that the fate of Europe depends on the victorious resistance by Germany on the Russian front. The German Army is the only possible bulwark—‘baluardo’—against Bolshevism. Should this bulwark break, European culture would be finished.”91
On September 3 Weizsäcker sent an even more explicit report to Berlin regarding the pope’s political attitude: “I continually receive proof how very much annoyed Vatican people are over Anglo-American policy, the spokesmen of which are regarded as clearing the path for Bolshevism. Concern in the Vatican about the fate of Italy and of Germany, too, is growing. A diplomat who enjoys special connections with the Vatican assured me yesterday the Pope sternly condemns all plans aimed at weakening the Reich. A bishop working in the Curia told me today that in the Pope’s view a powerful German Reich is quite indispensable for the future of the Catholic Church. From confidential transcript of conversation between an Italian political publicist and the Pope, I gather that the Pope, in reply to question as to what he thought of the German people, replied: “They are a great nation who, in their fight against Bolshevism, are bleeding not only for their friends but also for the sake of their present enemies.”92
Three weeks later Orsenigo paid a visit to the new state secretary at the Wilhelmstrasse, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, and, without any prodding, started expostulating about the threat represented by world communism. Only Germany and the Vatican could counter the threat: Germany, in material terms, and the Vatican, spiritually.93 In all probability Weizsäcker in his reports and Orsenigo in his communications were trying to please Ribbentrop and, beyond him, Hitler himself, in order to alleviate the constant pressure put by the regime on the church in Germany. Nonetheless the authenticity of the constantly repeated political message could not be doubted.
All this must have been known to both Hitler and Goebbels when, on August 7, they discussed the situation in Italy following Mussolini’s fall. At some point Goebbels broached the subject of the pope: “Undoubtedly, as the Führer also agreed, the Pope is a Roman and an Italian. His efforts are concentrated upon holding back Bolshevism in Europe, under any circumstances. Also, he can certainly be considered as a friend of the Germans; after all he did spend fourteen years in Germany. Naturally he is no friend of National Socialism; but, all the same, he likes it more than Bolshevism. In any case, during the entire Italian crisis he did not express any hostility against fascism or against Mussolini. The Italian clergy in its majority is favorable to fascism. Admittedly though, the Pope is advised by a wide circle of enemies of National Socialism. His Secretary of State in particular, Maglioni [sic], is thoroughly hostile to Germany and National Socialism. I believe however that one can do something with the Pope and that is also Ribbentrop’s opinion. The Führer wants to keep him for a favorable occasion. Here too we have a piece on the chessboard. When to move it remains open.”94
On October 14, as the first anti-Jewish measures had already been taken in the Italian capital, Goebbels noted: “The Cardinal Archbishop of Paris has expressed himself regarding the present situation in a conversation with one of our informants: According to him, the Vatican is absolutely hostile to Bolshevism. It would wish to reach firm agreements with the Reich. The Pope watches with greatest worry the increasingly bolshevist mood in all European countries. There is no doubt that the Catholic Church knows that if Bolshevism were to stand at Germany’s borders, it would mean mortal danger for her [the Church].”95 Closer to home, Mussolini’s fall energized the partisans active in the northern and central parts of Italy and, among them, communist units, which particularly worried the Vatican.96
The Nazi leader could assume therefore that Pius XII would abstain from any step that would harm Germany and increase the communist danger from outside “Europe,” or from inside. The only way that seemed open to the Vatican in order to avoid what it deemed an oncoming catastrophe was to broker a peace agreement between the Western powers and Germany that would establish a common “bulwark” against the advancing Soviets and defend the heart of the Continent. Hence Pius’s criticism of the unconditional surrender formula, if indeed he expressed himself in the way Weizsäcker reported on July 5. Both sides were aware of the papal plan and knew it to be the Vatican’s first priority. Within such a grand scheme there could be no place, the pontiff probably thought, for a public stand regarding the fate of the Jews, either in general or in relation to the events in Rome and in Italy.
It has been argued that in order to bring about the diplomatic compromise that he considered his mission, the pope had decided, from the very beginning of the war, not to speak up for any group of victims of the Nazi regime—either the Poles, the victims of euthanasia, or the Jews. This, however, was not the case. As we saw, the pope publicly expressed his sympathy for the Poles in his encyclical Summi Pontificatus of December 1939. Over the following years Polish bishops and the Polish population felt that Pius did not protest frequently and forcefully enough. This may have been the case until May 31, 1943, when the pontiff expressed a ringing recognition of “the tragic fate of the Polish people,” adding warm praise about the “faithful Polish people, heroically silent about their sufferings down the centuries, [who] have contributed to the development and preservation of Christian Europe.”97 Pius spoke again about Polish sufferings in his June 2, 1943, address to the College of Cardinals. Regarding euthanasia the pope most energetically condemned it in letters to the German bishops. Mainly the Holy See addressed numerous protests, demands, and inquiries via diplomatic channels both regarding the situation of Catholics in Poland and about the killing of the mentally ill.98Not one such diplomatic intervention dealt with the overall fate of the Jews.
Was the pope convinced that the Nazis would be impervious to any declaration he would make against their anti-Jewish policies? Did he believe that the bishops should respond according to their assessment of local conditions and not be prompted by Rome? Did he fear retaliation against baptized mixed breeds? Was he afraid of endangering the Jews who had gone into hiding in Italy, or did he believe that concealed assistance to the victims was the only possible way of countering the persecution? Furthermore, was he worried about a Nazi onslaught against German Catholics? Or did he fear the occupation of the Vatican? All these arguments have been made, either during the war or in the debates that followed since, and all, in some minor way, may have influenced Pius’s decision to remain silent. The political argument must have played the central role. However, a few of these secondary points demand brief comments.99
Was Pius XII referring to the situation of the Jews in the already mentioned address to the College of Cardinals, on June 2, 1943? I thought so in my 1964 interpretation of papal policy, mainly in view of the pope’s mention of “the anxious entreaties of all those who, because of their nationality or their race, are being subjected to overwhelming trials and sometimes, through no fault of their own, are doomed to extermination.”100 Yet, according to the Vatican editors of the document themselves, the address dealt essentially with the situation of the Poles.101 Therefore the pope’s remarks could have dealt with the Jews only incidentally if at all, and in this context “extermination” may have meant the widespread killing of Poles. The word “sometimes” reinforces this interpretation.
“Every word We address to the competent authority on this subject,” Pius went on, “and all Our public utterances, have to be carefully weighed and measured by Us in the interests of the victims themselves, lest, contrary to Our intentions, We make their situation worse and harder to bear. To put the matter in i
ts most basic terms, the ameliorations apparently obtained do not match the scope of the Church’s maternal solicitude on behalf of the particular groups that are suffering the most appalling fate. The Vicar of Christ, who asked no more than pity and a sincere return to elementary standards of justice and humanity, faced a door that no key could open.”102
If this address referred at all to the fate of the Jews, the pope, in mentioning the possibility that his interventions could create an even worse situation, may have had the events in Holland in mind, where, as we saw, the Catholic bishops’ protest of July 1942 led to the deportation of ninety-two Catholic Jews. However, by specifically alluding to a “situation…even harder to bear,” the Pontiff must indeed have rather been pointing only to the sufferings of the Poles; for the deported Jews, there was no situation harder to bear any longer. Moreover, “the ameliorations apparently obtained” also could not refer to the fate of the Jews.
The most important papal document regarding the Jewish issue, during those same months of 1943, is the letter Pius XII addressed to Bishop Preysing on April 30. The bishop of Berlin had informed the pontiff, in a message sent on March 6, 1943, of the new deportations from the Reich (the Fabrikaktion, among others): “Even harder [than by the bombings], we are hit here in Berlin by the new wave of deportations of Jews. Many thousands are destined for the probable fate to which your Holiness has alluded in your Christmas [1942] radio message. There are also many Catholics among these deportees. Would it not be possible for your Holiness to try once again to intervene for these many unfortunate innocents? It is the last hope of so many of them and the innermost prayer of all people of goodwill.”103
The Pope did not avoid answering Preysing’s anguished cry: “It was a consolation for Us to learn that Catholics, notably in Berlin, had manifested great Christian charity toward the sufferings of ‘non-Aryans.’ Let this be the occasion for Us to express Our paternal gratitude and Our profound sympathy to Msgr Lichtenberg who is in prison.”104
Preysing, however, had implored the Pope to intervene in some way. The answer made clear that the pontiff was not ready to do anything beyond his private message of encouragement. He explained his abstention as follows: “So far as Episcopal declarations are concerned, We leave to pastors on the spot the task of assessing whether, and to what extent, the danger of reprisals and pressures and, perhaps, other circumstances due to the length and the psychological climate of the war, counsel restraint—despite reasons that may exist for intervention—in order to avoid greater evils. This is one of the motives for the limitations which We impose upon Ourself in Our declarations.”105
In other words the complex circumstances and the dangers of each local situation prescribed utmost prudence lest a move by a Catholic dignitary could result “in reprisals and pressures” and even “greater evils.” The pope thus favored a general code of conduct that gave much freedom of decision to the bishops in assessing the advisability of their own interventions in view of local circumstances and, as he explicitly mentioned in the letter, also applied it to his own decisions.
Some historians have suggested that following his Munich “experience” with the local Soviet in 1919, an experience that certainly remained engraved in his memory, as shown by the conversation with Weizsäcker in July 1943, Pius XII’s traditional Christian anti-Judaism became straightforward anti-Semitism. Bolshevism was identified with Jewry, as, indeed, some Jewish leaders had played a prominent role during the brief communist takeover of the Bavarian capital.106 There is no specific indication that the pope was anti-Semitic or that his decisions during the war stemmed, be it in part, from some particular hostility toward Jews. Yet, contrary to his feelings for his “beloved Polish people,” and mainly for the German people, it does not seem that Pius XII carried the Jews in his heart.107 This becomes apparent in the last part of the letter to Preysing, in which Pius addresses the help that he extended to Jews in need:
“To non-Aryan Catholics as well as those of the Jewish faith, the Holy See has acted charitably, within the limits of its responsibilities, on the material and moral plane. This action has necessitated a great deal of patience and disinterestedness on the part of the executive arms of Our relief organizations in meeting the expectations—one might even say demands—of those asking for help, and also in overcoming the diplomatic difficulties that have arisen. Let us not speak of the very large sums in American money, which we have had to disburse on shipping for emigrants. We gave those sums willingly because the people concerned were in distress. The money was given for love of God, and We were right not to expect gratitude on this Earth. Nevertheless, Jewish organizations have warmly thanked the Holy See for these rescue operations.”
At this point Pius once more turned to Preysing’s entreaty for some public gesture for the Jews who were being deported to their death: “In our Christmas message We said a word about the things that are presently being done to non-Aryans in the territories under German authority. It was short, but it was well understood. It is superfluous to say that Our paternal love and solicitude are greater today toward non-Aryan or semi-Aryan Catholics, children of the Church like the others, when their outward existence is collapsing and they are going through moral distress. Unhappily, in the present circumstances, We cannot offer them effective help other than through Our prayers. We are, however, determined to raise Our voice anew on their behalf as circumstances indicate and permit.”108
“Moral distress” and the collapse of “outward existence” were not exactly the right terms regarding the fate of non-Aryan Catholics and all other Jews. As for the “circumstances” that would “indicate” another appeal (such as the Christmas 1942 message), one may wonder what in Pius’s mind would justify such an appeal above and beyond the deportation of the Jews from the bishop of Rome’s own city.
Finally, we mentioned that hundreds, possibly thousands of Jews found hiding places in religious institutions throughout Rome and in all major Italian cities; some even took refuge inside the Vatican. Could it be that the pope chose to abstain from any public challenge in order to facilitate the covert rescue operations by the church in Italy? There is no indication of any connection between the pontiff ’s silence and the assistance given to Jews. As for the assistance as such, it has been thoroughly researched by historian Susan Zuccotti; her conclusion, regarding Rome and Vatican City in particular, is that the pope must have known of the rescue activities without ever explicitly approving them but not forbidding them either.109 Personally he was not involved in any of the rescue operations throughout Italy.110 No trace of any written directive has ever surfaced; moreover, from among the main religious personalities involved in assistance to the victims, in Rome or elsewhere, no indication of an oral directive from the Holy See to help the fleeing Jews has ever been mentioned. The rescue activities were mostly spontaneous, with or without support from the Jewish relief organization Delasem.111
When the arguments that would explain Pius’s silence are assessed as a whole, it seems plausible that, in the pontiff ’s opinion, the drawbacks of an intervention far outweighed any beneficial results. The pope may have thought that by intervening he would grievously jeopardize his grand political project, possibly draw fierce retaliation against the church and its interests, first and foremost in Germany and, arguably, endanger converted mixed-breeds who hadn’t yet been deported. In his mind such calamitous results would probably not be offset by any tangible advantage; he may also have believed that nothing could change the course of Nazi policy regarding the Jews. According to this line of thinking, the only open course would have been covert assistance to individual Jews and some degree of intervention with predominantly Catholic satellite states (Slovakia, Croatia, and Vichy France to a certain extent). We shall return to the issue of individual assistance. As for diplomatic intervention with satellite states close to the Vatican, no direct appeal by the pope himself is known of. Maglione’s remonstrances, whenever they took place, were usually expressed with such diplo
matic restraint that they could almost be considered as steps undertaken for the record rather than attempts to effect a change of policy or at least some greater reluctance in collaborating with German measures.112
In more general terms, if the Catholic Church is merely considered as a political institution that has to calculate the outcome of its decisions in terms of instrumental rationality, then Pius’s choice may be deemed reasonable in view of the risks entailed. If, however, the Catholic Church also represents a moral stand, as it claims, mainly in moments of major crisis, and thus has to move on such occasions from the level of institutional interests to that of moral witnessing, then of course Pius’s choice should be assessed differently.113 What we do not know and have no way of knowing—and there lies the core of the issue—is whether for Pius XII the fate of the Jews of Europe represented a major crisis situation and an anguishing dilemma, or whether it was but a marginal problem that did not challenge Christian conscience.
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