Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World

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Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World Page 76

by Samantha Power


  22 Davie, “Search for the SRSG.”

  CHAPTER 22. POSTMORTEM 1 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Press Conference at Arlanda Airport, Stockholm, August 20, 2003, online at .

  2 “UN Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello Begins Final Journey Home,” August 22, 2003, &Cr=xxxx&Cr1=#.

  3 Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General Mourns Loss of ‘Dear Friend’ Sergio Vieira de Mello, Memorial Service in Rio de Janeiro,” August 23, 2003, online at Press/docs/2003/sgsm8829.doc.htm.Vieira de Mello’s “dying wish,” which quickly entered popular lore, was not mentioned in the press before Sevan’s tarmac speech on August 22. The following day the Washington Post published an article with the headline: “ ‘Don’t Let Them Pull the U.N. Out of Iraq’; Envoy’s Final Words Related by Army Sergeant Who Tried to Free Him.”

  4 Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General’s Press Encounter with the Ambassadors of Malaysia, Cuba and South Africa Regarding the Attack on the United Nations in Baghdad,” August 22, 2003.

  5 Liana Melo and Rita Moraes, “Energia e paixão Com a mesma intensidade que trabalhava, o diplomata reconstruía a vida afetiva” (Energy and Passion:With the Same Intensity with Which He Worked, the Diplomat Reconstructed His Personal Life), Istoe, August 27, 2003.

  6 On August 21 the FBI also got a confession of sorts. A previously unknown group, the Armed Vanguards of the Second Mohammed Army, claimed responsibility. "We say it proudly that we did not hesitate for one moment to kill crusader blood,” said the group. In a typewritten statement in Arabic sent to the Dubai-based satellite TV channel al-Arabiya, they pledged “to continue fighting every foreigner [in Iraq] and to carry out similar operations.” Brian Whitaker, “Mystery Group Says It Planted Baghdad Bomb,” Guardian, August 22, 2003. Suspicion also fell upon Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, who on August 11 had told the Arab media that the “enemies of Islam” were not only the United States, the U.K., and Jews, but also “the UN and other international organizations.” Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, August 28, 2003. The Associated Press reported on the contents of the two-page message from Mullah Omar, written in Pashtu, which said: “Oh Muslims, know the enemies of your religion—the Jews and Christians. America, Britain, the UN and all Western aid groups are the greatest enemies of Islam and humanity.” Kathy Gannon, “Reclusive Taliban Leader Calls International Aid Groups ‘Enemy of Islam,’” Associated Press, August 12, 2003.

  7 Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 22, 2003.

  8 Ramiro Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, August 27, 2003. Among the 4,233 Iraqi staff, 2,830 worked in the northern governorates, 157 in central Iraq, 935 in Baghdad, and 311 in southern Iraq. Kevin Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 23, 2003.

  9 Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 25, 2003.

  10 Ibid.

  11 Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 28, 2003.

  12 Iraq Steering Group meeting, September 11, 2003.

  13 Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, August 25, 2003. On August 24 UN security reviewed the ten hotels being used by UN staff and required staff to leave five of them. Iraq Steering Group meeting, August 25, 2003.

  14 Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, September 1, 2003.

  15 Lopes da Silva to UN Headquarters, September 2, 2003.

  16 Kevin Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 10, 2003.

  17 Iraq Steering Group meeting, September 8, 2003.

  18 Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 3, 5, and 11, 2003.

  19 Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 5, 2003.

  20 Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 7 and 8, 2003.

  21 Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 16, 2003.

  22 Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, online at (hereinafter Ahtisaari report).

  23 Kevin Kennedy was the rare UN official who agreed with Annan. Afraid of stranding Iraqi staff, he wrote to New York: “The UN should only leave if a direct, sustained threat, indicative of an organized campaign against United Nations personnel, premises or programmes, was established.” Kennedy to UN Headquarters, September 11, 2003.

  24 “Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Remarks to the Memorial Ceremony in Honour of Colleagues Killed in the Bombing of the United Nations Mission in Baghdad,” September 19, 2003.

  25 Internal UN Discussion Draft, Planning Assumptions, September 19, 2003.

  26 Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Anthony Shadid, “Gunmen Injure U.S. Appointed Iraqi Official,” Washington Post, September 21, 2003, p. A1.

  27 David Filipov, “Rebuilding Iraq: New Strains after Iraq Blast; UN to Reconsider Staffing Levels,” Boston Globe, September 23, 2003, p. A1.

  28 Kevin Kennedy,“Baghdad Update #3: SMT Recommendations,” September 22, 2003. On the suggestion of Kevin Kennedy, the SMT included a caveat that if the secretary-general deemed it necessary, a small voluntary presence of international staff could be maintained in Baghdad to provide leadership to national staff, to liaise with the CPA and the Governing Council, and to continue beefing up security at the Canal Hotel. SMT,“For Consideration of the Steering Group on Iraq, Concept of Operations for a Core Presence in Baghdad, 22 September 2003.” In a follow-up memo on September 24, Kennedy elaborated on the functions of this core presence. “A UN international presence, regardless of size, is more than mere symbolism; it indicates visible commitment and involvement. Ongoing discussions of a future role for the organization will be affected if the UN withdraws all international staff from Iraq and even a small presence can perform a critical role.” The abandonment of national staff weighed on him: “National Officers, regardless of experience and rank, will not get the same access or reaction from the Coalition, should assistance be required on an urgent basis.” In addition “a complete departure of international staff may have a direct impact on the continued deliverance of NGO programmes.” Kennedy also noted the UN’s experience with reconstruction and the assistance UN officials were giving civilian contractors and Coalition engineers. “If all internationals leave, that work, for the most part, will cease, making a larger re-entry more difficult.” The proposed core team included nineteen UN officials. “Concept of Operations for Core International Presence in Iraq,” September 25, 2003.

  29 Kennedy, "Baghdad Update #3.”

  30 In April 2004 Lopes da Silva was named country director of the World Food Program operation in Sudan.

  31 Gil Loescher, online diary, .

  32 Annan’s report to the Security Council in August 2004 said that the security of UN staff would be the “overarching guiding principle” for all UN activities in Iraq. In December 2004 Annan announced the creation at Headquarters of the UN Department of Safety and Security, for which the General Assembly added $53.6 million to the UN’s regular budget. The Department of Safety and Security would have 383 posts, 134 of them temporary. See .

  33 Al-Kurdi said he had also been involved in the September 22 attack, dropping off the car used by the bomber. He was involved in a November 12, 2003, attack on the Italian police headquarters in Nasiriyah, killing nineteen Italians, the first Italian casualties in the Iraq war and the worst single loss of life for Italy since World War II. Twenty Italians were wounded. At least eight Iraqis were killed, and more than fifty wounded. He also owned up to the assassination of Izziden Salim, the former president of the Iraqi Governing Council. Al-Kurdi was arrested on January 15, 2005, and testified on March 30 before the Iraqi Central Criminal Court.

  34 All quotes in the confession taken from Ashraf Jehengir Qazi to Ibrahim Gambari, “Meeting with Awraz Abd Al Aziz Mahmoud Sa’eed, aka Al Kurdi,” Code Cable CZX-251, July 3, 2006.

  EPILOGUE 1 Felicity Barringer,“UN Chief Says New Force in Iraq Can Be Led by U.S.,” NewYork Times, August 23, 2003, p. A2. “We have played a vital role,” Annan said. “But we did because of that personality. Because of Sergio being who he is. The next time around, the mandates have to be very clear and well-defined. I cannot rely on personalities. I had only one Sergio.”

  2 SVDM, “The World’s Con
science: The UN Facing the Irrational in History,” inaugural lecture at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, November 2, 2000, p. 11.

  3 Ibid., p. 6.

  4 SVDM, “Global Governance and the UN,” address to annual meeting of Trilateral Commission,Tokyo, 2000.

  5 SVDM, “War and Politics: The Humanitarian Deceit,” written 1998, unpublished, p. 2.

  6 Ibid., p. 4.

  7 SVDM, “The World’s Conscience,” p. 11.

  8 SVDM, “The Future of UN State-Building,” International Peace Academy conference, October 18-19, 2002, .

  9 Ibid.

  10 Ibid.

  11 Ibid.

  12 SVDM, “War and Politics,” p. 10.

  13 SVDM, “Challenges in Peacekeeping: Past, Present and Future,” New York, October 29, 2002.

  14 SVDM, “Philosophical History and Real History: The Relevance of Kant’s Political Thought in Current Times,” Geneva International Peace Research Institute, December 4, 1991.

  15 SVDM, “The World’s Conscience,” p. 11.

  LIST OF INTERVIEWS (excluding sources who asked not to be named)

  PHOTOGRAPH CREDITS

  INTERIOR IMAGES

  Pages 13, 17, 27, 34: Courtesy of Gilda Vieira de Mello

  Page 28: UNHCR Photo

  Page 97: UN/DPI Photo

  Page 103: Courtesy of Mieke Bos

  Page 124: UNHCR/I. Guest

  Page 139: Francois Briquemont/Ediciones Tricorne

  Page 169: Courtesy of Michael Rose

  Page 191: Gilles Peress/Magnum Photos

  Page 223: Hazir Reka/Reuters

  Page 242: The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, MacNeil-Lehrer Productions

  Page 251: Ivan Miluntinovic/Reuters

  Page 253: AP Images/Peter Kujundzic

  Page 287, all: AP Images/John Stanmeyer/VII

  Page 291: AP Images/Jason Reed

  Page 293: The New York Times Graphics

  Page 313: Matthew Sleeth

  Page 342: AP Images/Dita Alangkara

  Page 345: Denis Balibouse/Reuters

  Page 396: AP Images/Bullit Marquez

  Page 410: AP Images/Samir Mezban

  Page 421: Stan Honda/Getty Images

  Page 434: Courtesy of the UN, photographer unknown

  Page 463: Joao Silva/The New York Times

  Page 469: Rob Gauthier/Reuters

  Page 495: AP Images/Firdia Lisnawati

  Page 501: Frederic Neema/Gamma/Eyedea Presse

  Page 503: AP Images/Robert Sullivan

  INSERT IMAGES

  Pages 1-4, all: Courtesy of Gilda Vieira de Mello

  Page 5, top: Courtesy of Gilda Vieira de Mello; bottom: Courtesy of Timur Goskel

  Page 6, top: Sylvana Foa, courtesy of Jamshid Anvar; bottom: Courtesy of Gilda Vieira de Mello

  Page 7, all: Courtesy of Mieke Bos

  Page 8, all: Courtesy of Michael Rose

  Page 9, top: AP Images/Srdjan Suki; bottom: UN/DPI Photo

  Page 10, top: AP Images/Ruth Fremson; bottom: Courtesy of Gilda Vieira de Mello

  Page 11, top: Commonwealth of Australia; bottom left: Edy Purnomo/Getty Images; bottom right: Nicole Hochschild

  Page 12, top: Courtesy of Dennis McNamara; middle: UN/DPI Photo; bottom: Courtesy of Carolina Larriera

  Page 13, top left: Courtesy of Jonathan Prentice; top right: Courtesy of Gilda Vieira de Mello; bottom: White House Photo by Eric Draper

  Page 14, top: AP Images/Vahid Salemi; bottom: Courtesy of Carolina Larriera

  Page 15, top: Stan Honda/Getty Images; bottom: Courtesy of Carolina Larriera

  Page 16, top: AP Images/Victor R. Caivano; bottom: Vania Laranjeira

  INDEX

  Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations. "SVDM” refers to Sergio Vieira de Mello.

  Abdullah, Crown Prince

  Abona, Saad Hermiz

  Abu Ghraib

  Abu Nidal .

  Abu Walid

  Adolph, Robert:

  on excessive UN staff in Iraq

  June Threat Assessment of

  on perimeter fencing of Canal Hotel as security coordinator for UN mission

  in Tent City after Canal Hotel attack

  “affirmative action,”

  Afghanistan:

  Brahimi as UN envoy to

  Rice comparing Iraq with

  Rumsfeld on nation-building in .

  SVDM and humanitarian trap in

  Taliban .

  torture in

  Aghadjanian, Paul

  Ahmed, Salman

  Ahtisaari, Martti

  Aimé, Jean-Claude

  Akashi,Yasushi .

  as arriving in Cambodia

  with Boutros Boutros-Ghali,

  on Cambodian elections

  as head of UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs

  Khmer Rouge defying

  Khmer Rouge marginalized by

  Khmer Rouge refusing to deal with

  Khmer Rouge’s disappointment with

  and NATO air strikes in Bosnia

  on prostitution in Cambodia

  on refusing to use force in Cambodia

  on return to normal life in Bosnia

  and Sarajevo market massacre and security breakdown in Cambodia

  and Serb attack on Gorazde enclave

  Silajdžić breaking off contact with

  as special representative in Yugoslavia

  strained relations with SVDM

  SVDM excluded from decision-making by

  SVDM’s criticism of

  United States criticized by .

  and UN peacekeepers escorting Serb tanks

  as UNTAC head

  on UN war crimes tribunal

  Albright, Madeleine .

  Ali, Marwan:

  and Bremer’s criticism of SVDM

  as going on leave to Jordan

  and Hooper just before explosion

  on Iraqi anger

  on Manuel’s injuries

  on security situation in Iraq

  and al-Sistani

  on SVDM and Coalition

  on SVDM discovering world of Iraq

  and SVDM keeping up appearances with UN staff

  on vagueness of Security Council Resolution

  Ali,Tariq .

  Alkatiri, Mari ,

  Almstrom, John

  Amal

  Amanpour, Christiane

  Amaral, Domingos

  American exceptionalism

  Anderson, John Lee

  Andreev,Viktor

  Angola

  Annan, Kofi:

  as becoming secretary-general

  bin Laden on

  Annan, Kofi (cont.)

  and choosing administrator for East Timor

  on Coalition invasion as illegal

  commemorating Baghdad victims

  on continuing mission in Iraq

  divorce of

  at East Timor independence ceremony

  and humanitarian crisis in East Timor

  on humanitarian intervention

  and increased security for Baghdad UN headquarters .

  investigations into staff security

  on launching UN operations

  and NATO intervention in Kosovo

  Oil for Food scandal .

  plans for UN reform by

  at reestablishing UN presence in Iraq .

  and replacement of Ogata as UN High Commissioner for Refugees

  and Saddam Hussein’s weapons

  on Security Council Resolution .

  security phase V for West Timor

  statement on Canal Hotel attack

  SVDM appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq by

  and SVDM as UNHCR deputy head of personnel services on SVDM earning a vacation .

  on SVDM having “political bug,”

  SVDM named under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs by

  SVDM named UN High Commissioner for Human Rights by

  SVDM on secretary
-general’s role and

  SVDM’s leave from UNHCR extended by

  and SVDM’s mission behind Serb lines

  on SVDM wanting to be in the field

  and UN administration of Kosovo

  and UN role in postinvasion Iraq

  UN staff feeling let down by

  and U.S. threat to invade Iraq

  Ansar al-Islam

  Anvar, Jamshid

  Aquino, Corazon

  Arafat,Yassir

  Arboleda, Eduardo

  Arbour, Louise

  Argov, Shlomo .

  Armitage, Richard

  Arnaout, Ghassan

  Arraf, Jane

  al-Assad, Bashar

  Assadi, Jahanshah

  Austin, Reginald

  Ayun, Y-Pen

  Azerbaijan

  Ba’ath party n.

  Baker, James

  Bakhet, Omar:

  and Buddhism

  life after Canal Hotel attack

  as meeting with Kabila

  as showing Rwandan genocide sites to SVDM

  on SVDM as future secretary-general

  on SVDM defending his thesis

  on SVDM in Iraq

  and SVDM on UN weapons inspector’s spying for U.S.

  and SVDM’s love of women

  and SVDM’s meeting with Prodi

  on SVDM’s mission to Kosovo

  on SVDM’s relationship with Larriera

  Bali nightclub bombing

  Banbury, Anthony

  Bangladesh, , ,

  Baril, Maurice

  Baron, Romain

  Baskin, Mark

  Becker, Elizabeth

  Begic, Hasan

  Belo, Felipe Ximenes

  Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine Benomar, Jamal

  Berger, Sandy . Bertron, Jean-Marie

  Beye,Alioune Blondin .

  bin Laden, Osama

  Black, Cofer

  “black boxing,”

  Blair,Tony

  Blitzer,Wolf

  Blix, Hans

  Bloch, Ernst

  Blue Routes

 

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