by Meda Ryan
Barry with Liam Deasy, Charlie Hurley, Seán Buckley and other officers in the brigade area turned their attention to spies. It was evident that the British forces had an extensive espionage service in the West Cork area and it was felt that the IRA and their activities would be short-lived unless this was broken. May Twomey, who worked in Bandon post office with Anna Mulqueen intercepted corre-spondence which was passed on to Seán Buckley, intelligence officer and his team. ‘We knew that men were being sold; we knew that there were several types of spies and informers.’ Between 17 January and 16 February 1921, Barry said that ‘as a result of information given to the enemy, nine IRA within a 12 mile radius of Bandon were captured and murdered’.[8]
Barry regretted the turn events were taking but spies had to be dealt with ‘coldly and ruthlessly to ensure the survival of the IRA’. He said that every national movement in Ireland had failed because of spies and informers – ‘the only source of enemy intelligence … we had hesitated too long to strike ... we, the brigade officers, must always bear a certain responsibility for the needless deaths of many of our own Volunteers’. There were ‘spies who took blood money’ and ‘unpaid informers from the wealthier land-owning class who hated the Republican movement – were the worst’.[9]
Major Percival noted that in some districts all civilians were treated as hostile. It was the IO’s duty to find out ‘the political sympathies of every civilian … if friendly whether they are prepared to give information and if so what is their information worth.’ He kept a largescale map on the wall where every farm and house was marked and there was a note on the sympathies of the occupier, therefore ‘before any officer went on a raid,’ he wrote, ‘we had all available information’.[10] Lieut Gen. Hugh Jeudwine, GOC Fifth Division, said that ‘in intelligence … every raid, every search, every encounter, successful or unsuccessful provided information.’[11]
Percival ordered that the IO ‘must keep in close touch with the Loyalist especially those who were are not afraid to tell him what they know … if the IRA suspected a Loyalist of giving information or being too friendly with the crown forces, it meant certain death to him,’ Percival noted. Usually, visitation to these houses ‘took place after dark’. Percival tells how he blackmailed a local company officer into giving information in return for immunity. The officer was ‘convicted of some small offence and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment’. Percival wrote that ‘he proved very useful’.[12]
There is no indication that Barry or any of the senior officers were aware of this man’s activities at this time. However, when a man was either ‘captured or surrendered voluntary whilst armed with a rifle’ at the Upton train ambush, their suspicions were roused. Flor Begley notes that ‘the column could have been wiped out as a result of this man’s betrayal of many vital facts relating to brigade H. Qrs. and the movements of senior brigade officers’. Though with the IRA, he did not participate in any engagement for some time before Upton, but ‘turned up that day with a rifle’. Afterwards Charlie Hurley investigated his actions, discovered ‘he hid in a house, never fired a shot but remained there to be arrested, waiting!’ Within a week of this arrest the IRA were ‘tipped off by a friendly RIC sergeant to be careful as he had given the game away, meaning he had talked a lot.’ Upon general release this ‘Coy. Captain volunteered a statement’ said ‘that he gave information whilst under the influence of drugs, etc.’ He was court-martialled, sentenced to death which was ‘commuted to exile for life’. Neither Tom Barry nor any of the Cork No. 3 Brigade men were aware at the time that it was due to his information that Charlie Hurley was killed and ‘several other captures were effected in this neighbourhood’.[13]
‘Every civilian should be looked on as a potential enemy,’ Percival emphasised to his regiment. ‘It would have been impossible to carry out any operations without having a reasonably good intelligence service,’ he wrote. With this in mind he used ‘Loyalist sympathisers’ to the fullest extent.[14] Strickland’s division found that ‘information obtained from civilian agents’ helped the 6th Division track down ‘arms dumps’ and ‘rebels’.[15]
‘Some were ready to tell what they knew, frequently without asking for payment … small presents were more acceptable ... Most informants, preferred to tell verbally what they knew … A method frequently employed was to carry out a raid on and search the house of an informer, and during the course of it an opportunity could be found to speak to him or her.’ Occasionally, ‘an informant’ would be ‘arrested’ during ‘curfew hours’, and in the security of barracks impart with ‘valuable’ information.[16] Some ‘loyal inhabitants’ who ‘have incurred the displeasure of the IRA and are therefore unable to reside in their homes’ were ‘recompensed out of a special intelligence fund and transferred to England,’ according to Strickland’s records. It was considered ‘the duty of the government, to help loyal citizens of the United Kingdom.’[17]
Barry and the officers of the Third West Cork Brigade knew they had a difficult task, and they knew some though not all of their enemy’s methods of seeking information, such as putting ‘stool pigeons’ into jail to mingle with IRA prisoners. ‘Stool pigeons’ pretended to be in sympathy with the IRA and tried to obtain information.[18]
IRA officers implemented various forms of interrogation. But ‘a tight rein was kept on all battalions, no spy was executed without the sanction of a brigade officer,’ according to Liam Deasy.[19] Barry dressed in leggings and trench coat and sporting a captured Auxiliary’s tasselled beret visited houses of suspected informers. Speaking with a British accent, he questioned them about the IRA. Information was given freely as they believed they were speaking to a member of the British forces.
He told of one occasion, wearing the captured Auxiliary’s tasselled beret, when he was readily admitted into the home of a ‘a Loyalist informer’. Three armed IRA officers waited outside. The man was not on their list until they were freely given his name when on another ‘visitation’. This ‘visitor’ was ushered into the drawing-room where the man drinking whiskey asked him to join him in a drink. Barry refused. He never drank spirits until after dinner! The man grumbled because the authorities took so long to respond to his call. In explaining the reason for his message, he named two IRA men he had tracked to a barn, gave their names and how best to trap them. He produced a notebook, and again complained about delays in acting on his previous messages. ‘If you people were quicker to act on information the IRA would be finished in the locality long ago.’ He poured out details of IRA movements and activities in the area. As he warmed to his subject he also poured himself another glass of whiskey, asked his ‘visitor’ was he sure he wouldn’t have one. ‘No thanks!’ Barry politely declined. He correctly named the local IRA officers, and the names of senior officers whom he called ‘The Big Shots’. He went on to name ‘reliable men’ who like him were helping the authorities.
‘In vivid detail he boasted about information which led to the murder of two of my men,’ said Barry. ‘This was proof. My blood began to stir as the maid brought more water for the whiskey, and he poured himself another. Again I refused. “He’ll have tea,” he said. I said, “No.” She brought it anyway and left. My pulse beat faster, I knew I was going to kill him.’
‘“Don’t move,” I said. “Keep your hands on the table.” I drew my companion from my pocket, blew the whistle, told him who I was – one of “the Big Shots” he named. The whiskey glass fell from his hand …’ Hearing the sound of the whistle, Barry’s fellow officers came in. The man was court-martialled. He admitted making the statements and his incriminating activities. A few hours later he was shot.[20]
One informer in Innishannon, according to Barry ‘was not only an important organiser of espionage against the IRA, but guided in person raiding parties of the Essex Regiment.’ It was well known from inside information that he wore a mask. But one night in a victim’s house, his mask slipped. From that December night in 1920, he was guarded by four Black and Tans. On the nig
ht he was shot the Tans failed in their aim on the IRA raiding party.[21]
‘We cleared thirteen spies out in one month … Spies got no mercy. The spy is the paid man; he’s the blood-money scoundrel, but he’s not as dangerous as the informer. The spy takes his chance ...’[22] The ‘unpleasant duty of dealing with spies and informers’ Liam Deasy believed was ‘necessary’ as ‘British gold and Irish greed’ would outstrip the Volunteer efforts to secure ‘freedom’. ‘Incidents convinced us beyond all possible doubt that information was being supplied to the enemy’.[23]
On the rare occasion when a man tried to take advantage of the situation for his own reasons, Tom was unbending; his capacity for sizing up facts and motives was said to be extremely accurate. When he decided that a spy deserved to be shot following a court-martial, if circumstances permitted he either ordered the execution to be done or performed it himself. Occasionally the spy was asked to leave the country.
There was the odd occasion when a member tried to take advantage of the situation. One man in an effort to have his neighbour shot because of some disagreement told Barry more than once that he was a spy. Having put some preliminary questions to the Volunteer, Barry decided that his motives were other than honourable. Barry was writing at a table when the Volunteer again approached him. ‘Look,’ said Barry, placing his own gun on the table, ‘go away and shoot him.’
The man knew that Barry didn’t believe him. He looked at Barry, then at the gun, and walked away.’[24]
As Barry was writing his book he had the names of those involved in espionage and the details of their activities. ‘At first I listed the names and addresses of those sixteen British agents who were shot by the West Cork Brigade of the IRA Then the thought came of the pain such a listing would bring to those traitors’ descendants and relatives … Innocent men and women should not suffer for the sins of their fathers,’ he wrote. The daily press ‘of the first six months of 1921 will supply all particulars’ of those ‘executed including the official British announcements of the deaths of their agents,’ he wrote to the editor of the Irish Press. Mr Sweetnam was happy with Barry’s omission of names, but he also wanted Lord Tom Kingston’s name omitted, as ‘it might be embarrassing to other Kingstons’. Barry disagreed with that one, as Burgatia House would identify it in any case.[25]
Barry and his column knew that one man dressed in a woman’s hood cloak was a constant caller to Bandon barracks. ‘He sold Brinny ambush’. Several attempts ‘to get him’, failed. The British government sent ‘the informer and his family’ to England. ‘A member of GHQ squad followed, but failed to find him.’[26]
Major B. L. Montgomery of the Seventeenth Brigade, told Percival that he ‘regarded all civilians as “shinners”.’ His ‘whole attention was given to defeating the rebels and it never bothered me a bit,’ he wrote, ‘how many houses were burned.’ In his ‘general remarks’ he suggested, ‘that to win a war of that sort you must be ruthless; Oliver Cromwell, or the Germans, would have settled it in a very short time. Now-a-days public opinion precludes such methods; the nation would never allow it; and the politicians would lose their jobs if they sanctioned it.’[27]
The British, Barry said, were met with their own weapons. ‘They had gone down in the mire to destroy us and our nation, and down after them we had to go to stop them.’[28] As a result of this drastic action IRA casualties were greatly reduced. ‘There can be no doubt as to why the death roll of the West Cork IRA dropped so amazingly; it was solely because British terror was met by a not less effective IRA counter-terror.’
Even after ‘a lapse of years’ he believed he had nothing ‘to apologise for’, in fact he felt ‘the decision should have been taken earlier’ when more of his men would have been saved. The step these officers believed they had to take was ‘not an easy one’ Barry said, ‘for one’s mind was darkened and one’s outlook made bleak by the decisions which had to be taken.’[29]
Notes
[1] Tom Barry’s manuscript: Tom Barry letter to Miah Galvin, 26 May 1948, TB private papers; Barry, Guerilla Days, pp. 103, 104; Denis Lordan, author interview 7/7/ 1974; Jim Kearney, author interview 18/10/1980.
[2]Jones, Vol. 11, pp. 45, 46; Pat Walsh, pp. 6–10, introduction to Street, The Administration. Tom Barry had typed passages from C. J. Street’s writings. Street wrote under IO in earlier works.
[3] Lord Russell, King’s Liverpool Regiment, Skibbereen, to Butler, p. 86.
[4] Tom Barry, author interview; Dan Cahalane, author interview 30/1/1977.
[5] Barry, Guerilla Days, p. 116; Tom Barry, author interview.
[6] Bill Hales, author interview, 14/9/1974; Donal Hales and Madge Hales, Hales Family Papers.
[7] Béaslaí, Vol. 11, 173–185.
[8] May Twomey, author interview 30/11/1974; Tom Barry, author interview; Tom Barry, n. d. RTÉ Sound Archives; see also Barry, Guerilla Days, p. 112.
[9] Tom Barry’s manuscript, TB private papers; also Tom Barry, Guerilla Days, pp. 105, 106; Tom Barry, RTÉ recording, not dated, RTÉ Sound Archives.
[10] Percival Papers, 4/1, IWM.
[11] Jeudwine Papers, 72/82/2, IWM.
[12] Percival Papers 4/1, IWM.
[13]Flor Begley, 15/3/60, FO’D Papers, MS. 31,301(5) NLI. The name is not given in this instance, but is given in Seán MacCárthaigh to Tom Barry 16/8/ 1948, TB private papers; Flor Begley, E. O’Malley Papers, P17b/108, UCDA;.see also details in Percival Papers, 4/1, IWM; Strickland Papers, typewritten report 25, 26, IWM.
[14] Percival Papers 4/1, IWM.
[15] Strickland, Irish Rebellion, p. 70 and App. V., IWM.
[16] Jeudwine Papers, Record Rebellion in Ireland, Vol. 11, 25–34, IWM.
[17]Strickland Papers, draft document, IWM.
[18] Percival Papers 4/1, IWM.
[19] Liam Deasy, author interview 5/12/1972; see also, General Order No. 20, ‘a convicted spy shall not be executed until his conviction and sentence have been ratified by the brigade commandant concerned’. Prior to this the suspect would be arrested ‘and placed before a Court of Inquiry’ – the conviction should be absolute.
[20] Tom Barry, author interview; Tom Barry manuscript and notes, TB private papers; see also Irish Press, l and 2 June 1948.
[21] Tom Barry author interview, Tom Kelleher, author interview 9/4/1979; see also Irish Press, 1 and 2 June 1948; Barry, Guerilla Days, 109, 110
[22] Tom Barry, author interview; also Donal Corvin, Sunday Independent, 7 March 1976.
[23] Deasy, pp. 200, 201.
[24] Jim Kearney, author interview 18/10/1980.
[25] Tom Barry to editor Irish Press, 1 May 1948, torn copy of letter. Irish Press editor William Sweetnam, to Tom Barry, 12 May 1948. Barry lists all of them, and their addresses on a separate sheet. TB private papers; see also Irish Press 1 and 2 June 1948; Barry, Guerilla Days, pp. 105–114.
[26] Danny Canty, author interview 6/8/1972; Jim Kearney, author interview 18/10/ 1980.
[27] Montgomery to Percival, 12/10/1923, Percival Papers, IWM.
[28] Barry, Guerilla Days, p. 112.
[29] Tom Barry, manuscript, TB private papers.
8 - Crossbarry’s Landmark Success
By March 1921, the Third West Cork Brigade was an army, well trained and experienced in guerrilla warfare. This style of fighting required a commander able to make split-second decisions and the men under him able to act immediately on his commands to out-wit and out-fight an army trained in regular warfare. Their intelligence section was now much better equipped with binoculars, telescopes and other field equipment, and they had mastered Morse code signalling. Tom had learned message-sending and decoding in the British army and passed on these invaluable skills. ‘Smoke, mirror and light signals could be sent from Kinsale to the top of Ballyhandle, on to Belrose and into Lovell’s Hill and from there to Bantry. It only took seven minutes to send a signal from Kinsale to Bantry – 50 miles approximately cross-country. (Tom’s friend Dick Barrett, a teacher at Gurranes National School
was an expert. Later he took the anti-Treaty side, was arrested and executed while in custody, during the Civil War.)[1]Meanwhile, the flying column was mobilised to the strength of 104 officers and men and had, to Barry’s relief, obtained an explosives expert, Capt McCarthy, a former officer of the Royal Engineers with strong Republican sympathies. Another asset to the column was Flor Begley, intelligence officer, who would use his well-known talent as a player of the bagpipes. ‘I had formed an opinion that the best soldiers will fight even better to the strains of their traditional war songs,’ said Barry. ‘You know, we Irish love this rousing music; it puts life into our blood.’[2] Word reached the flying column that the British garrison in the area, was being strengthened by 300 troops who had arrived in Kinsale and were to travel to Bandon on 17 March. Barry mobilised his column and moved into ambush position on the main Bandon-Kinsale road. He had ‘made arrangements to have the pipes collected’ so that St Patrick’s Day could be celebrated ‘by ambushing some lorries to the accompaniment’ of Flor Begley on the pipes.[3]‘We had been marching all night.’ Dr Nudge Callanan recalls, ‘and when dawn came I remember looking out over a wall and I saw reeds waving. I said to Dan Holland, “Come here, Dan. Would you tell me where we are?”
