by Meda Ryan
[16]Ibid; Jack Dohney Lynch, author interview 10/1/1981; Dr Ned Barrett, author interview 9/12/1980; see also Bowyer Bell, p. 165, 166; MacEoin, The IRA, p. 66.
[17]Tom Barry, author interview; Den Carey, author interview 11/1/1981.
[18]Brendan O’Neill, (Jim O’Neill’s son) to author, 10/4/2003; Jimmy Wynne, Dundalk, in MacEoin, The IRA, p. 521.
[19]Eunan O’Halpin, Defending Ireland, p. 127; Bowyer Bell, pp. 166, 167.
[20]Hanley, pp. 157–160; J. Bowyer Bell, pp. 163–167.
[21]MacEoin, The IRA, p. 66.
[22]Jack Doheny Lynch, author interview 12/1/1980.
[23]Seán Cronin, The McGarrity Papers, pp. 161–163.
[24]Tom Barry letter to Seán Cronin, 13/2/1975, quoted, Cronin, Frank Ryan, p. 106.
[25]Seán Cronin, Frank Ryan, p. 106.
[26]Sheila Humphreys to Seán Cronin, in Cronin, Frank Ryan, p. 109.
[27]FO’D Papers, document notes, MS 31,490, NLI.
[28]An Phoblacht, 15/5/1937.
[29]Tom Barry to Seán Cronin, 13/2/1975, quoted in Cronin, Frank Ryan, p. 110.
[30]An Phoblacht, 15/5/1937.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Tom Barry, An Phoblacht, 15 May 1937.
[33]Tom Barry to Nollaig Ó Gadhra, 1969, RTÉ Sound Archives.
[34]Tom Barry, author interview; Tom Barry to Nollaig Ó Gadhra, 1969, RTÉ Sound Archives.
[35]An Phoblacht, 26/6/1937.
[36]Ned Barrett, author interview 19/7/1979. Wedding date of Tom Kelleher to Síle Crowley, 24 July 1937; Seán Kelleher to author, 28/11/2002.
[37]Den Carey, author interview 11/1/1981.
[38]Tom Barry to Dr T. Ryle Dwyer, a letter in response to a query, 25/5/1975. I am grateful to T. Ryle Dwyer for this personal correspondence.
[39]Eunan O’Halpin, ‘British Intelligence, the Republican Movement and the IRA’s German links, 1935–1945’, in McGarry. I am grateful to Eunan O’Halpin for manuscript. Irish government intelligence kept a close eye on Tom Barry’s activities, though some of government suspicions on Barry were unfounded.
[40]Seán Mac Bride, author interview 6/2/1977.
[41]MacEoin, The IRA in the Twilight Years, p. 67.
[42]Seán O’Neill to Uinseann MacEoin, in MacEoin, The IRA, p. 740.
[43]Bowyer Bell, p. 168.
[44]Jack Doheny Lynch, author interview 10/1/1981; Tom Barry to Nollaig Ó Gadhra, 1969, RTÉ Sound Archives.
[45]Tom Barry to Seán Cronin, 29/6/1978, quoted Cronin, Frank Ryan, pp. 178, 179; MacEoin, The IRA, p. 67.
[46]Tom Barry to Sighle Humphreys, 12 June 1936, Sighle Humphreys Papers, P106/ 839, UCDA.
[47]Tom to Nollaig Ó Gadhra, 1969, RTÉ Sound Archives.
[48]Cronin, Frank Ryan, p. 179.
[49]Agreement between Eamon de Valera and Neville Chamberlain, April 25 – Act of An Dáil gave effect to the agreement 16 May 1938.
[50]Coogan, The IRA, p. 127; see also Barry, The Reality, p. 48.
[51]Jerh Cronin, author interview 10/1/1981.
[52]Tom Barry to Seán T. (O’Kelly) 11 October 1938, TB private papers.
[53]Tom Barry to Donal Corvin in Sunday Independent, 7 March 1976.
[54]Tom Barry to Dr T. Ryle Dwyer, 25/5/1975. I am grateful to T. Ryle Dwyer for this personal letter.
[55]FO’D Papers, MS 31 490, NLI; Jerh. Cronin, author interview10/1/1981; Criostóir de Baróid, author interview 11/1/1981. In June 1949, Downing Street got ‘a request from an Irish committee’ for their repatriation, Cork Examiner, 22/1/1983.
[56]Copy of letter, Tom Crofts to Oscar Traynor, TD, 23 April 1940, TB private papers.
[57]Mrs O’Driscoll to Mr Barry 25 August [1943] TB private papers. Cornelius O’Driscoll must have been on the pension board. I have been unable to get further clarification on this.
[58]Tom Crofts to Oscar Traynor, TD, 23 April 1940, TB private papers.
[59] Jack Doheny Lynch, author interview 10/1/1981 – ‘They’d be delighted to lock him up.’
20 – Second World War
Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as prime minister in Britain on the day that Germany invaded Belgium and Holland. De Valera did not feel that Churchill’s attitude would be favourable to Irish neutrality; certainly a speech which he made in 1922 in the House of Commons was looked upon as the ultimatum which helped kick-start the Civil War. In 1938 ‘he had vigorously opposed the handing over of the occupied ports in Ireland … his general attitude was common knowledge. From the beginning of the war he had chaffed at Irish neutrality.’[1]
De Valera had, in 1939, arranged for the Irish Red Cross to be established in Dublin. A month after its inception a meeting was held in Cork City Hall where the Lord Mayor Alderman James Hickey presided. On this occasion Leslie Bean de Barra, wife of General Tom Barry, became its honorary secretary.
She admitted that enthusiasm was high for the society because there was the anticipation that Ireland would be involved in the Second World War and their services would be necessary. With other voluntary members she studied and took examinations in first aid, hygiene and child welfare. Extremely dedicated and much in demand, she travelled throughout the country giving lectures and organising the Red Cross. In 1941 she was elected as Cork’s representative to the Dublin Central Council.
Though De Valera took a firm stand on the question of Irish neutrality he nevertheless was preparing an army which could at least put up some resistance if the country was invaded.
Many of the IRA from the War of Independence years had later taken opposing sides during the Civil War. Now there came a ‘bury the hatchet’ plea. De Valera asked many of his former Republican friends like Tom Barry, Liam Deasy, Tom Crofts and others to join the army. They wouldn’t have to go through the ordinary ranks, and would subsequently be posted to various places to command training camps. Barry willingly ‘went alone’ to Blackrock Garda Station several days ‘before the mass enrolments’. After he had worked in the Cork Barracks with Col M. J. Costello for almost three weeks he was notified of a five week training course ‘as a potential officer’ to be conducted in the military college in the Curragh. He protested. He did not want ‘either commission or course’. Nevertheless, he agreed and set out for the Curragh, but ‘made it perfectly clear’ that he had ‘no intention of staying for the full course’ but had come because he ‘did not want to disobey an order.’[2]
Drilling up and down the square and the military discipline being doled out by young officers did not find favour with Barry. During a lecture one day an officer explained tactics of surrounding an enemy, drawing a diagram and describing on the blackboard with his chalk that moving the troops in a certain formation would result in breaking through the enemy line.
‘Nonsense,’ shouted Barry, jumping to his feet. ‘You don’t know what you’re talking about,’ and he sat down.
Theory and book information was very different from reality, as Barry knew.
Some days later, Col Costello sent him from Cork Barracks to inspect a squadron under Pat Buttimer (ex-IRA and veteran of Barry’s flying column), officer-in-charge at Bantry House.
‘I got a phone call saying that it was Tom Barry who was coming to inspect. The troops were all lined up – all “heelable” when he was brought from the gate by the guard. As soon as he showed his face the bugler began, and we all stood to attention. Tom stood by the guard while the bugler’s salute was being blown. I went towards him, saluted him and told him the troops were ready for inspection.’ After inspection, Buttimer dismissed the troops and the pair went in and had a drink. ‘But the one thing that struck me was that he was wearing civilian clothes, and I needn’t really have handed over my troops for inspection to anybody in “civvies”. But I knew Barry so well I was delighted to be able to do it. I never heard anything about this breach of regulations afterwards.’[3]
Upon Barry’s return to Cork and then to the Curragh he was told by Major Egan that the adjutant general had ‘instructed him’ that he ‘was to
be discharged from the army’. The official reason was ‘services no longer required’.
In a letter to the commandant of the military college he listed four main reasons for returning to Cork Barracks. He would be ‘happier serving in the Ranks’ (Rank A) rather than as an officer, and did not wish to spend time away from where he ‘expected to fight, if war comes’, he wrote. Furthermore, it would be of no military value being grouped among ‘young service men’ with ‘only a few days service in the army.’ All his comrades (T. Crofts, F. O’Donoghue, M. Leahy, et al) ‘were posted to different duties’ and ‘excused’ from the course. ‘I was the only one sent from this group,’ he wrote to An Taoiseach, De Valera.
Dismissal from the army was ‘a drastic punishment’ without being given a reason, he wrote. ‘I am not conscious that I have done anything wrong and I fail to understand why GHQ ordered my discharge without reason … I have been working in Cork city and county and I now ask that the officer commanding, Southern Command, be asked to report on my work and my conduct from the date of my attestation.’
Col Costello put him ‘into operations’ where he ‘authenticated amongst others two important operation orders’ headed Defence and Plans for Action. He wished he did not have to bother An Taoiseach in ‘a time of national crisis’ and had ‘hesitated before writing’. Nor did he ‘want any investigations now if such would divert officers from pressing duties … I will ask when this crisis is past or eased that the whole matter be gone fully into.’
Having apologised in writing to the commandant of the military college for ‘any inconvenience’, Barry assured him that he was ‘not aware of any irregularity [in] refusing the course and returning to Cork.’[4]
Army records show that Private Tom Barry, number E410364, was enlisted on 1 July 1940 and discharged on 9 August 1940. The reason given for his discharge was ‘services no longer required’.[5]
Tom Barry could not see a future for himself as a soldier of the Irish army as he did not want to concede to their wishes to be a commissioned officer. He returned to the Cork Harbour commissioners, was appointed general superintendent where with other duties he organised security, fire drill, attention to property – all the necessary precautions that had to be undertaken at a harbour during this ‘difficult period’, Liam French, the general manager, recalls. ‘Trade had stopped, and the defence of our ports became an important factor, and Tom was an extremely shrewd and capable official.’[6]
Barry was a firm believer in neutrality. ‘I had no connection with the IRA at the time, my thoughts were with staying out of war.’[7]
On 25 August De Valera told Barry, that ‘the conditions which we are likely to face in the case of invasion would be very different from those of 1920–21 … our aim must be to go for the enemy at once wherever he appears, rather than to wait for him to advance against us. I would be surprised to learn that any contrary view is held in any responsible quarter’.[8]
Tom Barry, on the other hand, believed that ‘this country’ would only be invaded if ‘another power’ dropped ‘all moral scruples’ and decided that the cost in money and ‘thousands of casualties’ would be worth ‘the gain’. Rather than inviting action, the army should take a ‘defensive’ role to ‘nullify the invader’s superiority… in the shortest possible time’ if an attack came. The use of ‘Irish forces to counter attack at night’, the prevention of ‘encirclement’ with the use of ‘controlled guerilla movement’ should be part of the national policy and strategy. But most important, there should be ‘leadership, first class staff work necessary for effective functioning’ with officers taking full responsibility.[9]
Barry made himself available to the army’s Southern Command for advice, became a great friend and was ‘most helpful’ to Col M. J. Costello, who found ‘that Tom Barry’s vision and capacity to size up situations’ could not be surpassed. ‘His role at the Harbour Board was vital at this juncture’. Furthermore, he embarked in training the local defence forces (LDF), thus making a worthwhile contribution to Cork’s Civil Defence. These two men fought in the War of Independence. Unlike Barry, Costello supported the Treaty, yet it made no difference to their friendship.[10]
When Col Costello wrote memos or guidelines for the army he would often send them to Barry for an opinion. One such is in relation to ‘sniping’. Barry disagreed ‘with the tactical handling of snipers [in a platoon] as outlined in it [the memo] for in real war a unit commander dare not allow a unit (of snipers) within his unit to “act more or less on its own”. That is contrary to the principles of command and the responsibility, which such command implies.’ He believed that no section should be ‘allowed act’ on its own. He went on to explain the danger of the liberty ‘to open an attack’ without orders.[11]
Though Barry was a strong advocate of neutrality he had a fear that at some stage Ireland could be invaded and discussed this possibility with M. J. Costello. ‘A very obvious and ideal place for occupation in Cork was the City Hall, no matter whether it was Germans or British came in. It was a strategic building in the city, on the water’s edge. So with this senior officer, the pair went one night and planted 400 pounds of gelignite in the basement.’[12]
After the United States entered the war in December 1941, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed to allow American troops to complete their training in Northern Ireland. This began in January 1942. David Gray, American ambassador to Ireland, was extremely anxious to maintain a good relationship with de Valera and he in turn endeavoured to see that any allied airmen would be released without undue delay. However, Gray sent ‘alarmist report to Washington’ regarding ‘stories’ of German activists Edouard Hempel and Henning Thomsen’s visits to Ireland. The men had come to Ireland, Gray informed Roosevelt, and met with former IRA men, Dan Breen and Tom Barry. In May 1942 Gray anticipated a German move on Ireland within a month. Gray wrote that Thomsen had ‘been entertaining’ Dan Breen in the Gresham Hotel, and that he (Gray) ‘suspected’ Breen ‘of being on the German payroll’. Also Thomsen had ‘twice’ met Tom Barry.
T. Ryle Dwyer suggests that the German men’s ‘actions’ may ‘have been designed merely as a veiled threat to keep the Irish government from making too many concessions to the allies’.[13]
One morning the German minister, Hempel ‘accompanied by a carload of detectives’ called on Barry. The two men spoke ‘for about an hour and a half.’ Hempel ‘made it clear immediately that he did not want any information from me except my reaction to any invasion of Ireland by either Germany or Britain,’ Barry wrote to Dr T. Ryle Dwyer. ‘At no time did he suggest that I should get IRA help for Germany.’ Barry told Hempel ‘early on’ that he would inform De Valera of the conversation; he knew the detectives ‘would’ undoubtedly ‘report’ the meeting. Barry left ‘Dr Hempel in no doubt,’ he wrote ‘that I backed our government’s neutrality stand 100%, and I told [him] that Irishmen could not see any difference between the German imperialism which had ruthlessly destroyed small nations and British imperialism.’ Consequently ‘the first invaders would be our enemy’.
Barry, who regarded Hempel as ‘a real friend of Ireland’, had a second meeting that night and he with his wife, Leslie, were dinner guests at his hotel. Hempel said that the Irish ‘should thank God for Sir John Maffey who undoubtedly is a restraining force on bellicose Churchill’. It is obvious from this letter that Barry disliked ‘that scoundrel Gray’ and was ‘thankful’ to have given him ‘a few unhappy moments’ as he believed ‘the greatest danger of invasion came from USA.’[14]
Churchill was also concerned that the IRA might pose a threat. He had received a report through Major Desmond Morton that the ‘War Office states categorically that the IRA is well armed and well organised, whereas the Eire defence forces are little short of derisory. There is information that a number of Germans have landed surreptitiously in Eire since the outbreak of the war’ with regular communication between both countries. It meant on-going surveillance of IRA activities by British in
telligence throughout the war.[15]
Hard work and dedication found Barry compiling articles well into the night hours. He set out military problems for army personnel – many were printed in An Cosantóir – A Review for Army and L.D.F. De Valera consulted him on several occasions ‘and took his views on board. Barry was very strong on neutrality. Avoid antagonism was his motto at this period.’[16]
Between January and June 1941 he wrote accounts of the Kilmichael and the Crossbarry ambushes under the pseudonym ‘Eyewitness’ with the addition of ‘Commentary and Conclusions’. Editorial deletions ‘because of the [war] climate’ meant that the details of the brandy flasks that the Auxiliaries carried and other incidentals in relation to them were omitted. However, ‘the false surrender’ of the Auxiliaries at Kilmichael was not censored.[17]
In a prepared paper Barry ‘clarified’ from his viewpoint, ‘our defence policy’ tied in with the ‘dignity of man, the love of relatives, friends and neighbours and the love of the motherland.’ As a ‘small nation’ we should not waste money in the air force, or naval service as ‘we would be shot out of existence within twelve hours of the opening of hostilities.’ Instead, we should concentrate on ‘building up our ground forces,’ and money should be spent on ‘light artillery, anti-tank guns, machine-guns, mines and automatic rifles.’ In the future rather than ‘slavishly’ having officers trained in the army schools of ‘world powers’ such as the US and Great Britain, we should send officers for training in countries similar to ours, such as Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway.’[18]
