by Donald Keene
In any case, Itō himself had decided to resign, disappointed that during the three and a half years of the protectorate he had not won the allegiance of the Korean people. His gradualist policy had obviously failed. The intensification of activity by the “righteous army” as well as attacks from Japanese politicians, who claimed that Itō’s conciliatory policy had weakened Japanese prestige, made him feel there was no point in wasting more time in a thankless post. But even after his resignation as resident general in June 1909, Itō still wielded influence within the Japanese government, and his death meant that an important obstacle had been removed from the path of annexation.
The Ilchin-hoe (now headed by Yi Yong-gu) stepped up its advocacy of annexation after Itō’s death. On December 5, 1909, the Japanese press reported that on the previous day the Ilchin-hoe had issued a manifesto calling for annexation. Memorials to this effect were submitted to the Residency General and Prime Minister Yi with the request that they be transmitted to the emperors of Japan and Korea.9 This was not mere opportunism: Yi Yong-gu was convinced that Korea was moribund, at death’s door, and that the only hope for its recovery was a union with Japan that would bring benefits to be shared alike by the Korean and Japanese peoples. His memorial to the emperor of Korea seems to reflect genuine convictions:
I, Yi Yong-ku, the president of the Ilchin-hoe, representing a million members and 20 million other subjects, in profound awe and trepidation, bow my head in respect and offer a hundred reverences in addressing these words to Your Majesty…. Our country, Korea, is now like a sick man whose pulse has for long been on the verge of failing. For us, Your subjects, to cry out our griefs to our country has been exactly like holding a corpse in our arms and vainly howling our sorrow…. Fortunately, we come originally from the same race as the Japanese, and there never has been between us any greater difference than between the karatachi and the tachibana.10 If now, before quarrels intensify, we boldly obliterate the national boundaries and remove the high walls separating the two neighbors, and the two peoples, enabled to live freely under one regime, receive equally the blessings of living together under the same government, who will say that this one is the elder brother or that that one is the younger brother? Indeed, it is certain that His Majesty, the emperor of Japan, in his great humanity will nurture and educate our 20 million compatriots and raise them to the same level [as the Japanese]…. Let us shake off the name and reality of being the inferior people of a protectorate and, in one leap, rise up, a great new union of peoples, into the ranks of the finest nations of the world. This indeed will be like the first blooming of an udombara, and the lucky stars and the phoenix will see each other.11
The memorial, signed by Yi Yong-gu and “1 million people,” was submitted on December 4, arousing public outcry against the Ilchin-hoe, whose members were branded as traitors.12 It was rejected by the Korean government, and Sone Aramaki, the resident general, told a Japanese reporter that he still was not in a position to say anything definite about the union of Japan and Korea. He stressed that the Japanese government was in no way involved in the Ilchonhoe’s declaration. The Japanese government considered unification a very serious matter and would not act until the appropriate time, and then only after proper preparation. It was to be regretted that the Ilchon-hoe had not waited and had made no preparations.13
Yi Yong-ku’s assertion that the Koreans and Japanese were fundamentally the same people with the same traditions would be repeated many times in years to come, mainly by the Japanese in justifying their conquest of Korea.14 The destruction of the formal line dividing the two countries even caused some Japanese to refer to Koreans as “people of the peninsula” (hantōjin), a term the Koreans found highly offensive because it denied the existence of Korea except as a mere projection of land. Perhaps Yi meant no more than that both the Koreans and the Japanese were recipients of Chinese civilization. That is, a Korean gentleman raised on the Four Classics of Confucianism had no trouble in “conversing with the brush” with a Japanese gentleman of similar education, and the elaborate courtesies observed by both courts were ultimately derived from the same Chinese models. But it is astonishing that a former advocate of Tonghak xenophobia should have contemplated with equanimity being ruled by a foreign people who not only spoke a different language but had a government that, unlike the Korean one, was thoroughly Westernized.
The Japanese seem to have had no doubts about the propriety of occupying a country whose traditions were as old as their own. Korea was now militarily weak and had fallen far behind in the race of East Asian countries to modernize. The Japanese authorities were actually puzzled by Korean resistance to their gift of modern civilization and could attribute it only to ignorance. Yamagata Aritomo, the least sympathetic to Korea of the Japanese leaders, declared, “Korea has neither the basic knowledge nor sufficient capacity to absorb the new civilization. The Korean people, high and low alike, are indecisive and rather indolent.”15
Annexation was undoubtedly the goal of the Residency General, but its officers were determined to suppress “righteous army” resistance before the union took place. Accordingly, a harsh campaign to wipe out this resistance was initiated in the south of Korea in September 1909. The brutal “churning method,” employed with devastating success, was followed by similar campaigns elsewhere in the country. It seems likely that the hatred of Japan felt even today by many Koreans dates from this time.16
In May 1910 the ailing Sone was replaced as resident general by Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919), who continued to serve also as army minister. In July, shortly before Terauchi was to sail for Korea, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō reported to the emperor on the situation in Korea. After hearing their report, the emperor asked that Terauchi take with him a personal letter and various gifts to the emperor of Korea.17 It is surprising that the emperor, so shortly before his government deprived the Korean emperor of his crown, should have followed the old oriental practice of exchanging gifts with other sovereigns. Perhaps he had not yet been informed of how drastically annexation would affect the Korean monarchy.
One of Terauchi’s first actions on assuming office, even before he arrived in Korea, was to unify under Japanese command all police functions in the country. On being asked why the number of Japanese military police had been so greatly increased, he is said to have commented, “It is easier to use military than ordinary police to control a primitive people.”18
From the time of his appointment to the post of resident general, Terauchi waited patiently for the right moment to set in motion the mechanism of unifying the two countries. The moment seemed to have arrived in August. Terauchi received an increasing number of reports that Koreans, irrespective of their social status, were becoming resigned to annexation by Japan. But one major concern remained to be cleared up. People expressed fears concerning the treatment of the Korean imperial house and the future position of the prime minister and other high-ranking statesmen. Terauchi secretly sent word to members of the Korean cabinet explaining that the emperor of Japan was generous and his government fair, that they would never allow the Koreans, whether they were members of the imperial household or humble peasants, to fall into adversity. If the members of the cabinet chose to resign in a body, the Japanese government would not try to stop them, but it would try to make them see that shirking their responsibility could only harm themselves and the nation.19 This stirred the prime minister, Yi Wan-yong, into resolving to face the crisis rather than flee it. Terauchi, guessing that Yi’s attitude had changed, sent for him on August 16.
As soon as Yi arrived in the Residency General, Terauchi handed him a memorandum concerning the treaty of annexation. It opened with what were now familiar generalizations—that Japan and Korea were neighboring countries; that their cultures were the same; that from ancient times they had shared weal and woe, profit and loss; and that their relations were so close they should no longer remain separate. That was why Japan had twice fought wars, sacr
ificing tens of thousands of soldiers and vast sums of money. Ever since then, the Japanese government had zealously devoted its energies to helping Korea, but under the present complicated structure of the protectorate, it found itself unable to ensure in perpetuity the security of the Korean imperial house or to protect to the full the welfare of the Japanese and Korean peoples as a whole. For this reason, the two countries should be brought together and made one.
Needless to say, the memorandum continued, this union of two countries must not be thought of as being the result of a war or hostility. Rather, the agreement is to be carried out in a spirit filled with the friendliest of feelings. In view of the current situation, the emperor of Korea will voluntarily cede his sovereign powers to the emperor of Japan. He will abdicate his throne and in the future occupy a position of perfect security. It was in order to protect the tranquillity of the emperor, the retired emperor, the crown prince, and other members of the imperial family, as well as to ensure the prosperity of the Korean people, high and low alike, that Japan felt it necessary to conclude the treaty of annexation.20
As finally presented to the Korean government, the treaty was in eight articles, which mainly reassured the emperor of Korea and the nobility that they would be well treated after unification.21 This promise, on the whole, was honored by the Japanese. Members of the Korean imperial family and other high nobles received Japanese titles and sufficient stipends to carry on their lives in the manner to which they were accustomed.22 After abdicating, Emperor Sunjong and Retired Emperor Kojong continued to live in the Toksu Palace in Seoul. In 1920, after receiving an excellent education in Japan, Yi Eun, the crown prince, married Masako, the eldest daughter of Prince Nashinomoto. During his distinguished career as a Japanese army officer, Yi Eun eventually rose to the post of commandant of the First Air Force.
The memorandum that Terauchi showed to Yi Wan-yong contained a somewhat earlier version of the treaty articles. It proposed, for example, that the Korean emperor be known henceforth as taikō denka (His Highness, the archduke) and the crown prince as kōdenka (His Highness, the prince). These titles would be hereditary. The memorandum recognized that some people might object that this represented a demotion from their present status, but these titles would be Japanese, not merely Korean. Besides, if one examined the matter historically, one would find that it had been only since Japan gave Korea its protection and proclaimed Korean independence that the king of Korea had assumed the title of emperor. It was nonsense to claim that his title went back centuries; indeed, it was not necessarily true, regarding his status of thirteen or fourteen years earlier, to say that he would suffer a demotion. In any case, there would be not the slightest reduction in court appropriations. Most important, as the recipient of the privileges of a member of the Japanese imperial family, he would enjoy a position that was permanent and stable and would never suffer any alterations in his status.23
The memorandum promised that members of the Korean aristocracy would be given equivalent titles in the Japanese aristocracy and that their annual allowances would actually be increased, thanks to the generosity of the Japanese emperor. Members of the present Korean cabinet would remain in office until their terms expired and then would be given pensions that would enable them to live comfortably for the rest of their lives. Ordinary citizens would be given grants to enable them to carry on with their livelihoods.24
After listening to a lengthy exposition of Japan’s future policy that promised benefits for all, Yi Wan-yong had only two requests to make of Terauchi. The first was that even after unification, the country would still be known as Hanguk, and the second was that the Korean emperor be allowed to retain the title of king. Although Yi welcomed annexation, he evidently feared that unless the name of the country and the title of king were preserved, Korean identity would be lost. Terauchi replied that keeping the name of the country and the title of king would contradict the reality of a postunification Korea, that if the two countries became one, a name that suggested a wholly independent state would be inappropriate, and a king had no functions when the emperor of Japan ruled over joined countries. Yi asked to consult with his adviser Cho Chung-ung, the minister of agriculture and industry, and Terauchi agreed.
Cho (who spoke fluent Japanese) called that night on Terauchi and told him that he and Yi agreed that unless the name Han-guk and the title of king were retained, no compromise could be reached. They were apparently under the impression that annexation would be a union of two countries, each retaining sovereign status, rather in the manner of Austria-Hungary or Sweden-Norway. Terauchi was surprised by this lack of understanding of Japanese aims, but he finally agreed to allow the country to be known by the old name of Chōsen. In response to the request that the title of king be retained, Terauchi compromised to the extent of allowing the emperor to be known as riō denka (His Highness the Yi king). The title ō was not the same as kokuō (king); in Japan, ō meant no more than a prince, but this concession seemed to satisfy the Koreans’ wounded pride.25 Retired Emperor Kojong would be known as taiō denka (His Highness, the great king), and Crown Prince Yi Eun, as ōseishi denka (His Highness, the heir to the king). Cho agreed to these changes and informed Yi, who told Terauchi that he was confident he would be able to persuade the cabinet at the meeting on the next day to accept Terauchi’s compromise.
On August 18 Katsura Tarō reported to the emperor on Terauchi’s negotiations with the Korean cabinet. Mentioning the two concessions he had made, Terauchi asked the government’s approval, promising that once it had been obtained, the treaty could go into effect within a few days.26 The emperor gave his consent, and Katsura wired this to Terauchi, who at once informed Yi Wan-yong. He advised Yi to take steps to ratify the treaty. Yi summoned the cabinet the same day and asked them to support unification. A cabinet meeting in the presence of the Korean emperor was arranged for August 22.
The meeting was attended by the emperor, the prime minister, representatives of the imperial family, and other high-ranking personnel. The emperor announced that he was ceding to the emperor of Japan sovereignty over Korea and that he had personally signed and affixed the imperial seal to the commission of full power. He gave the document to Yi Wan-yong, who in turn submitted the treaty of annexation for the emperor’s inspection and explained its provisions. The emperor was pleased to approve them.
As soon as the meeting had ended, Yi Wan-yong went to the Residency General to inform Terauchi what had happened at the meeting and to show him the commission of full power. He asked Terauchi to sign the treaty. Terauchi, after inspecting the document, pronounced it to be complete and accurate. He remarked that it was a blessing for both Japan and Korea that such a restrained and amicable solution to the political situation had been found, that it was an occasion for congratulations. He and Yi put their signatures to both Japanese and Korean texts of the treaty.27
On August 29 the text of the treaty was published in Japan along with an imperial rescript:
We, bearing in mind the necessity of maintaining peace permanently in East Asia and ensuring the future safety of Our empire and, taking cognizance of the fact that Korea has always been a hotbed of disorder, in the past asked Our government to reach an agreement with the Korean government to place Korea under the protection of the empire, in the hopes of extirpating disorders at their source and ensuring peace.
During the more than four years that have elapsed since then, Our government has assiduously striven to improve Korean facilities, and its achievements have been considerable; but they have still not been sufficient to make complete the maintenance of order under the present system in Korea. Feelings of fear abound within the country, and the people do not live in peace. It has become clear that in order to maintain peace within the community and to advance the well-being of the people, reform of the existing system is inevitable.
We, together with His Majesty the emperor of Korea, reached the conclusion, in view of this situation, that there was no alternative to uniting Kor
ea with the Japanese Empire, in this way responding to the demands of the times; We have therefore decided to unite Korea permanently with the empire.
His Majesty the emperor of Korea and members of the imperial family will, after unification, receive appropriate and generous treatment, and the people, direct recipients of Our compassion, will know greater security and happiness. Industry and commerce will see marked development under good government and peace. We are absolutely certain that peace in East Asia will as a result have stronger foundations than ever before.
We shall appoint a governor general of Korea, and expect him, in keeping with Our orders, to command the army and navy and to exercise general control over all governmental business. We expect that government officials and public servants, in obedience to Our wishes and in accordance with the situation, will choose whether it is preferable to be fast or slow in the development of facilities and, in this way, inspire confidence in the people in the blessings of order and peace.28
As usual in the case of rescripts issued in the emperor’s name, it is not clear what part (if any) he had in the expression, but probably the text accorded with his opinions concerning Korea’s immediate fate. At this distance from the events, we can see that everyone involved in the decision to join Korea to Japan was seriously mistaken. Koreans who believed that the union would result in mutual prosperity should have foreseen, in the light of their experiences with foreign countries, that profit for the foreign country would always take precedence over any desire to bring prosperity to the Koreans. They should have realized, too, that even if figureheads like their king were permitted to enjoy a comfortable retirement, the mass of Koreans were likely to be exploited. The Japanese, who were ahead of the Koreans in every aspect of modern civilization, would surely not hesitate to take advantage of this superiority.
Those Japanese who sincerely believed in the professed aims of their country should have realized that there was nothing to indicate that the military men who ruled in Korea as governor generals would display any real interest in Korea except as a possible springboard for further Japanese expansion on the continent. And although it should have been easy to predict, no one seems to have feared the worst aspect of the annexation: that the Japanese in Korea would conduct themselves with the arrogance of a master race, and the Koreans, in order to survive under Japanese rule, would have to learn how to please the Japanese, humiliating although this sometimes proved.
