by Mitch Weiss
It eventually grew to provide any opportunity or excuse to have a large meal together to play the game for the right to be base champion for the week. At one point it became so popular that other Afghan units were coming to our firebase to play. Some Afghan units tried to smuggle in ringers from other bases.
The game, like Pappy Shelton’s guitar in Bolivia, is solid proof that no matter the situation you can build rapport with people who came from opposite ends of the earth by combining camaraderie, good food, different cultures, and a war against a common enemy.
United States Special Forces teams are strategic assets. There are many “Special Operations” forces—but only one Special Forces. Any unit can be helicoptered onto an objective to fight for an hour or two but not every unit has the diverse skill sets to build or destroy an entire country. Training and building armies are one of the fundamentals that make Special Forces unique.
Even today, Special Forces soldiers are doing and using the same time-honored skills that Shelton and his team did in 1967. As you read this, Special Forces teams on almost every continent in the world are performing the same mission Shelton’s team accomplished in Bolivia.
What Shelton did in Bolivia was classic FID or Foreign Internal Defense and has been emulated by every Special Forces team leader since, with varying degrees of success. Since the units were created more than fifty years ago, the Special Forces teams have successfully trained soldiers to fight tyranny and oppression in Vietnam, Colombia, and Afghanistan to name just a few.
Green Berets trained in the language and culture of the host country is working by, with, and through native soldiers to carry out American policy. In this case, as are in most involving Special Forces, the men in this story were of the highest quality and caliber capable of executing a highly sensitive and classified operation for both the Bolivian and American governments.
But what separates Shelton’s mission and makes it so impressive was that, unlike Afghanistan today, Shelton’s Green Berets couldn’t go with the Bolivians. They had to trust their training and hope the Rangers could execute under pressure. And they did, but their success was put in place months before when Shelton, guitar in tow, started building the rapport that would forge the lifelong friendships.
Special Forces personnel are extremely sensitive to the political implications and national interests that their actions, decisions, and mission accomplishments affect. A clear understanding of the population is the key terrain that defines a mission’s success or failure. Take Shelton’s relationship with Prado. I had a similar experience in Afghanistan.
Shinsha was my Afghan counterpart during my 2006 deployment. He had an avid interest in all things American as I did for things Afghan. He would come by my room to visit and we would sit and drink strong black or green tea called “chai” for hours talking about our families, where we would visit after the war, and our beloved Buzkashi. Buzkashi means “goat grabbing,” and is essentially like a violent combination of polo and the rodeo. It is especially associated with the northern Uzbek and Tajik tribes in Afghanistan, and it is considered to be the national sport of Afghanistan.
Shinsha had fought the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters since 1995 and the Soviets before that. He was a man who commanded and deserved respect. I knew that his friendship and support would allow my team to accomplish our mission. On one particular evening I had already spent the entire day in Kandahar City drinking chai with the provincial governor and was in no mood for any more. Knowing that I would be up all night anyway, I decided to introduce Shinsha to the wonderful world of espresso. Not long after his arrival, we began making the syrupy black concoction on my tiny machine. His expression after the first cup was like that of realizing he had been missing something awesome his whole life. He grew such an affinity for the teacup-sized liquid that he would sneak over to my room several times a week to get a shot of the boiling hot rocket fuel before going out on patrol.
After realizing that he would be going on leave soon to visit his family and see his son who would be playing in the upcoming season of buzkashi, I presented him with the best gift I had, my silver espresso maker and a large yellow coffee container of ground espresso. He nearly broke my ribs as he swooped the bag from my hand and headed north to Kabul. Nearly a month later Shinsha showed up at my door holding a large object wrapped in a wool blanket. Knowing I would never get to go to Kabul and physically see the game together with him, Shinsha had brought a saddle he had made for me. I had to promise that one day when the war was over, I would return to Afghanistan, if we were still alive, and play the great game of buzkashi with my old warrior and friend.
If the FID effort is a success, it essentially prevents the requirement for larger scale commitments of American military forces. By training the Second Bolivian Ranger Battalion to conduct basic combat operation and counterinsurgency, the United States would be able to assist Bolivia in building a partner and capabilities to deal with current and future internal threats.
Plans can be made, men organized and equipped but the actual culmination of training and the ultimate conduct of any mission and its success or failure ultimately rests squarely on the shoulders of the men responsible for executing it. The selection of a United States Special Forces team to train the newly established Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion was the right decision at the right time to deal with the growing threat. What made this mission work was the experience and maturity of the Special Forces team members and their commander.
Shelton was the kind of leader men aspire to be, past, present, and future, including myself. I had the honor of speaking with Pappy two years ago. I was in complete admiration of his selfless service to this country and his dedication to his team and their mission. Shelton was not willing to compromise his mission or his men for the sake of climbing the ladder or willing to make himself look good to get promoted. He was an old-school veteran of multiple conflicts who forced himself to master the basics and was driven to give himself the tools to succeed wherever his country sent him. To Pappy, the mission and the men came in that order, and he would do whatever was needed on the battlefield to ensure mission success, even if it meant going around, under, over, or through people who were obstacles.
Missions like this and men like Shelton should be celebrated and honored by those who have earned and worn the Green Beret because every day we are following in their footsteps.
Major Rusty Bradley
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
November 2012
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book was two years in the making.
We started and stopped many times before finally getting to work, but as with all books, the author is just a member of a bigger team. We want to thank a number of people who helped us along the way, including the historians before us who found and archived the necessary documents and accounts to tell this story.
We would like to thank Félix Rodríguez for allowing us to interview him for hours in Miami and then bombard him with follow-up questions. A special thanks to Gary Prado, who opened his home to us and helped us track down his unit mates in Bolivia. Prado’s book, as well as Rodríguez’s book, provided a wealth of information and only highlighted the stories told in the interviews.
There was no better guide and companion on a trip through the backcountry of Bolivia than Noah Friedman-Rudovsky. Without Noah, we’d have been as lost as Che. Thanks also to Judy Royal for the interview transcripts and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office, especially Carol Darby, for trying to dislodge some of their archived information. The professionals in that office truly serve the soldiers of that command.
Special thanks to Julie Reed and Rebekah Scott. Reed, an incredible researcher, helped track down critical documents. Scott provided insightful guidance and wisdom along the way.
We’d like to express our gratitude to our wives—Suzyn Weiss and Jessica Maurer. We spent many weeke
nds and long nights working on the book. Without your patience, love, and understanding, we could not have written the book.
Finally, none of our books exist without our agent, Scott Miller of Trident Media Group, who recognized the importance of this story, and thank you also to Penguin Group, especially Robin Barletta, for all the editorial support. Our editor, Natalee Rosenstein, continues to help refine our manuscripts and make them better. A writer’s best friend is a good editor, and Natalee has been that for us.
AUTHORS’ NOTE
This is the story of a group of extraordinary men who hunted down and captured one of the most feared revolutionaries of the late twentieth century.
The events depicted in this book are based on extensive interviews with key members of the team of Green Berets tasked with training the Bolivian Rangers for the hunt, the Ranger officer who captured Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and the CIA operative sent to gather intelligence for the Bolivian unit.
We reviewed thousands of pages of documents and photos from the National Archives and private collections. We also examined hundreds of news stories from the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Associated Press, among other media outlets. Many of the key characters in the story have written their own biographies, which were used to offer the reader an internal monologue or to help reconstruct conversations.
The narrative is intended to tell the story of how Che was captured and executed through the eyes of the American trainers. In lieu of adding footnotes that we felt would bog down the narrative flow of the book, we’ve included a detailed bibliography in the back for future reading.
As with many popular histories, people are familiar with the story, but few know the behind-the-scenes details. The hunt for Che, in some ways, reads like a 1960s spy novel. And the best part is the story is all true.
REFERENCES
BOOKS
Anderson, John Lee. Che Guevara. A Revolutionary Life. New York: Grove Press, 1997.
Castaneda, Jorge G. Companero. The Life and Death of Che Guevara. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997.
Castro, Fidel. Che. A Memoir. New York: Ocean Press, 2005.
Debray, Regis. Revolution in the Revolution. 1st edition. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
Escalante, Fabian. The Secret War: CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959–1962. New York: Ocean Press, 1995.
Farcau, Bruce. The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932–1935. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996.
Fontova, Humberto. Exposing the Real Che Guevara: And the Useful Idiots Who Idolize Him. Reprint edition. New York: Sentinel Trade, 2008.
Gotkowitz, Laura. A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880–1952. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.
Guevara, Che. The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara. 1st edition. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1994.
———. Guerrilla Warfare. 3rd edition. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1997.
———. The Motorcycle Diaries: Notes on a Latin American Journey. Sal Val, 2003.
Harris, Richard. Death of a Revolutionary. Che Guevara’s Last Mission. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2007.
John, Sandor S. Bolivia’s Radical Tradition: Permanent Revolution in the Andes. Reprint edition. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2012.
Klein, Herbert S. A Concise History of Bolivia. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Rasenberge, Jim. The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. Reprint edition. New York: Scribner, 2012.
Rodríguez, Félix, and John Weisman. Shadow Warrior: The CIA Hero of a Hundred Unknown Battles. 1st edition. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.
Ryan, Butterfield Henry. The Fall of Che Guevara: A Story of Soldiers, Spies and Diplomats. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Salmon, Gary Prado. The Defeat of Che Guevara. Military Response to Guerrilla Challenge in Bolivia. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1990.
Villoldo, Gustavo. Che Guevara. The End of a Myth. Rodes Printing, 1999.
ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS
After Action Report of MTT BL-404-67x.
Anti-Government Activity in Bolivia. CIA report, August 21, 1964.
Bolivian Demonstrations Most Serious in Fourteen Years. CIA report, October 30, 1964.
Bolivian Government Imposes Strict Control Over Opposition. CIA report, September 25, 1964.
Bolivian Junta Leader Prepares to Be Elected President. CIA report, January 15, 1965.
Bolivian Junta Moves to Win Public Support. CIA report, November 20, 1964.
Bolivian Junta Still In Control. CIA report, November 13, 1964.
Bolivian Power Struggle Threatens New Violence. CIA report, March 26, 1965.
Castro’s Excesses Alienating Other Latin American Countries. CIA report, November 19, 1959.
Increasing Difficulties of the Bolivian Government. CIA report, May 14, 1965.
Kornbluh, Peter. The Death of Che Guevara Declassified. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 5, 1997.
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Activation, Organization and Training of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, 1967.
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. This archive includes CIA, U.S. Army, Defense Department, and military intelligence files related to Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s guerrilla war in Bolivia and the U.S. government’s response.
National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
Pressure Growing for Bolivian Junta Chief’s Resignation. CIA report, March 19, 1965.
Situation and Prospects in Cuba. CIA report, August 5, 1964.
The Che Guevara Diary. CIA report, December, 1967.
The Crisis USSR/Cuba. CIA report, October 26, 1962.
The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution. CIA report, October 18, 1965.
The Situation in Bolivia. CIA report, September 14, 1967.
Threats to Barrientos Regime in Bolivia. CIA report, May 28, 1965.
Turmoil in Bolivia. CIA report, November 6, 1964.
Waghelstein, John D. A Theory of Revolutionary Warfare and Its Application to the Bolivian Adventure of Che Guevara. Master’s thesis. Cornell University, 1973.
PERIODICALS
“Bolivia: Operation Cynthia.” Time, July 1967.
“Bolivia: The Case of Regis Debray.” Time, September 1, 1967.
“Bolivia: Unwitting Betrayal.” Time, November, 1967.
“Cuba: Come Out, Come Out Wherever You Are.” Time, June 1965.
“Latin America: Elusive Guerrilla.” Time, September 29, 1967.
“Latin America: End of a Legend.” Time, October 20, 1967.
Moyano Martin, Dolores. “A Memoir of the Young Guevara.” New York Times Magazine, August 18, 1968.
Ray, Michele. “The Execution of Che by the CIA.” Ramparts, March 6, 1968.
Shelton, Ralph. “Advice for Advisers.” Infantry Magazine 54 (July/August 1964).
St. George, Andrew. “How the U.S. Got Che.” True, April 1969.
Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History, PB-31-05-2. Vol. 4, no. 4 (2008).
Waghelstein, John. “Che’s Bolivian Adventure.” Military Review 59, August 1979.
NEWSPAPERS
Associated Press
Miami Herald
New York Times
Reuters
Times (London)
United Press International
Washington Post
INDEX
The page numbers in this index refer to the printed version of this book. To find the corresponding locations in the text of this digital version, please use the “search” function on your e-reader. Note that not all terms may be
searchable.
Abra del Picacho, Bolivia, 197, 200
Abraham, Moises, 245
A Company, 189, 198, 199
Acuna Nunez, Juan Vitalio.
See Joaquin
Afghanistan, 266, 273–74, 275–76
Agency for International Development (AID), U.S., 96, 120
Aguirre Palma, Guillermo, 252
AID. See Agency for International Development, U.S.
Alamo, Texas, 157
Algeria, 30
Allende, Salvador, 265
Alliance for Progress, U.S., 40
Alto Seco, Bolivia, 188–89
Amezaga, Ruben, xiii, 12, 13, 26
Ammunition, 94–95, 124, 208
Anderson, Jack, 140
Anderson, Jon Lee, 270–71
Antennas, 209
Antivenom, 158
Antonio (Orlando Pantoja), x, 169, 227, 237
Argentina, 51, 142–43, 151
Army School of the Americas, 77
Arturo (Rene Martinez Tamayo), x, 227
Assassination, 21
Asthma, 247
Asylum, 133–34
Ayala, Jorge, xiv, 45
Ayoroa Montano, Miguel, xiii
Che and, 206, 218–19, 220, 221, 240
interrogation by, 191
B-26 bomber plane, 132
Barrientos Ortuno, René, xii
assassination attempt on, 21
Che and, 19–20, 22–23, 28–29, 108, 137, 140, 191–93, 227, 229–30, 251
coup by, 19, 21–22, 49–50, 92, 93
death of, 264
Debray and, 62, 63
early life of, 191–92
government under, 262
