by Dick Cheney
Despite the White House focus on timetables and numbers in early 2009, American military officials in Iraq knew the challenge was much tougher. One put it this way: “It is more than just a question of how fast and how low; it includes calculating how much risk you are willing to take in Iraq.” The risk was that a withdrawal based on U.S. political timetables instead of on conditions on the ground would leave Iraq unable to provide for her own security. Such a policy would sacrifice the gains for which so many Americans had fought and died, and leave a vacuum that al Qaeda and Iran would rush to fill.
In response to President Obama’s request for drawdown timetables, Ambassador Crocker and General Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, recommended a period of twenty-three months before the formal end of America’s combat operations. This would allow the maximum number of U.S. forces to remain in Iraq through the upcoming Iraqi presidential elections and enable the United States to maintain the maximum pressure on “extremist networks” that threatened the security of Iraq. Crocker and Odierno included a list of ten reasons why the twenty-three-month time frame was the most responsible approach. Among these, it “maintains the greater security presence through the window of greatest risk” and it provides “most effective pressure vs. AQI [al Qaeda in Iraq] and balances Iranian influence in Iraq, to best deny extremist organizations the ability to regenerate organizational capacities.”
In addition to the twenty-three-month timetable supported by Odierno and Crocker, the president considered two other options: the Obama campaign time frame of a sixteen-month drawdown and a compromise of nineteen months suggested by Secretary Gates, though neither of the shorter schedules had a military rationale. The president would also decide how many American troops to leave in place after the end of combat operations. General Odierno believed a residual American force of 50,000–55,000 troops would be necessary through the end of December 2011, when the existing Status of Forces Agreement expired. After that, the expectation was that a new SOFA would be negotiated to enable the United States to leave a stay-behind force in Iraq.
General Odierno and Ambassador Crocker also made the point that adopting a twenty-three-month drawdown schedule would enable the president to shift to either of the faster timetables if conditions on the ground warranted. There was no military necessity to make announcements about timetables at this point at all.
President Obama rejected the twenty-three-month timetable, the residual force of 50,000–55,000 through the end of 2011, and the advice that no immediate announcement on a timetable was militarily necessary.
On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune, President Obama lauded the “relative peace” and substantial reduction in violence in Iraq brought about by the surge, though he did not credit the surge, likely because he had opposed it. He also said that al Qaeda had “been dealt a serious blow.” Therefore, he announced, he would be removing all American combat brigades from Iraq over the next eighteen months. “Let me say this as plainly as I can, by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.” Having decided on a faster drawdown than the one recommended by his commander in the field, the president then announced that after the combat brigades were withdrawn, he would leave 35,000–50,000 troops in Iraq until the end of 2011. At that point, he explained, “I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.”
President Obama also announced at Camp Lejeune that he was appointing Chris Hill to be America’s new ambassador to Iraq. It was a perplexing choice. In Hill’s last diplomatic assignment, he had been responsible for the disastrous nuclear negotiations with North Korea, which the North Koreans used to buy time as they developed their massive uranium enrichment program. Hill had no experience working in the Middle East and no apparent understanding of the importance of actively engaging with the Iraqis to ensure a stable government would be left behind once American forces withdrew. He informed General Odierno that from here on Iraq would be treated like any other sovereign country, and America’s diplomats and military leaders should not attempt to try to shape its future. By early 2010, things had deteriorated to the point that America’s military leaders believed Hill was spending more time tracking which Iraqis the military met with than actually meeting with Iraqis himself.
Sixteen months later Hill left Iraq. “The most merciful comment I can make,” said Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the former Iraqi national security advisor, “is that Chris Hill’s legacy in his time here was uneventful, from the American government’s side, while Iraq was full of events. He was a traditional diplomat with no experience in the Middle East, the Islamic world or Iraq. . . .” Hill did accomplish one thing. According to Emma Sky, a British advisor to General Odierno, Hill was reportedly determined to ensure that the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad had grass. “Great rolls of lawn turf were brought in . . . and took root,” wrote Sky. “There was now grass on which the ambassador could play lacrosse.”
As the Obama administration began its withdrawal and shifted its focus elsewhere, Iraqi officials expressed concern about America’s dwindling commitment to Iraq. The concerns ranged from who would fill the vacuum if American forces withdrew completely, to worries that President Obama’s renewed engagement with Iran would come at Iraq’s expense. In May 2009, Iraqi vice president Tariq al-Hashemi told visiting U.S. diplomats that he was worried about the “pervasive Iranian influence in both the security and political arenas” in Iraq, and he said he “hoped that the US Government was not sacrificing its interest in Iraq for its growing interest in Iran.” Hashemi’s chief of staff noted that Iraq was not yet a sovereign state, but a “collection of competing interests in a state-like environment.” He said, “Iran understands this and is in Iraq for the long-term, whereas the U.S. is only here for the short term.”
As the meeting concluded, the Iraqi vice president asked once again what would fill the vacuum when American troops left. Undersecretary Bill Burns, according to the embassy’s report of the meeting, “reiterated that the U.S. is determined to keep its commitments to Iraq, build strong political and security institutions, and will not exchange Iraq’s security as part of discussions with Iran.” Sadly, President Obama would walk away from just those commitments over the next few years.
On August 12, 2010, the Iraqi Army chief of staff was even more direct about what the security of his country required. Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari told a London newspaper that the Iraqi Army would not be ready to protect the nation until 2020 and that they would need support from U.S. troops until then.
In a speech from the Oval Office on August 31, 2010, President Obama announced the end of American combat operations in Iraq. It was time, he said, for us to turn our attention to problems at home and to the war in Afghanistan, where, he said, “al Qaeda continues to plot against us, and its leadership remains anchored in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We will disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, while preventing Afghanistan from serving as a base for terrorists.” But, as important as the war in Afghanistan was, we were going to fight it only for the next year. “Next August,” he explained, “we will begin a transition to Afghan responsibility.”
In case America’s withdrawal from the field of battle looked to the world like a defeat, President Obama offered this: “In an age without surrender ceremonies, we must earn victory through the success of our partners and the strength of our own nation.” He could hardly have been more wrong. In an age of terror, America must earn victory by defeating the terrorists, not by ceding them large swaths of territory and resources.
As 2011 opened, President Obama had to determine what size residual force the United States would leave in Iraq after the current Status of Forces Agreement expired in December. America’s new commander in Iraq, General Lloyd Austin, recommended a force of between 20,000 and 24,000. The White House said that was too large. General Austin then recommended 19,000, with two other options for 16,000 troops with different glide paths for withdrawal. Again, the White House said no. The presid
ent decided, based on no military rationale, that he was prepared to leave behind no more than 3,500 troops. In addition, the United States would insist that any new Status of Forces Agreement would have to be approved by the Iraqi parliament. In light of the political atmosphere in Baghdad at the time, this was essentially a poison pill.
Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki suggested a memorandum of understanding or an executive agreement that would not require the politically impossible step on which Obama was insisting. The White House said no. In the end, the number of troops President Obama was willing to consider in a stay-behind force was too small to protect America’s interests or Iraq’s security. Maliki was being asked to take a big political risk—seeking parliamentary approval—for minimal security gain. The deal fell apart.
America’s commitment to Iraq’s security was now being replaced by something else. In a joint press conference with Maliki on December 12, 2011, Obama said America and Iraq would be “partnering for our shared security.” This did not mean “stationing American troops there or with U.S. bases in Iraq,” President Obama was quick to add. “Those days are over.” What America would be doing, among other things, would be establishing “a new formal channel of communication between our national security advisors.” In addition, America and Iraq would be “partnering for regional security.” The president didn’t offer any details, but he did issue an edict. “Just as Iraq has pledged not to interfere in other nations,” he said, “other nations must not interfere in Iraq. Iraq’s sovereignty must be respected.”
President Obama still seemed not to understand that words divorced from action cannot defeat a determined enemy.
On December 14, 2011, the president visited Fort Bragg to commemorate the end of the war in Iraq. America’s withdrawal was “a moment of success,” he said.
Now, Iraq is not a perfect place. It has many challenges ahead. But we’re leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people. We’re building a new partnership between our nations. And we are ending a war not with a final battle but with a final march toward home.
When President Obama arrived in office, Iraq was stable, largely because of the surge of forces and the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy ordered by George W. Bush, but that stability would not last long. On December 17, 2011, at 0230 hours, the last American ground convoy left Iraq.
A senior Obama administration official interviewed by Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor for their book The Endgame explained:
[W]e came to the conclusion that achieving the goal of a security partnership with Iraq was not dependent on the size of our footprint in country, and that stability in Iraq did not depend on the presence of the U.S. forces.
It was a convenient conclusion, and it was wrong. Though the Iraqis themselves certainly bear a portion of the responsibility for the failure to secure a new Status of Forces Agreement, it is clear President Obama did not want to leave any American forces in Iraq.
He has since tried to deny this—as terror and destruction spread across Iraq in the wake of America’s complete withdrawal. President Obama has tried to assert that the troop withdrawal wasn’t his plan after all. Most memorably, in an appearance on the South Lawn of the White House in August 2014, the president was asked whether, in light of the rise of ISIS and the violence spreading across Iraq and Syria, it might not have been better to have left some U.S. troops in Iraq. “You know,” he said, “the thing I find interesting about this, is that people are acting as though it were my decision.”
The president seemed to have forgotten his repeated claims of credit for the removal of all U.S. forces from Iraq, beginning with his announcement of the end of combat operations in a speech from the Oval Office in October 2011. “After taking office,” he explained, “I announced a new strategy that would end our combat mission in Iraq and remove all of our troops by the end of 2011. . . . So, today, I can report that, as promised, the rest of our troops in Iraq will come home by the end of the year.”
Obama similarly took credit for removing all U.S. forces nearly every day of the 2012 presidential election campaign. During a debate with his Republican opponent, former governor Mitt Romney, on October 22, 2012, President Obama criticized him for asserting that America should have left a stay-behind force. “Now you just gave a speech in which you said we should still have troops in Iraq. That’s not a recipe for making sure we are taking advantage of the opportunity and meeting the challenges of the Middle East.”
In his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, President Obama heralded all he had done to end war, and explained what this new era would mean for America:
Ending the war in Iraq has allowed us to strike decisive blows against our enemies. From Pakistan to Yemen, the al Qaeda operatives who remain are scrambling, knowing they can’t escape the reach of the United States of America.
He wrapped our exit from Iraq in a glossy metaphor:
As the tide of war recedes, a wave of change has washed across the Middle East and North Africa, from Tunis to Cairo; from Sana’a to Tripoli.
There was indeed a wave of change washing across the Arab world. Tragically, it would be led by thousands of militant Islamist terrorists marching under the black banners of al Qaeda and ISIS.
AFGHANISTAN
In 2008, candidate Barack Obama left no uncertainty as to his position on the war in Afghanistan. In a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars that August, he said:
This is the central front in the war on terrorism. This is where the Taliban is gaining strength and launching new attacks. . . . This is a war we have to win. And as commander in chief, I will have no greater priority than taking out these terrorists who threaten America, and finishing the job against the Taliban.
At about that time, work was under way in the Bush White House from which President Obama and his team would benefit. In the fall of 2008, President Bush ordered “a quiet surge” of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan. At the same time, he instructed the National Security Council to conduct a review of Afghan policy and provide recommendations for the road ahead. Simultaneous reviews were under way at the State Department, Defense Department, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
President-elect Obama and his national security team were briefed on the findings and recommendations of these reviews early in the transition process. The incoming national security advisor, General Jim Jones, asked that the Bush administration not announce the findings of their policy review publicly and President Bush agreed. He wanted to give the incoming team every opportunity to succeed.
In March 2009, when President Obama launched his new Afghanistan strategy, which included additional troops and a focus on counterinsurgency, it bore a striking resemblance to the review and findings the Bush team had provided. In a speech from the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the president told the American people what was at stake:
We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists. So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.
To complete this mission, President Obama had ordered the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. In May 2009, he appointed General Stanley McChrystal to take over command of U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates instructed McChrystal to undertake a sixty-day assessment of the situation on the ground before making any requests or recommendations for resources.
General McChrystal submitted his findings on August 30. He urged immediate action. “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months)—while Afghan security
capacity matures,” he wrote, “risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” It was also crucial that the president dedicate the necessary resources to the fight. “Failure to provide adequate resources,” McChrystal’s report concluded, “also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure.” General McChrystal assessed he would need an additional 40,000 troops to accomplish the mission President Obama had given the military. McChrystal wrote later that he viewed the troop calculation not as a “request” but as providing his “best military advice to the commander in chief.”
Having told the American people for the last two years that he was dedicated to doing everything it took to win in Afghanistan, and having already established the mission in March 2009, the Obama administration nonetheless took months debating McChrystal’s assessment and troop request. As Secretary of Defense Gates described it, “Over and over again we would rehash the issues and get further into the weeds—details beyond what was needed or appropriate.”
Ultimately, the president decided to send 30,000 additional troops. At least one of the reasons he did not grant the full troop request was political. During one of the meetings to discuss the troop levels, according to former secretary of defense Gates, the president had said, “On Afghanistan, my poll numbers will be stronger if I take issue with the military over Afghanistan policy.”
President Obama announced his decision in a speech on December 1, 2009, at West Point. He explained all that was at stake. America’s security, “the security of our allies, and the common security of the world,” he said, depended upon denying al Qaeda a safe haven and reversing the Taliban’s momentum. And then, in what may be the most ambivalent presidential call to arms in history, he said, “As commander in chief, I have determined that it is in our national interest to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.” In case the Taliban or al Qaeda or our allies didn’t catch this first reference to a timetable, a few paragraphs later the president said we would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.” After telling the world that this was a war of necessity, not a war of choice, Barack Obama was now announcing he would be fighting it only for the next eighteen months.
