by Dick Cheney
The president has also agreed as part of this deal to remove restrictions on those who facilitated, over the last thirty-five years, Iran’s efforts to gain a nuclear weapon. In particular, he has agreed to remove sanctions on individuals who were at the heart of the worst nuclear proliferation network in history, the A. Q. Khan network. In a little-noticed action on April 3, 2015, the day after the outlines of the framework agreement were announced, the U.S. Treasury Department lifted sanctions on B.S.A. Tahir, the man who met the Iranians in the Dubai hotel with the briefcase full of centrifuge designs in 1987. Tahir was the point man, providing technology and centrifuge parts as the Iranians built their illicit nuclear program. He was the CEO, CFO, COO, chief money-launderer, and right-hand man for A. Q. Khan and his global proliferation network. In the deal announced on July 14, 2015, sanctions were also lifted on Gerhard Wisser, another of the key suppliers for Iran in A. Q. Khan’s network. Why would President Obama, who claims to want to halt proliferation, lift sanctions on two of the world’s worst offenders? Obviously, it was an Iranian demand as part of the deal, and there seems to be no limit to President Obama’s appetite for concessions.
The president has said repeatedly that he is committed to stopping Iran’s support for terror and its destabilizing activities across the Middle East. Instead, he now seems intent on ushering in an era of Iran as a political, economic, and military power. Not only has he been unwilling to take action against Iran’s interests in the Middle East, he seems to have convinced himself that it is in America’s interest for Iran to play a dominant role in the region. And the concessions he has granted in this agreement enhance their ability to do so.
One principle the president has lived up to is something he announced in his June 2009 Cairo speech. “No single nation,” he said, “should pick and choose which nations hold nuclear weapons.” It is as though President Obama sees no moral difference between an Iranian nuclear weapon and an American one. The agreement he approved in July 2015 cedes our right to keep the world’s greatest state sponsor of terror from obtaining the world’s worst weapons.
President Obama told us no deal is better than a bad deal. Now he tells us this deal, which is so bad it guarantees the very things he said he was trying to prevent, is the only option. There was another option: America could have negotiated from a position of strength. The president could have left the sanctions in place instead of releasing the pressure just as Iran was beginning to feel the impact. He could have left the military option on the table instead of announcing in May 2015 that there was no workable military solution. He could have recognized that the credible threat of war makes war less, not more, likely. He could have learned from the example of Ronald Reagan’s negotiations with the Soviets at Reykjavik that no deal really is better than a bad deal, and some things cannot be conceded. He could have stood firm for the principle that Iran must not have a nuclear weapon. He could have secured a deal that enhanced America’s security. Instead, he agreed to one that puts us at risk.
The Obama nuclear agreement with Iran is tragically reminiscent of Prime Minister Chamberlain’s Munich agreement. Both were negotiated from a position of weakness and conceded nearly everything to appease an ideological dictator. Hitler got Czechoslovakia. The mullahs in Tehran get billions of dollars and a pathway to a nuclear arsenal.
The July 14, 2015, agreement jettisons forty years of an international arms control regime, guts the United Nations Security Council’s ability to restrict Iran’s nuclear weapons program, ends prohibitions on Tehran’s ability to build ballistic missiles to carry their nuclear warheads, lifts the embargo on the import of conventional weapons Iran uses and supplies to terrorists around the globe, and removes sanctions that have limited the ability of the IRGC to proliferate nuclear technology, support terror, and kill Americans. Munich led to World War II. The Obama agreement will lead to a nuclear-armed Iran, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and more than likely, the first use of a nuclear weapon since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
RUSSIA
ON APRIL 25, 2005, Vladimir Putin delivered the Russian equivalent of a State of the Union address—his annual speech to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Speaking of the challenges facing Russia, he said it was necessary to consider Russia’s recent history. “Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.” Where most saw the triumph of freedom over tyranny, Putin saw geopolitical disaster. He has spent his years in office trying to restore what he believes Russia lost.
With bullying, extortion, blackmail, covert operations, the threat of nuclear strikes, and outright military invasion, Putin is desperately trying to reestablish Russia as a global power and reimpose Russian dominance over large swaths of Europe. The sovereignty of his neighbors is of little concern to him. Under the pretext of coming to the aid of Russian-speaking populations, Putin is using force to redraw the map of Europe. In the early years of the Obama administration, President Obama and Secretary Clinton were either unable or unwilling to recognize Putin’s true intentions. When those intentions turned into actions, President Obama consistently failed to take any meaningful steps to stop him.
President Obama’s approach to Russia began where his approach to Iran did—with the assumption that America was to blame for the tensions in the relationship. The problem was not Vladimir Putin’s behavior but rather George Bush’s. To drive this point home, and signal a time of new beginnings, Secretary of State Clinton presented Russian foreign minister Lavrov with the now-infamous “reset” button in front of the world’s press in Geneva in March 2009. The button was a grand gesture, presented in a box tied up with a bow. After he opened the box, Lavrov looked down on the button as the cameras rolled. “You got it wrong,” he said. The label on the button said “overcharge,” not “reset.” Later, Secretary Clinton’s staff chased down the Russian delegation pleading with them to allow the Americans to fix the label.
The translation mistake could have happened to anyone. Secretary Clinton has explained that it was really the thought that counted, the policy behind the “reset” button. Unfortunately, the policy was as flawed as the translation on the label.
President Obama visited Moscow in July 2009. In a speech at the New Economic School, he described the world of the Cold War:
At that time, the American and Soviet armies were still massed in Europe, trained and ready to fight. The ideological trenches of the last century were roughly in place. Competition in everything from astrophysics to athletics was treated as a zero-sum game. If one person won, then the other had to lose.
It’s the perfect picture of a world divided between two morally equivalent powers dug in to their individual “ideological trenches,” conveniently leaving out that only one side oppressed, terrorized, built walls, and killed to keep its people within its borders. The Cold War, as Obama told it in Moscow that day, wasn’t won or lost. It “reached a conclusion.”
Twenty years later, Obama continued, America now rejected the idea of powerful nations leading a global world order. “As I said in Cairo, given our interdependence any world order that elevates one nation or one group of people over another will inevitably fail. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game—progress must be shared.” In this new world, governed by an idealized “international system,” Obama explained, “rules must be binding, violations must be punished, and words must mean something.”
Obama’s vision was simultaneously prescriptive and passive—these things all “must” happen, yet there is no mention of who will make them happen. “Progress must be shared”; states that attempt to dominate others “will inevitably fail.” There was no recognition, and worse, no apparent understanding, that the triumph of freedom was the result of the actions of free nations—especially the United States. The Cold War simply “reached a conclusion,” like a lecture does, or a particularly boring book. The president’s failure to understand this fundamental truth—that fre
edom must be defended and America must lead that defense—has been the fatal flaw in his policies. It was on full display that day at the New Economic School in Moscow.
After serving two terms as Russia’s president from 2000 to 2008, Vladimir Putin was prevented by the Russian constitution from serving a third. When Obama visited Moscow in the summer of 2009, Putin had stepped aside as president, although he was still running the country, and he hosted Obama at his country house outside Moscow.
The meeting opened with a lecture from Putin on America’s misconduct and lies. Then he moved on to Russia’s role in Europe. Putin had launched his efforts to regain lost Soviet territory with the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and now he demanded that the United States recognize Russia’s sphere of influence over all the former Soviet republics. U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul called Putin’s lecture “grossly inaccurate,” adding, “but that’s his theory of the world.”
President Obama was nevertheless anxious to further the “reset” of the relationship. This meant eliminating irritants. The missile defense system planned for Poland and the Czech Republic was at the top of this list. In his speech at the New Economic School, the president acknowledged Russia’s concerns and announced that the United States would be undertaking a review of the plans.
America’s new Russia policy was causing grave concern in Central and Eastern Europe. As President Obama’s trip to Moscow came to an end, twenty-two former heads of state, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and scholars from Central and Eastern Europe published an open letter to the American president. They urged that America not walk away from Europe or give in to Russian bullying. “Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States,” it began:
Many of us know firsthand how important your support for our freedom and independence was during the Cold War years. U.S. engagement and support was essential for the success of our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty years ago. Without Washington’s vision and leadership, it is doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.
It was critically important, they continued, that America “reaffirm its vocation as a European power and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on the continent.” The free nations of Europe faced many challenges. Russia was at the top of the list. They were under no illusions as to Russia’s plans. America shouldn’t be, either. The leaders explained:
Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th century agenda with 21st century tactics. . . . It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.
They stressed the critical importance of the planned missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. The system had become “a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region.” Despite Russia’s objections to the system, they wrote:
The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia’s strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic plusses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations. The Alliance should not allow the issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition. Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the United States across the whole region.
President Obama sided with the Russians. On September 17, 2009, he announced he was canceling the installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Both the Poles and the Czechs had expended significant political capital to secure parliamentary approval for the systems. They had been assured the project would proceed. “We heard first from the media,” said Witold Waszczykowski, deputy in Poland’s national security bureau. Poland’s prime minister was so angry about the cancellation that he refused to take President Obama’s call, which came at midnight Poland time. Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski spoke for many when he was overheard saying, “The Polish-American alliance is worthless, even harmful, as it gives Poland a false sense of security.”
The president has been willing to gamble not just the security of our allies, but of the United States as well, by appeasing the Russians with regard to missile defense. On Monday, March 26, 2012, President Obama was caught on an open microphone making what he thought were private comments to Russian president Medvedev: “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved, but it’s important for [Putin] to give me space.” Putin had just been elected to return to the Russian presidency. “This is my last election,” Obama continued. “After my election I have more flexibility.” Medvedev replied, “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir.” In this case, Obama was good for his word. The following year, six weeks after President Obama was sworn in for his second term, the United States announced it was canceling the final stage of the European missile defense program the Russians had so strenuously opposed.
Three months later, Russian president Vladimir Putin welcomed Edward Snowden to Moscow, granting asylum to the traitor responsible for one of the greatest thefts of American intelligence in history. Whether Snowden was a Russian operative at the time he stole the U.S. secrets is the subject of debate, although it is hard to conceive of his landing in Moscow as a coincidence. What is clear is that he is fully Putin’s tool now. On April 18, 2014, Snowden participated in one of Putin’s government-controlled television shows. He “called in” to ask Putin, “Does Russia engage in mass surveillance of its population?” Of course not, Putin answered. Those who herald Snowden as a hero fighting for freedom ought to consider the propaganda services he is now providing for a man who, among other things, routinely has journalists and political opponents murdered.
A CENTERPIECE OF PRESIDENT Obama’s reset with the Russians and of his efforts to reduce America’s strategic nuclear arsenal was the New START Treaty he signed with Russian president Medvedev in Prague in April 2010. The original START Treaty, signed in 1991 by President George H. W. Bush and Soviet premier Gorbachev, had expired in 2009. The Obama administration heralded New START as a “serious step” toward achieving the president’s announced goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
Secretary Hillary Clinton described all the treaty would accomplish in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace in October 2009. In those early days of the administration, when promises were made and performance remained to be judged, she laid out lofty goals for this treaty. By reducing our nuclear arsenal, it would “bolster our national security.” By setting “the stage for even deeper cuts,” New START would make us even safer in the future. We had more nuclear weapons than we needed anyway, she said—“nuclear weapons in excess of our security needs,” as she put it. Staying at those numbers would only “give other countries the motivation or excuse to pursue their own nuclear weapons.” Reducing them would help us “build trust and avoid surprises.”
It is not clear on what basis Secretary Clinton determined that cutting our arsenal would make us safer or that our nuclear forces were “in excess of our security needs.” There had been no strategic review supporting this conclusion. A few months later, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Kevin Chilton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, addressed the size of our arsenal:
I do not agree that [the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal] is more than is needed. I think the arsenal we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. And I say this in light of—when we talk about the non-deployed portion of the arsenal—it
is sized to be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the current deployed arsenal and any geopolitical concerns that might . . . cause us to need more weapons deployed.
The assertion about America’s “excess” nuclear weapons was crafted to support President Obama’s goal of getting to nuclear zero. Cutting America’s arsenal through reductions adopted in New START was the easiest place to begin.
The Obama administration claimed that Russian nuclear forces would be reduced by a third as a result of the treaty. Instead, the Russians have used the years since the treaty was signed to increase spending on and modernization of their nuclear forces. As a result of the treaty, Russia now has more strategic warheads deployed than the United States does. Contrary to Secretary Clinton’s promise of verifiable reductions that would build mutual trust, inspections have been tightly managed by the Russians and are far from go-anywhere-anytime.
While the United States has been reducing its nuclear arsenal, the Russians have also been violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed by President Reagan and Soviet premier Gorbachev in 1987, by testing missiles prohibited by the treaty. Secretary Kerry was reportedly briefed on the cheating in November 2012 when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The United States at first attempted to ignore the violations, then deal with them privately. The Russians, predictably, have denied the cheating and resisted all entreaties, including from President Obama, to stop cheating and comply with their treaty obligations.
