Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Of more influence were the two military instructors who oversaw the physical aspect of Alexander’s education. These were Leonidas and Lysimachus, disciplinarians who certainly instilled in him toughness of mind and body. Most of his military acumen, however, came from his father. Philip showed remarkable confidence in his son from an early age: at sixteen, Alexander was given trusteeship of the throne while his father was off campaigning. During that period, Alexander (with the assistance of one of Philip’s generals, Antipater) was involved in suppressing a rebellion of the Maedi tribe in Thrace. He also established his first of many cities, Alexandropolis. In a society that valued military skills, Alexander’s combat served not only to give him experience but also to show his mettle to the army, in whose ultimate control the kingship rested.

  Alexander’s last successful operation he shared with his father was the Battle of Chaeronea in Boeotia in 338 BC. He led the Companion cavalry (the chief Macedonian cavalry force) in the attack that destroyed the elite Sacred Band of Thebes, broke the enemy line, and as a result broke the power of Athens and Thebes. As that victory was bringing about a unification of Greece under Macedonian authority, however, a new marriage was creating division between father and son; Philip married a Macedonian princess. Olympias, long out of favor, became enraged. A son from that union would be seen by the upper classes as more fitting for the throne than one from marriage to a foreigner. For a time Alexander and Philip were estranged, and they never reestablished any sort of bond.

  Successful as he had been on the battlefield, Philip was better still as a grand strategist and politician. He had manipulated potential enemies and friends with a combination of the carrot and the stick. As his army became more successful, it grew in numbers and skill so that success began to feed off itself. By the time Alexander was reaching his teens, Philip had created the finest military in the Hellenic world. He also had reached a dominant political position over the Greek city-states and created the Hellenic League, whose goal was to invade the Persian Empire and punish the Persians for their attacks on Greece a century and a half earlier. Philip therefore provided Alexander not only with a first-class military but also with a united Greece from which to draw support for implementing a generations-old dream: the invasion of Persia.

  When Philip was assassinated in 336 BC, the army proclaimed Alexander king; he soon eliminated any potential rivals. After suppressing rebellions both in the north and in Greece, Alexander finally set about finishing the work his father had started.

  Warfare of the Time

  IT IS THE ARMY ITSELF that was Philip’s greatest gift to his son. As a teenager, Philip had been a hostage in Thebes in the time between the great battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, and he undoubtedly absorbed many of his views on developing an army from the men around Epaminondas.3 Once Philip assumed the throne in 359 BC, he began serious reforms within the Macedonian military. Macedon, like Thebes, had been a territory often crossed by passing armies, which had kept it sufficiently disorganized that it never was a serious threat to its neighbors. Philip changed that. Distancing himself from the long-standing view that military service was a duty of citizenship to be provided in times of emergency, Philip accorded it high social status. The state began providing more materiel, as well as land grants for meritorious service, and this produced eager soldiers. “Judging by results,” notes military historian G. T. Griffith, “few generals ever did more to change the face of his own times and to throw a shadow over the future.”4

  The army Philip created was based on cooperation between infantry and cavalry, but his main deviation from the existing order of battle was to make the cavalry the shock troops, rather than the phalanx. While the practice of “combined arms” had been used before, Philip made it the central aspect of his army. The phalanx still existed and was still important, but it was different from what had been employed up to this time. Philip dictated lighter armor for easier maneuvering, and nearly doubled the length of the spear, making it between fifteen and eighteen feet. This new spear, the sarissa, made it virtually impossible for the standard Greek phalanx to close in during battle. If that happened, the longer reach of the sarissa meant that men farther back in the ranks could use it, creating a numerical advantage in a melee. It was also carried and used underhanded, rather than over the shield as was traditional. The standard Macedonian phalanx was deployed sixteen files wide and sixteen ranks deep.

  By raising a standing army, Philip made sure that the men were in continuous training. Three advantages resulted from his changes. “First,” writes Eugene N. Borza in an influential article, “in an age in which troops may have been expected to arm themselves, the property requirements necessary for Macedonian military service would have been relatively small, so that troops could be drawn from a broader population. Second, the longer sarissa enabled the Macedonian infantryman to engage in battle beyond the range of his enemy’s spear. And third, the lighter shield and body armor freed both hands to manipulate his long main weapon.”5 Some military historians have seen no advantage to the adapted formation, such as Hans Delbruck, who argues it was “more cumbersome than the old one, fell more easily into disarray, and was still more sensitive on its flanks.”6 This is a minority opinion, however, given Philip’s and Alexander’s successes. Most have recognized the transformative evolution of the Macedonian infantry under Philip II, which got somewhat lighter, but with greater reach. As Archer Jones has noted, “The Macedonians made a virtue of the tactical innovation of the long spear and drilled their phalanx of professional soldiers so that it could function as a unit. In addition, they subdivided their troops, giving some articulation and maneuverability to an inherently unwieldy formation.”7

  Another of Philip’s innovations was the hypaspists. There is debate over whether these soldiers were an elite infantry force (possible, considering Philip led them at Chaeronea) or a light infantry unit meant to fill the gap between the phalanx and the peltasts, the lightly armed missile-firing troops. Some argue that they were armed like the traditional Greek hoplite, with a spear rather than the sarissa, so they could be used as a more mobile force. A portion of the hypaspists have also been mentioned as acting as a personal bodyguard for Alexander.8 Having started his military career in battles against guerrilla forces in the Illyrian hills, Philip had learned the value of light troops and incorporated them into his army. Before him the light infantry had mainly played a prebattle harassment role, but Philip expanded these troops into a part of the Macedonian army equal in value to the rest.9

  Only in central Greece, around Thebes and Thessaly, had horse raising been possible, so cavalry to the Greeks was by necessity less important to warfare. However, by establishing cavalry (hippeis) as the primary force, Philip took advantage of the equine resources of Macedon. He opened up the cavalry to all comers, rewarding loyalty and ability over origins. Philip paid his horsemen with land rather than money. As his kingdom expanded the amount of land he could award grew, so the number of horsemen grew as well.10 From the time of Philip’s accession in 359 BC until his death, the Macedonian cavalry forces grew from 600 to more than 3,000.

  The horsemen used a shorter sarissa, about nine feet long, with a foot-long spear point on both ends. This allowed them to stab in both directions during a melee and to continue to use the weapon even if it broke. It was also light enough to use as a throwing weapon. If the sarissa was gone, the cavalrymen still carried the curved, single-edged sword, the kopis. They also wore helmets and armor. Philip developed a cavalry wedge formation designed to penetrate an enemy line, then widen the break as the wedge rode deeper into the foe. The standard unit was 200 men (when made up of foreign troops, who were seen as more expendable) and 300 in the Companions. There were also light cavalry units, numbering about 400 horsemen in each, used primarily for scouting but also occasionally in combat. Their sarissa was the same length as that carried by the infantry and weighed twelve to fourteen pounds.

  The use of cavalry as shock troops may seem on
the surface to be obvious, but there was one major problem: the stirrup had not yet been invented. The stirrup allows horsemen to remain mounted when they hit the enemy line; without it, one has to depend on muscles in the thighs. The horse’s weight as much as the man and weapon made the cavalry functional for shock. Nonetheless, Philip’s formations were effective, and were the centerpiece of his combat tactics.

  The Persians, Macedon’s foremost enemy, also used a system of combined arms, which included a far greater number of missile weapons: bows and arrows, javelins, and slings. Owing to its massive empire, the Persians could draw on a large population with a variety of local weapons and skills. Their cavalry was mostly light and not used for shock—they used javelins or bows as their main weapon. The Persian infantryman wore no armor, just a padded uniform. His weapons were much the same as the Greek hoplite: a round shield and a nine- to ten-foot spear.

  The strength of the Persian army seemed mainly to be its numbers, although its leaders had upgraded their infantry since the Greco-Persian wars of the early fifth century with the introduction of new units called cardaces. Modern scholarship continues to debate the exact nature of these units, about which little is known for sure.11 Some argue that they were possibly peltasts.12 Others say they were heavily protected heavy infantry.13 Some have suggested that they probably had bow and arrows, and were formed in a remarkably deep phalanx.14 One view has it is that they were Iranian youths who were undergoing military training.15

  Greek mercenaries also played a key role in the Persian military, reflecting the Persians’ openness to taking advantage of the martial skills of each nation into which they came in contact.16 Thus, the Persian army was polyglot, but one that was multitalented and flexible. The core of the army, however, was made up of “homeland” Persians and Medes, who had a vast amount of experience in suppressing rebellions and defending the frontiers. They may not have faced great adversaries, but they were veterans nonetheless.

  The Opponents

  AT THE TIME OF THE MACEDONIAN INVASION of the Persian Empire in 334 BC, Darius III was on the Persian throne. He was probably born a provincial satrap in Armenia (where he may have taken the Persian name “Artaŝātu”), and his rise to power has been a subject of debate. The first-century BC Greek historian Diodorus Siculus wrote that a eunuch of the royal court named Bagoas poisoned Artaxerxes III, leading to the short reign of the child Artaxerxes IV, who was also poisoned when Bagoas could not control him. (Recently translated contemporary cuneiform tablets, however, dispute Diodorus and claim that Artaxerxes III died of natural causes.)17 Bagoas, still looking for an easy-to-manipulate king, put the possibly distant relative Artaŝātu on the throne.18 Finding him also intractable, Bagoas went for poison once again, but his plot was discovered and he was forced to drink it himself. Artaŝātu rose to the throne in 336 BC and took the regal name Darius III.

  Diodorus claims that Darius was well known for his bravery in battle, and therefore was acceptable to the empire’s population. Egypt had revolted before Darius came to the throne, and his first order of business was to restore the empire’s power in North Africa. He did so in 334 BC, but it was to be his last accomplishment; after that, he had to deal with Alexander’s invasion.19

  Alexander quickly proved himself to be his father’s son. The Hellenic League that Philip had created immediately began showing signs of dissolution, with resistance led by Philip’s and Alexander’s constant Athenian nemesis, Demosthenes. Almost before any of Macedon’s tributaries could ponder revolt, however, Alexander marched his armies throughout the region and crushed any nascent uprising. With order restored, he directed the allied forces toward Persia.20

  Philip’s best and most favored general, Parmenio, had been holding the straits at the Hellespont since the time of Philip’s death. Thus, in 334 BC Alexander’s army moved into Asia Minor and began liberating cities along the seaboard that were ethnically Greek. Regional satraps, unwilling to lose their authority, gathered an army—smaller than Alexander’s—to oppose him. Placing themselves astride his line of march, they prepared to face Alexander at the River Granicus, near Troy.

  The Granicus was probably no more than five meters wide, but had steep banks on both sides. Alexander deployed his forces in what would become the standard formation for decades to come: heavy infantry phalanxes in the center and cavalry forces on the flanks. The Persians lined up their entire cavalry force along the river bank, with their infantry force of 4,000 to 5,000 Greek mercenaries behind. No one who has studied the battle can quite fathom the rationale behind this deployment. Parmenio commanded the left while Alexander (with the Companion cavalry) was on the right. Alexander sent in a squadron of his Companion cavalry with some light infantry toward the left center of the Persian line. They were quickly beaten (possibly Alexander’s intention) and in their retreat provoked the Persian left-flank units into pursuit. This exposed the rest of the Persian line: Alexander’s cavalry, in an echelon formation—meaning arranged diagonally, like steps in a ladder—crossed the river and fell on the exposed flank. Alexander’s own unit struck the commander’s bodyguard. In hand-to-hand fighting Alexander killed a number of men and received a crashing axe blow to his helmet from which he apparently soon recovered. This first encounter with Persian troops showed that Alexander’s taste for leading from the front, which he had showed at Chaeronea, had not changed.21

  The Battle of Issus

  AFTER THE GRANICUS BATTLE, Alexander continued liberating Greek cities and capturing Persian ones, establishing bases of operations and supply.22 With Asia Minor secure, Alexander moved toward Syria. His intent was to cripple the Persian navy, which was stronger than his own, by capturing all the coastal cities and denying the enemy fleets any harbors. Meanwhile, hearing of his subordinates’ defeat at the Granicus, Darius gathered his own army to fight Alexander.

  Alexander stopped at Issus (now skenderun, located near the border of modern Turkey and Syria), and left his sick to recuperate, then kept marching southward down the coast. He sent detachments into the hills to beat back guerrilla forces and to secure his flank. Alexander assumed that Darius would gather his forces in Syria in the open plains, where he could best use his cavalry and chariots. Indeed, that was Darius’s original intent when he gathered his army at Sorchoi on the east side of the mountains. Here a broad plain stretched out before him, and he could employ his superior numbers. When he heard Alexander’s location and the direction of his march, however, many of Darius’s advisors urged him to strike rather than to wait on the Greeks. He did so, entering from the north, where he believed that there were unguarded passes, and sitting across Alexander’s lines of communication and supply, forcing him to fight or starve.23

  Upon occupying Issus, Darius massacred the Greek soldiers left behind.24 He then marched southward to the Pinarus River, where he established a defensive position. This could have proven a good move; the battlefield he chose was virtually perfect for a defensive stand, with a river with steep banks in front, the ocean on the western right flank and the mountains on the left. The battlefield at Sorchoi, however, may have been far better for an offensive attack—meaning that whether he gave up a better battlefield at Sorchoi for a worse one along the Pinarus depends on his numbers, and those are greatly disputed. The source closest to the period is Arrian, a Roman historian who wrote in the second century AD. He claims that Darius had 600,000 men in his army, 30,000 of whom were Greek mercenaries. While no modern historian believes that number accurate, the implication is that the Persian numbers were large and that the total force seriously outnumbered the Greeks. If that was the case, then by placing his men along the Pinarus Darius was denying himself the ability to use his vastly superior numbers. If his army did indeed greatly outnumber Alexander’s, Darius would have been far better off staying at Sorchoi or marching his army south to catch the Greeks as they emerged from the Belen Pass. If, on the other hand, Darius did not have a huge army, then establishing himself on the Pinarus and taking up the de
fensive was smart, given the natural strength of the position.

  Estimates about the size of Alexander’s army vary. Ancient-warfare historian John Warry’s fall into the center: he proposes Alexander’s army to consist of 22,000 infantry, 13,000 peltasts, and 5,850 cavalry (2,100 in the Companion cavalry). The Persian army consisted of as many as 10,000 Greek mercenary hoplites, along with another 20,000 cardaces, up to 65,000 light troops including tribal levies (“worse than useless against the Macedonian phalanx”25), and as many as 13,000 cavalry (3,000 of them Persian nobles), for a total of 108,000.26 Another expert, Arthur Ferrill, suggests 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry. Finally, Hans Delbruck avers that the Macedonian force numbered less than 30,000 and the Persians only slightly larger, though greater in cavalry strength.27

  Even if the forces were relatively equal in number, the strength of the Persian position was key to the Persian strategy. One expert describes the upper river bed as about thirty-five meters wide with “a cliff-like right bank some three to seven meters high but with occasional breaks.”28 Another calls it invincible, with the infantry concealed within it and the cavalry ready to move forward.29 Darius’s defensive strategy stemmed from the knowledge that all he had to do was fight to a draw. If the Macedonians failed to win outright, they would be cut off from home and supplies. Since Darius did not need to win outright, he fought to not lose.