The youthful Scipio was willing to break with the old ways. Bitter experience from facing Hannibal had already convinced him that learning from the victors was the key to beating them at their own game. With Novo Carthago he had come into possession not only of a huge arsenal but also the sword makers who specialized in crafting the Spanish sword. With a steady supply of the new weapons he began training his men.
Not many details as to how he did this are available. Nonetheless we do know that he kept the maniples but reorganized them into cohorts. The maniples consisted of two centuries of 80 men each and the cohorts became the next larger unit, containing three maniples, numbering 480 men. Ten cohorts constituted a legion. The result was that the basic tactical unit remained the same, but the cohort was made more flexible, so that it could be moved around the battlefield more easily than the legion. As Goldsworthy observes, “The old lines of the manipular legion were not effective tactical units for independent operations. The cohort, with its own command structure and with men used to working together, may well have fulfilled a need for forces smaller than a legion.”21 Movement on the battlefield—in a direction other than straight ahead—was one of Scipio’s significant contributions to the Roman army’s organization and behavior.
The Battle of Baecula
SCIPIO LEFT A GARRISON IN NOVO CARTHAGO and removed the rest of his men north, to their previous base at Tarraco. Inexplicably, none of the three Punic generals did anything to threaten him or try to regain their capital city. They did, however, watch a number of their allies desert and go over to Scipio. By the spring of 208 Scipio was ready to take the field again. The three Punic armies remained divided, and he was determined to fight them before they united. The closest army was that of Hasdrubal Barca, who had spent the winter in Baecula (modern Bailen) near what is today the Guadalquivir River. He was ready for action when he learned of Scipio’s approach, placing himself in a strong position atop a hill with steep sides. The topmost part was fairly flat; there he placed his camp. From there the land sloped down to another shelf where he placed his skirmishers. That shelf was atop yet another, with steep slopes on three sides, so that any assault would involve strenuous climbing. Scipio’s army marched toward the position ready for battle. A good look at the hill brought them up short.
For two days Scipio pondered how to attack. Fearful of the possible arrival of one or both of the other armies, he decided to start the battle. As usual he started with his velites in front, as a skirmish line. Backed with some heavier infantry, they began climbing the hill in front of the Carthaginians, who showered them with javelins and rocks. The Romans nonetheless made steady progress and Scipio sent in some more infantry for support. Hasdrubal at this point decided that the main Roman effort would come at him head-on; that was the way they had always fought. Polybius writes that Scipio “led out his troops and drew them up along the brow of the hill,” taking his time. At this point Scipio launched his surprise: he divided the heavy infantry into two units; he led the right wing and Laelius the left. They worked their way up the base of the hill on both sides, then charged up to the flanks of the shelf. “While the manoeuvre was in progress,” writes Polybius, “Hasdrubal was still engaged in leading his troops out of the camp. Up to this moment he had waited there, trusting to the natural strength of the position and feeling confident that the enemy would never venture to attack him.”22
Pressured from the front and surprised on the flanks, the Carthaginian forces panicked. Hasdrubal made a hasty exit, his heavy infantry covering his retreat as he left his camp with the war chest and elephants. He waited for those who escaped to join him, then marched north for the Pyrenees to join his brother Hannibal in Italy. Scipio, unsure of the location of Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Gisgo, decided against pursuing the defeated Carthaginians. Instead, he once again divided the spoils of the captured camp and entertained the new stream of Spanish chieftains who came to pledge their support. Livy describes a meeting between the fleeing Hasdrubal and the other two generals, in which they exchanged intelligence and laid out potential actions. Hasdrubal marched for Italy to join Hannibal. He never reached him, however, as he was defeated and killed at the Metaurus River in northern Italy by Gaius Nero, whom Scipio had replaced in Spain.
Scipio introduced two new aspects to Roman warfare at Baecula. First, he held the center with light troops and a relative handful of supporting infantry; the heavy infantry had always held the center. This shows that the Romans had at last trained their lightly armed troops properly. Scipio gets the credit for using them for the first time effectively in battle.23 Second, he engaged in maneuver, striking both enemy flanks with heavy infantry. Hasdrubal was certainly surprised at the arrival and the make-up of the flanking units, which hit him before he could properly deploy his main force.
Nonetheless, the Battle of Baecula falls well short of being decisive. The two flanking movements were not coordinated (not surprising given the broken terrain and the novelty of the maneuver). Further, once the Romans reached the plateau there was no quick reestablishment of control over the units, thus giving Hasdrubal the opportunity to make an orderly withdrawal.24 Thus, Scipio failed to properly concentrate his forces; he did not exploit the victory, since so many of Hasdrubal’s troops escaped; and he did not engage in pursuit. Though it was not a complete victory, the battle was a major accomplishment, for Scipio had to dislodge an enemy from such a strong position. This gave the Romans the momentum to go on to bigger and better things as their training and execution matured over time.25
Scipio’s army had been the larger of the two (35,000 to Hasdrubal’s 25,000) but the numbers were negated by the strength of the Carthaginian position. Livy says Hasdrubal lost 8,000 in the battle and agrees with Polybius’s report of Scipio capturing 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Most modern historians find those numbers exaggerated. Some think the numbers must include Spaniards who quit in the middle of the battle or changed sides. Others say that the numbers given by the ancient historians would be correct were the population of Baecula itself included.26 If Hasdrubal’s plan in 208 had been to assist Hannibal in Italy, then he risked being unable to reinforce his brother if he fought Scipio and lost. Had Hasdrubal won, of course, facing Scipio would have been the wise decision as he would have regained Spain for Carthage.
Whether or not Livy is correct concerning Hasdrubal’s conference with his compatriots, the other two armies made no attempt to counter Scipio’s victory and the resulting local alliances his victory gave him. According to Livy’s account, the three decided thus: Hasdrubal Barca would proceed to Italy with as many Spanish troops as he could gather in order to keep them away from Scipio’s influence. Mago should give his army to Hasdrubal Gisgo, then travel to the Balearic Islands to recruit more mercenaries, particularly slingers, their specialty troops. Gisgo would take the Carthaginian forces to the far west coast—away from Scipio’s area of rumored largesse with the Spanish tribes. Last, the Numidian cavalry general Massanissa should take 3,000 cavalry and harass pro-Roman towns along the frontier. In short, the Carthaginians would initiate no action that year. Scipio gave them little choice, anyway. Having won at Baecula, he withdrew to his base at Tarraco again and spent the remainder of the year there.
The following year, 207, the two sides did little more than spar with each other. Hasdrubal Barca’s replacement, Hanno, tried to keep up recruiting among the Celt-Iberian tribes of Spain’s central region and lost a small battle with Scipio’s brother Lucius, while Hasdrubal Gisgo redeployed in the area around Baecula but refused battle with the Romans, retreating into a number of fortified towns. It almost seems as if the strategic situation in Italy was seeing its mirror image in Spain, with the Carthaginians engaging in Fabian tactics. Scipio, unable to maintain his army in the countryside too far away from his bases, did not press.
The Battle of Ilipa
IN 206, HOWEVER, HASDRUBAL GISGO was back on the move—into the Baetis River region west of Baecula. He’d reportedly gathered 70,00
0 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 32 elephants and seemed to be throwing down the gauntlet to Scipio. Livy asserts that the Carthaginians numbered only 50,000. Whatever the case, given the nature of Scipio’s battlefield maneuvers, as we shall see, he seems to have been heavily outnumbered. The Roman leader responded by sending out subordinates to round up Spanish allies. He eventually fielded an army of about 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. About half Scipio’s force was Roman or Latin, the other half locally recruited, including the tribes that had turned against his father and uncle and caused their deaths. “For without their allies the Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle,” as Polybius observed. “Yet to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians.”27 The loyalty of Spanish tribes, or their perceived loyalty, figured into his battle plan.
The exact location of what came to be called the Battle of Ilipa is subject to debate. The best guess is that it took place somewhere in the neighborhood of modern Alcala del Rio, north of Seville. An alternate location is nearer the site of the Battle of Baecula. There is also an “Ilipa” near the river south of Castulo, much further east, which is another possibility. Both Polybius and Livy locate the battle there, and there is some independent evidence for such a town.28 The description of the ground is fairly generic: Polybius says Hasdrubal’s army dug their “entrenchment at the foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and battle” while Scipio “pitched his camp on some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.”29
Mago Barca, subordinate it seems to Hasdrubal Gisgo at this battle, launched a spoiling attack with his cavalry (accompanied by some Numidians under Massanissa) just as the Romans were setting up their camp. In his study of Scipio, Basil Liddell Hart writes that the Roman general was, “as usual, imbued with the principle of security,” and had foreseen such a possibility by hiding his cavalry in the shelter of a hill and keeping them prepared.30 The Romans put up a good fight (dismounted at times) and through surprise and toughness repulsed the Carthaginians, then pursued them. Though there is no written evidence for this, it seems as if Scipio had trained his cavalry in new tactics along with his infantry. They were now vastly better than the cavalry forces the Romans had fielded before. This action had an impact on the morale of both sides.
After the initial skirmish, both sides proceeded to a battle of nerves. Every afternoon Hasdrubal deployed his men for battle: African infantry in the center, Spanish infantry on the wings, fronted by elephants and flanked by cavalry. Every day, later in the afternoon, Scipio deployed his men: Roman infantry in the center, Spanish infantry on the wings flanked by cavalry. As Livy writes, “The Carthaginians would always be the first to lead their troops from camp, and the first to sound recall when they were weary of being on their feet. There was no charge, no spear thrown, and no battle-cry raised on either side.”31 This went on for several days. Finally, when Scipio was sure everyone knew what to expect, he shook things up. One evening after withdrawing from the field he sent word quietly around the camp: get up early and eat, then prepare to deploy at first light.
The next morning the Romans were up early, fed, and ready to go. Scipio had been at his father’s side, if not in actual combat, at the Battle of the Trebia River in 218 when Hannibal had done precisely the same thing on a freezing December morning. When the Carthaginians awoke and found themselves facing a Roman army ready for battle, they rushed to deploy. As they did so, they came under fire from the Roman velites, which kept them focused on their own protection. Scipio, meanwhile, had deployed his Spaniards in the center, not his Romans, who were now on the flanks with the cavalry. When the Carthaginians had arrayed themselves for battle and seen the unexpected formation, it was too late to shift their own. The battle did not begin, however. The opposing skirmishers (with the two main forces perhaps half a mile apart) kept up their respective fire, pelting the enemy with javelins and stones. The hour drew toward noon, and the Carthaginian soldiers began to feel the heat of the sun and the hunger in their bellies.
Scipio’s next move is what makes the Battle of Ilipa unique in the annals of combat, and so complex that even Polybius can’t do it justice. Indeed, illustrated depictions of what happened vary from historian to historian. It seems that the Roman skirmishers, having been withdrawn in normal fashion through maniples, reformed at the rear flanks so the flanking units were three lines deep—a line of heavy infantry maniples in front, a line of light infantry second, a line of cavalry third. The entire army then proceeded to move forward, line abreast. Keeping the Spanish infantry in the center, marching forward at half time, Scipio ordered his Roman cohorts on either flank to face outward. Scipio’s actions on the right flank were mirrored by Marcus Junius Silvanus and Lucius Marcius on the left. Having executed a right-flank march, they proceeded until they were even with the ends of the Carthaginian lines. Scipio then ordered a column-left march. (Some historians say the movement up to this point was actually done in echelon or in two moves, half-right march then half-left march, to end up at this point.) His unit was now perpendicular to the enemy (heavy infantry maniples on the left, velites in the center, cavalry on the right) and moving in column much more quickly than the Spaniards. At one stade (600 feet) from the enemy the column halted. The columns then faced outward, heavy infantry facing left, light infantry and cavalry facing right. At this point Sciopio had each line wheel toward the enemy (heavy infantry right-wheel march, light infantry and cavalry left-wheel march). When it was all over, he had his heavy infantry in line facing Hasdrubal’s Spanish infantry and the light infantry and cavalry continuing the line past the enemy flanks.
Now the actual fighting started. The velites and cavalry continued to wheel until they struck the Carthaginian flank and rear. “When these troops were at close quarters the elephants were severely handled,” writes Polybius, “being wounded and harassed on every side by the velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that fell in their way on either side alike.”32 Scipio’s infantry struck at the same time Hasdrubal’s Spanish allies were collapsing. The Carthaginians in the center could do nothing; to turn and assist their Spanish allies would expose their flanks to Scipio’s oncoming Spaniards; to charge forward would open their flanks and then rear to the Roman-Latin troops. The Carthaginian force at first stood firm and began to withdraw in order, but as the Spanish troops on the wings began to buckle the units in the center collapsed and fled. Polybius noted that had not “Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have been driven from their camp too. A sudden storm erupted, and it was so heavy that it forced the Romans back to their own camp.”33
Polybius leaves off his description of the battle at this point, but Livy continues with a description of the Carthaginian troubles. Hasdrubal watched while Spanish tribes fled, and he soon learned of garrisons in the area surrendering to the Romans. The following night he led the rest of his men westward but could not make good his escape to Gades (Cadiz), since the pursuing Roman cavalry and light infantry blocked his crossing of the Baetis River. The retreat, says Livy, became flight, and only got worse as the rest of the Roman army began to catch up to the pursuit. “After that it was no longer a battle; it was more like animals being slaughtered—until their leader authorized flight by personally making off to the nearest hills with approximately 6,000 poorly armed men. The rest were cut down or taken prisoner.”34 The 6,000 fugitives tried to defend themselves at a hastily built fort, but were easily surrounded. Hasdrubal abandoned his men and reached Gades, where he caught a ship for home.
Much had changed. Mago’s initial spoiling attack probably would have done some damage had the battle taken place a few years earlier, but the Roman cavalry had honed their skills under Scipio’s command and their counterattack dr
ove the enemy from the field. Both sides demonstrated for a number of days before the actual fighting began, an action of which Scipio took advantage by a deployment employing surprise both in timing and in alignment of his forces. Next, his deliberate drawing out of the initial skirmishing in order to use heat, hunger, and thirst to weaken the Carthaginian troops exhibited his control of tempo. Whether at Trebia or elsewhere, he had somehow absorbed the lesson of subjecting his opponent to hunger, fatigue, and temperature.35 Indeed, the U.S. Army’s definition of “concentration” is almost a description of Scipio’s maneuvers: “Attacking commanders manipulate their own and the enemy’s concentration of forces by some combination of dispersion, concentration, deception, and attack.”36 And although unable to exploit the victory owing to the heavy rain (also reminiscent of Trebia), he made up for it with relentless pursuit. Liddell Hart comments that the pursuit had “no parallel in military history until Napoleon,” who saw it as “one of the supreme tests of generalship.”37
Scipio took a major risk in using these maneuvers at Ilipa. Could his men perform the complicated marching and wheeling he asked them to do in the face of the enemy? Livy’s description of the maneuvers is much shorter and simpler and says nothing about an attack in column. He says merely that Scipio ordered the commanders on the opposite wing to follow his lead by extending their units outward, to engage the enemy with their light infantry and cavalry before the centers could meet, “and with these they advanced swiftly, the rest of the troops following at an angle.”38 Except for his comment about the “angle” it would appear (to Livy) that the wings marched line abreast across the field, but simply did so more quickly than the Spanish mercenaries, creating a refused center. It is possible that the advance in column was done in the interests of speed, for a column can advance more quickly than a line, and Scipio was anxious to initiate contact with his Romans before there was any possibility of his potentially unreliable Spanish allies being engaged in the center by Hasdrubal’s more reliable Africans.39 As Goldsworthy notes, “The details of the manoevre performed by the Roman army has, like so many other aspects of the war, been endlessly debated by scholars.”40 His illustration shows the two Roman wings attacking line abreast at about a thirty degree angle toward the Carthaginian flanks.
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