This was the way European armies fought for several decades prior to the Thirty Years War. Since the 1560s the Spanish had kept their armies in the United Provinces of Holland, hoping to suppress Protestantism. In an intermittent Eighty Years War, the Dutch learned weapons and tactics from the Spanish, and began to alter them. The architects of this change were Maurice of Nassau and his cousins, William Louis and John. Maurice was not a spectacular general in the field, often too hesitant when haste was called for. Even so, he transformed a motley group of mercenaries and part-time militia into a professional fighting force that was enough to win him a lasting place in the evolution of modern war.12 Although the Dutch operated with a core of native soldiers, they also depended on the mercenaries, who had been the soldiery of Europe for decades. Naval difficulties with the English hurt the income from the New World vital to Spain’s economy and military goals, and irregular pay to their soldiers in northern Europe caused discontent and mutinies. A growing nationalism coupled with a growing navy gave the Dutch both motivation and money to maintain themselves as the war dragged on, and it was those two factors that gave Maurice what he needed to overhaul his army.
Maurice, son of William the Silent, was named at age twenty-one to be an admiral of the Dutch navy and commander of armies opposing the Spanish. The titles did not translate into power, as he was under the authority of a confederation of states that was extremely difficult to make effective. With too many heads of state jockeying for power, Maurice’s noble status gave him influence but not control, so it is even more remarkable that he successfully remade an entire military system while a war was going on. The basis of his reforms came from study of the old Roman and Byzantine military texts, the Renaissance bringing about a fascination with all things from the classical world.
Maurice realized the major problem with the tercio: it was a big target. With artillery still too large to easily maneuver around a battlefield the tercio’s size was a problem, but if employed properly the muskets could provide enough firepower to break a mass of pikemen. Maurice understood that to increase firepower, one would have to bring more guns to bear at once and increase the speed of reloading. Maurice reduced the size of the formations from 2,000 to about 600, made up of companies consisting of 130, and ranged them no more than 10 ranks deep, as opposed to the 25–30 ranks of the tercio. More units meant more guns along a greater front. A more rapid reloading procedure could keep the guns firing faster, and if two or three ranks fired at the same time before retiring to reload, a lot of lead would be flying. In his work on the military revolution of that age, Geoffrey Parker writes, “We can date the Dutch discovery of the ‘volley’ technique very precisely: it first appeared, in diagrammatic form, in a letter from William Louis to his cousin Maurice dated 8 December 1594, and the author asserted he had derived the idea from an assiduous study of the military methods of the ancient Romans.”13 (This is twenty years after Nagashino saw the use of volley fire.) Thinner lines not only created massed firepower but presented a smaller target for return fire.
To further increase firepower Maurice developed iron foundries in the United Provinces to cast cannon, for which he began the standardization of bore and shot, casting only three sizes: 12-, 24-, and 48-pounders, all large artillery pieces and difficult to maneuver. These guns were placed in front of the infantry, who were deployed in a checkerboard formation, as the ancient Romans had been, in order to advance and retreat through the gaps. Cavalry units were placed to protect the flanks. Maurice’s reforms achieved two objectives. First, the battalions were more mobile and better suited to operating in the marshy terrain of the Netherlands. Second, they were much handier than the larger tercios both in offense and defense.14
To make these improvements work, it was necessary to have more than short-term enlistees. The population of the United Provinces was no more than a million people, most of whom were dedicated to farming or trade. Maurice would therefore be obliged to use mercenaries. The difference was that these men were hired for long service, not the seasonal fighting that was typical of the age. Once hired, the soldier now received something almost no mercenary ever had: a regular paycheck and regular supplies. In return for these, he had to undergo intense training, which developed both discipline and unit cohesion. Again, this was something not seen in western Europe since ancient Roman times. Smaller also units meant more units, which meant more officers and noncommissioned officers. These men were usually Dutch rather than foreign, as most of the mercenaries tended to be. Thus, the officer corps had loyalty to the state, and the soldiers developed loyalty to the unit. Pikemen, musketeers, and cavalry working together took constant practice, something no short-timer would have been interested in. The reintroduction of drill into the army was an essential part of Maurice’s reforms and a basic contribution to the modern military system.15
The negative side of the lengthened front was that more men had to actually face the enemy and exercise courage, since there were no longer massed ranks within which a new recruit could be lodged until he had seen some action. This, again, is where the discipline created by the drill and the unit cohesion came into play. Just how effective such training would be was illustrated in the two battles the Dutch army actually fought under Maurice; they were both victories, but hardly overwhelming ones: Turnhout in 1597 and Neiuwpoort in 1600. These suggest that there were still improvements to be made in order to achieve notable victories, but they laid the foundation on which Gustavus built.16
Gustavus took what Maurice had created and adapted it for Sweden and for a more aggressive style of warfare. From a manpower standpoint, Gustavus used Swedes as officers and soldiers, thus creating a truly national army. Mercenaries were simply too independent to form a standing army. Michael Howard observes, “Armies were in a continual state of deliquescence, melting away from death, wounds, sickness, straggling, and desertion, their movements governed not by strategic calculation but by the search for unplundered territory. It was a period in which warfare seemed to escape from rational control; to cease indeed to be ‘war’ in the sense of politically-motivated use of force by generally recognized authorities, and to degenerate instead into universal, anarchic, and self-perpetuating violence.”17 Instead, Gustavus drew on the conscription system initiated by his grandfather and expanded by his father. One man in ten from a community was liable for military service, and the remainder of the citizens provided the necessary taxation and supplies to maintain them. This offered sufficient manpower to create a strong defense force for a population of a million and a half, but to go campaigning would require more. Thus, Gustavus was obliged to fill his ranks with mercenaries when away from home. They, however, would be forced to learn the Swedish way of war.
The soldiers were organized in squadrons of just over 400 men, almost equally pike and musket. They were deployed with the pikemen in the center and the musketeers equally divided on both flanks, all arrayed six deep. Attached to each squadron was a unit of 96 musketeers for reconnaissance or reserve. Three or four squadrons made up a brigade. The infantry were equipped with improved arms. The musket the Swedes used had, like the Dutch, been produced in a standardized caliber. Already the powder horn, used to carry and measure the gunpowder charge, had been replaced by the single cartridge. A premeasured amount of powder was stored in a wooden vial, with numerous vials carried on a bandoleer around the gunner’s neck. Gustavus improved this further by introducing (or perhaps merely expanding the use of) the paper cartridge, with both powder and musket ball combined in one disposable package. The Swedes also abandoned the matchlock for a “snaplock” (an early flintlock). They were issued in great numbers during the 1620s, and not just to artillery and bodyguards as in other armies. One of the main reasons Gustavus introduced this was the difficulty in Sweden of finding material with which to make the match cord.18
The Swedes not only manufactured a lighter musket, but by removing the need for a rest, the number of movements necessary for reloading decreased and the rate
of fire thereby increased. The two-rank volley instituted by the Dutch was also changed to three ranks. When the musketeers had their weapons loaded and had completed the shoulder-to-shoulder rearrangement into three ranks, the front rank knelt, the second rank stooped, and the rear rank stood, then all three ranks simultaneously fired.19 Gustavus also altered the nature of the countermarch, whereby the musketeer marched to the rear of the line to reload and await his turn to fire again. After the front three ranks fired, they would stand fast to reload as the following three ranks stepped forward, hence creating almost a rolling barrage.20
The pike underwent a transformation in the Swedish army as well, shortened from sixteen feet to eleven. The metal point extended from a sheath long enough to keep the pike from being broken or hacked off in close combat. Although the pike remained the sole defense for the musketeers, Gustavus used it for more than keeping the enemy at bay. For him the pike was the battle-winning weapon, a left over from tercio-style warfare. The goal of the musketeers was to break the enemy line in order for the pike-wielding infantry to finish the job.21
Shot, however, was not to be provided only by musketeers. Another of Gustavus’s innovations was light artillery. Cannons had long been standard equipment, but were primarily used in siege warfare (very common at the time) with minimal but increasing use on the battlefield. Their size meant that once set in place, they were extremely difficult to move, hence of mixed effectiveness against moving targets. Prior to Gustavus, artillery was considered to be a technological specialty, usually operated by civilian engineers. The gunners often scorned the requirements of standard military discipline and were scorned by the regular army in return. Gustavus made them military professionals as well.22
Maurice had improved the artillery by standardizing bore and shot, but even his guns were large. Gustavus had his foundries cast cannon in 24-, 12-, and 3-pounder sizes. The smallest gun became mobile, drawn by one horse or (in case of need) three men. At 625 pounds, it could be hauled where needed and set up quickly, and it was easier to adjust and maintain fire on targets. Initially Gustavus used a copper-barreled gun wrapped in mastic-coated rope with a sheath of leather, but by the time of his German campaign metallurgy had so improved that the replacement 4-pounder was solid metal. Improvements in gunpowder helped immensely to standardize pressures in the tube, thus permitting reduction in thickness of the barrel. As with the musketeers, a prepackaged cartridge simplified loading and assured a high rate of fire for the guns. This weapon completely changed the role of artillery on the battlefield.23 Gustavus also introduced grapeshot, firing up to twenty-four smaller balls at once in place of one large cannon ball. The Swedish army could thus produce more, and more concentrated, firepower than any army in Europe. Constant practice increased not only the professionalism but the accuracy of the gunners. With these changes, the Swedes had the finest artillery in Europe, and historians have argued that the modern role of artillery on the battlefield truly began with Gustavus.24
“For all that, it was Gustavus Adolphus’s cavalry that became the true decisive weapon and that most fully bestowed offensive power upon his army.”25 So says Russell Weigley, but different authors have their views of which arm was really key to Swedish victories. The cavalry under Gustavus was primarily made up of Swedes, usually the nobility or the wealthy farmers. Gustavus did not employ them as scouts or in the caracole maneuver, the normal roles for horsemen of their day. He wanted to restore the days when cavalry used their weight and speed for shock power. Hence, although the cavalry were armed with the wheel-lock pistols, their primary weapon was the saber. Each cavalry unit had a musket unit attached, so they could approach the enemy at the same speed, and the musketeers could deliver a massed volley that would disorganize the enemy sufficiently to allow the cavalry to launch their charge. The musketeers would reload during the charge to assist with a second wave or cover a retreat, as necessary. Gustavus also attached 3-pounder guns to his cavalry for the same purpose. As mentioned earlier, the role of gunfire was to open a hole in the enemy formation, and the cavalry would use cold steel to finish the enemy off.26
The Opponents
FIREPOWER, CLOSE COMBAT, and cavalry charge all have their proponents as the key to Gustavus’s improved military system. One thing is sure, however: the alterations came during and as a result of the campaign against Poland in 1621. With Denmark and Russia out of the way, and the Swedish army beginning to adapt its version of the Dutch system, the war against Sigismund was the proving ground for weapons and tactics. Details of the war itself are minimal, but the overwhelming shock of the lance-armed Polish cavalry convinced Gustavus to alter his own tactics. Also during this war, in 1623, Gustavus instituted his first artillery company, which by 1629 had expanded to six companies forming a regiment under the command of Lennart Torstensson. The Swedes conquered Livonia (in modern Estonia) fairly quickly and moved the war into Prussia. There, victories were a bit harder to come by, especially when Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand (who was also Sigismund’s brother-in-law) provided an army to assist in the Polish defense. In a battle at Sztum on 29 June 1629, the Swedes came off second-best in a somewhat inconclusive battle, at which Gustavus was almost captured. The battle did, however, bring about another truce between the two powers, as Sigismund was tired of fighting and Gustavus wanted to enter the war going on in Germany.27 Hence, both sides were open to the offers of mediation from England and, more importantly, France. As Basil Liddell Hart writes, “Gustavus was wanted on a greater stage, and [French Cardinal] Richelieu’s master mind pulled the strings to release him for the new part.”28 The Treaty of Altmark began yet another truce, this one to last for six years; this freed up Gustavus to go to war against the Holy Roman Empire, France’s rival.
The Polish war had turned the Swedish army into a finely tuned machine made up of combat veterans. The soldiers and Gustavus had matured from the experience. Theodore Dodge comments, “Under Gustavus’ careful eye, every branch of the service during these campaigns grew in efficiency. Equipment, arms, rationing, medical attendance, drill and discipline, field-maneuvres, camp and garrison duty, reached a high grade of perfection. … Not only had Gustavus learned to know his generals and men, but these had gauged their king.”29
Gustavus’s rationale for invading German territory is the topic of much debate. He quickly became to the German people the champion of the Protestant cause, even though their princes were slower to embrace his crusade. Although Gustavus certainly made war against the Catholic Holy Roman Empire and sought Protestant princes as allies, his motives certainly could have been political rather than religious. In a speech in 1629, Gustavus remarked:
The Papists are on the Baltic. … [T]heir whole aim is to destroy Swedish commerce, and soon to plant a foot on the southern shore of our Fatherland. Sweden is in danger from the power of the Hapsburg; that is all, but that is enough; that power must be met, swiftly and strongly. The times are bad; the danger is great. It is no time to ask whether the cost will not be far beyond what we can bear. The fight will be for parents, for wife and child, for house and home, for Fatherland and Faith.30
When he landed in the province of Pomerania, Gustavus issued a “press release” that was translated and distributed across Europe. It listed his reasons for invasion: diplomatic insults, imperial aid to Poland during the recent war there, imperial designs on the Baltic region, and oppression of the Germans by the emperor. There was no mention of military goals or of religious motivations. Gustavus’s chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, later averred the invasion was “not so much a matter of religion, but rather of saving the status publicus, wherein religion is also comprehended.”31
Gustavus later began to posit the idea of a Protestant league of sorts, which some have suggested meant that he had imperial designs of his own. His major biographers, Ahnlund and Michael Roberts, agree that there was no divorcing politics from religion. It may have been some, any, or all of these motives. Or, to the cynic, none of them: some think he fought fo
r fighting’s sake.32
When Gustavus and his army of 13,000 arrived near Peenemünde on the Pomeranian coast in July 1630, he had but one ally, the port city of Stralsund. The city had been under siege by imperial forces the previous year, and Gustav had dispatched 5,000–6,000 men under the Scottish mercenary Alexander Leslie to stiffen the resistance. The imperial forces’ goal had been to seize the city and take over the fleet in its harbor to create a naval force strong enough to dominate the Baltic, a project hatched between Sigismund and the Spanish (yet another reason for Gustavus to go to war). The reinforced garrison at Stralsund proved too difficult to overcome, so the attention shifted to another port, Wismar.
Although Gustavus had income from tolls from Prussian and other Baltic ports, he needed other sources of financial support as well as military assistance. In 1631 the French diplomat Cardinal Richelieu (angling to increase French power at the expense of the Holy Roman Empire) entered into an agreement to provide a monthly subsidy. He realized the danger of an overly strong Hapsburg empire and was willing to finance efforts to combat it; local princes under more direct threat were less willing. Only those whom Emperor Ferdinand had dispossessed from their lands came to Gustavus’s aid, and that was little more than moral support.
As for his enemies, Gustavus faced primarily Count Johann Tserclaes Tilly, a professional soldier of great experience, who had started his military service in 1574 at age fifteen. Having seen Protestant forces destroy his home province of Brabant in the Spanish Netherlands, he had a passion for revenge. He served in the wars against the Turks and rose through the ranks. He was named an imperial field marshal in 1605; later that year he accepted the position as commander of the Bavarian military. When Bavaria created the Catholic League in 1609, he became commander of its forces. During the Thirty Years War (starting in 1618), he led armies in Bohemia and Denmark, winning an unbroken series of victories. By the time he came to face Gustavus, however, he was of advancing years and declining abilities. Tilly was an excellent commander and had a grasp of strategy at least as good as Gustavus’s, but was wedded to the tercio style of fighting. He has at times been depicted as over-the-hill, but he was not without some of his old talents.33 Often fighting alongside Count Albrecht von Wallenstein, Tilly became supreme commander when Wallenstein was removed from his position shortly after the Swedish forces arrived. Subordinate to both was Field Marshal Count Gottfried Pappenheim, commander of the imperial cavalry. Still comparatively young, he was almost a caricature of a fiery cavalry leader. He was at times brilliant, but too hotheaded to be consistent and often insubordinate. He despised Tilly, thinking him senile.34 For almost a year the two sides played a game of position. Gustavus spent six months capturing as many cities along the coast as he could in order to maintain his lines of supply. He campaigned into the north German state of Mecklenburg and brought it under his control. The Swedish army was growing with the addition of local mercenaries, and Gustavus was determined to maintain supply depots to keep his army from engaging in pillage and thus alienating the population. By the end of 1630 he had established secure supply bases, but picked up few allies. The elector of Brandenburg refused to cooperate with Gustavus, and in February 1631 the elector of Saxony, John George, called a conference of Protestant leaders to his capital in Leipzig and proposed a defensive alliance to field a neutral force that would support neither Sweden nor the empire. Such an attempt to avoid commitment was futile when the two opposing armies met to fight in Saxony, and John George had to make a choice.
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