Luckily for Marlborough, arguments between Vendôme and Burgundy took up the remainder of the month of June and into July; the marshal wanted to march east to besiege Huy while the duke wanted to march northwest to Ghent to take advantage of the growing disaffection with Dutch rule. Finally word came from Versailles to follow the duke’s plan. Unfortunately, focused as Marlborough was on his own plans and preparations, he ignored intelligence reports of French intentions. On 4 July a French cavalry force left Vendôme’s army to “forage.” At the same time, a separate force marched quickly from Menin northward to Bruges. By employing speed and deception, small forces broke into Bruges and Ghent, taking them both without a fight. The rest of Vendôme’s army was quickly away from Marlborough and into Ghent before he could react. Winston Churchill commented on his ancestor’s plight: “At a stroke, the French had made themselves masters of the middle Scheldt [River] and the canals leading to the coast. … This coup returned much of Spanish Flanders into French hands, and constituted a serious blow to Marlborough’s prestige and thus to the morale of the Allied army.”80 With these two key cities in hand, the French began laying siege to Oudenarde on the Scheldt River; control of that river would isolate Flanders to the west.
The usually well-balanced Marlborough fell into a depression approaching despair. He probably was also suffering from a severe fever. The arrival in camp of both Eugene and the British second in command Cadogan broke the spell, restoring his morale as well as that of the army.81 The brothers-in-arms were quickly planning moves. In their camp at Asch, intelligence reports arrived alerting them to another French move. After seizing Ghent, the French had taken up a forward position some seventeen miles to the southeast at Alost. The Anglo-Dutch camp at Asch was eight miles due east of Alost. The scouting report said the French were marching south, probably to the town of Lessines, to cover the approach to Oudenarde. Marlborough and Eugene had to get there first. They sent Cadogan ahead with an advance team of cavalry and infantry; he got there at 4:00 a.m. on 10 July, well before the French. The rest of Marlborough’s army was there by 11:00, having marched thirty miles in thirty-six hours. When the French army on the march learned of this rapid movement, they had no choice but to alter their route. Chandler observes, “The French (Burgundy not desiring to force a battle at this stage—to Vendôme’s disgust) forthwith swung away northward towards Gavre, intent on placing the Scheldt between the Allies and themselves, and called off the blockade of Oudenarde as the Allies began to pour over the Dender [River at Lessines].”82 The French failed to fight the Anglo-Dutch force piecemeal as it arrived at Lessines; perhaps they could do it at Oudenarde.
The French established themselves at Gavre, eight miles downstream (north) of Oudenarde, while at 1:00 a.m. on 11 May Marlborough sent Cadogan and 10,000 men straight for Oudenarde. They carried bridging equipment and encountered no enemy scouts along the way. By 10:30 they had reached the river and begun work, constructing pontoon bridges and strengthening the stone bridges in the town. Although the French could see the activity from a distance, they apparently believed it was foragers or the British garrison, rather than the advance force of Marlborough’s army. They continued to move at a leisurely pace southward from Gavre to begin their deployment on high ground near Huyshe. Meanwhile, Marlborough had been alerted to the relative movements of the two forces, and the bulk of his troops were in a mad dash to assist. Early in the afternoon the advance guard completed the first bridges and British and Dutch infantry along with Hanoverian dragoons began to take up positions. Past the river lay open farmland, rising upward, cut by three streams: the Norken, Diepenbeek, and Mollenebeek.83
The commander of the French advance guard finally came close enough to the bridges to confront reality: not only were they built and guarded, but in the distance he could plainly see the bulk of Marlborough’s army approaching. He alerted Vendôme, who quickly ordered several Swiss mercenary battalions of the advance guard forward to seize the bridges; he would send forward cavalry support and bring up the rest of the army. Unfortunately for the French, senior officers again took counsel of their fears. The ground along the Scheldt on which the cavalry would have to ride was thought to be too marshy to cross, although nobody seems to have actually gone forward to inspect it. The support column thus halted on the command of Vendôme’s chief of staff. When Vendôme himself arrived, he demanded to know why the troops were not advancing. Vendôme decided not to override his chief of staff’s decision, so unhappily countermanded his earlier order. He then rode off to find Burgundy to see about formulating another battle plan.84
The Swiss battalions did not receive the withdrawal order. Marlborough and Eugene arrived on the scene about noon and ordered Cadogan to drive the Swiss out of their position at Eyne. This was accomplished quickly, and the British line extended as far as Heurne. The next arriving British units went past Eyne to the northwest and occupied Groenwald. With an allied line forming, Vendôme met with Burgundy and recommended withdrawal. Had the initial attack been made with deliberation, it would have been the French establishing a line, and one much closer to the Scheldt. Now, the initiative was lost. The inconsistency of the dual command showed itself again. The royal pulled rank on the general, ordering an attack. Vendôme unhappily returned to his wing of the army and began sending units forward with intent of outflanking the allies to the west. Burgundy, however, did not get involved. He brought his wing forward from the Huysse heights past the Narken to the higher ground around Roijgem. Here he was informed that the ground to the front, along the Mollenebeke, was also too marshy for cavalry to operate. This too was untrue, but Burgundy also believed the terrain report, and he, with his half of the army, spent the rest of the battle as observers.
The battle developed in parallel, with allied units deploying between Herlingem and Schaerken along the east bank of the Mollenebeek, while arriving French units marched onto the field and deployed opposite them. Just as Vendôme thought he was getting units around the allied flank, new units would cross the pontoon bridges and take up position to the left of the defending units, turning westward along the southern bank of the Diepenbeek. Through the late afternoon, one French unit would reach the far flank just as an allied unit would arrive to oppose it. Vendôme was in the thick of the fighting, “in the front line, pike in hand, as if he could beat a way to victory by his own physical efforts.”85 Burgundy watched from behind. At one point Vendôme sent a messenger to Burgundy, ordering (or suggesting) he bring the stationary troops down on top of the allied flank at Herlingem. Again, “marshy terrain” kept this from happening, and the messenger returning the negative response to Vendôme was killed on the way.
The final units of the allied army were finally arriving. Owing to the collapse of one of the pontoon bridges, these Dutch and Hanoverian soldiers had to march through Oudenarde (earlier the cavalry had been ordered to take the southern route to facilitate the infantry crossing the pontoons). With the reserves arriving on the field, Marlborough sent Eugene to take command on the right while he oversaw the left. Meanwhile, Vendôme was redoubling his efforts to break through, finally capturing Groenwald and Hermlingen. Marlborough sent fresh Hanoverian troops into the far western lines, withdrawing the committed troops back through them (but leaving their colors behind to give the impression they were still there). The relieving troops pressed the French across the stream, while the newly relieved troops marched behind the lines to aid Eugene. Marlborough illustrated his mastery of the battlefield in employing this tactic and having it succeed.86 With the reinforcements Eugene retook both villages.
With the entire line stabilized, Marlborough now had the opportunity to deliver his killing blow. He ordered the Dutch troops under Overkirk to march northwest from Bevere onto the high ground called the Boster Couter, from which they could fall on the French right flank. At about 7:00 p.m. the flank attack began, with eight battalions under General Week passing the headwater of the Diepenbeek and turning east. About a half hour later twelve squad
rons and sixteen battalions were in position past Oyck and received the order to charge. They accomplished a total surprise, and the French right flank began to fall apart as it approached 9:00. They tried to put up a fight but could not handle frontal and flank pressure in what was beginning to look like a single envelopment that would close a ring around the French. Before it could close the allied troops withdrew to the north, as did their commanders.87
Chandler writes, “Casualty figures are, as usual, hard to establish with any accuracy. The Allied figures are generally agreed to have been about 825 killed and 2,150 wounded, but the French claim they lost only about as many … and a mere 1,800 prisoners (including 300 officers). Some Allied sources put the French loss as high as 6,000 killed and wounded besides 9,000 prisoners and a further 5,000 deserters.”88 Although nightfall prohibited immediate pursuit, the darkness did have one beneficial effect on the allied prisoner count. Eugene ordered French Huguenot troops in the allied army to call out in their native language and to beat the drums, sounding the French order for retreat; French troops marched to the sounds of those drums and became captives.
Although both armies knew the other’s general location and their intent to march to Oudenarde, the battle became a textbook example of a meeting engagement. Neither army had the time to choose good ground or to make well-thought-out decisions. Vendôme correctly ordered a hasty attack by his advance guard on the allied advance guard and bridgehead; unfortunately for him Cadogan’s attack overwhelmed what became an exposed Swiss infantry unit. The immediate pursuit gained a forward position at Heurne and Groenwald, the latter becoming the initial point of contact as well as the focal point of the most intense fighting throughout the afternoon. After hours of hasty attack and defense, Marlborough was finally able to implement a deliberate attack with his flanking movement. Immediate exploitation was curtailed by darkness, while the pursuit ordered the next morning ran into a well-organized rear guard that drove them off and allowed the remains of the French army to retreat into Ghent.
Marlborough’s Generalship
THE REMAINDER OF THE CAMPAIGN SEASON of 1708 proved successful for the allies. They recaptured the fortresses lost at the beginning of May and successfully besieged the most important French fortress city of Lille. Unfortunately, this did not bring about an end to the war any more than had the spectacular successes of 1706. The following year the armies were at it again, with Marlborough winning another victory, though an extremely costly one, at Malplaquet, south of Mons, on 11 September. He also had some success in penetrating the line of fortresses known as the Ne Plus Ultra, but it was not enough to either force a peace or maintain his own military and political position. Growing fatigue over the war in Parliament and the English public worked against his goal of a military-political success. The relationship between Queen Anne and Sarah Churchill, Lady Marlborough, soured as well. The friendship between the two that had taken Marlborough to power eventually led to his demise when Sarah grew too domineering for the queen to handle any longer. “When the Whigs were driven from office in 1711, Marlborough was dismissed from his command,” notes Spencer. “He was accused of having prolonged the war to his own advantage.”89 The Marlboroughs fell from grace in 1708, and many of the next years were spent on the continent, where they were more appreciated. The crowning of George I in 1714, however, brought Marlborough back into high military command, for the new monarch had fought under Marlborough in the Netherlands and admired his skill as a general and leader.
Most English historians regard Marlborough and Wellington as the two greatest generals of their history, with the two exchanging first and second place depending on the author. I will discuss Wellington later in this book. Marlborough’s strengths as a general include mastery of the principles of objective, offensive, mass, unity of command, and morale.
By holding political and military positions simultaneously, Marlborough had a terrific grasp of what needed to be done militarily in order to achieve political objectives. Unlike most of the Dutch leaders, he saw the enemy army as the center of gravity. Thus, all his battles were fought with the intent of destroying armies. His ultimate failure lay in the fact that there were too many enemy armies, and the defeat and virtual destruction of one—as certainly happened at Blenheim and Ramillies—did not cripple the whole French military system. One of Louis XIV’s advantages lay in the fact that he could keep up the war by personal choice, which none of the allied leaders could do (with the exception of the emperors in Austria). Thus, while Marlborough could maneuver an enemy into a battle that was locally decisive, victory tended to have only a regional effect. Chandler writes, “From first to last he was the proponent of the major battle as the sole means to break an enemy’s military power and thus his will to resist. In this he was following the advice given by Turenne to Condé in the preceding generation: ‘Make few sieges and fight plenty of battles; when you are master of the countryside the villages will give us the towns.’”90
On the battlefield, Marlborough was always quick to read the terrain and locate the enemy’s weakness. Even at Oudenarde, where time was of the essence and he could not personally reconnoiter, his trusted aides knew his mind and discovered the unoccupied high ground to the west from which to launch the decisive attack. Possibly no general since Alexander was as good at finding or creating weak points in enemy lines. Eventually, however, the tactic of threatening a strong point and drawing in reserves, used at the three battles discussed in this chapter, became too predictable. At Malplaquet in 1709, French marshal Villars did not rise to the bait as his predecessors had. The result was not an overwhelming victory for the allies but a slugfest that forced the enemy from the field, though in good order and with fewer casualties than the allies.
Marlborough was also master of the offensive. Since he was always looking for a battle, he often wrong-footed his opponents by rapid marches to the battle site. This was best illustrated at Oudenarde, when his men marched twice as fast as the French to occupy Lessines—an advance that a Dutch general described not as a march but as a run. The allies then threw pontoon bridges across the Scheldt while the French were leisurely moving into the area from Gavre. When Vendôme received news of this rapid movement, he reportedly responded with disbelief: “If they are there, then the Devil must have carried them. Such marching is impossible.”91 Marlborough’s advance to the Schellenberg caught the defenders unprepared, and the allied appearance at dawn at Blenheim was a shock to the French.
While Marlborough’s army for most of the afternoon stood on the tactical defensive at Oudenarde, he was the aggressor at all his battles. At Blenheim and Ramillies, the French generals thought themselves to be in strong defensive positions, so they gladly let him take the initiative. At Oudenarde, the opening fight between the two advance guards virtually determined which side would hold the initiative, and Cadogan gained that for the allies (with some help from faulty terrain reading by French officers). In all three battles, the offense was always controlled, intended to hold the enemy and focus his attention away from the decisive point. In this Marlborough was fortunate to have less-than-able opposing generals at all three battles, although Vendôme certainly would have been a worthy opponent had he not been overruled by the inexperienced Duke of Burgundy. Once battle was joined there was no letup, no time to allow the enemy commander to assess his situation and make any moves other than in reaction.
In all his battles, the factor Marlborough was most intent on employing was mass. He made sure that he had functioning combined arms, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery all trained to work together—a lesson learned from Gustavus. He was able to employ dragoons as extra infantry, a service Gustavus did not develop, and mobile artillery supported all attacks. All of Marlborough’s battles, as illustrated in the discussion above, were designed to isolate enemy forces into as small an area as possible, such as the wall at the Schellenberg; Blindheim and Oberglau in 1704; Ramillies and Autre-Église in 1706; and Hermlingen, Groenwald, and Schaerken
in 1708. All these moves drew in enemy reserves and weakened sections of their line. Then, more combined arms in his own reserve would be massed against that weak point: the unrepaired walls at Schellenberg overrun by the elector of Baden’s attack, the marshy center of the lines at Blenheim, the open plain between Ramillies and Taviers, and the west flank at Oudenarde. Although quick assaults won all these actions, the combination of cavalry and infantry in mutual support was instrumental in stopping counterattacks and giving the horsemen time to regroup and maintain cohesion while the enemy horse became tired and disorganized.
In the area of unity of command, one sees perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Marlborough’s character. Although he was an extremely able diplomat, his relationship with Prince Eugene of Savoy had nothing of the negative aspects of political diplomacy. There was no false modesty nor playing to one’s strengths or weaknesses, as we see in his actions with members of government. Here was one of those rare times in history when two men meet and have an instant connection, seeing each other’s value and recognizing how one might work off of the other’s strengths. Although Eugene was certainly a brilliant leader in his own right, he must have seen in Marlborough not only a man senior to himself in age and in numbers under his command, but also an equal in talent and vision on the battlefield. That Marlborough acted as commander in chief when they worked together is not only a tribute to his talent but to a remarkable humility on Eugene’s part. The two had little in common as far as personal bearing or habits were concerned, but it was only battlefield ability and trust that mattered. Count de Biron, who had led the French advanced guard at Oudenarde and was captured afterward, noted the relationship between the two and their subordinates, commenting on “a deep respect on the part of all the general officers for these two chiefs.”92
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