by Denis Smith
59 Memo, “For your information when calling Mr. Alex McKenzie,” nd, JGDP, III/74/14.5, 59696; Goodman, Life, 72-76; Fleming, Near 1, 324-26; Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 12-13; Peter Stursberg, “Desperate Search on for Tory Candidate to Oppose Diefenbaker,” Toronto Star, October 11, 1956
60 Nicholson reported that the Old Guard had also approached a British Conservative MP and expatriate Canadian, the notoriously pompous Sir Beverley Baxter, to come home to the leadership campaign. After these efforts had failed, party president Leon Balcer announced his own candidacy in late November, but withdrew it a few days later. Patrick Nicholson, “Old Guard Can’t Stop Diefenbaker,” Winnipeg Tribune, November 14, 1956; Windsor Daily Star, November 23, 1956; Winnipeg Tribune, December 3, 1956
61 Telegram, Gordon Churchill to JGD, October 3, 1956; “Summary of meeting of supporters of candidature of John Diefenbaker for leader of Progressive Conservative Party,” nd, JGDP, III/74/14.5, 59866, 59721-22
62 Leadership announcement, nd, JGDP, III/74/14.5, 59706
63 “Summary of meeting of supporters of candidature of John Diefenbaker for leader of Progressive Conservative Party,” nd, JGDP, III/74/14.5, 59721-22
64 Sévigny wrote long letters to Diefenbaker offering his opinions on a wide range of subjects such as sincere leadership, Quebec’s dislike of British domination, avoiding military support for the UN in the Middle East, a distinct Canadian flag, the priority of provincial rights, useless government spending, and opposition to dictatorship. He gave no indication of any activity to recruit Diefenbaker delegates in Quebec. Pierre Sévigny to JGD, November 16 and November 27, 1956, JGDP, III/74/14.5, 60036-40, 60108-10; Fleming, Near 1, 326-27
65 Fulton recalled that “this was my first overt action which brought me into conflict with John, and he could never understand why I had run … I think he was very disappointed: he had counted on my support. Whether my running was an error or not is very difficult for me to judge … But unfortunately he held it against me, there’s no question about that.” E.D. Fulton, interview with author, September 24, 1993; Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 14
66 “Diefenbaker Leads Field as Tory Leader in Poll,” Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, November 24, 1956
67 “Wars May Come and Go/ Party Lines Hold Firm,” Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, December 1, 1956
68 Bothwell et al., Canada, 127-29; English, Worldly, 107-45
69 The Egyptian government identified the Canadian forces with the British invasion army, at least partly because of the unit’s name. Extended negotiation resulted in a compromise, under which Canada would provide technical and logistical support units, while the entire UNEF operation would remain under command of the Canadian general E.L.M. Burns. The Queen’s Own returned from their way station in Halifax to home base in Calgary. Pearson reflected that the Egyptian reaction was “entirely predictable … In retrospect, this was not an unfriendly gesture on Nasser’s part, it was just being sensible.” Pearson’s biographer John English suggests that the affair strengthened Pearson’s interest in a distinctive Canadian flag. Pearson, Mike 2, 261-71; English, Worldly, 141
70 Debates, November 29, 1956, 139-44; OC 1, 280-81. Diefenbaker’s reference to his earlier proposal for a UN peacekeeping force was subtly misleading. In January, Diefenbaker had mentioned “something in the nature of an international force” to stand between the Arabs and Israelis, as suggested in reports of talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden. Pearson, in reply, did not reject, but endorsed, the idea: “If that proposal were made … and if it became a matter for United Nations consideration, I am sure this country as well as other countries would want to do what they could to carry it into effect.” But he added that no such proposal had been made to the UN or the Canadian government, and that he was reluctant to commit the government’s hand in advance. This was diplomatic discretion rather than rejection. Debates, January 31, 1956, 723; February 1, 1956, 775-77
71 Debates, November 29, 1956, 139-44
72 Fleming, Near 1, 327; Globe and Mail, November 30, 1956; Winnipeg Tribune, December 3, 1956; Winnipeg Free Press, December 4, 1956
73 Camp, Gentlemen, 232
74 Goodman, Life, 76-77. Camp recalled that the Diefenbakers occupied a single room rather than a suite. Camp, Gentlemen, 254
75 On Camp’s advice, O’Leary had been bumped from his original position as keynote speaker to make way for Premier Robert Stanfield, the party’s new political hero from Nova Scotia. The change turned out for the best, in Camp’s view, because “O’Leary could not have done both the eulogy of Drew and the keynote address.” Coincidentally, Camp ghostwrote the Stanfield speech. Camp, Gentlemen, 233-37
76 Ibid., 235-37
77 See, for example, Ted Rogers to JGD, September 25, 1956, JGDP, III/74/14.5, 59826-29; Camp, Gentlemen, 233; Sawatsky, Mulroney, 41-47. Diefenbaker’s own insecurity was echoed among the nineteen delegates and alternates who attended the convention from Prince Albert. According to Dick Spencer, they had “nagging fears that somehow the westerners and their candidate might be outfoxed in the capital.” Spencer, Trumpets, 18
78 Camp, Gentlemen, 233, 238
79 Quoted in Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 15. Diefenbaker no doubt knew of Bell’s role some weeks earlier in the “Stop Diefenbaker” discussions, and thus believed he had reason to doubt Bell’s neutrality. Bell insisted that he “preserved a total impartiality and judicial approach as chairman.” Films of Diefenbaker’s nomination speech show Bell sitting, stony-faced and motionless, as others on the platform applauded Diefenbaker’s conclusion.
80 Sévigny, This Game, 37-41, esp. 41; Stursberg, Leadership Gained, 16-21; Camp, Gentlemen, 238-40; Meisel, Election 1957, 31-33; OC 1, 278-79. Pierre Sévigny saw Diefenbaker’s refusal to alter his plans as a sign of “terrible indecision,” while Churchill saw it as a sign of “courage and determination.” In his memoir, Sévigny wrote that Diefenbaker had invited him to second the nomination; the indecision came when Diefenbaker subsequently opted for Pearkes and failed to tell Sévigny. Sévigny insisted later that, when confronted with the dispute, Diefenbaker could not make up his mind, and finally left the decision to others. But Churchill and Hees credited him with decisiveness. Perspective, in this case, was all. Sévigny claimed that the choice cost Diefenbaker sixty votes or more at the convention, which seems doubtful. Meisel could find no plausible explanation for Diefenbaker’s gratuitous alienation of Quebec delegates.
81 Camp, Gentlemen, 28-30
82 Camp, the professional, judged that the speech had a “curious abjectness,” that it was “a poor speech, poorly organized and poorly spoken.” But he recognized that Diefenbaker had nourished long-starved hopes. J.B. McGeachy, Financial Post, December 22, 1956; Sévigny, This Game, 41-42; Fleming, Near 1, 328-29; Camp, Gentlemen, 247-48; Toronto Telegram, December 14, 1956; Globe and Mail, December 15, 1956
83 The Globe and Mail reported that Diefenbaker received 102 votes from Quebec delegates, or one-third of the total, but that seems doubtful. In a frank letter to Diefenbaker written shortly after the convention, Fleming attributed the figure to George Hees and called it “utterly preposterous … My best information is that neither you nor Davie obtained more than about a score of votes in Quebec.” Fleming, Near 1, 329; Sévigny, This Game, 42-43; Camp, Gentlemen, 250-52; Globe and Mail, December 15, 1956; “Acceptance Speech by Mr. Diefenbaker”; Donald Fleming to JGD, December 27, 1956, JGDP, XII/120/F/390
Chapter 7 On the New Frontier
1 Camp, Gentlemen, 254
2 Ibid., 255
3 Fleming, Near 1, 329-30
4 Ibid., 332-34
5 Interview with Richard Bell, October 11, 1969. Drew convinced Bell that he should stick around to help pick up the pieces, by running for parliament in 1957.
6 Toronto Globe and Mail, December 15, 1956
7 Camp, Gentlemen, 241
8 George Bain, “Minding Your Business,” Globe and Mail, January 10, 1957. Bain seemed to be
responding to Peter Stursberg’s report, “A Lone Wolf Takes Over the Tory Party,” in the Toronto Star, December 15, 1956. Stursberg also reported doubts among Conservative MPs about “his quality of leadership” and “his ability as an administrator.” For Stursberg, Diefenbaker after 1948 had been “irascible and erratic … not a deep thinker … superficial and petty.” He concluded, however, that Diefenbaker’s caucus critics recognized that the man might change, “the dark shadows should disappear,” now that his ambition had been achieved.
9 Prince Albert Herald, December 29, 1956; Spencer, Trumpets, 20-21. For an analysis of Diefenbaker’s appeal as a charismatic leader, whose personal qualities resonate among distressed or expectant followers, see Courtney, Selection, 168-72.
10 In the memoirs, Diefenbaker wrote: “What I did not need was a National Headquarters full of people whose chief desire was to torpedo me so as to bring about a new leadership convention as quickly as possible.” This was a curiously suspicious attitude for a new leader; but as he had admitted, his previous relations with the party office had been unfriendly. OC 2, 6
11 Camp, Gentlemen, 256-60, esp. 260. In an interview after his retirement, Churchill said that he had had “a desk-banging argument” with Diefenbaker in January 1957, after which he wished to have no part in the election campaign. (If his recollection was correct, this would have been before the creation of the triumvirate.) Diefenbaker had persuaded him to continue, Churchill said, “because Mr. Diefenbaker respected a man who would stand up to him.” Despite their disagreements, Churchill recalled that their political views coincided “90% of the time.” Churchill did not mention the subject of the January disagreement. Gordon Churchill interview with W.F.W. Neville, July 7, 1970
12 The tale is told at length in Camp, Gentlemen, 256-77, and Diefenbaker’s words are as reported by Camp. Camp’s objection to Grosart was based on a “superficial” judgment that Grosart was “incompetent in matters of advertising” and an opportunist: “While I marvelled at his toughness, accommodated by a masculine, roguish charm, I considered him cynical and uncommitted. Politics on that basis was impossible to me. I wanted the Conservative Party to become an effective, efficient political instrument - such as could bring down a Liberal government.” Ibid., 259. In one of his most blatant efforts to rewrite history, Diefenbaker claimed in the memoirs that Camp had played no part in the 1957 campaign: “At that time, I knew nothing of him whatever … In 1957 … he was nothing.” OC 2, 29. This was just one indication of the rage Diefenbaker felt over the campaign, eventually successful, to remove him from the leadership after the 1965 election.
Diefenbaker’s apparent indecision about the party’s electoral management may have been affected by his effort to recruit a former Conservative Party stalwart, Mel Jack, as his executive assistant or campaign manager. Jack had been fired from the leader’s office in 1954 by George Drew, and had been taken into the civil service through the good offices of Walter Harris and J.W. Pickersgill. When Diefenbaker sought him out, Jack responded that he would accept “if it can be arranged without sacrificing my present economic position with regard to earnings, pension and security of employment.” That would involve a firm contract, a pension, and a salary of $10,000 to $12,000 per year. For the depression-formed lawyer, that was too high a price. After the 1957 Conservative victory, Jack became George Hees’s executive assistant and was credited with much of Hees’s success in that portfolio. Melville R. Jack to JGD, February 14, 1957, JGDP, IV/8/333.8 Misc.,6377; Nicholson, Vision, 40-42
13 Charlotte Whitton to JGD, January 15, 1957, JGDP, XII/7/A/172
14 Pierre Sévigny to JGD, April 4, 1957, JGDP, IV/19/391.5 Que. Sévigny’s letter was in response to a curt letter from Diefenbaker in which he said: “I am very anxious to have you announce your candidacy now… Please let me hear from you by return.” Sévigny subsequently decided to run, but lost his contest in 1957. JGD to Pierre Sévigny, April 2, 1957, ibid.
15 Fleming, Near 1, 337-38; OC 2, 9
16 JGD to Mary F. Diefenbaker, January 2, 1957, JGDP, V/1, 560
17 Nicholson, Vision, 37-38
18 House of Commons, Debates, March 15, 1957, 2349
19 Ibid., 2350
20 L.B. Pearson to JGD, March 29, 1957, JGDP, IV/29/861 Egypt, 20685
21 “Statement by John G. Diefenbaker, Q.C., M.P.,” April 4, 1957, ibid., 20698; Debates, April 4, 1957, 3058-59
22 Mike Pearson to JGD, April 3, 1957, JGDP, IV/29/861 Egypt, 20690. Pearson seems to have dated the note for the previous day.
23 See, for example, Toronto Star, April 5, 1957
24 JGD to Mrs R.C. McFaul, April 8, 1957, JGDP, IV/29/861 Egypt, 20702
25 Debates, April 10, 1957, 3358-59
26 Ibid., April 12, 1957, 3466
27 Ibid., 3492-93
28 Ibid., 3493-502
29 For example, Diefenbaker received and filed the May 1957 bulletin from Ron Gostick’s extremist “Canadian Intelligence Service,” titled “Does Responsibility for Norman Tragedy Point at Pearson and St. Laurent,” and a long letter from Edith Dickey Moses in South Carolina, who condemned American fellow-travellers on the basis of the Senate subcommittee hearings and concluded: “I have just gone over the Norman record … And I personally have not the slightest doubt that he was a Communist. With his background I consider it sheer stupidity for your government to have sent him to Egypt. And if Lester Pearson were not white-washing this I am sure more shocking information would come out.” “Does Responsibility for Norman …” Canadian Intelligence Service 7 (May 1957); Edith Dickey Moses to JGD, April 14, 1957, JGDP, IV/17/*352 EA, 11242; IV/29/861 Egypt, 20716-19
30 R. Donellan to JGD, April 14, 1957, JGDP, IV/29/861 Egypt, 20723-24
31 M.W.M., “Memorandum for Mr. Diefenbaker: Re Norman Case,” May 7, 1957, JGDP, IV/17/*352 EA, 11229-32
32 There is now a large literature on Herbert Norman and “the Norman affair,” but the evidence remains ambiguous, as it tends to be in Cold War intelligence cases in the absence of documents from the Soviet archives. See, for example, “The Strange Case of Mr. Norman,” U.S. News & World Report, April 26, 1957; Bowen, Innocence Is Not Enough; Barros, No Sense of Evil; English, Shadow, 301-02; English, Worldly, 164-82. On the strictly domestic, political aspects of the affair, English judges that “the Norman controversy illuminates a great deal about Pearson, the Liberal government, and their times.” Pearson, he suggests, was a decent man who preferred to keep such issues out of “party politics.” In the United States, Norman would have been hounded out of public life, but in Canada “Pearson and his colleagues kept matters to themselves.” “McCarthyism’s failure in Canada may be the victory of elitist tendencies in Canadian political life in the post-war period. It was also, however, the victory of civility and decency.” English, Worldly, 181-82
33 Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician; John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain
34 Fleming, Near 1, 335
35 M.W. Menzies to Dr Glen Green, December 1, 1956; June Menzies to JGD, January 6, 1957; JGD to June Menzies, January 17, 1957; M.W. Menzies to JGD, January 22, 1957; JGD to M.W. Menzies, January 29, 1957; Donald Eldon to Derek Bedson, January 30, 1957; M.W. Menzies to JGD, February 11, 1957; telegram, JGD to M.W. Menzies, February 26, 1957, JGDP, XIII/284/E/88, 179377-419; IV/1/201, 497-509; see also OC 2, 10-13; Bothwell et al., Canada, 186-88; Meisel, Election 1957, 42-44. After the 1957 general election, Menzies became an adviser in the prime minister’s office, where he remained until 1959.
36 M.W. Menzies to JGD, January 22, 1957, JGDP, OF/271/333.8 M and Mc
37 This is particularly obvious, for example, in Diefenbaker’s marked copies of Menzies’s letter of March 28, 1957, and his memo on national policy of April 6, 1957. M.W. Menzies to JGD, March 28, 1957; “Memo for Mr. Diefenbaker,” April 6, 1957, JGDP, IV/22/*391.8, 14965-71, 14788-807
38 “Memo for Mr. Diefenbaker: National Policy,” April 6, 1957, ibid., 14788-807, esp. 14788-90
39 Menzies proposed, f
or example, immediate completion of the Pine Point railway to the south shore of Great Slave Lake; paving of the Mackenzie and Alaska highways; completion of the Stewart-Cassiar highway to bypass the Alaska panhandle in northern British Columbia; a railway from Prince George, British Columbia, to Whitehorse, Yukon; a carefully planned system of “development roads” in the territory; improved air, radio, and telephone services in the north; and major federal initiatives to provide hospital, education, and social services for the new province. M.W. Menzies, “Memo for Mr. Diefenbaker: National Policy,” April 6, 1957, ibid., 14792-800
40 This is especially evident in Menzies’s comments to Diefenbaker on policy discussions in the National Campaign Committee on April 7 and 8, 1957. M.W. Menzies, “Memo for Mr. Diefenbaker,” April 10, 1957, ibid., 14943-47; see also Meisel, Election 1957, 41-44
41 On the Ontario bargain, see Graham, Frost, 329-35.
42 Camp, Gentlemen, 277-79
43 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, April 11, 1957, JGDP, V/3, 1608-09
44 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, April 11, 13, 14, 1957, JGDP, ibid., 1610-13. In April, Diefenbaker expressed guilty concern that his response to a letter of congratulations had not been received: “I cannot understand this as I wrote you a personal letter in long hand. I don’t know what happened. Yours is not the only case. There are at least half a dozen others who have told me they did not receive the replies that I wrote which were all sent at about the same time. These letters may have been misplaced in a group. “JGD to Charles Peters, April 11, 1957, ibid., IV/3/284, 2045
45 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, March 29, April 10, April 11, April 13, April 14, and May 5, 1957, JGDP, V/3, 1604-05, 1608-13, 1619
