by Denis Smith
120 Robinson adds that Diefenbaker came to Pearson’s office to seek his advice, and agreed that Pearson should ask questions in the House to elicit the prime minister’s jointly prepared response. Diefenbaker, however, opened the day with a statement that incorporated Pearson’s advice without acknowledgment, and without giving Pearson a chance to speak. Pearson’s secretary told Robinson that he was “angry about being double-crossed and his regard for Diefenbaker sank even further.” Debates, October 23, 1962, 821; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 289, 334
121 CBC transcript, nd, JGDP, XII/56/C/120
122 Debates, October 25, 1962, 911-13; the draft texts, with Diefenbaker’s revisions, are in JGDP, XII/56/C/120.
123 Washington Post, October 27, 1962
124 Reeves, President Kennedy, 410-26; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 290-91
125 Orme Dier to Basil Robinson, January 25, 1987, quoted in Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 291-92
126 Reeves, President Kennedy, 410-26
127 “Statement by the Prime Minister, Sunday, October 28, 1962,” JGDP, XII/56/C/120
128 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 13
129 Ibid., 13-14; CC, 96-62, October 30, 1962; OC 3, 90, 93-94; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 297-98. Diefenbaker suggested that the renewed negotiations gave Canada the chance to “raise questions concerning the working of NORAD” and the meaning of consultation in periods of crisis, but there is no indication that these issues were discussed. The standby proposal for storing warheads in the United States was outlined in a memo from Green to Diefenbaker on October 26, and suggested that “nuclear warheads would be brought into Canada only on a finding by Cabinet that an emergency exists and a concomitant request to the United States Government to provide the warheads.” HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister: Provision of Nuclear Warheads,” JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.9
130 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 14-17; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 298-300; OC 3, 106-07
131 Globe and Mail, November 9, 1962; Toronto Star, November 9, 1962
132 George Hogan to JGD, November 8, 1962, JGDP, XII/62/C/215
133 George Hogan, “The Conservative Party and the United States,” November 8, 1962, ibid. The confusion of Diefenbaker’s political constituency was illustrated by the (Liberal) Toronto Star’s editorial, “Ready, Aye, Ready,” which congratulated the prime minister for having done none of the “foolish and mischievous” things that Hogan suggested. Toronto Star, November 9, 1962
134 JGD, “Strictly Confidential Memorandum: Re: Telephone Conversation with George Hogan, Friday Nov 9th. 1962 Regarding Speech in Toronto Nov. 8th. - Cuba &C”; unsigned handwritten memos, JGDP, XII/62/C/215; Debates, November 9, 1962, 1451
135 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 16-17
136 W.W. Butterworth to Department of State, December 17, 1962, 442, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1191-92; O.W. Dier, “Call by Ambassador Butterworth on the Prime Minister,” December 18, 1962, JGDP, XIV/19/F/5
137 OC 3, 94-95; Harold Macmillan to JGD, November 30, 1962; Derick Amory to JGD, December 5, 1962, JGDP, XII/8/A/282.3
138 The phrase was provided to Diefenbaker by his new executive assistant, Burt Richardson, who had joined him from the Telegram to replace John Fisher - who was about to become commissioner for the 1967 centennial. Richardson preceded Diefenbaker to Nassau by one day and reassured the prime minister in a telephone message: “Regardless of what the doctrinal professors of the State Department and External Affairs say, Kennedy is anxious to improve relations with you.” There was scant evidence for this belief. OC 3, 95; B.T. Richardson, “Memorandum to: The Prime Minister,” December 20, 1962, JGDP, XIV/19/F/5
139 Diefenbaker said in the memoirs that he told Kennedy he would soon have proposals to discuss with him. The official Canadian minute of the meeting does not mention the subject, but Diefenbaker’s own memorandum for file, written in Nassau, does so. There is no record of any response from the president. OC 3, 98-99; “Bahamas Meetings - December 21-22, 1962, Specific points discussed with President Kennedy at Luncheon Meeting December 21”; JGD, “Memorandum Re: Discussions with President Kennedy, Nassau, Bahamas - December 21, 1962,” December 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/66/C/291
140 Diefenbaker’s own records of the meetings, along with the delegation’s memoranda and draft communiqués, appear in JGDP, XIV/9/D/17, XII/66/C/291, and XII/113/F/222.
141 JGD, “Draft statement on meeting in Nassau with President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan,” January 21, 1963, JGDP, XII/66/C/291; OC 3, 105-06; Debates, January 21, 1963, 2898-99
142 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, January 2, 1963, JGDP, V/5, 2724. In mid-January Olive was examined at the Montreal Neurological Institute and provided with a back brace. JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, January 11, 1963, ibid., 2725
143 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 302-03
144 Transcript of a press conference with General Lauris S. Norstad, January 3, 1963, JGDP, VI/2/108 (Norstad)
145 Le Devoir, January 5, 1963
146 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 18
147 Ibid., 19
148 English, Worldly, 249-51; Pearson, Mike 3, 69-72; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 304
149 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 20. Diefenbaker offered a variation of the point to Finlay Macdonald in a telephone conversation on January 14: “In 1878 Macdonald was in the same position. The Grits announced on a Thursday that they were in favour of free trade. Sir John changed his speech around and went to the country … I am trying to work out a Declaration of National Idealism somewhat as I made at the conclusion of my Bill of Rights speech - ‘I am a Canadian …’ About 8 lines.” On the other hand, Diefenbaker recorded another telephone conversation with John Pallett on the same day in which he blamed Norstad for his indecision: “We would have made an announcement if it had not been for Norstad. There is American domination again. The attitude Kennedy took to Macmillan in the Bahamas was simply to push him.” JGD, “Conversation with Finlay Macdonald,” January 14, 1963; JGD, “Telephone conversation with John Pallett,” January 14, 1963, JGDP, XII/71/C/354; VII/73/A/610.4
150 E.A. Goodman to JGD January 15, 1963, JGDP, XII/71/C/354; Goodman, Life, 94-101; OC 3, 153-55. Diefenbaker had the chutzpah to declare in his memoirs that he was “entirely satisfied” with the defence resolution and that he agreed with Goodman’s approach to it. But he added delphically: “It is of significance that Goodman was John Bassett’s lawyer and George Hees’s principal backer, a powerful man within the Toronto Tory hierarchy with a considerable influence over Ontario’s Premier, John Robarts.”
151 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 21-23
152 Ibid., 23-24
153 Fleming, Near 2, 581-82; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 26-29. Fleming described it as “a momentous document,” and prided himself that he had “kept the original in a secret place these twenty years.”
154 Fleming, Near 2, 583. Harkness’s account is generally similar, although he adds some personal exchanges not reported by Fleming. Fleming suggests that there was no further discussion of the memo, while Harkness recalls that cabinet discussed it the next morning in the absence of the prime minister and that the “great majority” of ministers accepted it. When that was reported to Diefenbaker by Fleming, he maintained his defiance. Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 29-31
155 Ibid., 32
156 Fleming, Near 2, 583-84; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 156; Debates, January 25, 1963, 3125-37
157 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 32-36
158 Globe and Mail, Ottawa Citizen, January 26, 1963
159 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 35-44; Debates, January 28, 29, 1963, 3157-58, 3203-06
160 Fleming, Near 2, 592-94
161 “United States Information Service Special: United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons,” January 30, 1963, JGDP, VII/75/A/612; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 306-09
162 NAR, “Memorandum for the Prim
e Minister,” January 30, 1963, JGDP, XII/104/F/100; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 306-07
163 Fleming, Near 2, 588-89
164 Ibid., 589; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 46
165 Debates, January 31, 1963, 3289-305, 3313-28; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 46-47; Fleming, Near 2, 589-90. Under House procedures there was no appeal against Speaker’s rulings, but the three opposition parties combined to defeat the government by 122-104 and to overturn the rule.
166 Debates, January 31, 1963, 3313-28; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 47-48
167 Telegram, Canadian Embassy, Washington, to External Affairs, 351 emergency, February 1, 1963, JGDP, VII/75/A/612; Washington Post, New York Times, January 31, 1963. The Bundy story became the official American line on February 7, when Bundy telephoned the Canadian ambassador, Charles Ritchie, to say that “the President knew nothing in advance about the State Department release of January 30 which triggered the currrent controversy. Bundy said ‘it was a case of stupidity and the stupidity was mine.’ ” A memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy on February 14, 1963, confirms this, speaking of “my obvious error in giving telephone clearance, even under the pressure of time, without giving you a whack at it.” Ross Campbell for NAR, “Memorandum for the Minister,” February 7, 1963, JGDP, XIV/9/D/17; McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the President,” February 14, 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: 02/01/63-02/14/63, Mandatory Review Case NLK-87-215
168 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 48-51. According to Harkness, the nine were Baker, Fleming, Hugh John Flemming, Halpenny, Harkness, Hees, McCutcheon, Nowlan, and Sévigny.
169 Ibid., 51-52; Fleming, Near 2, 594-95
170 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 52
171 The quotation is from a memorandum by Carlyle Allison, recording the events of the weekend, which he sent much later to Diefenbaker. Carlyle Allison to JGD, April 26, 1971, JGDP, XIV/9/D/17
172 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 52-53; OC 3, 5-6. In the memoirs, Diefenbaker mentions only that “a prominent journalist” had baited Harkness. The prime minister’s informant was probably Carlyle Allison, who also provided Diefenbaker with the tip about further resignations. Diefenbaker was “effusively” thankful for the information. Carlyle Allison to JGD, April 26, 1971, JGDP, XIV/9/D/17
173 OC 3, 160. The account that follows is drawn chiefly from the memoirs, Diefenbaker’s notes made during the meeting, another (and fuller) handwritten summary (perhaps by Gordon Churchill), Harkness’s essay, Fleming’s detailed record, and Patrick Nicholson’s Vision (which was based on copious leakage). There were no officials present, and no formal record was kept.
174 Peter Newman gave that version of the story from his cabinet sources. Newman, Renegade, 475
175 OC 3, 160-64; JGD, “Meeting, Feb 3/63” (handwritten notes, including Bell’s draft of cabinet resolution), JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.12; “Meeting of Ministers, February 3rd, 1962” (sic) (handwritten notes, unsigned), ibid., XIV/17/E/222.8; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 54-59; Fleming, Near 2, 597-601; Nicholson, Vision, 230-36; Douglas S. Harkness to JGD, February 3, 1963 (and covering “Memorandum to the Prime Minister”), JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.12. Diefenbaker told Fleming that Fulton made a second visit that night (which Fulton denies) to tout his own qualifications as prime minister. Two documents in the prime minister’s files suggest that there was only one visit, by Fulton and Hees together. JGD, “Saturday, February 2, 1963” (sic), February 10, 1963; “Chronology of Events re Crisis,” nd, JGDP, XIV/17/E/222.11; XIV/14/E/143
176 Fleming, Near 2, 601. Fleming’s doubts about who controlled the succession were sound. Once Diefenbaker had resigned, the selection of a new prime minister would lie with the governor general, whose duty would be to find a candidate most likely to command support in the House. He was not obliged to consult Diefenbaker, and would almost certainly have sought advice from other ministers who were opposed to Fleming. The most likely temporary favourite seemed to be Nowlan.
177 CC, 10-63, February 4, 1963; Fleming, Near 2, 601-02; OC 3, 165
178 Debates, February 4, 1963, 3377, 3395-409; CAR 1963, 299-301
179 Nicholson, Vision, 227-30, 236
180 Michael Wardell, “Chateau Laurier. February 6, 1963,” JGDP, XIV/9/D/17
181 Nicholson, Vision, 239
182 Debates, February 4, 1963, 3410-14
183 Wardell, “Chateau Laurier,” JGDP, XLV/9/D/17
184 Nicholson, Vision, 242-46. Wardell’s account from Robert Thompson was not inconsistent, although Wardell heard it only after the government defeat. Nicholson’s remarkable part in this affair is explained by Diefenbaker as the result of his ambition for a senatorship, which he now hoped to secure from a new prime minister as the reward for his king-making role. The prospect of an appointment under Diefenbaker had certainly been discussed, and Nicholson’s name went before cabinet at the meeting in September 1962 when Grattan O’Leary and Allister Grosart were made senators. Nicholson’s appointment, however, was not confirmed. Diefenbaker wrote that “he would have received this elevation in due course.” His disenchantment may have followed that disappointment. Wardell, “Chateau Laurier,” JGDP, XIV/9/D/17; OC 3, 166; CC, 82-62, September 24, 1962
185 “Chronology of events re crisis,” JGDP, XLV/14/E/143; Nicholson, Vision, 247-49
186 Nicholson, Vision, 249-50; Fleming, Near 2, 604-05
187 Debates, February 5, 1963, 3431
188 Ibid., 3438-48
189 Nicholson, Vision, 256-60; Fleming, Near 2, 607
190 Globe and Mail, February 6, 1963
191 Telegram, February 6, 1963
192 The account is by Dal ton Camp, quoted in Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 72
193 The account of the caucus meeting is based on OC 3, 171-72; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 68-71; Fleming, Near 2, 609-14; Nicholson, Vision, 261-63; Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 71-77; Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, February 7, 1963. The reports vary somewhat in detail and chronology, but are consistent in their accounts of the powerful mood of the occasion. Harkness wrote that the meeting “was an outstanding example of the working of mass psychology and the influence of crowd emotion to cause men to agree to a course of action which they knew to be wrong and which they had previously decided against. It was again an example of a failure in human courage when the pressure was extreme. Had the half dozen or more ministers who had decided to resign done so, I believe the Caucus would have seen the impossibility of the situation and agreed to Diefenbaker resigning.”
Chapter 13 A Leader at Bay
1 “The Sacrifice Was Too Great,” Telegram, February 7, 1963
2 “A Matter of Morality,” Globe and Mail, February 8, 1963
3 Wallace McCutcheon to JGD, February 6, 1963, JGDP, XIV/E/222.10 Defence (Haslam). The concluding warning proved empty. There were no further negotiations with the United States on warheads during the election campaign. On February 11 George Nowlan established the same position in public, telling the Halifax Chronicle Herald that he would “quit the cabinet immediately if an anti-American election program were presented by his party.”
4 E.A. Goodman to JGD, February 5, 1963, JGDP, OF/1326/Ontario-Political 1963
5 Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 78-79; Goodman, Life, 102-03
6 Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 80-85; Sévigny, This Game, 284-86. Hees must have been subject to further persuasion during the week. Richard Bell told Stursberg: “I heard that John Bassett threatened to expose him with something that was subsequently exposed. I was told soon afterwards that there was this scandal in the background of which I then knew nothing. This story moved around amongst ministers, idle gossip, no proof, no nothing. Frankly none of us believed that George would have gone out except under very heavy, almost irresistible, pressure.” The reference was to Hees’s involvement with Gerda Munsinger, which was known to the RCMP security service and probably to Diefenbaker and Fulton. Diefenbaker later believed that Bassett also knew the story and had th
reatened Hees that he would spill it if Hees did not resign. Bassett denied the accusation. Diefenbaker makes only veiled reference to this story in his memoirs.
During the 1963 campaign, I was asked over and over again: “Why did George Hees resign?” “What happened between the Wednesday, when he came out of the caucus and announced to the press, ‘We’re all together,’ and Saturday morning when he resigned?” I could have told the Canadian people, and possibly I should have. I have said it was an error, not of the head but of the heart. Had I revealed what I knew, this would have brought harm to the innocent members of families. Prime Ministers, according to the late Earl Attlee, have to be butchers; I never reached the point where I could do anything that might bring harm or hurt to the innocent. Sir John Macdonald once said, “Be to our faults a little blind, and to our virtues always kind.”
There is nothing in the papers to suggest that Diefenbaker had any proof of his implied accusation. Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 79-80, 86; OC 3, 177
7 JGD, Memorandum, February 18, 1963, JGDP, XIV/E/222.10 Defence (Haslam). Sévigny’s account is consistent with this story. Burt Richardson reports that he had been warned earlier by Hees’s executive assistant, Mel Jack, “that something was going on,” but he may or may not have told the prime minister what to expect. OC 3, 174-75; Stursberg, Leadership Lost, 83-85; Sévigny, This Game, 285
