by Tom Clancy
Meanwhile, there'd been a major command change. Gary Luck was being promoted to Lieutenant General and would now command U.S. Army Special Forces Command; Major General Wayne Downing was taking over as commander of the JSOTF. Since General Downing's background was filled with Airborne, Ranger, and Special Operations assignments, including combat in Vietnam, there was no loss in command continuity. He had been completely read-in on the plan, and had participated in all the rehearsals.
By the time the Execute Order was published, a large part of the special operations forces had already clandestinely infiltrated into Panama; the rest were scheduled to be infiltrated before H-hour. At 0100 on Monday morning, General Downing left for Panama with a contingent of his forces.
The force he would command totaled approximately 4,400 and was composed of special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs units from the Army, Air Force, and the Navy. The largest special operations component, and its principal assault force, was the 75th Ranger Regiment, dubbed Task Force Red.
CARL Stiner comments:
Gary Luck had done an outstanding job integrating the joint special operations activities into the overall plan, and now he would not have the opportunity to execute them. On that count, I had to feel sorry for him. On the other hand, his promotion was long overdue and he would do an equally outstanding job commanding the Army's Special Operations Command and go on to command the XVIII Airborne Corps in Operation DESERT STORM, less than a year away.
PRE-H-HOUR
Maintaining operational security had from the outset been crucial to the plan. Without it, we could forget about achieving surprise. And without surprise, there would certainly be greater casualties — on both sides. The troops stationed in Panama gave me the most concern in this regard. Some lived off-base, some had Panamanian girlfriends, some of the families had maids, and all our installations had Panamanian workers — a ready-made situation for a compromise.
One of my main reasons for going down to Panama early was to meet with the commanders there to determine how to best alert the troops for the operation without compromising security. And of course, I could control the pre-H-hour activities better there than I could back at Bragg.
There was no doubt; the troops in Panama were ready. All units were already in a high state of alert and could be assembled in two hours. They'd had intensified training; they'd eyeballed every target they would take down; and commanders had even prepared handy "battle books," which provided the complete tactical plan for each target. For the sake of security, however, units below battalion level had deliberately not been briefed. And now this would have to be done for real, and quickly.
After landing at Howard Air Force Base on Monday night, I went straight to Fort Clayton and assembled all my commanders down to battalion level to tell them the operation was a go, at 0100 hours, 20 December — twenty-eight hours away. We then decided to call the junior officers in for briefing at 8:00 P.M. the next day, and the troops sequestered and briefed at 9:00. This would allow four hours for detailed briefings at company level, issue of ammo, and preparation for movement to attach positions. Both Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations teams (equipped with portable lowdspeakers and precut scripts) had previously been assigned to all company-level combat units.
Meanwhile, General Thurman and I had one other major concern — the security of the rightfully elected government, Endara, Ford, and Calderon, in hiding since their heating in May. Although Green Berets stationed in Panama had been keeping an eye on them and had responsibility for a rescue mission (if needed), the truth was that Noriega could have taken them anytime he wanted.
The Deputy Chief of Mission, John Bushnell (the Ambassador was on home leave), solved that problem by inviting the three men to dinner at his quarters on Howard Air Force Base, Tuesday evening, December 19. After dinner, they were flown by helicopter to Quarry Heights, where they were briefed on the operation by General Thurman.
Just before midnight, a Panamanian judge was provided space in Thurman's headquarters, and there officially swore in Endara as president, and Ford and Calderon as vice presidents. After the ceremony, they were taken to a safe house on Fort Clayton, where they prepared the speeches they would deliver the morning after H-hour.
The United States immediately recognized the Endara government.
Meanwhile, we had several people tracking Noriega, and they had a fairly good handle on where he was about eighty percent of the time. That turned out not to he good enough.
On Tuesday the nineteenth, he had spent most of the day in the Colon area. Late that afternoon, his entourage left Colon and headed for Panama City — or so we thought. We later learned that somewhere between Colon and Panama City, the convoy had split in two, one part headed east to a rest camp near Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport, where Noriega had a rendezvous with a prostitute (arranged by his aide, Captain Gaitan — a true bad guy; he'd reportedly murdered three people). The other part proceeded on to the Comandancia, where a Noriega look-alike got out, was greeted by the honor guard, and proceeded inside.
Based on information our people provided, Wayne Downing and I both quickly realized that this man was not Noriega.
But where was the real one? We didn't know.
Back in the States, marshaling had been completed and troops were loading and launching from fourteen different bases. Since the plan called for radio silence, we conducted everything up until H-hour from a Master Execution Checklist. As long as a unit was on schedule, there was no need for reports; we broke radio silence only when something happened that might keep a unit from accomplishing its mission at the specified time.
So far, so good. Everything seemed to be on track — including command and control: I had overall control from my headquarters in Panama, while Downing provided an alternate command post in that country. He had complete communications and the ability to control the whole operation. Airborne over the Atlantic in an EC-130 was the Deputy Corps Commander, Major General Will Roosma, with a complete battle staff and all the communications necessary to control the operation. And back at Fort Bragg was another fully manned command center, also capable of controlling the operation.
A total of 253 fixed-wing aircraft and 80 helicopters were to be involved in D Day activities. On the next page is a listing by type and number.
Some of these aircraft, such as the thirty-five KC-10 and KC-135 tankers, would assume orbit positions outside the immediate operational area so as not to interfere with combat activities.
All those carrying troops or in troop support missions would assemble over the Gulf of Mexico, drop down below Cuba's radar coverage and proceed through the Yucatan Gap, and then on to Panama and their specific target areas. Just in case any were challenged by Castro's air force, twelve F- 15 fighters were aloft near Cuba and ready to respond.
All crews involved in the combat operation would wear night-vision goggles. All troop-carrying aircraft, including heavy equipment drop operations, would fly blached-out, and were to be AWADS-equipped (technology for all weather conditions). All crews flying special operations forces would be SOLL-11 qualified (able to make blacked-out landings in total darkness).
D DAY FIXEL
The first call from a commander came at about 6:00 P.M., an hour before the 82nd's scheduled takeoff time, from Major General Jim Johnson, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division: A severe ice storm had hit Pope Air Force Base and it would be impossible to launch all his troops as scheduled. The twenty-eight C-141 heavy drop aircraft had been loaded and pre-positioned at Charleston. No problem as far as they were concerned. The problem was with the troop-carrying C-141s. There was not enough de-icing equipment to launch the twenty personnel birds at one time. At this point, he had only eight ready to launch, and it would be three to four hours before he could launch the rest of the force.
I was not surprised when he asked for a delay, but I denied it. "Send those eight on, " I told him, "and send the rest as soon as the others can be
de-iced."
Of course, I knew there was no getting around a delay, which would mean that three key targets — Panama Viejo, Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron — could not all be taken before daylight. Two of them, probably Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron, would have to be taken in the morning, which would likely mean more casualties. You have to adjust for the unforeseen in any complex operation.
Meanwhile, a thick fog had moved in at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, where the tanker aircraft had been assembled. Though it was so thick that a truck had to lead each plane to the end of the runway for takeoff, all the aircraft launched on time.
Delaying H-hour for the entire operation would have resulted in serious consequences, as I well knew. Commanders are trained and entrusted to wake these kinds of judgments, and to develop alternative plans.
Accordingly, I called Johnson back ten minutes after his call. "Your first priority," I told him, "is to take Panama Viejo, and if possible Tinajitas, before daylight. Fort Cimarron," which was farther from Panama City, "can be taken later in the day. I'll take responsibility for containing Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron by keeping AC-130s nearby until you can conduct your air assaults."
We knew in advance that the PDF had established a nest of sixteen heavy mortars near Tinajitas, which could range all of Panama City and Howard Air Force Base. For that reason, they had already been targeted for AC-130 strikes at H-hour, and afterward if required.
Those mortars had given us other concerns: Since the nineteen C-130s carrying Rangers to Rio Hato and Torrijos would have been in the air for seven hours, they'd be practically running on fumes when they made their drop. Because they were not air-refuelable, we had to have fuel for them in Panama; the plan was to land them at Howard — about forty miles from Rio Hato. But, because the PDF mortars might be firing on Howard, an alternative plan had to be developed. We therefore planned to land two C-5s ou the civilian runway at Torrijos-Tocumen, where they could serve as "wet wing filling stations" for the C-130s, if nesessary. The C-5s were to land immediately after the Rangers had secured the field and cleared the runway of obstacles.
As it turned out, we had no problem using Howard, but still used the C-5s for refueling helicopters, particularly those supporting the 82nd's three air assaults.
As we got closer to H-hour, Downing and I monitored PDF command nets to determine if they had any inkling of our operation.
And then we got a kick in the gut.
At 1830 I got a call from Bragg: Dan Rather had just announced on the CBS Evening News, "U.S. military transport planes have left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of the Army's elite 82nd Airborne paratroopers. The Pentagon declines to say whether or not they are bound for Panama. It will say only that the Bragg-based XVIII Corps has been conducting what the Army calls an airborne readiness exercise." And on the NBC Evening News, Ed Rabel reported, "United States C-141 Starlifters flew into Panama this afternoon, one landing every ten minutes. At the same time these aircraft were arriving, security was tightened around the air base. U.S. soldiers could be seen in full combat gear on roads around the base." At the end of his brief report, Rabel noted, "No one here could confirm that these aircraft were part of a U. S. invasion group, but tensions on both sides are high this evening over the possibility of a U.S. strike."
Washington had also received a report that a PDF soldier had overheard U.S. soldiers discussing H-hour, and had sent this information up the chain to Noriega; but I didn't believe it for a minute. All U. S. servicemen were locked up and preparing for the attack at the time when this was alleged to have happened.
However they got it — from reports in our media or otherwise — t he PDF apparently picked up word of the operation, now only three hours away. At 10:00 P.M., our listeners began hearing conversations among PDF commanders that indicated they knew something was up. One PDF commander told another: "Tonight is the night, the ball game starts at one o'clock"; others called in their troops and ordered weapons to be issued. There were enough such indicators to convince me to recommend to Thurman that we should advance H-hour. My plan was to attach earlier with the troops already in Panama, to gain as much advantage as possible. The Rangers and the 82nd would just have to attach as scheduled.
I had first hoped to move H-hour ahead by thirty minutes, and Thurman approved that. But after checking again with Wayne Downing, who'd be running the three concurrent critical actions — rescue Kurt Muse, attack the Comandancia, and neutralize Patilla Airfield, Noriega's jet, and the presidential yacht — he and I realized that a thirty-minute advance might be pushing the envelope a bit. So we settled for fifteen minutes, which Thurman approved.
H-hour for all units in Panama was therefore set for 12:45 A.M.
TWENTY-SEVEN MINUTES TO GO
Now everything was on track. Most of the facilities that had to be protected had already been clandestinely secured. Special Forces reconnaissance teams had been covertly inserted in the vicinity of the major targets where they could report the latest information. Units were loaded and ready to move. Communications hot lines had long since been established to the major supporting commands — LANTCOM, SOCOM, the Air Mobility Command, and of course our parent headquarters, SOUTHCOM, only a short distance away in the tunnel at Quarry Heights, where General Thurman would remain the first night.
Though sporadic gunfire could be heard throughout Panama City, by then that was usually the case on any night.
As all troops well know, "Shit happens."
We didn't expect airliners at Torrijos-Tocumen after midnight. This night turned out to be an exception. At 12:40 A.M., a Brazilian wide-body landed, with more than three hundred people on board. At 0100 hours, when the Rangers dropped, these people would either be inside the terminal getting fleeced by the PDF and the customs agents or still unloading. Either way, we had problems.
I called Downing to tell him to prepare for a mass hostage situation at the airport.
"We'll be standing by," he answered. "But remember, we have four rifle companies in that battalion, and one has responsibility for securing the terminal and the control tower. They should be able to handle the situation."
"Let's hope so," I said.
With only minutes remaining, combat was fast approaching. The AC-130 gunships and Apaches were airborne and ready to start preparatory fires on key objectives. The four Sheridan tanks brought in on October- 15 were now approaching firing positions on Anton Hill. They'd engage the Comandancia with their main guns at precisely 0045 hours. Twenty-five Special Forces soldiers from Task Force Black were aboard three Blackhawk helicopters en route to secure the Pacora River bridge, which was critical in keeping Battalion 2000 out of the fight at the airport.
During the planning phase, we had ruled out destroying the bridge. It was the only way for people in much of eastern Panama to get to Panama City. That meant the bridge had to be secured and protected.
All units in Panama were "locked and loaded" (rounds chambered and weapons cocleed) and moving to their assault objectives. Once again, men had to resort to a barbaric way of settling differences. Hopefully, the dying would last no longer than about four hours.
During the final minutes before H-hour, I learned from Thurman that the name of the operation had been changed to Operation JUST CAUSE. General Jim Lindsay of USSOCOM had called General Kelley: "Do you want your grandchildren to ask you, 'What were things like back there in BLUE SPOON?' "And Kelley had agreed: BLUE SPOON didn't sound like anything anybody would ever want to be proud of.
"I sure am glad Jim Lindsay made that call," I told Thurman, "because what we're about to spill blood over certainly is a just cause. ' "
XI
PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE
At precisely 0045 hours, two EF-111 aircraft jammed PDF tactical communications, special operations EC-130s began to override Panamanian radio and TV stations and broadcast the U.S. message to the Panamanian people, and all units began engaging their targets.
Special Forces snipers, who had painstakin
gly worked their way into strategic ovcrwatch positions, also began systematically to eliminate PDF sentries with highly accurate sniping. The sniper teams were led by Sergeant Major Pat Hurley (later killed in the Gulf War in a nighttime helicopter crash during a raging sandstorm as he was returning from a behind-the-lines mission in Iraq).
At the Modelo Prison (part of the fifteen-building Comandancia compound), the assault was under way to rescue Kurt Muse. Six operators from Task Force Green (the Army special mission unit), supported by AH-6 Little Bird gunships and OH-6 lift ships, made the short jump from the pods of their helicopters down to the rooftop. During their approach to the prison, the gunships cleaned off four.50-caliber machine guns from the roof of a high-rise in the compound that housed one of Noriega's Dignity Battalions. An AC-130 gunship blasted the Comandancia with its 105mm howitzer. Green tracers from PDF guns were flying everywhere.
The operators entered from the roof and moved through the totally dark building down to the second floor, neutralized the guards as they went, blew the cell door, and were back on the roof ready to lift off with their "precious cargo" (now outfitted with a flak vest and Kevlar helmet) — all within six minutes.
A few moments later, Wayne Downing called Stiner on the hot line. "We got our man," Downing said, "but the helicopter may have been shot down as it was lifting off the roof."
"When you get it sorted out, let me know what the situation is."
Downing called back in less than five minutes. "Don't know whether the helicopter was shot down or whether it just had too much weight to lift off the building. It appears that it sort of fell off the building and came down on the street. I am arranging a rescue operation now, and will keep you posted."
