by Tom Clancy
• Transition from combat operations to stability operations to nation-building.
• Establishment of a military support group to administer nation-building programs.
• Conduct nation-building with in-country forces, plus augmentation as required.
During the transition phase, the combat units would also establish the security environment needed for nation-building, and use their own organic capabilities for food distribution, medical care, transportation, and cleanup.
Long before H-hour, Civil Affairs teams would be attached to the combat units, to assist commanders with civilians and refugees during the combat phase. Special Forces A-Detachments would also be attached to combat units during the transition phase; and as combat units were redeployed, they would remain in assigned areas of operations to assist with nation-building.
The Military Support Group for administering nation-building programs was formed as the USARSO Headquarters; I had absorbed it earlier when I had formed my headquarters, JTF South, but now it was reinstated. It would consist of three major components: 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; 1st PSYOPs Battalion; and Special Operations Forces (SOF), consisting of SOUTHCOM's Special Operations Command, 7th Special Forces Group, Naval Special Boat units, the 122nd Signal Company and a Special Aviation Detachment. Logistical support would be provided by the 41st Army General Support Group.
Detailed planning for nation-building was completed along with the combat plan. During planning, it was determined that approximately three hundred uniquely qualified Civil Affairs personnel would be needed — sanitation engineers, medical administrators, facility planners, construction supervisors, banking, police supervisors, etc. For security reasons, they could not be notified in advance, and were therefore notified at H-hour for individual call-up; they arrived in Panama within three weeks. All active-duty units needed were force-listed to arrive as soon after H-hour as they could be flown in.
SOUTHCOM interfaced with the country team and the new government and executed nation-building activities, while I continued my efforts to bring stability and control to Panama.
On December 21, the Military Support Group was activated; and some three hundred civil military affairs reservists were called up. On December 22, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion arrived and immediately got to work; the 7th Special Forces Group followed over the next couple of days.
The 96th's assignments were to: restore basic functions in Panama City and throughout Panama, establish a police force, provide emergency food distribution, supervise Panamanian contractors in the cleanup of the city, and restore medical services. Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Peters, immediately established an operating infrastructure. Commanders and operational detachments were assigned to Zone P (Panama City and the eastern provinces), Zone C (Colon), and Zone D (the provinces west of Panama City).
On December 22, the day the 96th arrived in country, President Endara abolished and reorganized the PDF.
The major task and challenges associated with nation-building were as follows:
• First and foremost was the restoration of law and order.
• Second was the future disposition of the PDF.
• Third was the care and feeding of the 3,500 refugees then under U.S. control.
• Fourth was the restoration of medical services.
• Fifth was to clean up Panama City and restore services to the people.
On December 20, the 16th MP Brigade was brought in from Fort Bragg, and was immediately sent into Panama City, operating under U.S. rules, to provide security for the civil affairs efforts. The plan was to conduct joint patrols using the Brigade's HMMWVs; two U.S. MPs and two Panamanian policemen would ride together. The Panamanian policemen would make actual arrests, but under U.S. supervision. The immediate challenge was to come up with enough former policemen or soldiers to meet the need. Out of the first four hundred volunteers screened by the Panamanian government, only 160 were acceptable; but this was enough to get started. The vetting process continued among the units of the former PDF.
A police academy also had to be established. By U.S. law, the training of foreign police forces is the responsibility of the Justice Department. However, since security considerations had prevented us from bringing them in on the planning of JUST CAUSE, the Justice Department had passed its authority to the Department of Defense. The 7th Special Forces Group was brought in to establish the training programs for both the presidential guard unit and the national police force. The police and security experts needed for this mission were called up from the Reserves.
Because of the surgical nature of our invasion, collateral damage throughout the country was small. The only significant damage occurred in the Chiriori slum near the Comandancia, where many homeless had built cardboard and plywood shacks. Soon after our assault on the Comandancia, many weapon-toting PDF and Dignity Battalion members, dressed in civilian clothes, took refuge there, and then set the community on fire.
Later, many tried to pose as refugees; but most were caught.
Early on December 20 (D Day), we established a refugee center on the athletic field of Balboa High School, which was managed by a Civil Affairs company and governed by the mayor of Chiriori. An average of 3,500 refugees per day were provided with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and security. Eleven thousand people were processed through the center, many just to get a meal, before it was eventually given over to the new government and then closed.
We knew from an early survey that Panama had adequate medical facilities, doctors, and technicians, but there was a severe shortage of medical supplies.
During combat, Task Force Bayonet captured a warehouse in the Balboa area containing 150,000 pounds of medical supplies — accessible only by means of bribes. We changed that system on the spot, and the supplies were immediately distributed to Panamanian medical facilities. Two hundred and eighteen tons of Department of Defense medical supplies were also provided to hospitals and medical clinics.
Meanwhile, U.S. aid stations and hospitals were opened to the sick and wounded; fifteen thousand Panamanians were treated at U.S. facilities.
From December 26 to January 3, Civil Affairs and Special Forces troops operated thirteen food distribution centers, handing out 1,660 tons of food — mostly meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) — and one million tons of bulk food, such as baby food, liquids, dehydrated milk, and dried beans.
Cleaning up Panama City was relatively easy. The Civil Affairs troops and the MPs used some of the less hostile detainees held at the detention camp, organized them into detachments, placed them under U.S. guard, and took them into the city to do cleanup work. This was a great morale boost for local residents.
One of the first official ceremonies performed by President Endara was to swing a sledgehammer against the wall of the now-war-ravaged Comandancia. His swings were punctuated by chants from a crowd: "Harder, harder." This hated symbol of torture and oppression was being transformed into an apartment complex for those who had lost their homes in the fire.
TRANSITION AND REDEPLOYMENT
As word of Noriega's arrest and imprisonment in the United States spread across Panama, there was no longer any reason for resistance, and it was now possible to begin redeploying our combat forces.
Downing's special mission forces meanwhile relentlessly dismantled the Dignity Battalions; people were coming forth with information on their whereabouts about as fast as Downing's forces could follow up on them. It was a matter of time before they were no longer a viable force. That moment occurred on January 10, when Benjamin Calomarko, their commander, surrendered to U.S. forces.
At 6:00 P.M. on January 11, General Thurman was notified by the Pentagon that Operation JUST CAUSE was officially terminated.
It had indeed been a just cause. All our troops had believed that from the beginning. Their reward would be an enduring feeling in their hearts that they had sacrificed for what was just and right, and that their actions had made Panama a better place.
Their victory for freedom had not been without cost:
All armored vehicles, crew-served weapons, and ammunition were evacuated to the United States.
All other weapons and ammunition, except what was needed for training and equipping the new presidential security, reaction, and police force, was either destroyed or evacuated to the United States.
All vessels/ships and aircraft were restored to operational condition and left with the new government.
All money was turned over to the new government.
All explosives and chemical weapons were destroyed.
On January 3, we began a phased redeployment (January 18–26) of the 17,000 combat troops over and above the 9,500 troops normally assigned to SOUTHCOM.
Much nation-building work still had to be done in support of PROMOTE LIBERTY. Some of its requirements could take up to two years. The units involved with longer-term programs remained in Panama, but were rotated on a scheduled basis.
For the next nine days, my headquarters, JTF South, continued stability operations while managing the phased redeployment of our forces. We were also transitioning to a headquarters, JTF Panama, commanded by Major General Cisneros, which would take over responsibility for nation-building and security. Its headquarters and Military Support Group had been activated on December 21. Soon it would take control of the 193rd Brigade, the Marine Amphibious Unit, and additional forces that would remain behind — one of Major General Carmen Cavezza's combat brigades, plus a battalion of MPs from the 16th Military Police Brigade.
JTF South passed over all responsibilities to JTF Panama on January 11.
On January 12, at 8:00 A.M., two thousand troopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, the XVIII Airborne Corps staff, and I jumped onto Sicily Drop Zone at Fort Bragg to a cheering, flag-waving crowd of five thousand family members and dignitaries, among them, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff. The troops assembled on the drop zone and marched with their colors waving in the brisk cool breeze to the bleachers area.
This is what I said there:
"Thank you — and I cannot begin to tell you what you mean to us.
"1 wish you could have marched with us across that sand, and experienced our feelings as we drew closer and realized the meaning that you and these children conveyed with the flags you were waving.
"The mission to Panama was a difficult one. We literally decapitated a government, and then shook hands with the very people we had fought the night before and said, 'We want to help you now.'
"You would have been very proud of your soldiers. They're dedicated and motivated by all the things the American flag stands for, the very flags you were waving. No one ever fought more bravely or with more compassion for those they faced in battle.
"Everyone knew there would be danger, but not a single one hesitated to go, or to enter battle time and time again. They were well-trained for the mission, and they fought the way they had trained. We believe that what we were sent to do was just and right.
"Twenty-three of our comrades are at peace today, and they deserve the highest honors for their sacrifice. Our experience adds meaning to the expression 'Freedom Isn't Free.'
"To the families and all the members of this great community, we thank you for your prayers and your support. It gave us strength when strength was needed — and we thank you from the bottom of our hearts."
POST-ACTION THOUGHTS
In the days following Operation JUST CAUSE, I was asked many times, "What lessons did you learn?" and, "If you had to do it all over again, what would you do differently?"
Let me answer the second question first: "I'd have guarded the Nunciatore. That way we would either have grabbed Noriega on the way in, or we would have taken that option away from him."
As for lessons learned: JUST CAUSE was a very successful operation. There were several reasons for its success:
First, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 clearly established the chain of command down to theater level, along with the authority for fulfilling command responsibility. Under this act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was made the principal military adviser to the National Command Authority (SECDEF and President), and the Joint Staff was made directly responsible and subordinate to the Chairman, not to the Joint Chiefs, as had been the case before. This docs not mean that an astute Chairman does not consult with the service Chiefs; but it eliminated consensual decision-making that was sometimes influenced by service parochialism. The act also included the warfighting commanders-in-chief in the chain of command, and gave them additional authority for conducting military operations in their theaters for wartime as well as peacetime activities.
Second, clear guidance was given by the National Command Authority to General Thurman.
Third, from the start, General Thurman gave me full authority over all forces and the necessary freedom for developing the plan.
Fourth, once the plan was completed, we briefed it all the way up through the decision-making authority, and it was approved as written.
Fifth, we were allowed enough time to fully rehearse.
Sixth, when the operation was launched, we were allowed to execute it without changing the plan.
Back to the question: "What lessons did you learn?"
I can't say we really learned any lessons. In my opinion, you only learn a lesson as a result of a big mistake, or when you have failed to anticipate an event somewhere along the line — training readiness, plan development, or the like — that could effect the mission.
With that said, however, we did validate some principles and procedures that contributed to our success in Panama, which also apply to future operations:
• Integrated planning and execution are key to success for all contingency operations, particularly for joint operations when forces from other services are involved.
• A streamlined "warfighter"-oriented command-and-control structure, responsive to needs at lowest levels, is imperative.
• Overwhelming combat power results in quick victory with fewer casualties on both sides.
• Continuous review of rules of engagement, with responsive and assured dissemination, maximizes combat capability and flexibility.
• Use of Joint Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI) is crucial for successful joint operations.
• Troops fight to standards to which they are trained — and nothing more. There is no substitute for live-fire training, under the most realistic conditions, as you expect to fight.
• Maximum latitude must be allowed units at lowest level; otherwise don't expect their fullest potential.
• No force more powerful than PSYOPs can ever be brought to the battlefield. If you can influence the minds of your foe, the job is much easier and less expensive by every measure.
• Appropriately integrating Special Operations and conventional forces maximizes force potential and capability in ways not otherwise possible.
Though all of this contributed immeasurably to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE, it is no more than what is normally expected of senior commanders.
And finally, the plan the leaders create may be a thing of great beauty, yet it is only as good as the troops that execute it. The outcome is determined at their level.
I cannot praise enough the motivation, the technical and professional competence, the daring, the maturity, and the caring of our troops at all levels from all the services. Our officers and NCOs were superbly trained; they led their troops the way troops expect to be led. They and their troops did everything we asked — and then more. They have earned the credit for all that was accomplished in Operation JUST CAUSE.
One more group deserves recognition — the wives in Panama who were embroiled without warning in mortal combat, and who spent the night of December 19 and 20 huddled over their children in closets as the battles raged. These same women, two days later, opened and operated the Commissary and P.X. so families could get much-needed supplies. They were professionals of
the highest order, most deserving of our deepest respect and gratitude.
YES, Operation JUST CAUSE was an occasion of deep satisfaction. We didn't rest on our laurels, though. We knew another major crisis could come any time, and we had to be prepared for it. Little did we know, however, just how soon that would be.
XII
SHADOWS IN THE STORM
At 1:00 A.M. on August 2, 1990, three divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard, equipped with nearly a thousand tanks, streamed across Iraq's border with Kuwait. Within half an hour, helicopters dropped Iraqi commandos on rooftops in Kuwait City. By dawn, the massive invasion of the small Arab country at the top of the Persian Gulf was well under way. By nightfall, it was nearly complete, and Saddam Hussein could declare that Kuwait was now his country's "19th province." By week's end, eleven Iraqi divisions had backed up his claim.
Though early on American satellites had detected the massing of Iraqi troops along the border, there had been mixed interpretations of Saddam's intent, and the initial U.S. approach had been uncertain and at times muddled. In the early hours of the invasion itself, the Bush administration seemed unsure about what to do. All that quickly changed, however, and on August 5, President George Bush made his famous "line in the sand" speech, declaring that the invasion "will not stand." Within hours, Bush had put together a powerful multinational coalition, including leading Arab nations, and American troops were en route to the Gulf. The massive buildup that followed eventually brought half a million U.S. troops to the region.
Among them would be nearly 9,000 special operations soldiers—7,705 in Saudi Arabia and 1,049 in Turkey. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would perform a wide variety of tasks, ranging from simple language interpretation to strikes against targets more than a hundred miles behind enemy lines. During the early stages of the American buildup, small groups of SOF operators would be posted on the front lines, both to gather intelligence and to serve as trip wires, symbolic sacrifices in the event Saddam chose to invade Saudi Arabia.
