by Tom Clancy
On October 15, the Iranians launched an attack against tankers loading oil at Kuwait's Sea Island terminal. The British-owned Sungari suffered a direct hit, and an American-flagged Kuwaiti tanker named the Sea Isle City was struck the next day. Though seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the attack, the vessel was not seriously damaged.
The Reagan administration ordered a retaliation. But the President, seeking to limit the conflict, ruled out a strike against Silkworm sites, which were on Iranian soil. He opted instead for the destruction of an Iranian oil platform known as the Rashadat GOSP (GOSP stands for gas and oil separation platform; this one had multiple structures). The Rashadat GOSP had two platforms 130 meters apart. At the north was an oil-drilling rig; at the south was a platform used as living quarters and equipment storage and repair. A third platform, supposedly abandoned, lay about two miles north of these structures.
Three destroyers, a frigate, and a cruiser were tagged to shell the platforms. A SEAL platoon would then board and search for prisoners before blowing them up.
The operation got under way at 1340 on October 19. Broadcasts from the destroyer Thach warned the Iranians to abandon the platforms; they quickly complied, and shelling began. Flames leapt up within minutes, and the fire soon spread.
Smoke and flames towered over the SEALs as their three rubber assault boats were lowered from the deck of the Thach. They could feel the heat as they approached the ravaged oil rig. "The surface of the water was on fire within a two-hundred- to three-hundred-foot radius around the burning platform," remembered the SEAL officer in charge.
Trying their best to ignore the heat, flames, and smoke, the SEALs set charges on the oil drilling platform, then searched the other platform, capturing cryptographic encoding devices and documents. All three platforms were eventually destroyed, with no American causalities and none known to the Iranians.
Though the Iranians did not immediately end their attacks, the U.S. Special Forces activities caused them to sharply reduce the tempo of their attacks and shift their focus to the central and southern Persian Gulf.
It was not until April of 1998, when the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine east of Bahrain, that another major operation was launched, this time primarily by regular Navy units. Initially targeting oil platforms, the engagement eventually included several Iranian patrol boats and aircraft, most of which were destroyed or heavily damaged.
PACIFIC WIND
That was the background when, in September, Stiner journeyed to the Gulf with Downing to get a firsthand view of the situation, brief Schwarzkopf, and finalize details on the embassy operation, which came to be called PACIFIC WIND. Before departing, Stiner checked with Powell to see if he had any special guidance.
"Saddam is making threats about waging a worldwide terrorist campaign," Powell told him, "and I don't want Norm worrying about this. You keep the terrorists off his back and tell him that we want his focus to be to the North."
In Saudi Arabia, Stiner linked up with Jesse Johnson, while Downing coordinated the details of PACIFIC WIND with Schwarzkopf's staff and component commanders.
For the next three days, Stiner and Johnson visited every coalition support team, as well as other SOF forces, including those involved in retraining and equipping the remnants of Kuwait's army that had ended up in Saudi Arabia, and the training of resistance teams for infiltration into Kuwait City.
In Stiner's mind, the contributions that SOF could make were limited only by what SOF would be allowed to do — and by Johnson's ability to effectively manage the myriad of complex mission profiles. Johnson's problem was his colonel's rank — every other component commander for Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine conventional forces carried three stars. This just wasn't going to work. The general officers would inevitably command more resources as well as respect. He was going to have to take it up with Schwarzhopf.
Meanwhile, Downing had settled on the details of PACIFIC WIND.
The plan for taking the embassy was deceptively simple: JSOTF special mission units, supported by USAF air strikes to neutralize air defenses and isolate the embassy compound, would land at night by helicopter in the compound, take out the Iraqi guards, and rescue the personnel being held there.
If the goal was straightforward, however, the chances of achieving surprise and neutralizing the Iraqis in the occupied city was not. The invaders had located their theater headquarters in the Hotel Safir next to the embassy. The nearby beachfront, as well as the local road network, gave the enemy easy access to the target. Even the act of positioning the assault group close enough to Kuwait to launch the attack was a complicated logistics matter.
Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Navy component of Central Command, solved part of the logistics problem by making a Navy LPH available for the mission. LPHs look like World War II-era escort carriers, and in fact, the first versions of the assault ships were converted from just such vessels. At about 600 feet long, LPHs are only half as long as attack carriers such as the Nimitz, and displace less than a fifth of a supercarrier's bulk; but they can carry a reinforced Marine battalion and its vehicles, as well as support them once an attack is under way. Optimized to get the assault troops on and off quickly via helicopter, LPHs typically carry two dozen helicopters, and can make about twenty-three knots. Though now overshadowed in the Navy by the newer Wasp and Tarawa LHA vessels, the LPHs nonetheless offered the Special Operations troops both a jumping-off point and floating headquarters.
At a meeting in the Gulf, Arthur assured Downing he could quickly off-load the Marines and replace them with the Special Operations package.
Downing and Stiner were well aware that the Iraqis had to be neutralized with overwhelming firepower at the start of the operation. The most practical method for that was to use the Air Force. Soon after their arrival, they met with Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson, a command pilot who oversaw all U.S. Air Force wings in the Gulf and directed planning for Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, the CENTCOM air commander. Downing and Colonel "Pete," one of his commanders, laid the plans out in Glosson's small command room in Riyadh, carefully going over the assault. When he finished, Glosson had a funny look on his face.
"Are you guys serious?" asked Glosson.
"Yeah," said Downing. "We're serious."
"You guys really think you can go in in downtown Kuwait City?"
"If we got your support the way we want it, we can do it."
Glosson looked at the map again. "You're goddamn right," he said finally. "You got my support."
Glosson's F-117As and F-15Es — the Air Force's front-line tactical bombers — were what they wanted. As eventually perfected, the plan called for a pair of F-117A Stealth Fighters to launch laser-guided missiles at the Iraqi headquarters in the Hotel Safir precisely sixty seconds before the helos landed. The 2,000-pound warheads would reduce the hotel's eight floors to rubble, wiping out the Iraqi headquarters, as well as depriving the enemy of a fire control center. Electrical power would be cut with another F-117 attack on a nearby electrical tower. The F-1 5E Strike Eagles would then drop cluster bombs around the embassy, neutralizing Iraqi troops and creating a minefield to isolate the building.
Cluster bombs were a common weapon during the war. Officially called CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units), they are actually a collection of smaller bomblets, and can be configured for different missions. CBU-87s spray more than two hundred antipersonnel and antiarmor bomblets over an area, killing unprotected personnel and destroying lightly armored vehicles. CBU-89 "Cators" lay down a mix of about a hundred antipersonnel and antiarmor mines, creating an instant minefield. The word Gator comes from the twenty-four BLU-92/B antitank mines the CBU launches; the image of snapping alligators provides an apt metaphor for these weapons' devastating effect on vehicles.
Glosson did more than commit Air Force support for the assault. He took the plan personally to General Schwarzkopf. Though the CINC was still not enamored of
an attack that might precipitate a war he wasn't ready to fight, he gave his okay.
At a meeting with Schwarzkopf, Downing briefed PACIFIC WIND. Then, with Downing and Johnson present, Stincr summarized his visit for the CINC: "I have visited all SOF teams and units in your area of operations, and in my judgment they are doing an outstanding job. The coalition support teams (CSTs) will be worth their weight in gold — they'll give you 'truth in reporting' about what the coalition units are doing.
"You already have nine thousand SOF over here," Stiner continued, "and I'm prepared to give you whatever you need. I know you have the greatest confidence in Jesse Johnson — and 1 do, too. But, considering the complexity of his operation, together with what SOF can do for you in the broader context, I would like to give you one of my best two-stars — maybe even two general officers — to run our part of things." He had already told Johnson the same thing privately before the meeting.
"I'll think about it," Schwarzkopf responded.
At this point, Stiner delivered Colin Powell's message about keeping terrorists off Schwarzkopf's back so he could focus his attention on Kuwait and Iraq.
"I intend to move one-third of my special mission forces to Europe," Stiner said, "but here would be better, so they can respond quicker.
"I would also like to establish a small tactical command post in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, so I can be more responsive to your needs. I'll even wear a plain flight suit with no rank. Nobody will know that I'm here."
"I'll let you know," the CINC replied.
Back in the States a week later, Stiner learned from Powell that he could forget about his small command post. According to Schwarzkopf, the Saudis didn't want another four-star command in their country. The offer of a general officer to run Schwrarzkopf's special operations activities never received an answer.
Stiner thought he knew the reason. As we have often seen before, the "big" Army has traditionally been, at best, unfamiliar with special operations, and at worst, hostile. Such attitudes naturally derive from the normal machinery of internal politics, the sort of political infighting that springs up within any organization. Part of it comes from a distrust of unconventional warfare in general. In some cases, the image of Special Forces as "can-do" guys actually hurts them. Highly trained elites called on to operate clandestinely in hazardous situations risk a bad reputation. It's not a big jump from there to thinking SF guys can be evil.
One Special Forces general recalled meeting a Navy officer who told him that sitting down with Special Forces planners was like encountering "the princes of darkness." Despite the success of Earnest Will and a concerted effort by the Special Forces Command not only to increase SOF professionalism but to make others aware of it, as the Cold War wound down, such attitudes — and others even worse — were far too common.
The SOF approach to warfare called for a high degree of cooperation between different branches of service. But that cooperation wasn't always forthcoming.
General Schwarzkopf himself apparently did not trust SOF units — or if he did, he did not want them inside Iraq before his conventional forces were in place and ready to fight.
Both General Schwarzkopf's CENTCOM and General Stiner's SOCOM were headquartered at the same base near Tampa, Florida. They were next-door neighbors. While the two men got along personally, there was plenty of friction between members of the two commands. "Schwarzkopf was a good example of a senior officer who did not understand Special Operations and was afraid of it," said Major General Jim Guest, looking back on the start of the Gulf War. "Schwarzkopf's mentality was, 'I have a coiled cobra in a cage and if I open that cage, that cobra is going to get out and possibly embarrass me."'
Many SOF officers understood Schwarzkopf's decision not to allow Stiner to move his command to the Middle East. Two four-stars in the same battle theater could cause unnecessary confusion, no matter how carefully they orchestrated their command structures. But the CENTCOM CINC's resistance to SOF went beyond that. In the opinion of Stiner, Downing, and others, Schwarzkopf handicapped the utility of Special Operations in the Gulf War by insisting that the command be represented and managed in the theater by the colonel — no matter how able — instead of a general officer. He also allotted insufficient resources and priorities for SOF units, thus hampering planning and intelligence.
Though SEALs were among the first units in the Gulf, Schwarzkopf changed deployment priorities in favor of more conventional forces, which delayed the arrival of most of the 5th Special Forces Group. This meant that, when most needed, he did not have available his main Special Forces asset, the Army Green Berets, with its broad range of special operations expertise and capabilities. That left only a few SEALs to work with Saudi forces to provide intelligence, coordinate air support, and form an American trip wire at the border at a most critical time. Combat air support (CAS) was not generally considered a SEAL mission, but the unit's inherent flexibility and its interface with different branches and services helped it do its job.
After the 5th SFG finally arrived in late August and early September, Special Forces personnel began branching out as CSTs, serving initially with Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian units. Some 109 CST teams were eventually formed, working at all levels of command.
During September, Green Berets replaced SEALs at the border, working with Saudi paratroopers and border police along the Saudi side of the berms separating the countries. Nine reconnaissance detachments provided around-the-clock surveillance and "truth in reporting."
"You've got three missions up on the border," 5th SFG commander, Colonel James Kraus, told his men. "See, Scream, and Scoot." Special Forces units didn't always "scoot." Several snagged infiltrators and deserters during the early days of the buildup.
MEANWHILE, there was a justified fear of Iraqi-inspired terror attacks. National intelligence agencies had learned that as many as thirty Iraqi terrorist teams were positioning to conduct strikes against U.S. embassies and other allied facilities in other parts of the world. To counter this threat, SOF units provided security to vulnerable embassies and other facilities, and special mission teams were prepared to deploy instantly to handle unexpected situations.
As a result of these and other related efforts, no Iraqi terror attempts were successful — though at least two Iraqi operations, one in Jakarta and another in Manila, were foiled when terrorist bombs blew up while the terrorists were preparing or transporting them. "Iraqi bad luck," the JSOTF commander Major General Downing put it.
While all this was going on, Special Operations troops began practicing for PACIFIC WIND off the coast of Florida. They built a mock-up of the Embassy, and the Navy lent them an LPH. They worked out problems: For example, while the Army and Air Force people were used to working at night, the Navy wasn't. The assault ship's captain nearly freaked when Downing told him to turn off the deck lights.
"God, I can't do that," protested the captain.
"Yeah, we can do it," Downing responded. The lights were turned off.
Thirty helicopters, from Army Special Aviation, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel "Doug," crammed with Army special missions troops, peeled off from the deck in the dead of night without a hitch or scraped rotor blade. The Navy captain turned to Downing and said, "If I didn't know I was awake, I would think I was dreaming this."
A short time later, a pair of Air Force F-15 pilots flew in from the Gulf to help with a live-fire rehearsal at Fort Bragg. The Eagles came in low and hot; and windows broke in nearby Fayetteville. But a little broken glass seemed incidental.
Meanwhile, SOF planners were working up other missions. The most promising involved fomenting and supporting a guerrilla movement similar to the one that eventually kicked the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Intelligence analysts had noted that Kurds, in the north of Iraq, and Shiites, in the south, were displeased with Saddam's regime. Encouraging dissident movements there, as well as stoking guerrilla activity in Kuwait, would weaken and disrupt the Iraqi military, whose units would be tied down d
ealing with dissension. A pilot team of SOF ground and air personnel flew to Turkey soon after the invasion to examine the possibilities in northern Iraq. About half of the 10th Special Forces Group would be on the ground there by the end of September, ostensibly in Turkey to help provide search and rescue support for the U.S. Air Force pilots shot down over northern Iraq. The operation was headed by Brigadier General "Richard," himself a former commando.
At least four different dissident groups were active in Kuwait, estimated to consist of about 3,500 armed personnel. Though these could have been supported and encouraged in various ways, especially since SOF troops were already on the front line as "trip wires" and well-equipped SEAL units were in the Gulf, the plans for assisting resistance movements and general sabotage failed to receive support from Washington or from Schwarzkopf, who worried about the political ramifications of losing Americans behind the lines.
As an alternative, which would also provide a source of intelligence in Kuwait City, a Special Planning Group was organized under SOCCENT, consisting of an SF lieutenant colonel, two SF warrant officers, and five SF NCOs. This group conducted specialized unconventional warfare training for selected Kuwaiti personnel, who were eventually infiltrated into Kuwait. The Special Planning Group provided operational direction and intelligence-collection requirements to the Kuwaiti resistance throughout the conflict. Ninety-five percent of the HUMINT intelligence that came from occupied Kuwait resulted from this initiative.
By the end of October, however, a systematic campaign by the Iraqis had greatly diminished the effectiveness of the Kuwaiti resistance groups; photos smuggled out of the country showed dismembered bodies hanging from lampposts — a sign to others.
