by Tom Clancy
After a fashion: Washington had split the plan into two halves — overt and covert. "Overt" PSYOP actions were okay, but covert actions were put on hold. The catch-22: Nearly everything Normand wanted to do was considered "covert," much of it simply because it required cooperation from another organization or country. With the exception of a film called Line in the Sand—which had to be reedited because the delays made parts of it out of date — the major PSYOP initiatives against Iraq were put on hold. The film would later be smuggled into Iraq and distributed freely around the rest of the world; but little else in the way of a "strategic" PSYOP campaign — targeting common Iraqi citizens and telling them why their country was being attacked — would ever be implemented.
Carl Stiner has views about this kind of thing: "Certain lawyers get in the act, and you've got certain people that don't want their thumbprint on anything that might have risks associated with it. That's the way they've survived; they limit their exposure. And when you run into that, you've got to get the Chairman or the CINC to override all these birds and get their asses out of the process or they'll delay it to eternity."
Finally, Normand went to Schwarzkopf in mid-December, shortly before he was scheduled to relinquish command of the 4th PSYOP Group for another assignment. Standing in front of the CINC in disgust, he told him, "We need to send a message back to Washington that if we don't get approval soon we can't execute." He handed the general a piece of paper. "I recommend you send this message."
Normand had carefully prepared a "Let's Go" message, a masterwork of diplomatic language, politely requesting Washington to "relook" the issue.
"Bullshit," said Schwarzkopf. He ripped up the paper and began writing his own message. It began with the words "Bungling bureaucrats in Washington," and then got really nasty.
"What do you think about that?" the CINC asked, handing it back to Normand.
"If you'll sign it, I—"
"It's signed," Schwarzkopf broke in.
The PSYOP tactical campaign aimed at Iraqi troops suddenly hit the fast track. The campaign took off with the start of the air war a few weeks later.
MUCH of the DESERT SHIELD/STORM PSYOP mission was aimed simply at countering the propaganda Saddam was spreading. The PSYOP warriors were trying to set the record straight. Arab countries were a vital part of President Bush's carefully constructed coalition, and so it was vital that their citizens, and in fact the Islamic world in general, know the truth about why the coalition was fighting Saddam.
Cairo is the Arab media center, the Arab "Hollywood." The highly regarded Radio Cairo is there, many Arab and international news organizations have offices in the city, and Arab intellectuals tend to congregate there. If you want to get the word out to the Arab world — and to the entire Islamic world — you want to work through these facilities. At the same time, Egypt was an ally in the coalition. Government officials as well as media members were receptive to American-inspired suggestions and information.
Normand sent Devlin to Cairo at the end of October.
Here are Devlin's thoughts on the experience:
"The extensive Iraqi propaganda machine required countering with factual information that Saddam was in every way a despicable human being — a horrific leader who did not care about his people, an unjust Muslim, a terrible neighbor, an untrustworthy Arab and Muslim, and a liar in everything he said." The PSYOP operation, therefore, aimed to point out these truths and strip him of support from the Islamic world and elsewhere, while eliciting increased Islamic and world support for the coalition forces. With strong backing by the American ambassador, who provided entry to the Egyptian government and military, and by American embassy officials, Devlin organized a cooperative effort out of Cairo to counter the continuous Iraqi propaganda.
"Because the invasion was literally a television news event, it was important to point out to the entire world exactly what a brutal dictator he was. But we wanted to point out specifically to the Islamic world that Saddam had attacked his Islamic brothers without justification, or the support of the rest of the Islamic world.
"According to Islamic law, you can be a bad Muslim and an evil man who does not follow the law. But then you can have a change of heart and convert to a follower of the law. Once you have done that, you can proclaim the right to call a Jihad." Saddam claimed he was a good Muslim in calling for a justified Jihad. "But also according to Islamic law, Muslims don't attack other Muslims. So Saddam's claim had this fundamental flaw."
Both the Arab world and the Islamic world as a whole had to pay attention to this truth, but it obviously could not come directly from Americans.
"We wanted to get word out to the Islamic world that noted Islamic clerics faulted his reasoning and justification, according to the Koran and Islamic law. Our goal was not to get them to say what we wanted; we wanted them to say, print, and transmit what they were already saying as Islamic experts, recognized as such by the Islamic world: Saddam's claims were not true, according to Islamic custom and law."
This message went out: Devlin's team and their Egyptian colleagues found ways to insert it into plays, radio and TV shows, soap operas, and magazines and newspapers. Islamic conferences held for world Islamic leaders condemned Saddam. The end result was a chorus of voices in all media denouncing Saddam from recognized Islamic sources.
"I never told them what to write. The suggestion would be that an article (or program, or conference, etc.) stating their beliefs would be useful. They would take it from there. One result was a book, written very quickly, by a noted Islamic scholar.
"Effective PSYOP is not always preparing the message; it is extremely effective when already available materials, programming, or information are properly directed."
Another aspect of the PSYOP war saw the 4th Group working like a political campaign's media advisers, suggesting talking points for U.S. officials and others who would counter Saddam's propaganda. "We suggested four or five information points every few days for leaders of the United States, Egypt, and other allies, such as Great Britain, to use in public interviews, press conferences, and statements. This showed that the coalition force really spoke with one mind. Every day, ideas would float back and forth between governments and leaders. From these, we'd take four or five points for all to use.
"It was magic to watch all of this unfold. Following agreement on the points by the leaders, and their dissemination through the Ambassador and the CINC, we would watch them come back through the media over the course of a week."
Very few people outside of military circles are aware of PSYOP campaigns. And even the military…
"You have to be satisfied with accomplishment, because you sure as hell don't get any recognition," Devlin concludes.
By the time the war got under way, Colonel Layton Dunbar had taken over as the 4th Psychological Group's commander. The unit's efforts varied:
In December, stickers began appearing on buildings in Kuwait City encouraging resistance to Saddam — a PSYOP project. two days after the first bombs fell in the air war, PSYOP troops — predominantly members of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard — launched the Voice of the Gulf, a radio program broadcast on both AM and FM bands from three ground stations and an airborne EC-130. Subtle PSYOP appeals played in rotation with music and news programs.
B-52s can carry a very large load of bombs, and when the load hits, it wastes a lot of territory and makes lots of noise. In other words, B-52s are not only strategic and tactical weapons, they are psychological weapons. Ground troops who have seen what they can do are not eager to repeat the experience — or be subjected to it.
Six Iraqi military units were targeted for treatment that combined PSYOP leaflets with B-52 strikes. The operations unfurled over several days. On day one, leaflets were dropped on the unit, warning that it would come under B-52 attack at a specific time. The soldiers were urged to flee. At the specified moment, the B-52s would arrive with their loads of bombs. Afterward, a fresh round of leaflets would arrive,
reminding them of the strike and warning that a new one would soon follow. Neighboring units nearby would receive their own warnings. Mass defections often followed. Or as Carl Stiner put it, "They ran like hell."
The Air Force was at first reluctant to sign on to this approach (who warns the people they're going to bomb?), but they eventually became big boosters. These operations conveyed a sense of overwhelming superior force, while filling the enemy with dread.
You don't have to kill the enemy to win a war. It's enough that the enemy does not choose to fight.
Later, the Air Force adopted a PSYOP campaign that targeted SAM sites, warning them that they would be bombed if they turned on their radars. "It kept bad guys from shooting at Air Force aircraft," Normand comments. "So they turned out to be among our strongest proponents."
One feature of PSYOP leaflets was the positive portrayal of Iraqi soldiers. As a unit historian pointed out later: "I Ie was always portrayed as a decent, brave fellow who had been misled by his leaders, but who would be received by the coalition forces with the dignity he deserved." Coalition soldiers were depicted in unthreatening ways.
This portrayal was not accidental. PSYOP planners market-tested their products. Among other things, they discovered that Iraqi soldiers responded better to simple leaflets with primitive illustrations and poor-quality paper; slicker efforts were too Western. They also discovered the kinds of content that worked and the kinds that didn't.
"We had some Iraqi POWs who had surrendered," said Normand. "We laughed and joked with them and found out that the thing they miss the most over there was bananas. Over and over, for some reason, that kept coming up."
So PSYOP leaflets began to feature a fruit bowl with bananas.
The subtle touches took time; a single leaflet could involve as many as seventy-five people and a week and a half to develop. The leaflets were then dropped by a variety of aircraft, including B-52s, F-16s, F/A-18s, and MC- 13 °Combat Talons. The 8th SOS dropped approximately 19 million leaflets from MC-130s alone.
PSYOP troops also used specially prepared balloons, relying on carefully charted weather patterns to target specific areas with leaflet drops, and they paid smugglers in Jordan and off the Kuwaiti coast to distribute leaflets in Iraq.
A PSYOP survey of many of the 86,743 Iraqis prisoners found that 98 percent had seen a leaflet; 80 percent said they had been influenced by it; and 70 percent claimed it had helped them decide to give up. Radio messages were found to have reached 58 percent of the men; 46 percent had found these messages persuasive; and 34 percent said they had helped convince them to surrender. Loudspeaker broadcasts reached fewer, and affected fewer still: thirty-four percent had heard them; 18 percent had found them persuasive; and 16 percent claimed the messages had helped convince them to give up. These numbers, have to be considered with skepticism, since they were supplied by prisoners of war probably eager to please their captors, but even so, the vast number of Iraqi defections indicate the PSYOP campaign helped demoralize a large part of the Iraqi army.
Demoralizing the enemy was not, in fact, the main PSYOP goal.
"PSYOP basically has two functions," Colonel Normand comments. "To persuade and to inform. Persuasion is important. But supplying information is most of what we did. A lot of times, it's questionable whether you arc going to get an enemy soldier to surrender. So your main task may not necessarily be to persuade him, but to let him know what he has to do. If the situation reaches a point where you can't go on, then here are the things you need to do to save yourself."
Accordingly, the PSYOP warriors gave soldiers in Kuwait and Iraq very clear maps to allied lines, where they could go to surrender or wait to be repatriated.
Supplying maps to the enemy, and warning units that arc about to be attacked, seems an odd military tactic. Even more, an odd SOF tactic. These are shadow warriors. But in fact the goal is also a traditional one for the SOF: to affect people's hearts and minds. Successful PSYOP operations share another SOF principle as well: Think creatively. For example, PSYOP planners recognized that the goal of a particular bombing raid is to make the targeted unit ineffective, as opposed to simply killing as many men as possible — which meant that a good propaganda campaign could actually accomplish much more than bombing alone. The leaflets helped make the allies seem overwhelmingly powerful.
No wonder so many Iraqis deserted as the war progressed.
Psyop units also worked with ground troops near the front, in campaigns designed either to confuse the enemy or to trick him into revealing his position.
In one celebrated example, a Marine unit's Light Armored Vehicles, or LAVs, were tape-recorded. The PSYOP team then used loudspeakers to convince an Iraqi unit that LAVs were maneuvering near the border. When the Iraqis began firing at them, Marine air and artillery zeroed in on the enemy positions.
Sixty-six loudspeaker-equipped teams accompanied advancing armies during the ground war to encourage surrender and direct enemy prisoners of war. The teams helped herd and control the large number of EPs (enemy prisoners) taken by coalition forces.
Some nine hundred PSYOP soldiers took part in various facets of the campaign; most were highly educated and many were language specialists. The 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) included nearly fifty Ph.D.s. Normand had a B.A. in political science and two master's degrees, one in international affairs and the other in strategic planning. Devlin earned a B.S. in history education, and two master's degrees in national security affairs and international relations. Both were trained and experienced U.S. Army foreign area officers (FAOs), army strategists, and joint service officers (JSOs).
Interestingly, clinical psychologists play a very small role in PSYOPs. They're too narrow. "Their focus is on an individual's thinking processes, but they don't go beyond that into the effects of that thinking. They don't consider what that thinking causes to happen in a society and in a culture, explained Normand.
THE WAR AGAINST SCUDS
Saddam had his own psychological weapons, as well. After the air war began, Saddam struck back with "Scud" missiles.
Scuds were not an effective tactical weapon. They were obsolete and inaccurate. The original Scud design had been introduced in 1957, but even then it looked back more than it looked forward: It was a near-descendant of the Nazi V-2s that had terrorized London in the latter part of World War II. A modern military commander actually had little to fear.
Stock versions of the Soviet SS-1 mobile missiles (as they were officially designated) could send a 1,000-kg warhead of conventional high explosives just under 300 kilometers. The Iraqis had increased their range by welding additional fuel sections to some of the rockets. Two lraqi variants used during the war had ranges of just over 400 and 550 miles. Achieving this, however, came at a considerable price. Payloads had to be reduced, and worse, shoddy welding often meant that the missiles ruptured as they flew, decreasing their already poor accuracy. This defect actually made it harder for antimissile systems, like Patriot MIM-104 missiles, to target them effectively.
There was considerable concern that the Scuds might carry nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads. While Iraq had chemical — and probably biological — weapons, there was debate over whether they could be used on the missiles, and though the Iraqis had a program to develop nuclear weapons, they were years away from a working warhead in 1991.
In the end, no chemical, nuclear, or biological agents were launched on Scuds during the war.
Because the Scuds were not seen as a serious tactical threat to American forces, they were mostly ignored by the early Air Force war plan (except to knock out known Scud sites during the first moments of the war). But the Air Force made a serious error in estimating their strategic importance: Like the German V-2s, they had a potent psychological effect.
Saddam's targeting during his first salvo of the war, January 18, made his strategy obvious. Eight Scuds were launched toward Israel that night; the most serious strike injured a dozen people. The injuries were l
ight — mostly cuts and bruises from shattered windows. In all, about sixty people in Tel Aviv and Haifa were hurt. But Saddam's goal wasn't so much to kill Jews as to provoke Israel into a military response. Israeli action, he believed (probably correctly), would drive the Arab nations arrayed against him from the allied coalition.
A switch from support to opposition by the leading Arab nations would have subjected American forces to innumerable difficulties, encouraged terrorist attacks, and greatly complicated logistics.
Saddam did very nearly get his wish: A flight of Israeli air force jets were reportedly scrambled for a retaliatory raid but were called back. The Israeli government tottered for weeks on the brink of ordering a revenge raid, yet the go-ahead blessedly never came. President Bush and his administration worked feverishly to calm the Israelis with assurances that stopping the Scuds was a top priority. It was a top priority. But stopping them wasn't easy. The attacks continued. By the end of the first week of the war, more than thirty Scuds had been launched against Israel. Another eighteen were fired at Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force changed targeting priorities to concentrate on the missiles, but the Iraqis had put enormous effort and ingenuity into making the Scuds mobile, and into deception and camouflage. They had adapted transport vehicles to use as primitive launchers, drastically cut the arduous launch preparation procedure, and produced convincing decoys. Hitting such missile units at night from 15,000 feet in the air was problematic. Even with well over fifty sorties a night, the United States failed to stem the Scud attacks.
In September, and again in late December, Carl Stiner had recommended deploying a Joint Special Operations Task Force to Saudi Arabia, consisting of more than one-third of his special mission forces, to be readily available for counterterrorist operations as well as deep-strike missions, but he had been turned down. Even so, his planning continued.
