by Tom Clancy
Farther back, ahead of Ryan on his left and right, were the head of the NSA and the secretary of commerce.
Also present was the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Mark Jorgensen. Secretary of Defense Burgess had asked permission to bring Jorgensen along, as he knew China’s capabilities in the SCS better than anyone.
As everyone settled into their seats with soft greetings to one another, Ryan looked to Ambassador Kenneth Li. The United States’ first Chinese-American ambassador had been recalled the day before from Beijing, and his plane had only just landed at Andrews after a seventeen-hour flight. Ryan saw that though Li’s suit and tie looked crisp and fresh, the ambassador himself had puffy eyes and slightly slumped shoulders. “Ken,” said Ryan, “all I can offer you right now is an apology for rushing you back so quickly and free refills on the coffee.”
There were chuckles around the room.
Kenneth Li smiled a tired smile and replied, “No need for the apology, I’m glad to be here. I do truly appreciate the coffee, Mr. President.”
“Glad to have you.” Ryan now addressed the room, looking over narrow glasses that were propped just above the tip of his nose. “Ladies and gentlemen, President Wei got my attention and I sure as hell hope he got yours. I want to know what you know, and I want to know what you think. As always, be clear about which is which.”
The men and women around the Oval Office nodded, and Jack Ryan could see in their eyes that Wei’s proclamation was ominous enough for everyone here to recognize its importance.
“Let’s start with you, Ken. Until twenty hours ago I looked at President Wei as a bit of a hard-liner at home, but also as a man who knew what side his bread was buttered on. He has been absolutely the most pro-business, pro-capitalist leader we could have hoped for. What has changed?”
Ambassador Li spoke loud enough to be heard by everyone in the room. “Frankly, Mr. President, nothing has changed with regard to his desire to do business with the West. He wants our business, and he needs our business. Considering the economic problems China is facing, he needs us more than ever, and he knows that better than anyone.”
Ryan posed the next question to the ambassador as well. “We know about Wei’s public persona in the West versus his ‘tough guy’ pro-Party stance at home. What can you tell us about the man? Is he as good as many think he is, or is he as bad as many fear he is, especially in light of all the protests going on in China these days?”
Li regarded the question for a moment before answering: “The Communist Party of China has forced the population of China to swear allegiance to the CPC since 1949. The Tuidang movement that is getting limited press abroad is seen as a huge cultural phenomenon at home, especially among the old party guard. They are seriously worried about it.
“Additionally, there have been strikes, human rights protests, growing unrest in the provinces, even some small-scale acts of rebellion far from the capital in the past couple of months.
“For the past forty years or so, the prevailing thinking in the West has consistently been that with the growth of capitalism and increased engagement with the rest of the world, the nation of China would, slowly but surely, come over to a more liberal way of thinking. But this ‘liberal evolution’ theory has sadly not panned out. Instead of embracing political liberalization, the Communist Party of China has grown more resistant, more paranoid about the West, and more hostile to liberal values.
“Even though Wei has been at the forefront of economic liberalism, he also leads the charge in fighting back against Tuidang and personal liberty.”
Scott Adler, secretary of state, said, “Wei has always worn two faces. He believes in the party, in the devotion to the central government. He just doesn’t believe in the communist economic model. Since he came into power he has been crushing dissent, backing off on freedoms of travel between provinces and pulling the plug on more websites per day than his predecessor pulled per month.”
Ryan said, “He just does it all with a wide grin on his face and a regimental tie that makes him look like an Ivy Leaguer, so he gets a pass from the world’s press.”
Ambassador Li said, “Maybe not a full pass, but he sure gets a mulligan or two.”
Jack shook his head. He thought, but did not say, that the world’s press liked Wei Zhen Lin more than it did John Patrick Ryan.
“What are his intentions? Why the saber rattling? Is it just to fire up his party and his military? Scott?”
The secretary of state replied, “We don’t see it as that. We have witnessed major speeches by generals and admirals for that purpose, and they seem to work quite well at whipping up nationalist pride and animosity against their regional rivals. Having their decidedly nonmilitant president and general secretary taking up the bully pulpit to echo the generals, Wei has to know, will just create ill will with the rest of the world. This was not done for the purpose of political grandstanding. This seems to be an aggressive policy shift, and we should accept it as such.”
“So you are saying,” Ryan asked while leaning forward, “that this actually means they are going to use the People’s Liberation Army-Navy to control the South China Sea?”
“We at State are very concerned that it does mean the PLAN will be reaching out to the south to exert more influence.”
Ryan turned his head to the director of national intelligence. As the chief of all seventeen U.S. intelligence agencies, Mary Pat Foley was well positioned to fill in any details.
“What does it mean, Mary Pat?”
“Honestly, sir, we are taking this at face value. We expect them to land troops on some of the nondefended but contested islands, to push their Navy out further, and to claim international waters, not just with rhetoric but with gunboats.”
“Why now?” Ryan asked. “Wei is an economist; he’s shown no evidence of this militancy.”
Secretary of Defense Bob Burgess said, “True, but Chairman Su has real clout. He had, arguably, one-third of the power before the coup. After he pulled Wei’s butt off the grill over the summer by sending tanks to his compound to stop the Ministry of Public Security from effecting Wei’s arrest, you have to assume Su’s stock went through the roof.
“Wei can’t think he’s going to help his economy by taking control of a bigger portion of the South China Sea. Sure, there is oil and there are minerals and fish, but the headaches that it will generate for him with the West just aren’t worth it.”
Regina Barnes, secretary of commerce, said, “If anything, sir, significant military action in the SCS will destroy them economically. They rely on safe passage of freighters and tankers, and that passage will be disrupted if things get ugly in those waters. Saudi Arabia is the largest supplier of oil to China, which should surprise no one. What is surprising, perhaps, is that Angola is the second-largest supplier. Both nations deliver oil through the SCS via tankers. Any disruption of sea traffic in the South China Sea would be devastating for the Chinese industrial machine.”
Foley said, “Look at the Strait of Malacca. That is the choke point, and the Chinese know it. It’s their Achilles’ heel. Seventy-five to eighty percent of all oil heading to Asia passes through the Strait of Malacca.”
Ambassador Ken Li offered, “Maybe, sir, Wei is not doing this to help the economy. Maybe Wei is doing this to protect himself.”
“From what threat?”
“From Chairman Su. Maybe he is going along with this to placate Su.”
Ryan looked to a point on the far wall of the Oval Office. The crowd of people in front of him sat silently.
After a moment Jack said, “I agree that’s part of it. But I think Wei has something up his sleeve. He knows this will hurt business. If you look at his entire career, you can’t point to a single thing he has ever done to jeopardize trade with the West, unless it had something integral to do with his internal domestic situation. I m
ean, yes, he’s been involved with some hard-line Standing Committee decisions to put down insurrection in ways that were bad for business, but these were things he saw as necessary to keep the party’s hold on power absolute. I believe there must be something else to his comments.”
Admiral Mark Jorgensen lifted a hand slowly to get the President’s attention.
“Admiral?”
“Sir, just speculation.”
“Speculate,” Ryan said.
Jorgensen made a face like he was sucking a lemon as he hesitated. Finally he said, “Su wants to take Taiwan. He’s been as clear as any Chinese government figure has ever been. Wei wants to strengthen his economy, and Taipei under Chinese rule could arguably do that. Area denial of the South China Sea is a necessary first step for the Chicoms before they can make a play for Taiwan. If they don’t control their unfettered access to the Strait of Malacca, we could shut off their oil spigot, and their entire country would grind to a halt. It just may be that this is step one in their bid to finally suck Taiwan back into their control.”
It was perfectly silent in the Oval Office for several seconds. Then Jorgensen added, “Just throwing that out there, sir.”
Scott Adler was not buying this line of thinking. “I don’t see it. Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan are good economically, or better than they were, anyway. Direct flights, business deals, visitations of offshore islands . . . normal peacetime engagement. There is one hundred fifty billion a year in Taiwan money invested in mainland China.”
SecDef Burgess interjected, “Mutual prosperity doesn’t mean that nothing bad will happen.”
President Ryan sided with Burgess. “Just because everyone is making money does not mean that the Chicoms won’t muck it up. Money has never been their only aim. There are other paths to power over there. You may be absolutely right, Scott, especially in light of all the good tidings at the moment between the mainland and Taiwan. But don’t forget that this rapprochement is reversible by the Communist Party of China in a heartbeat. The CPC leadership is not satisfied with the status quo with relation to Taiwan. They want it back, they want the Republic of China in Taipei gone, and a few direct flights between Shanghai and Taipei isn’t going to change that long-term goal.”
Adler conceded this point.
Ryan sighed. “So . . . the admiral has outlined a worst-case scenario that I want everyone to keep in mind while we work on this. We thought Wei’s term would be the most friendly toward Taiwan, but the attempted coup and Chairman Su’s strength have, possibly, changed the equation.”
Ryan could see most people in the room thought Jorgensen was being overly pessimistic. He himself felt Wei’s going after Taiwan was doubtful, even with Su urging him forward, but he didn’t want his top people caught napping if that happened.
The United States had officially recognized Taiwan, and the United States could easily be forced into war if fighting broke out between the two nations. And though Jack Ryan was called a warmonger in much of the world’s press, he sure as hell hoped open war in the Pacific was not on the horizon.
Ryan next said, “Okay. President Wei said China owns the sea due to some historical precedent. What about international law? Laws of the sea, whatever. Do the Chinese have any rights at all to make these claims?”
Secretary of State Adler shook his head. “None whatsoever, but they are smart. They have made a point to not join binding agreements that could allow their neighbors to band together to gang up on them on this or on any other issue. To the Chinese, the South China Sea is not an international issue; they call it a bilateral issue with whichever country they are up against in the region. They won’t let this go to the UN or any international body. They want to fight their arguments one by one.”
“Divide and conquer,” Jack said under his breath.
“Divide and conquer,” agreed Adler.
Jack stood and began pacing around his desk. “What do we know about what is happening inside China?”
This opened the meeting up to the various members of the intelligence services present.
For the next twenty minutes, the national security adviser and the head of the CIA, as well as the director of national intelligence, spoke about covert technical means of espionage. Aircrafts and ships that monitored the country flew and sailed just offshore, satellites raced by overhead, and radio signal interception means were positioned to pick up much Chinese unsecure communication within the country.
It all left Ryan comfortable that America’s electronic eyes were turned toward the Middle Kingdom. Signals intelligence, measurement and signatures intelligence, and electronic intelligence means were well represented in America’s intelligence community’s coverage of China.
But something was missing. Jack said, “I’ve heard a good bit about SIGINT, MASINT, ELINT. What human intelligence assets do we have in the PRC?” The question was, naturally, posed to the head of the CIA.
Director Canfield said, “HUMINT is sadly lacking, sir. I wish I could report we were well positioned inside Zhongnanhai, Mr. President, but, in truth, we have very few human assets in place other than officers working out of the U.S. embassy in Beijing who control relatively low-level agents. There have been quite a few arrests in the past year of our best assets.”
Ryan knew about this. After a ring of agents spying for the U.S. was rolled up in China in the spring, there was a rumor of a mole in the CIA working for the Chinese government, but an internal investigation revealed that to be unlikely.
Ryan asked, “We don’t have nonofficial cover assets in Beijing anymore?”
“No, sir. We have a few NOCs in China, but none in Beijing, and no agents I would classify as highly placed. We have been working tirelessly at getting more agents in the PRC, but our efforts have been met by surprisingly robust counterintelligence operations.”
Robust counterintelligence operations. Ryan said the term to himself. He knew it was a polite way of saying the fucking Chinese had been executing anyone they thought might be spying for the United States.
The President said, “Back in the last go-around with Beijing we had a NOC that gave us a mother lode of intel from inside Politburo meetings.”
Mary Pat Foley nodded. “Who knew that those were the good ol’ days?”
Many of those in the room knew the story, but Ryan explained for those who had either not been in the government at the time or else did not have a need to know. “When Mary Pat was deputy director at CIA, she had an officer who worked for NEC, the computer company. He sold a bugged computer to the office of a minister without portfolio, one of the premier’s closest confidants. At the height of the conflict we were getting nearly daily reports on the leadership’s plans and mind-set. It was a game changer, to say the least.”
Mary Pat said, “And then, a couple months after the war, Minister Fang had to go and have a fatal aneurism while boffing his secretary.”
“Damn inconvenient of him,” agreed Ryan. “The case officer who pulled this off. Chet Nomouri, was it?”
Mary Pat nodded. “That’s correct, Mr. President.”
“He must be a station chief by now.”
CIA Director Jay Canfield shook his head. “He left the Agency a long time back. Last I heard he took a job with a West Coast computer firm.” With a shrug he said, “More money in the private sector.”
POTUS mumbled, “Don’t I know it?”
That earned a burst of laughs from a room that was in need of a light moment.
Secretary of Commerce Barnes said, “Mr. President. I hope we don’t forget what Wei said in his speech. ‘China is open for business.’”
Jack countered, “You mean you hope I don’t forget how much we need China’s business.”
She shrugged apologetically. “Fact is, sir, they own a big chunk of us. And they could call in those chips at a
ny time.”
“And be destroyed,” said Ryan. “They hurt us economically and it only hurts them economically.”
The secretary of commerce came back with a quick retort of her own: “Mutually assured destruction.”
Jack nodded at this but said, “Hey, it was ugly, but you can’t say MAD didn’t work.”
Barnes nodded.
“Let’s finish up with talk about capability,” Ryan said as he turned to his secretary of defense. “If they wish to exert themselves in the South China Sea, what exactly can they do?”
“As you well know, Mr. President, China has added over twenty percent to their military budget every year for nearly two decades. We estimate they spend over two hundred billion a year on their offensive and defensive weaponry, logistics, and manpower.
“China’s Navy has been growing by leaps and bounds. They have thirty destroyers, fifty frigates, seventy-five or so submarines. The Chinese have two hundred ninety ships in their Navy, but not much in the way of a blue-water capability. Not yet, anyway.”
Chairman Obermeyer said, “They have also been focusing on fourth-generation aircraft. They get SU-27s and SU-30s from Russia, and they have their own J-10 fighter, which is made locally although, at this juncture, they are buying their engines from France. Additionally, they have about fifteen SU-33s.”
Burgess said, “But it’s not just their Navy and Air Force; they have expanded in all five war-fighting domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. It could be argued, and I would agree with this assessment, that of the five, land has gotten the least attention in the past five years or so.”
“What do we make of that?”
Burgess said, “China does not see enemies attacking its turf, nor does it see large wars with its neighbors. It does see, however, small conflicts with neighbors and large conflicts with major world powers who are too far away to land armies on China’s shores.”
