by Nigel West
I should not think it particularly relevant to express my views so strongly were it not for the fact that hitherto we have all, whether we like it or not, really been working upon the basis of a contrary view. In actual fact, however, I think that the argument for not trusting HAMLET should be put in rather a different way. It seems to me that if the experience and policy of this office over a period of many years is anything to go on, we are not entitled to rely absolutely upon the loyalty of any person other than a British subject. Indeed it seems to me that to use the word ‘loyalty’ in the case of a German is, in relation to British interests, an almost ludicrous misuse of words. That HAMLET may be an Austrian and a Jew, and even an anti-Nazi, does not in my submission alter the argument. If he can betray the Germans how much more likely is he to betray us? In HAMLET’s case, moreover, we have the additional difficulty that his own financial interest enters into the question. This interest may at any time run counter to ours, and I very much doubt whether our grip upon what is going on is ever likely to be such that we should, at a sufficiently early stage, be able to recognise that this financial interest was diverging on to other lines. Lastly, and I suppose, incidentally, I see no reason why we should put ourselves in a great deal of trouble in order to enable HAMLET to do what without our help he could not do, namely build up a successful business, unless in return we see that we ourselves are going to obtain a great advantage.
It is therefore of great importance that we should have the clearest possible idea of what our objectives are. As the matter stands at the moment the only part of this case which we control is the secret correspondence of PUPPET. But much the most important part of the KOLBERG reports consists of the reports which HAMLET makes himself, and which we only influence to the extent of providing HAMLET with an excellent newspaper clipping service. This service, by reason of the fact that it covers many newspapers which are not available in Lisbon, is an improvement on anything which the Germans could maintain for themselves. It is true that the cuttings are submitted to our approving authorities, but in their final form they closely resemble the sort of information which all over the world the Germans for a long time thought, and still think, it worth their while to collect. In other words the information may be harmless, but it is of a type valued by the Germans.
Furthermore, we have absolutely no idea of what use HAMLET makes of this information, nor do we ever see the very numerous reports which he turns in to the Germans. Serious consideration is now being given by LCS and others to the abolition of OSTRO on the grounds that his information, though apparently guesswork, is nevertheless likely to compromise other activities.3 It seems to me that on that basis we all ought to regard HAMLET as at least as dangerous as OSTRO.
I do not know what others think but I do not myself seriously regard the possibility of using HAMLET either as a person who might be used to exploit breaches between the Army and the Nazis, for the reason that, as we now know; he has no important contacts with the Army, or as a possible channel for peace overtures, for the reason that, as already stated above, I do not trust HAMLET.
The only objective therefore which I can see for continuing the HAMLET case is to use him as a straight agent. It is now ten months since Major Foley first met HAMLET and if, therefore, he were likely to be or become a useful source, we by now ought to have obtained from him a considerable quantity of valuable information. It is possible that not all the information given by HAMLET has been made available to MI5 but if it has been it strikes me for the most part as being of singularly little value, (or possibly even a plant) and now that we have a much better source in ARTIST I should have thought that to be deprived of HAMLET’s information in the future would scarcely be regarded as a loss.
I hope I have made it clear from the foregoing that my own inclination would be to close down altogether, but I quite appreciate that after all the work which has been put into the case it may be thought that it would be a pity to abandon it completely. Upon what conditions then can it be run? In my opinion it can be run only upon the condition that complete and effective control can be, and is, exercised over HAMLET. As to this I should draw your attention to the decision taken as far back as 17 July 1943, when it was agreed by you, J.C. Masterman and A.H. Robertson that the maximum degree of control over HAMLET’s activities and independent reporting should be established. This decision, although in a slightly different form, was confirmed on 20 July 1943 at a meeting at which Foley was present. On 31 July 1943 at a meeting attended by, amongst others, Foley, it was agreed that Charles de Salis should get into touch with HAMLET and should vet his traffic. By 30 September 1943 it was apparent from an SIS letter that de Salis was not in touch with HAMLET, but that somebody else was, albeit that the first contact had only taken place on 20 Sepyember 1943, i.e. nearly two months after everybody had agreed that effective control must be established. So far as I am aware this contact, such as it is, has produced no sensible result, and in particular we still have no idea of what HAMLET’s own reports contain. The present state of affairs must therefore be remedied. This can be done, and in my view can only be done either by removing HAMLET to England, which I should regard, as the correct procedure, or by sending to, and maintaining in Lisbon a HAMLET Case Officer with a personality sufficiently strong to impose his wishes on HAMLET. Whether such an officer is available or not I do not know, but as he would require to be somebody like Cyril Mills I should doubt it. Failing this I agree with Robertson’s suggestion that the presence in Lisbon of MULLET himself would be an improvement on the present arrangements. I do not consider that the fact that HAMLET’s children are in this country amounts to effective control over HAMLET since, in common I should have thought with every other German, he must be quite well aware that we should never dream of exercising pressure on a man’s children, and I am certain therefore that their presence in England has no other effect on HAMLET than to inspire him with a feeling of confidence that no matter what happens they are in safe keeping.
I have considered this case only upon the footing that it is regarded with confidence by the Germans. In actual fact, however, as appears in A.H. Robertson’s note of 27 October 1943, there are good grounds for suspecting that it may be blown. Moreover, we know that HAMLET is disliked by most of the Germans with whom he deals and is in particular the object of a good deal of jealousy and suspicion within the Abwehr. This circumstance makes it even more essential to get our ideas straight about this case.
Finally, in view of the singularly nerveless way in which SIS have played their part, I think that Colonel Cowgill himself should be invited to give his candid opinion as to the value of the whole enterprise. There seems to me to be no point in carrying on if the majority opinion in both MI5 and SIS is against it.
Soon after Marriott, a peacetime solicitor, had expressed his views so forcefully, one of the major issues in the payments to HAMLET was explained. ISOS had revealed that he had received money from the Abwehr for PUPPET, but very little had actually reached Fanto. In these circumstances, when it was unlikely that PUPPET would continue his espionage without pay, Fanto had complained direct to the Germans in one of his letters, an event which led HAMLET to explain that he had told the Germans that he had been sending money to London. Furthermore, he claimed that he had already told SIS, presumably either Foley or his local Section V officer, Charles de Salis, about these notional payments. This episode highlighted the difficulties in running a case in which one part of the network was managed in Lisbon by SIS, whereas the other two agents were supervised in London by MI5.
A week after D-Day Ian Wilson undertook a final review of the HAMLET case:
The last general survey of this case by Mr. Robertson was made on 21 April 1944, at which date HAMLET was in contact with WERNER in Madrid but no report of his meeting had reached us. The main events which have taken place since then are that HAMLET gave a brief written report of his meeting with WERNER on 25 April 1944, and on 16 May 1944 put in a further written report, the first t
wo paragraphs of which again referred to his meetings with WERNER in April, while the remainder of his report dealt with discussions he had had with various people in Lisbon, which may be of some value to SIS but are unintelligible to us and in any event do not appear to arise out of his Abwehr connections.
In the meantime PUPPET has continued to write secret letters to the Abwehr, the most important part of which consist of putting over Plan PREMIUM, which was completed in a letter dated April 25th, notionally sent through the Ministry of Supply bag. Owing to the ban on air mail, PUPPET’s correspondence has decreased in volume so he can only communicate by air when it so happens that MULLET is sending a business letter to HAMLET through the Ministry of Supply bag, and naturally the frequency with which this occurs is outside PUPPET’s control.
Since Plan PREMIUM was completed by PUPPET on 25th April, he has written a further letter through the bag on May 17th, and has also written sea mail letters on May 10th and May 25th, the first of which contained no secret text.
In his report of 16 May 1944 HAMLET summed up the situation, explaining the perceived relationship between Major Joseph Brinkhaus, alias Bergman of the Brussels Abstelle, and his direct superior, Colonel Carl Servaes:
In spite of the fact that WERNER was excessively pleasant to me and repeatedly expressed to me his recognition of my services, it appeared to me that the opinion exists that I am handling this affair from personal friendship for Bergman, but do not myself earn the confidence that is placed in (PUPPET). If, in spite of this, they are sticking to me, this is only because I appear to them to be irreplaceable, and because they believe they need (PUPPET’s) reports most urgently.
Wilson’s review of the case continued, expressing some professional scepticism:
I have little doubt that HAMLET’s judgement of the situation as it existed in April is correct, and that, at least at that time, the Abwehr did regard PUPPET as being of value and were consequently prepared to find foreign exchange so that he could be kept active on their behalf, and for the same reason were prepared to keep in contact with HAMLET not because they liked or trusted HAMLET but because they had no other way of getting reports from PUPPET. Apart from HAMLET’s evidence on this point, there was earlier evidence from ARTIST that WERNER was trying to find someone else in the Peninsula who could maintain the contact with PUPPET in substitution for HAMLET.
It is a matter of conjecture whether the Abwehr will in the future continue to place any reliance on PUPPET, and, if so, for how long.
As long as they are prepared to believe in threats to the Pas de Calais and Norway we obviously do not wish to take any step which might, in the eyes of the Abwehr, throw additional doubt on PUPPET, but in my opinion PUPPET has committed himself more deeply to the cover plan for OVERLORD than other B1(a) agents, and therefore has less chance of survival if the time comes when the enemy convince themselves that threats to the Pas de Calais and Norway were deliberately exaggerated. I should myself hesitate to make any great use of PUPPET in this distinct field of deception for fear that he has failed to survive fresh investigations of agents which one may reasonably expect at any time now, both because of the subjection of the Abwehr to RSHA and because the Abwehr may justifiably be accused of having failed in their task of providing accurate forecasts of our invasion intentions.
I submit therefore that it is right that PUPPET should continue to send information of a not particularly deceptive character for such period as, in the opinion of SHAEF, it is desirable so as to keep alive any effect that may have already have been obtained from Plan PREMIUM, but that, in the absence of further evidence in the future, PUPPET is not a good channel for continued deception.
It would seem that the Abwehr are incapable of providing another channel of communication for PUPPET, and I can see no particular advantage in our endeavouring to provide another channel for them. HAMLET may not be the perfect post-box in Lisbon but there is no reason to think that he does not pass on communications from PUPPET to the Abwehr undeveloped, with reasonable despatch.
Apart from his function as post-box for PUPPET I can see no advantages, and several possible disadvantages, in the maintenance of contact between HAMLET and the Abwehr. HAMLET’s only direct contact with the Abwehr for a very long time past has been with Sonderfuehrer WERNER. WERNER does not seem to be a man of any great importance, and I cannot see that any information that HAMLET has obtained from WERNER is of any value, whereas some at least of the stories coming from WERNER which he has passed on have been held to be inaccurate and possible plant. It is clear beyond doubt that KO Portugal have no confidence whatever in HAMLET, and they never give him any information. There is no likelihood of his ever being given any position in any German stay-behind organisation in Portugal from which we could derive advantage. I am not sure that it has been previously reported, as it has not been carded in this office, that on 12 August 1943 KO Portugal were expressely forbidden by Eins Heer Berlin to have any contact with HAMLET, although Brussels had requested them to get in contact with him.
It was at one time suggested that HAMLET might be of some use as a channel for getting in touch with General von Falkenhausen. I cannot myself see any such channel operating. There is no reason to think that WERNER is in touch with the General, HAMLET is no longer in direct touch with Bergman, and, in any case, reports that Bergman is probably retiring or moving from Brussels. Even if Bergman continues to be concerned with the affairs previously run through Eins Heer Brussels, we would seem justified in expecting his office to be moved back into Germany proper. It seems not unlikely that even when Bergman was in Brussels his contacts with the General were only of the most formal character.
Bergman’s superior, Servaes, appears to have been on more intimate terms with the General, but HAMLET states that Servaes has retired, which is probably true as there have been no references to him on Most Secret Sources over a long period.
It will be remembered that last autumn stories appeared in the English press to the effect that a member of the General’s staff had been in Lisbon with a view to peace negotiations with the Allies. KO Portugal were asked to investigate the source of these stories, and, rightly or wrongly, KO Portugal advised Berlin on 7 October 1943 that HAMLET had been spreading these stories. (This was not carded in this office, although carded at Ryder Street, and may not previously have come to notice).
Whether or not there are any grounds for the accusation that HAMLET started these rumours, the mere fact that the accusation has been made would seem hopelessly to compromise any slight chance that might previously have existed of HAMLET’s being a suitable channel of communication to the General.
It strikes me as being possibly a little more than a coincidence that at an earlier date HAMLET had reported to us a story about an aerial attack on Gestapo Headquarters in Brussels, which story subsequently found its way into the press through the Belgian News Agency in Lisbon, but on enquiry in this country was found to be totally untrue. It seems therefore at least possible that HAMLET deliberately circulates false rumours in Lisbon.
I do not for a moment suspect HAMLET of working with the present German Government against us. On the other hand, I do not see why we should expect HAMLET to give greater weight to our interests than to his personal business interests, or such political views as he may hold. As a business man he is probably very disappointed that no commerical business has resulted from MULLET’s activities here, HAMLET is an ex-army officer and, although a Jew, probably has some of the prejudices of the German officer class. He was no doubt sincere when, at the beginning of his case, he recommended the policy of trying to persuade the German generals that Allied production was so enormous that a compromise peace was desirable. Fortunately the German generals are now receiving more direct evidence of the volume of Allied production, and I strongly suspect that HAMLET would like to see the interests of the German officer class, and of the German industrialists, preserved to a greater extent than we in this country would approve. This, if correct, m
ight not matter greatly if there were full and complete control over HAMLET’s activities, but in fact, except on the rare occasions when Major Foley visits Lisbon, there seems to be no effective attempt to direct HAMLET’s activities.
While I see no very great danger in HAMLET’s continuing to act for the time being as a cover address for PUPPET, and he may at the same time be able to provide SIS with useful information from non-Abwehr contacts in Lisbon, I cannot see that he offers the prospect of any more ambitious exploitation.
Finally it ought perhaps to be considered whether PUPPET could serve any useful purpose other than the implementation of deception. The view has sometimes been expressed that in some way use could be made of PUPPET’s personal friendship with von Falkenhausen.
I confess I do not see how this could be brought about. PUPPET has considerable social claim, and his father was a friend of the General’s, but this, while it no doubt accounts for PUPPET attending poker parties given by the General, does not necessarily mean that he could influence the General in taking a line independent of the Nazi Government. The fact that PUPPET writes letters to the Abwehr does not seem to me to make it any easier for him to get in touch with the General than for anyone else to do so. If we wish to try putting anyone else in touch with the General, the General’s nephew, who is now in this country, may be a more suitable man than PUPPET.
